This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000676 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2014 
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS BR UNSC
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: AMBASSADOR'S DEMARCHES TO MRE U/S PEDROSA 
ON HAITI MIF, IRAQ AND UNCHR ISSUES 
 
REF: A. A. STATE 56282 
     ¶B. B. STATE 56666 
     ¶C. C. STATE 41252 AND 44603 
     ¶D. D. BRASILIA 616 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR HRINAK. REASONS: 1.5 (b) (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. On 19 March Ambassdor, accompanied by 
PolCouns, met with Foreign Ministry Under Secretary for 
Political Affairs Vera Pedrosa to deliver demarches 
requesting immediate contributions to the Hait MIF (ref B), 
and soliciting Brazil's support for USG plans and goals for 
building a democratic and prosperous Iraq (ref A). 
Ambassador also took the opportunity to discuss cooperation 
with Brazil in the UN Committee on Human Rights (refs C and 
D).  On Haiti, Pedrosa responded that operational and 
budgetary challenges, the need for congressional approval and 
GOB concerns about operations under a Chapter 7 mandate all 
make an immediate Brazilian deployment unlikely.  Longer 
term, the issue of a Chapter 7 v. Chapter 6 mandate for the 
follow-on stabilization force would need to be considered, 
but may be "manageable" so long as there continues to be 
strong GOB political will to participate, she said.  Pedrosa 
said Brazil has not offered, and is not encouraging a 
request, for provision in Brazil of asylum to Aristide. On 
Iraq, Brazil is considering reopening its embassy, but still 
evaluating the security environment. In the UNCHR, Pedrosa 
said she hoped the U.S. and Brazil will find issues for 
cooperation, but noted that Brazil's delegation has already 
been instructed to abstain on any Cuba resolution. Key points 
follow below. End summary. 
 
HAITI 
 
¶2. (C) In the absence of Foreign Minister Amorim (on his way 
to China) Ambassador provided Pedrosa with a Portuguese 
language paper containing ref B points, and explained there 
is an urgent need for additional forces now if the MIF is to 
secure and stabilize areas of the country beyond the capital. 
Ambassador also welcomed the arrival in Haiti on 19 March of 
a Brazilian military fact-finding mission, encouraged 
deployment of a Brazilian liaison officer to the U.S. 
Southern Command as soon as possible, and reiterated 
SOUTHCOM's willingness to try to provide as much operational 
support as possible for Brazil's deployment to Haiti, 
especially if that could facilitate a positive GOB response 
to ref B request. 
 
¶3. (C) Pedrosa responded that Brazil continues to plan for 
participation in a stabilization mission following the 90-day 
MIF period established by UNSCR 1529.  However, she expressed 
doubts that Brazil could move sooner in making an immediate 
deployment because (1) Brazil's congress must approve any 
deployment of forces, (2) the operational planning and 
budgetary issues confronting the GOB are challenging and will 
take time to work through.  She noted particularly that the 
GOB formula for reimbursing its soldiers for PKO missions is 
extremely expensive for the national government, hence 
extensive consultations are necessary with the planning 
ministry, as well as congress, before moving ahead with a 
large-scale deployment of forces. 
 
¶4. (C) PolCouns asked Pedrosa and MRE North America Division 
Chief Washington Pereira (also present in the meeting) 
whether the MIF's current mandate under Chapter 7 (as opposed 
to Chapter 6) would be a problem for an immediate Brazilian 
deployment now, and whether it would continue to be a problem 
if the UN maintains a Chapter 7 mandate in Haiti for the 
follow-on force.  Pedrosa said the GOB has traditionally 
interpreted Brazil's constitution as permitting Brazilian 
forces to participate only in Chapter 6 peace-keeping (as 
opposed to Chapter 7 peace-enforcement) missions.  Hence for 
both an immediate deployment and for participation in the 
follow-on mission, this would be a serious issue for the GOB 
(and potentially its congress) to deliberate.  However, 
Pedrosa and Washington Pereira did note that there is strong 
GOB interest in participating in Haiti, hence a Chapter 6-7 
dilemma, should one arise in the context of the follow-on 
deployment, may be "manageable," so long as there continues 
to be GOB political will to support participation. 
 
¶5. (C) Ambassador asked whether Pedrosa could comment on some 
reports that Aristide may seek asylum in Brazil.  Pedrosa 
responded that Brazil had neither offered nor received a 
request in this regard, and she opined that the GOB would be 
unlikely to view the idea "with enthusiasm" should a request 
be made. 
 
IRAQ 
¶6. (SBU) Ambassador provided ref A paper, with a Portuguese 
summary, to Pedrosa, and indicated the USG is seeking general 
support for reftel plans and goals, as opposed to specific 
actions.  She noted that she understood Brazil is considering 
reopening its embassy in Iraq, and that there are many 
Brazilian companies with long experience and strong interest 
in Iraq. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Pedrosa indicated she would study ref A paper 
carefully, and confirmed that the GOB is considering 
reopening its mission in Iraq, but continues to study 
carefully the security situation on the ground. 
 
UNCHR Issues 
 
¶8. (C) