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Viewing cable 04BRUSSELS1081, US-EU COASI CONSULTATIONS PART 1: EAST ASIA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04BRUSSELS1081 2004-03-15 08:02 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brussels
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 001081 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/ERA AND EAP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2014 
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP CH ID BM KN ASEAN EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: US-EU COASI CONSULTATIONS PART 1: EAST ASIA 
 
Classified By: USEU Poloff Van Reidhead for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C) On March 5 in Brussels, SA A/S Rocca and EAP PDAS 
Keyser -- accompanied by USEU DCM Foster -- discussed US-EU 
cooperation in South and East Asia with the EU's COASI 
Troika.  This cable covers the EAP portion of the 
consultations.  The SA segment will be reported septel. 
 
-- Indonesia: EU concerned about lack of progress on Aceh and 
Papua; will send 200 observers for April and July elections; 
interested in coordinating with U.S. on education reform; 
Dutch will use EU Presidency to enhance EU support for reform 
and moderate Islam. 
 
-- Burma: EU stuck between wanting to take firmer action and 
doubts about effectiveness of sanctions; unsure whether 
Burmese membership in ARF would be good or bad; will reduce 
engagement with ASEAN when Burma assumes chair. 
 
-- ASEAN/ARF: EU wants to engage more with ASEAN/ARF and 
member states, which could pave way for eventual EU-ASEAN or 
intra-ASEAN FTA; will decrease direct assistance to ASEAN in 
favor of cooperating on more equal footing. 
 
-- China: EU moving rapidly to improve and deepen relations, 
but remains concerned about human rights; series of high 
level visits will culminate in November summit; EU well aware 
of U.S. views on arms embargo and keen to avoid transatlantic 
fallout. 
 
-- DPRK: EU grateful for readouts on Six Party Talks; stands 
ready to help when and as determined by U.S. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Indonesia: Aceh, Papua, Elections, Education, Timor 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
2. (SBU) Leading for the EU, Dutch Asia Director Robert 
Milders said that the EU continues to press Jakarta for more 
transparency on Aceh, including easier access for NGO's.  The 
EU is also increasingly concerned that Indonesia is not 
following through on its pledge to allow greater autonomy in 
Papua.  The EU will send 200 observers, 64 of whom will be 
"long-term," to the April (parliamentary) and July 
(presidential) elections, Milders said, and will examine the 
calendar for the best time to send a Ministerial troika to 
support the Indonesian reform program.  He also noted that 
along with Afghanistan, Indonesia would be the Dutch EU 
Presidency's highest Asia priority.  The Netherlands wants to 
use its term at the EU helm (July through December, 2004) to 
boost the EU's presence in Indonesia in order to provide more 
support for Indonesian reform and counter-terrorism efforts, 
"in coordination with the U.S."  Another initiative would 
focus on developing a "sustained and engaged dialogue with 
moderate Islam in Indonesia," he said. 
 
3. (SBU) Keyser said the U.S. shared the EU's concerns about 
Aceh and Papua, and desire to support reforms and engage 
moderate Islamic forces.  The U.S. is also deeply concerned 
about the kind of teaching going on in Indonesian schools, 
and was looking at a range of options for promoting education 
reform.  Irish Asia Director Cliona Manahan, representing the 
EU Presidency, said that the EU also wanted to increase its 
efforts on education and would welcome ideas from the U.S. 
Keyser said the U.S. was very interested in coordinating with 
the EU on these efforts.  The Commission Southeast Asia Rep 
noted that the EC is committing 20 million euros for 
education in Indonesia this year and was planning 45-50 
million euros for the 2005-06 timeframe. 
 
4. (SBU) The EC Rep also expressed concern about the possible 
pullout from West Timor this year of the UNHCR, a move that 
would strand 40,000 displaced and vulnerable people currently 
living in camps on the border.  "We hope the U.S. will help 
us get the UNHCR to change its mind," he said. 
 
----------------------- 
Burma: Holding the Line 
----------------------- 
 
5. (C) Keyser said that the similarity of U.S. and EU views 
on Burma offered an opportunity for greater policy 
coordination.  At the same time, though, the U.S. was 
disappointed that the EU did not enact further sanctions 
after the May 30 opposition crackdown.  The U.S. was also 
disappointed by ASEAN's reluctance to increase pressure on 
Burma at its October plenary.  Manahan said the EU remained 
stuck between, on the one hand, wanting to act firmer, and on 
the other, the perception that additional sanctions would be 
ineffective and possibly detrimental to Burmese citizens or 
third countries.  The EU was also torn on the issue of 
Burmese membership in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), she 
said, with the debate hinging on whether Burmese membership 
would reflect "constructive engagement or obdurate 
ignorance."  Milders added that without ideas for a clear way 
forward, the EU would probably simply extend its common 
position on Burma for another year. 
 
