This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DJIBOUTI 000460 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/E, DRL HARPOLE, LABOR FOR ILAB BOB YOUNG, 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2014 
TAGS: ELAB ECON PREL PINR DJ
SUBJECT: KEEPING IT IN THE FAMILY; GUELLEH'S LABOR POLITICS 
 
REF: A. DJIBOUTI 380 
 
     ¶B. 02 DJIBOUTI 392 
     ¶C. 01 NAIROBI 2689 
     ¶D. DJIBOUTI 299 
 
Classified By: CONOFF CHASE BEAMER FOR REASON 1.4 (d) 
 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
¶1. (C) Recent worker discontent in Djibouti brings the 
spotlight back to the subject of workers' rights in this 
commercial city-state.  The International Labor Organization 
has long maligned the Government of Djibouti for its labor 
policies but clever manipulation of key players, strong arm 
tactics, and financial clout have kept a lid on this 
Pandora's box.  Moreover, the Government has instituted a 
policy in recent years to install government appointed shadow 
unions in place of freely elected labor unions, and succeeded 
in efforts to fracture and weaken the legitimate labor 
movement.  The country has witnessed worker flare-ups in two 
key sectors of the Djiboutian economy.  Either President 
Ismail Omar Guelleh wants personal political recompense for 
his intervention in those flare-ups in light of upcoming 
elections, or his circle of trust has grown small and he 
views these outbreaks as potential security threats.  End 
Summary. 
 
RECENT EVENTS 
------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Per reftel A, March 13 saw public transportation shut 
down in Djibouti as bus drivers and bus owners protested 
increased fuel prices.  Adan Abdou, elected Secretary General 
of the Djiboutian Workers Union (UDT), told Conoff that the 
bus drivers had been trying to unionize for some time but had 
been forbidden registration by the Minister of the Interior 
and had been pressured financially by bus owners to keep 
quiet.  They lost patience as they saw their profit margin 
further diminished by a 4 DF increase per liter 
(approximately US$.08 per gallon) in diesel prices. 
 
¶3. (C) President Guelleh sent a negotiating team to resolve 
the problem.  The four member team consisted of the 
President's brother, Said Omar Guelleh, the President's son, 
Liban Ismail Omar, the National Security Advisor and Chief of 
Intelligence, Hassan Said Khaireh, and one of the inner 
circle members of the elite Republican Guard, Captain Mohamed 
Djama.  Sources report that the 4 DF price increase was 
immediately repealed and that the representatives of the 
striking drivers were promised a return to 1998 fuel prices. 
Kamil Hassan, Secretary of the opposition Republican Alliance 
for Democracy (ARD), former International Visitor 
participant, and key player in the 2001 Dini-Guelleh peace 
accords, told Conoff that when the Mayor of Djibouti arrived 
at the meetings he was dismissed perfunctorily by Said Omar 
Guelleh and told to mind his own business.  The State 
newspaper, La Nation, published an article on Monday, March 
22nd titled "After the strike, Elections!"  The article went 
on to comment that "the bus workers have been in a profound 
identity crisis for years...and suffered from real anarchy" 
before closing with the line that "elections for an organized 
union within regulations will be held on Friday, the 26th of 
March." 
 
¶4. (C) Port employees report that a strike by the dock 
workers was narrowly averted this week due to the 
intervention of the Chief of Service for Human Resources 
Houssein Kasim.  Apparently tension has been brewing at the 
port between the aforementioned Said Omar Guelleh, Chief of 
Technical Service, and Dubai Ports International installed 
Director General, Dutch national Johannes De Jong.  Guelleh 
has long been recognized as the de facto manager of the port 
and is apparently bristling at some of De Jong's efforts to 
gain better control of the facility.  Workers, meanwhile, 
have a list of complaints that include the formal recognition 
of their labor union, some manner of medical and disability 
coverage, and the standardization of pay scales amongst 
different shifts.  Adan Abdou told Conoff that the workers 
were prepared to strike this week when Human Resources head 
Kasim brought it to the attention of the Director General who 
agreed to a negotiating session with the workers.  This, in 
turn, apparently irked Guelleh who preempted the Director 
General with an aside meeting with the workers on March 22 to 
address their concerns. 
 
