This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

251054Z Mar 04

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BRUSSELS 001274 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/RSA; DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS USAID FOR 
AFR, DCHA AND PPC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF EAID PHUM XA EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: TRANSATLANTIC CONSULTATIONS ON AFRICA HIGHLIGHT 
PEACEKEEPING AND POST-CONFLICT EFFORTS 
 
REF: STATE 53747 
 
Classified By: PRMOFF MARC J. MEZNAR.  REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D) 
 
¶1. (U) Summary.  Major topics of discussion at the 
transatlantic consultations on Africa (COAFR), held March 10 
in Brussels, included:  support to peacekeeping and conflict 
prevention activities, including the EU's proposed Africa 
Peace Facility and U.S. support to ECOWAS through EUCOM; 
political developments in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), Uganda, Zimbabwe and Guinea; post-conflict needs in 
Liberia; peace processes in Sudan and Burundi; the boundary 
dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and humanitarian 
concerns related to food insecurity and the bombing of 
civilians in the Darfur region.  The U.S. and EU agreed on 
most issues.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------ 
Participants 
------------------------ 
 
¶2. (U) EU participants included: Nicholas O'Brien, Director 
General for African Affairs (MFA) and Pat Kelly, Deputy 
Director General for African Affairs (MFA) for the Irish 
Presidency; Ambassador Aldo Ajello, EU Special Envoy for the 
Great Lakes; Peter Clausen and Genoveva Hernandez, Africa 
Desk Officers for the EU Council Secretariat; Anders 
Henriksson, Director for the Horn, East and Southern Africa 
(DG DEV), Peter Christiansen, Head of Unit for Central Africa 
(DG DEV), and Andreas Fischer-Barnicol (DG RELEX) for the 
European Commission (EC); and Norbert Braakhuis, Deputy 
Director, Africa (MFA) for the incoming Dutch Presidency. 
USDEL consisted of Ambassador Pamela Bridgewater (Deputy 
Assistant Secretary, AF), William Schofield (Deputy Director, 
AF/Regional Affairs), Patricia Lerner (Development Counselor, 
USEU/USAID), and Marc Meznar (Political Officer, USEU/PRM). 
 
------------------------ 
Peacekeeping and Conflict Prevention: Shared Priorities 
------------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) The Irish Presidency reviewed the status of the Africa 
Peace Facility (APF), which O'Brien characterized as an 
"exciting new dimension of development and political policy," 
and said that he expected it to be operational before the end 
of June.  He noted that although "African ownership" of the 
APF was important, the EU needed to maintain adequate 
oversight of this 250 million euro funding mechanism. 
Henriksson added that the EU was not seeking to take over the 
African Union (AU) peacekeeping initiatives, but rather 
sought to show solidarity with them by establishing the APF. 
Presently, the EU is finalizing its internal discussion on 
the nature and scope of the APF.  According to Henriksson, 
this includes determining:  1) how South Africa and north 
African countries who are AU members, but not beneficiaries 
of the European Development Fund (from which the EU is 
drawing financial support for the APF), can be incorporated 
into this initiative; 2) how the APF will relate to future 
European security and defense operations in Africa (such as 
the recent Operation Artemis in the DRC); and 3) how the APF 
will relate to and support UN and regional peacekeeping 
initiatives.  Henriksson mentioned that other lingering EU 
concerns about the APF relate to the AU's inability to 
effectively manage funds, as well as the lack of military 
expertise necessary to assess situations and decide on 
logistical needs for each APF deployment. 
 
¶4. (C) The U.S. welcomed the EU plan to support peacekeeping 
in Africa and asked whether APF-supported deployments would 
act as bridge operations until UN peacekeepers could arrive 
or whether they would remain deployed until stabilization had 
been achieved.  Henriksson said that although both short-term 
and long-term deployments were envisioned, at present only 
bridging exercises could realistically be expected.  Ajello 
pointed out that 250 million euros was "peanuts" and said the 
APF deployments should be limited to bridging gaps -- that 
the AU should not try to duplicate UNPKOs.  He also suggested 
that the best APF forces deployed by the AU could be 
integrated into follow-on UNPKO operations. 
 