6. (C) Irish Deputy Asia Director Niall Brady said that UNSR 
Rizali had briefed the EU in Rangoon immediately following 
his March 1 visit.  Rizali told the EU that he saw no signs 
of softening by the Burmese regime, although he was glad that 
he had been able to meet with ASSK.  Brady said that when the 
EU demarched Rangoon in October, it had been given the usual 
line about staying out of internal matters.  While the EU was 
at a loss about how to increase pressure on Burma, all agreed 
that at a minimum "we need to at least get back to May 29, 
2003."  Brady added that the EU would also be forced to 
disengage to a certain extent from ASEAN when Burma assumes 
the chair in 2006.  Chris Holtby of the Council Policy Unit 
said the EU wanted to remain "side by side" with the U.S. on 
sanctions and policy, and was concerned that there might be 
the impression in Washington that the EU was soft on Burma. 
 
-------------------------------- 
ASEAN/ARF: "Teeth" in the Agenda 
-------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Keyser said while the U.S. and EU shared a common view 
of ASEAN and ARF, there was room for improvement in U.S.-EU 
program coordination.  He said the U.S. was intent on putting 
teeth into the agendas of regional fora to make them more 
effective in the war on terrorism.  One way to promote this 
-- supported by Japan -- would be the creation of a unit 
within ASEAN/ARF that could plan agendas and carry out work 
between plenary sessions.  The U.S. was not opposed to 
Japan's signing of  the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation, he said. 
 
8. (SBU) Referencing the "New Partnership with Southeast 
Asia" paper endorsed by the European Council in 2003, the EC 
Rep said that the EU wanted more -- and more effective -- 
engagement with regional fora and their member states 
bilaterally.  Such efforts could "pave the way" for the 
eventual creation of an ASEAN or EU-ASEAN Free Trade Area, he 
said.  The EC is also finalizing a draft paper on cooperation 
with ASEAN in 2005-06.  The paper foresees a reduction in 
direct EU assistance to ASEAN in favor of cooperation on the 
basis of local ownership.  Future EU assistance to ASEAN will 
therefore be lower than the 70 million euros provided over 
the past five years.  He said also that the EC was 
considering providing support for ASEAN efforts on border 
management. 
 
9. (SBU) Milders said he was pleased with the U.S. desire to 
put teeth in ASEAN's agenda, but was worried that "all the 
creativity in regional fora were being driven too much by 
China and Japan."  The EU would like to see others -- and not 
just Singapore -- get more engaged.  Keyser agreed, but noted 
that among the recent creative ideas, the Chinese proposal 
for a security forum at deputy defense minister level in 
ASEAN seemed worthy of serious consideration. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
China: "They're All Over Us These Days" 
--------------------------------------- 
 
10. (SBU) Manahan and Milders said that the EU and China were 
moving rapidly to improve and deepen relations, although 
serious problems remained regarding human rights, Tibet and 
Taiwan.  Manahan noted that the Chinese Vice FM Zhou Wenzhong 
is coming to Brussels soon to meet with the EU Political and 
Security Committee, and that Premier Wen would follow soon 
after for a first-ever meeting with the EU institutions. 
Traveling in the other direction, HiRep Solana plans to visit 
Beijing this month and Commission President Prodi will follow 
in early April.  The EU and China will also hold a summit in 
November. 
 
11. (SBU) The Commission East Asia Rep said that the EU just 
completed its first "seminar" with China to "give form to the 
enhanced relations."  The enhanced relationship will be built 
around five priorities, he said, reflecting EU support for 
economic and political reform: a) strengthened political 
dialogue; b) making sure the human rights dialogue works 
"favorably;" c) improvements on trade, such as Chinese 
implementation of the WTO agenda; d) dialogue on 
international challenges such illegal migration; and e) 
sectoral dialogues on issues such as culture, education, 
competition, nuclear energy, and customs, among others. 
 
12. (SBU) Holtby drew a parallel between a recent Chinese 
paper on its relations with the EU and the EU's new European 
Security Strategy (ESS), saying the two were remarkably 
similar and pointed to a likemindedness on EU-China 
relations.  The EU wanted to encourage China's recent 
progress on nonproliferation, but would remain critical of 
China's human rights record, he said.  He noted as well that 
the EU was taking seriously the ESS call for a stronger 
strategic "partnership" with China.  Manahan said that China, 
in seeking to use the leverage provided by the EU's desire 
for enhanced relations, keeps telling the EU that it should 
not apply conditionality to its strategic partners. 
 
