This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001295 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SR ZL EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: SERB PM KOSTUNICA VISITS EU; SOLANA AND PATTEN'S 
"DISAPPOINTING" TRIP TO KOSOVO 
 
REF: BELGRADE 646 
 
Classified By: Rick Holtzapple, PolOff, Reasons 1.4 (B/D) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) Our readout of Serb PM Kostunica's March 23 meetings 
in Brussels with High Rep Solana, and Commissioners Prodi and 
Patten tracks closely with reftel account from Belgrade.  In 
addition, Kostunica is reported to have hinted at the 
possibility of a "quiet dialogue" with ICTY, claimed to be 
open to cooperation with Defense Minister Tadic, and was 
upbeat on the future of the State Union with Montenegro. 
Separately, Solana and Patten are reported to have been "very 
disappointed" by their March 24 visit to Kosovo, with 
disparaging assessments of both UNMIK SRSG Holkeri and most 
of the Kosovar Albanian leadership, save PM Rexhepi.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
KOSTUNICA VISIT 
---------------- 
 
¶2. (C) KOSOVO:   Solana did prompt Kostunica to change his 
terminology about Kosovo from "cantonization" to 
"decentralization".  (NOTE: At the March 23 Contact Group 
meeting, which was held just after Solana's meetings with 
Kostunica, there was general agreement that a further shift 
in language away from "decentralization" to discussion of 
"increasing powers of local government" would be desirable. 
END NOTE.) 
 
¶3. (C) ICTY: Both Solana and Commissioner Patten were clear 
that it was up to Belgrade to improve its relations with the 
court.  According to our contacts, Kostunica's reply stressed 
not only the need to support domestic trials and repetitions 
of demands for an undefined "two-way street", but he also 
acknowledge the need to engage with ICTY and claimed Belgrade 
was "already thinking about a 'quiet dialogue'." 
 
¶4. (C) SERBIAN POLITICS:  Kostunica told both Patten and 
Solana that he remains open to working with Defense Minister 
Tadic and that they have a good working relationship.  But 
Kostunica was uncertain what sort of deal could be reached 
and implied that any difficulties lay with Tadic and his 
party, not on Kostunica's side.  With Patten, Kostunica was 
also reported to be quite clear that he was not interested in 
running for President, a development that worries the 
Commission, as they feel this will leave the field open for 
the Radicals.  Finally, Kostunia was upbeat on prospects for 
the State Union, as he claimed Milo Djukanovic's political 
position in Montenegro was weakening, forcing him to 
cooperate more with Belgrade.  Neither Patten nor Solana were 
persuaded by Kostunica's analysis. 
 
¶5. (C) Kostunica's team did not earn very favorable reviews 
from either Solana or Patten's staffs.  Trade Minister Bubalo 
received curiously mixed reviews: Solana's staff found him a 
rather "concrete" guy with some new ideas.  But in the Patten 
meeting, where trade issues (related to the EU's concerns on 
customs fraud) were actually discussed, Bubalo was 
"unimpressive and basically had nothing to say." 
 
SOLANA/PATTEN VISIT TO KOSOVO 
----------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Patten's staff told us both Patten and Solana returned 
from their one-day visit to Kosovo on March 24 "very 
disappointed".  Other than sessions with the German commander 
of KFOR and USOP COM Marcie Ries, the EU officials found 
their meetings in Pristina rather discouraging.  UNMIK SRSG 
Holkeri was described to us as a "disaster" who gave a 
"lamentable performance" in his meeting with Solana and 
Patten.  Particularly galling to Solana and Patten was when 
they were confronted by angry Serb civilians in the town of 
Kosovo Polje, Holkeri "just sat in his car" and then 
criticized Solana and Patten for taking risks by talking to 
the crowd.  Solana and Patten were also highly critical of 
most of the Kosovar Albanian leaders they met, whose 
statements about the recent violence were entirely 
inadequate.  Ibrahim Rugova reportedly prompted particular 
disdain ("Solana even refused to accept his rocks") for his 
weak excuses that he could do little to stop the violence 
because he did not control the police. 
 
¶7. (C) By contrast, Solana and Patten were favorably 
impressed by their meeting with PM Rexhepi.  He was "miles 
ahead of the others" in terms of understanding and accepting 
his political responsiblities in the current situation.  In 
this context, they took seriously Rexhepi's plea for caution 
when pressing for punishment of the villians in last week's 
events, even if they were not completely convinced by his 
arguments. 
 
SCHNABEL