¶5. (C) When asked whether the APF would engage in any 
capacity enhancement initiatives, Henriksson said that at 
present this would be overly ambitious, but did not rule it 
out.  He spoke of triangular cooperation between the EU, AU 
and UN in both capacity building and conflict prevention 
activities.  He noted there was a common EU position on 
conflict prevention and said that the actual equipment, 
training and logistical support had to come from the Member 
States (not the EC).  By mid-March, the EU should complete a 
comprehensive work plan which will include coordination with 
UNPKO.  Henriksson requested a POC in Washington for 
transatlantic coordination and Bridgewater suggested Mike 
Bittrick of AF/RSA. 
 
------------------------ 
DRC: Kabila's Mistakes 
------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) In his opening remarks, O'Brien stated that the dates 
for the Great Lakes Conference had slipped  and probably 
could not take place before November 2005.  He also 
highlighted the need for the Kabila government to regularize 
its diplomatic relations with both Uganda and Rwanda.  Ajello 
said that despite President Kabila's resistance to better 
relations with his eastern neighbors, the EU should use its 
clout with Kabila to impress on him the importance of 
diplomatic ties.  He also said the U.S. and EU should work 
together to put pressure on Uganda, perhaps using aid to curb 
involvement in the affairs of the DRC.  Braakuis pointed out 
that both Uganda and Rwanda's ambassadors are awaiting 
accreditation even though, in Uganda's case, the appointment 
was made over a year ago. 
 
¶7. (C) Ajello described Kabila as better than his father, but 
still error prone.  He cited the letter Kabila wrote to 
Parliament and made public (characterized by Ajello as 
"insulting"), his decision to ask the Supreme Court about his 
prerogative to appoint members to the Independent Electoral 
Commission (IEC) and the Bokab crisis caused by his decision 
to order an arrest outside the chain of command.  Ajello also 
expressed concern over the integration of the army (i.e., the 
lack of a legal basis), problems with the police, and the 
bureaucracy put in place by the government to implement DDR 
(in order to tap into international funds for this activity). 
 Ajello also wondered whether MONUC could monitor control of 
the main mines and said that this could be discussed in the 
UN Security Council as this type of monitoring was not 
currently in its mandate. 
 
¶8. (C) Bridgewater said that the U.S. shared the EU's major 
concerns and stated that financial management was key.  She 
supported SRSG Swing's recent suggestion that consideration 
be given to having a "strategic budget review" to address 
financial shortfalls.  Christiansen noted that the DRC did 
not have money to support the upcoming elections.  He 
recommended that the international community work together to 
make sure a framework was in place for the elections, as well 
as on financing for it.  Lerner said that USAID is also 
supporting the IEC with training and other technical support. 
 
------------------------ 
Burundi: Dutch Mediation Positive 
------------------------ 
 
¶9. (C) O'Brien noted the positive developments in Burundi, 
lamenting that the death of the Irish-born papal nuncio had 
been a catalyst in this regard.  Ajello said that the GoB's 
demobilization plans did not go far enough.  He thought it 
was ridiculous to integrate all ex-combatants into an army of 
80,000 and then start to demobilize them.    He also noted 
that the 36 million dollar price tag for this phase of 
demobilization (of the aged, children and disabled) was very 
high and that most donors would refuse to pay army salaries. 
Christiansen recommended that funds for training should be 
restricted to civilians and said he hoped demobilization 
would take place before the elections. 
 
¶10. (C) Braakhuis gave a read-out on the Netherlands' 
initiative to sponsor talks between the GoB and FNL.  He said 
that it was very difficult to work with the FNL because of 
their ideological mindset, but within the CNLD there was 
great respect for the FNL as the godfather of Hutu resistance 
to Tutsi domination.  Regarding violence, Braakhuis said that 
he felt the FNL would respond to a ceasefire if there were 
pressure put on both sides.  He said that minimum security 
guarantees needed to be in place before the FNL rebels would 
agree to attend a conference; Braakhuis worried that the 
President did not have a grip on the armed forces.  According 
to Braakhuis, the FNL wants attention, but establishing a 
parallel process could kill the peace in Burundi. 
Bridgewater commended the Netherlands for this initiative and 
said the U.S. would press for FNL to participate in a 
dialogue with the GoB. 
 