13. (C) Keyser said that the U.S. had enjoyed improved 
relations with China since 9/11, but was concerned about 
Chinese backsliding on human rights during the past year. 
The U.S. has not decided yet whether to seek a resolution on 
China at the UNHRC this year, and was still hoping that the 
pressure of a possible resolution would inspire eleventh-hour 
efforts by China to meet its commitments and our 
expectations.  The Council Secretariat's Ana Ramirez said 
that the EU needed to adopt conclusions at the March 25-26 
European Council on what to do in the UNHRC this season.  The 
EU hoped for a U.S. decision soon, she said, as all were keen 
to avoid a repetition of last year when the EU had to issue 
conclusions before knowing what the U.S. positions would be. 
Manahan said she was cautiously optimistic about China's 
apparent decision to allow visits this summer by the Special 
Rapporteurs for Torture and Religious Freedom. 
 
---------------------- 
China: EU Arms Embargo 
---------------------- 
 
14. (C) Turning to the issue all had been waiting for, Keyser 
said that U.S. firm opposition to the EU lifting its arms 
embargo on China was based both on our assessment that 
China's human rights record had not improved sufficiently and 
on our assessment that lifting the embargo would upset the 
strategic balance in the region.  If the U.S. were some day 
obliged to come to the assistance of Taiwan in response to a 
Chinese attack, we would not want to be faced with advanced 
weaponry supplied by our European allies.  Keyser noted also 
that with transatlantic acrimony still evident as a 
consequence of divisions over Iraq, the last thing either the 
EU or U.S. needed was another major falling out. 
 
15. (C) Manahan said the EU was engaged in a very serious and 
very thorough review of its embargo and of its Code of 
Conduct on arms exports (which will govern defense trade with 
China if the embargo is lifted), and that the Irish 
Presidency had no desire to rush the process.  The EU was 
very sensitive to the implications for transatlantic 
relations, she added.  Milders said that the arms embargo was 
"the most important thing" in EU-China relations right now, 
adding that the EU recognized a year ago that it was time to 
review the embargo.  While the country's human rights record 
remains spotty, it is clear that China has made much progress 
since 1989. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
DPRK: EU Ready to Help When Time is Right 
----------------------------------------- 
 
16. (C) Manahan, who visited North Korea as part of an EU 
troika in December, thanked the U.S. for providing such 
prompt and thorough readouts of the most recent round of 
Six-Party Talks.  She said the EU would like to help the 
process if there was anything it could do, and noted that the 
DPRK would be the topic of the EU's June COASI meeting. 
(Comment: In a follow on meeting with Council DG Robert 
Cooper (septel), Cooper also asked if there was anything the 
EU could do to help.  Mission desk contacts have also begun 
stressing that the EU stands ready to assist when and as 
needed.  This willingness to help on our terms -- conveyed at 
all levels with an unobtrusive openness -- contrasts sharply 
with the EU's irritation last year at feeling left out of the 
whole process, particularly with regard to the now-defunct 
KEDO.  The turnaround is due to recent U.S. efforts to keep 
the Europeans in the loop on as Six Party Talks proceed.  End 
Comment.) 
 
17. (C) Keyser briefed the troika on U.S. views about how to 
proceed with the Six Party Talks, and said that the parties 
were moving toward creating working groups that could remain 
operational between the plenary sessions.  The EC Rep asked 
whether the efforts to disrupt North Korea's illicit 
activities were having a significant impact on the regime. 
He said also that the EU was "struck" by inchoate efforts at 
economic reform and was wondering whether to support them in 
hopes of undermining the regime's closed system.  Keyser 
responded that while what we do not know about North Korea 
could fill volumes, the regime appears too strong to be 
undermined from within anytime soon.  On disruption of 
illegal activities, he said that the Proliferation Security 
Initiative and the Illicit Activities Initiative appeared to 
be getting the regime's attention.  But since we don't know 
the level of revenue generated by illegal DPRK activities, we 
cannot determine with accuracy how much impact the 
disruptions are having.  In any case, Keyser said, the U.S. 
would continue to pursue vigorously the two initiatives on 
the merits, since it was the obligation of any nation to 
defend its citizens and society against illegal activities. 
 
18. PDAS Keyser has cleared this message. 
 
Schnabel