This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001119 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/ERA AND EAP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2014 
TAGS: PREL KNNP KN EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: DG COOPER ON DPRK: EU READY TO HELP WHEN TIME IS 
RIGHT 
 
REF: BRUSSELS 1081 
 
Classified By: USEU Poloff Van Reidhead for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) Visiting EAP PDAS Donald Keyser met with Council DG 
for External Relations Robert Cooper March 5 on the margins 
of semestral troika consultations with the EU (reftel). 
Cooper expressed satisfaction with the slow but steady 
progress in the Six Party process and offered the EU's 
assistance both in support of the process (i.e. to deliver 
any messages) and afterward (i.e. when the time comes for 
European aid and trade incentives).  (COMMENT: We believe the 
Department should bear Cooper's offer -- conveyed also by 
regional directors at the troika -- in mind as the Six Party 
process moves forward.  Multiple avenues for EU support 
exist, from political declarations to economic carrots when 
the time is right -- all in consultation with the U.S.  END 
COMMENT.)  Cooper drew a parallel between the North Korea and 
Iran, saying that in both cases the trend lines looked 
positive, if halting.  And he suggested that the lessons of 
the Iraq war were helping to curb the Libyan, Iranian and 
Pakistani WMD programs, and hopefully also the DPRK program. 
North Korea seems increasingly interested in aid and trade 
issues, he said, and in dealings with the EU has been less 
preoccupied by the old insistence on U.S. security 
guarantees.  The EU will convene an economic reform seminar 
in Pyongyang in April.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (U) Accompanying Cooper were Council Secretariat DPRK Desk 
Director Antonio Tanca and China Desk Director Ana Ramirez. 
USEU DCM Jim Foster and USEU poloff also attended. 
 
¶3. (C) Cooper opened by assessing that efforts in North Korea 
"do not seem to be going badly now."  He said that in 
retrospect, the war in Iraq might have been a good thing from 
the nonproliferation perspective because it appeared to be 
having a powerful and positive impact on Libyan, Iranian and 
Pakistani WMD programs.  Hopefully it was having a similar 
impact on North Korea, he said.  Keyser agreed that the 
Coalition resolve in Iraq was having an effect on 
proliferating states, and added that the Libyan and Khan 
events were potentially instructive for and manifestly 
troubling to the DPRK, despite its insistence otherwise. 
 
¶4. (C) Cooper said the U.S. "strategy of calm patience" in 
the face of North Korea's "panicky attempts to provoke a 
crisis" seemed to have worked.  The slow, deliberate pace of 
the Six Party process was probably a good thing, he said, 
because it had the effect of lowering temperatures and 
dampening North Korea's heated rhetoric.  "It can't be called 
a success story," he continued, "but it could be a lot 
worse."  He also drew a parallel between the DPRK and Iran, 
"where the process is not entirely successful but where slow 
steady trend lines have emerged."  (COMMENT: Cooper's 
repeatedly expressed satisfaction with the Six Party Process 
was probably intended as a subtle message that the patient 
and unified-multilateral-front approach to North Korea might 
usefully serve as a model for dealing with other 
proliferating states, e.g. Iran.  END COMMENT.) 
 
¶5. (C) As evidence that tensions were waning, Tanca cited a 
recent meeting in Brussels between EU WMD Rep Giannella and a 
DPRK official, in which the official "barely mentioned" the 
North Korean goal of obtaining security guarantees from the 
U.S.  This was a new dynamic, Cooper and Tanca said, which 
was also reflected in the DPRK's growing interest in engaging 
the EU on aid and trade issues.  Keyser agreed that the Six 
Party Talks have pushed the North Koreans to focus more on 
their core interests -- i.e. economic and regime security -- 
and less on their earlier insistence on U.S. or multilateral 
security guarantees.  Tanca said the heads of EU member state 
delegations in North Korea, in coordination with the 
Commission, were organizing a seminar on economic reform in 
Pyongyang, tentatively scheduled for April 27 - May 1. 
 
¶6. (C) Cooper said the EU would continue delivering a strong 
message of support for the Six Party Talks in all dealings 
with North Korean officials.  He added, "if at any time you 
think there is some way we can deliver a message, or think of 
some message we can send, let us know."  Keyser responded 
that the U.S. appreciated the EU's support for the process 
and that we would consult more as/when the time drew near for 
the EU to have a greater role.  For now, the focus needed to 
remain squarely on the goal of "complete, verifiable and 
irreversible dismantlement" (CVID) of North Korea's nuclear 
weapons program, including its clandestine HEU program. 
Cooper agreed, and said that the EU had no desire to see the 
process rushed.  Just "let us know when you think we should 
get involved," he said, "we'll be ready once things are 
resolved and you begin talking economics and assistance." 
 
¶7. (C) Tanca said also that the EU would introduce a 
resolution on North Korea at the UNCHR this year.  Keyser 
urged the EU to consult closely with South Korea on the draft 
resolution.  Cooper said they would (although it was clear in 
the meeting that the EU had not previously thought about 
consulting South Korea). 
 
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Comment: Considering the EU Offer 
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¶8. (C) Cooper's message that the EU would like to help when 
the time came was reinforced by points made earlier in the 
day by a regional directors-level troika during U.S.-EU 
consultations on Asia.  At that meeting, EU interlocutors 
expressed gratitude at the U.S. effort to keep the EU in the 
loop about progress in the Six Party Talks and reiterated the 
EU desire to help when the time comes.  This willingness to 
help on our (or Six Party) terms -- conveyed at multiple 
levels and with an unobtrusive openness -- contrasts sharply 
with the EU's irritation last year at feeling left out of the 
whole process, particularly with regard to KEDO.  The EU's 
standing offer should be kept in mind as the Six Party 
process advances.  While the time for European carrots may 
not have yet arrived, perhaps there are other things the EU 
could do to support the process in the near term.  For 
example, we could talk to the EU about drafting a high-level 
declaration of support for the Six Party Talks, which could 
include strong, even conditional language on the need for 
CVID.  We could maximize the impact of such a declaration by 
suggesting and consulting on its language and timing.  Other 
options exist as well and should be carefully examined.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
¶9. (U) PDAS Keyser has cleared this message. 
 
Foster