¶11. (C) Regarding AMIB, Christiansen said EC funding should 
enable the deployment to last until at least May or June.  He 
noted that if a UNPKO would take over earlier than that date 
(perhaps by April), the EC would return the left over funding 
to the Burundi development accounts which had been used to 
support AMIB.  The U.S. noted that estimates of over 6000 for 
the PKO seemed too high.  Ajello replied that he thought the 
force could be the current AMIB force of about 2800 plus a 
headquarters element.  Both Christiansen and the Irish 
Presidency noted the importance of upcoming elections. 
 
------------------------ 
East Africa: Concern Over Regional Problems 
------------------------ 
 
¶12. (C) The Irish Presidency underscored EU concern over the 
border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea saying that it 
had carried on longer than expected but that the EU had no 
bright ideas.  The EU planned to send a ministerial-level 
Troika to the region in early April.  The  message to the two 
parties would be that the decision of the boundary commission 
was final and that both countries must cooperate with Lloyd 
Axworthy, and that the EU does not view his appointment as an 
alternative negotiating mechanism.  The US thanked the EU for 
this effort, noting that this was consistent with the 
position of  the U.S.  Henriksson urged the U.S. to use its 
clout to influence the government in Addis.  Schofield said 
the U.S. was in contact with the GoE, but cautioned that 
since U.S. relations with Eritrea were "strained" we had to 
be careful not to give the impression that the U.S. was 
siding with Ethiopia in this dispute. 
 
¶13. (C) Regarding food issues, Lerner said that the U.S. and 
EU had developed good transatlantic cooperation in the area 
of short term food aid and long term food security, but that 
another food shortfall was expected this May in Ethiopia. 
Bridgewater noted that to date only 20% of WFP's appeal has 
been pledged and that the food pipeline had broken in 
February.  Henriksson replied that the EC was supporting the 
agricultural sector, but that a feudal system which tied 
people to the land was causing the vulnerability and that the 
Ethiopian government was not relaxing these policies. 
 
¶14. (C) Bridgewater briefed the EU on EACTI, stating East 
Africa was the most important region on the continent for 
counter terrorism activities.  She explained that EACTI was a 
15-month  program which included training for law enforcement 
and judicial authorities, the strengthening of financial 
institutions, and support for border and coastal security. 
She said a conference would be hosted in Kampala this April 
to plan next steps, including possible expansion of the 
program to Madagascar, the Comoros Islands and Yemen. 
Christiansen noted that terrorist financing also comes from 
the mining of tanzanlite and asked whether the recent closing 
of Islamist organizations was connected to USG initiatives. 
Schofield said that EACTI was designed to strengthen regional 
capabilities and not conduct operational activities.   Lerner 
noted the option for donors to invest in secular educational 
opportunities as an alternative to Islamist madrassas. 
 
------------------------ 
Sudan: Darfur and Navaisha both Precarious 
------------------------ 
 
¶15. (C) O'Brien expressed "grave concern" over the 
deteriorating situation in Darfur, citing the 100,000 
refugees in Chad and 800,000 IDPs.  He informed the U.S. that 
the Government of Sudan had just agreed to U.S.-EU monitoring 
of mediation talks planned for next week and said the EU 
intended to participate.  Objectives of this mediation 
include a ceasefire and increased humanitarian access. 
(Background: UN Special Envoy Tom Vraalsen was in Brussels on 
March 8 and informed the EU of his efforts to involve 
President Deby of Chad to mediate between the GoS and rebels 
active in Darfur.  Besides the humanitarian toll in the 
region, Vraalsen expressed concern for the environmental 
degradation caused by over-grazing and digging wells to water 
herds of cattle.  He invited the EU to participate in this 
mediation effort and said he also intended to invite the U.S. 
 End Note.)   When asked about a possible joint statement on 
Darfur, O'Brien said that he preferred to wait to see what 
might happen with this new mediation effort.  In any case, he 
agreed that it was important for the U.S. and EU to "sing off 
the same hymn sheet" and that we should stay in touch. 
 