LABOR BACKGROUND 
---------------- 
¶5. (SBU) The Government of Djibouti has a history of trade 
union repression.  The harassment of duly elected trade union 
officials as well as the establishment of shadow trade unions 
whose leaders are appointed by the government are chapters in 
what is now a decade-long saga.  The ILO has restricted 
Djibouti's access to international conferences due to the 
Government of Djibouti's interference in trade union 
formation.  Broken promises made to the ILO include 
reintegrating fired union members into their state positions 
and halting interference in union affairs with the creation 
of shadow unions. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Per Reftels B and C, in 1999 the Government of 
Djibouti disbanded the duly elected Union Djiboutienne du 
Travail (UDT, Djiboutian Workers Union) and Union Generale 
Djiboutienne du Travail (UGDT, General Union of Djiboutian 
Workers) and held a shadow congress which elected 
representatives recognized by the Government.  According to 
the "old" (read legitimate) UDT, those active in unions are 
regularly harassed and fear for their jobs and the safety of 
their families. 
 
¶7. (SBU) At the end of September 2002 after pressure from the 
ICFTU and the USG (including discussions of workers' rights 
provisions under AGOA) the UDT (the largest national trade 
union Congress with 21 affiliates) was permitted to hold a 
free congress for elections.  This congress was composed of 
both the "real" UDT and the Government "shadow" UDT.  Ahmed 
Djama Egueh and Adan Mohamed Abdou were elected as President 
and Secretary General, respectively.  One month later, 
elements of the Government held a second congress and 
appointed Said Mamoud Hassan, the Minister of Labor's cousin, 
as the President of a "shadow" UDT. 
 
¶8. (C) Most recently, according to UDT Secretary Sulaiman 
Djama, the Government claimed that UDT Secretary General 
Abdou must step down due to his role as a ranking member of 
an opposition party.  In July of 2003 the elected President 
of the UDT made a private accord with President Guelleh 
stipulating that if Abdou was removed from UDT office the 
Government would permit all of those union members who had 
previously been fired from their jobs for union activity to 
be rehired.  This would occur despite Government officials 
having already committed to these actions in previous 
negotiations with the ILO.  Abdou was publicly removed by the 
UDT President after a press release made by Egueh. 
Unfortunately for Egueh, none of the UDT member 
representation accept his move and while Abdou still sits for 
meetings, Egueh has been isolated.  No one has been 
reemployed.  The movement is fractured however, which may 
ultimately have been President Guelleh's goal. 
 
GOVERNMENT VIEW 
--------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) The Minister for Employment and National Solidarity 
Mohamed Barkat Abdillahi told Regional LaborOff in October, 
2003 that the only two legitimate unions in Djibouti were 
those elected in 1999 in the "First congress where leaders 
who truly represent workers took control," and those that 
were again re-elected in October 2002. (Note: the Government 
called both of these congresses and hand picked the 
"election" winners. End Note)  The Minister believes that he 
has good relations with both unions and with the employers 
association (Note: He is one of the largest employers as he 
owns a large insurance company, AMERGA and a construction 
company, Concorde).  The Minister claims that the rights of 
unions have always existed in Djibouti and that the main 
problem he faces is that certain union leaders want to remain 
in power forever irrespective of the wishes of the workers. 
He also said that he "deplores the attitude of the ICFTU-AFRO 
for its archaic and colonialist attitude that supports those 
who want to hold onto power." 
 
¶10. (SBU) Regarding the Government's desire to have UDT 
Secretary General Abdou step down, the Minister quoted 
 
SIPDIS 
Article 31 of the UDT Constitution as saying that leaders of 
the union cannot also be political leaders. UDT 
representatives interpret Article 31 of their constitution to 
read that no UDT official can hold public office and UDT 
office simultaneously.  They point to January, 2003 
legislative elections when their second secretary was elected 
to Parliament on the Rassemblement Populaire pour le Progres 
(RPP) ballot and subsequently stepped down from his UDT post. 
 Only after his election to Parliament did this RPP official 
resign his UDT post implying that Secretary General Abdou 
need not resign his UDT post simply because he is a ranking 
member of the opposition ARD. 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶11. (C) The impact of USG demarches threatening the 
withdrawal of AGOA participation for Djibouti have had little 
effect on their labor policy as Djibouti does not take 
advantage of AGOA benefits.  The USG would have to leverage 
its other interests in Djibouti in order to have any real 
impact on Djibouti's abysmal labor record.  More interesting 
than the standard poor worker conditions in Djibouti however 
is the choice of mediators recently employed by President 
Guelleh.  One has to wonder why two members of his immediate 
family, his Director of National Security, and one of his 
personal "heavies" would be asked to intervene in an affair 
as mundane as a public transportation strike.  Perhaps 
Guelleh is losing confidence in his cabinet's ability to 
direct effective policy or, more likely, he is looking for 
clear lines of credit to interest groups that he can cash in 
when Presidential elections occur in 2005.  A third 
possibility is that with the recent discontent in his armed 
forces (see reftel d) he wanted to silence trouble quickly 
and thus sent in the big guns.  End Comment. 
RAGSDALE