This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 000634 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/ITA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PTER VM CTERR
SUBJECT:  SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE 
RESPONSES - VIETNAM 
 
REF:  STATE 28688 
 
Responses are keyed to REFTEL and include input from 
AmConGen Ho Chi Minh City. 
 
¶1.  (SBU) POLITICAL VIOLENCE - DEMONSTRATIONS 
 
1A.  NO 
1B.  YES 
1C.  YES 
1D.  :Following the initiation of hostilities in the Gulf, 
there were small street demonstrations across from mission 
facilities in both Hanoi and HCMC of about 100.  In addition 
there were also some large rallies (5,000 - 10,000), 
organized  by the government, that took place approximately 
two blocks from the Consulate.  Anti-war rallies of up to 
10,000 were also reported in the provinces. 
 
1E.  Yes, both in reaction to U.S. Congressional criticism 
of Vietnam and by U.S. Military action 
 
1F.  HANOI:  Demonstrations have been generally peaceful. 
However, a few bricks, rocks, and bottles were thrown at the 
Embassy on a couple of occasions without physical damage and 
much success of inciting violence 
 
HCMC:  Peaceful 
 
1G.  NO 
 
1H.  NO 
 
1I.  No, although there are periodic protests over land and 
other issues, they are not anti-government. 
 
1J.  NO 
 
1K.   100 people 
 
1L.   In 2003, we know of no violent demonstrations but in 
earlier years some injuries have been reported 
 
1M.  N/A 
 
¶2.  POLITICAL VIOLENCE - MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS 
 
2A.  NO 
 
2B.  N/A 
 
2C.  N/A 
 
2D.  N/A 
 
¶3.  POLITICAL VIOLENCE - HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES 
 
3A.  NO 
 
3B.  Mission encourages participation in ILEA sponsored 
courses.  However, this program reaches a very limited 
number of participants annually. 
 
3C.  YES 
 
3D.  SEE CLASSIFIED SEPTEL 
 
3E.  NO.  The relationship is mostly unilateral, see 
classified SEPTEL for additional information. 
 
3F.  N/A 
 
3G.  MIXED.  In response to specific threat information in 
September 2002, Embassy requested armed uniformed presence 
at its facilities.  The request was initially rejected, and 
as a security measure the EAC closed the Embassy and ConGen 
for several days.  Following the closure the GVN relented 
and began providing coverage for the Chancellery, Rose 
Garden Annex and the EMR.  This coverage remains to date. 
More recently, the GVN provided additional officers at the 
Embassy and Annex, and equipped them with AK-47 rifles, riot 
helmets and flack vests.  The Embassy was not advised in 
advance of the increase in security.  The rational 
eventually provided was that the increased security was for 
high profile diplomatic missions during the SEA Games. 
Shortly after the SEA Games ended, so did the additional 
coverage. 
 
3H.  POOR. While GVN security at major airports is 
insufficient (below average-poor), the CAAV shows continuing 
interest in cooperating with the USG on safety and the 
aspects of security that remain under their purview. 
Embassy has not conducted an in-depth assessment, but as 
part of the implementation of the recently approved  Air 
Transport Agreement, the CAAV is receiving USG assistance 
with safety and security reviews and training in preparation 
for assessments from the ICAO. 
 
3I.  Average.  Can be effective if they want to be, but 
riddled with corruption, hampered by lack of equipment, 
especially beyond the two major international airports in 
Hanoi and HCMC 
 
3J.   Poor 
¶4.  INDIGENOUS TERRORISM - ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS 
4A.  NO 
 
4B.  N/A 
 
4C.  N/A 
 
4D.  N/A 
 
4E.  N/A 
 
4F.  N/A 
 
4G.  N/A 
 
4H.  N/A 
 
¶5.  INDIDENOUS TERRORISM - OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS 
 
5A.  NO.  The GVN claims that there are, but the USG does 
not consider these groups to be terrorists.  These are 
usually groups of Ex-Pat Vietnamese, living in other 
countries, who criticize or even oppose the SRV. 
 
5B.  N/A 
 
5C.  N/A 
 
5D.  N/A 
 
5E.  N/A 
 
¶6.  TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM - TRANSNATIONAL TERRRORIST 
INDICATORS 
 
6A.  Not that Mission is aware of. 
 
6B.  N/A 
 
6C.  NO 
 
6D.  Not that Mission is aware of. 
 
6E.  N/A 
 
6F.  SEE CLASSIFIED SEPTEL 
 
6G.  The border is very porous and there is smuggling of 
small arms and relatively small amounts of explosives.  The 
explosives are generally intended for commercial use. 
However, the items would be available for purchase if a 
terrorist cell needed them.  Explosives have also been used 
recently, predominately in the south, as a method of 
carrying out vendettas. 
 
BURGHARDT