¶16. (C) Regarding a possible Human Rights Commission (UNCHR) 
resolution about the bombing of civilian populations in 
Darfur, O'Brien said he had learned that the GoS would not 
cooperate with even an Item 19 resolution.  He thought, 
therefore, that the EU might pursue an Item 9 resolution, 
falling back to an Item 19 if necessary.  Both the Irish 
Presidency and the incoming Dutch Presidency noted the Africa 
voting block in the UNCHR would serve to keep the pressure 
off Sudan.  Schofield stated that the U.S. would like to 
support a strong Item 9 resolution.  Braakhuis noted that the 
GoS has become accustomed to the pressure of the 
international community and it has not always had a positive 
impact.  Henriksson also noted that the EC's engagement with 
the GoS has resulted in "very unsatisfactory meetings," 
particularly with regard to the humanitarian crisis in 
Darfur. 
 
¶17. (C) Braakhuis said he was worried that the situation in 
Darfur could complicate the Naivasha talks.  He noted there 
were a number of pending issues and wondered what the "end 
game" was for Sudan.  Bridgewater said the Acting Assistant 
Secretary was in Naivasha for the talks and reported positive 
 
SIPDIS 
movement.  She said the U.S. supported the inclusion of Abyei 
in the south.  Regarding a timeline, she said the U.S. had 
hoped for an agreement by the end of last year, but that it 
was up to the interested parties to finalize the negotiations 
and reach a comprehensive settlement. 
 
------------------------ 
Uganda: LRA vs. Museveni 
------------------------ 
 
¶18. (C) Regarding the situation in northern Uganda, O'Brien 
noted that the LRA had a base in Sudan.  Schofield said that 
the GoS had said it had stopped supporting the LRA, and he 
noted the LRA was on the U.S. terrorism exclusion list. 
Bridgewater said that although the U.S. supported the GoU's 
struggle against the LRA, a political solution was required, 
not a military one.  Schofield also pointed out that the GoU 
was buying weapons of no particular use, such as jets and 
other high technology equipment.  He called for more 
transparency regarding Uganda's military budget.  Braakhuis 
commented on the GoU's call to have the International 
Criminal Court investigate the LRA leadership and questioned 
what impact this might have on a negotiated settlement.  He 
said there were indications the LRA was getting stronger and 
mentioned a UK defense review undertaken by DFID which might 
recommend that the strength of the Ugandan military be 
increased by one third.  Braakhuis said this would further 
complicate the situation in Uganda.  Both the U.S. and EU 
supported the current presidential term limits and felt 
President Museveni should step down at the end of his term. 
 
------------------------ 
West Africa:  Next steps for Liberia, Guinea and ECOWAS 
------------------------ 
 
¶19. (C) Bridgewater reported that a DoS/DoD mission had been 
undertaken to Liberia to assess military needs and 
recommended a merit based military that could protect its 
borders, including fishing resources along its coasts.  She 
said that support to the financial sector was crucial and 
that the interim government lacked transparency.  She called 
for more "economic boots on the ground" and said that the 
U.S. Treasury Department would be sending personnel to assist 
Liberian authorities. 
 
¶20. (SBU) Christiansen said that the 9 million euros (of the 
total 160 million euros pledge for Liberia) would be 
designated for technical support to and audits of key 
financial institution, 16 million euros for DDR activities, 
18 million euros for local community development (including 
reintegration of refugees, IDPs and ex-combatants); 8 million 
euros to support ECOWAS, and 55 million euros probably for 
health and education.  He added that 50 million euros were 
ready to spend and that a plan was being drafted for the 
remainder.  O'Brien noted that Ireland had also made 5 
million euros available bilaterally for Liberia to support 
good governance, health and education. 
 
¶21. (C) Bridgewater said that the U.S., through EUCOM, would 
build capacity of ECOWAS by conducting training and joint 
exercises to support rapid deployments and would enhance 
communications networks in the region.  She also described 
initiatives to support ECOWAS headquarters in Abuja, 
including efforts to attract the best African military 
personnel (through improved housing and other benefits). 
Christiansen said that ECOWAS was clearly better now than ten 
years ago, but agreed that it still needed strengthening. 
Fischer-Barnicol added that good support at the head of state 
level for ECOWAS did not translate to improvements in the 
organization's bureaucracy.  He said the ECOWAS' mission was 
not always clear and that only 10% of the EC's pledge for 
Liberia would be earmarked for peacekeeping.  (Note.  At a 
separate meeting at DG DEV, the EC expressed dissatisfaction 
with Francis Blaine for not being proactive and said that the 
EC was considering cutting its financial support for the 
ECOWAS office in Liberia.  End Note.) 
 
¶22. (C) Henriksson asked whether ECOWAS was becoming a victim 
of its own success and cautioned against overextending the 
organization.  He noted that although the peace/security 
sectors were dynamic, ECOWAS was structured to support 
economic growth.  Bridgewater shared this concern and agreed 
that the organization should not be diverted from its 
economic foundation by trying to be "all things to all 
people." 
 
¶23. (C) Bridgewater stated that expanding the scope of the 
International Contact Group on Liberia to include Guinea had 
merit.  She said the U.S. was concerned about a deterioration 
of the social and economic conditions in Guinea and opposed 
the military stepping in when Presidente Conte left office. 
She said the GoG needed to begin a dialogue with the 
opposition and the country also needed an independent media. 
 
¶24. (C) O'Brien stated that the EU was considering engaging 
Guinea in an "article 96" dialogue (of the Cotonou agreement) 
in which the GoG would come to Brussels and lay out their 
reform agenda.  The dialogue would continue for three months 
and at the end, the EU would decide whether to expand it to a 
regular, on-going "article 8" dialogue or end it for lack of 
substantive progress in Guinea.  Christiansen added that the 
EU has asked for the following items to be on the article 96 
agenda:  1) an independent body to supervise elections; 2) 
liberalization of the airwaves; and 3) measures to reverse 
the deterioration of the macro-economic climate. 
Christiansen noted that the December 2003 election had added 
to the further deterioration in Guinea and that the 
president's illness had basically halted the decision making 
process.  The EC's development assistance is frozen.  Lerner 
noted that USAID still has a $21 million assistance budget 
for Guinea, including programs to address AIDS, 
democracy/governance, education and agriculture. 
 
------------------------ 
Zimbabwe: No Bright Solutions 
------------------------ 
 
¶25. (C) Bridgewater made many of the points contained in 
reftel demarche about the continuing political impasse and 
the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Zimbabwe.  She 
welcomed the EU's renewal and expansion of targeted sanctions 
and stressed the critical importance of urging the GoZ to 
establish a meaningful dialogue with the opposition parties. 
Responding to a question from the Irish Presidency about U.S. 
sanctions, Bridgewater stated that they included some 
businesses that were owned and/or operated by senior ZANU-PF 
figures.  O'Brien said that the EU had considered similar 
provisions but had concluded that they were inoperable.  He 
also said the EU did not favor general economic sanctions 
that would affect the population.  Henriksson noted that 
there was a lack of understanding among Zimbabwean citizens 
about the EU's sanctions, with many believing them to be 
comprehensive instead of targeted.  Bridgewater responded 
that public diplomacy was critical and that many people were 
surprised that the U.S. still was giving $380 million for 
humanitarian assistance in Zimbabwe.  Lerner reviewed the 
various humanitarian needs, including the HIV/AIDS pandemic, 
drought in the region, unemployment and a contracting 
economy.  O'Brien noted that the parallel dollar economy was 
thriving.  Henriksson said that the EC had allocated 20 
million euros for food needs until May, but no further 
funding was available.  He also said that the GoZ had not 
requested more food aid and that if they did there was a risk 
of politicized distribution for electoral gains. 
 
¶26. (C) Regarding a UNCHR resolution, O'Brien said that 
Mugabe had been successful in convincing his counterparts in 
Africa that he was engaging in an anti-colonial struggle and 
that African governments were not responsive to critical 
resolutions.  Bridgewater encouraged the EU to consult with 
South Africa, Nigeria and other African members of the 
Commission before pursuing a resolution. 
 
------------------------ 
Comment 
------------------------ 
 
¶27. (SBU)  The Irish Presidency's pledge to make Africa one 
of its top priorities was evidenced at the COAFR discussions. 
 Irish engagement in reconstructing Liberia and in finalizing 
decisions related to the APF peacekeeping facility are two 
examples of the Presidency's leadership being instrumental in 
achieving goals supported by the U.S.  Dutch leadership in 
Burundi and Sudan peace negotiations bode well for continued 
transatlantic cooperation in the second semester of 2004. 
 
 
(Ambassador Bridgewater has cleared this message.) 
 
SCHNABEL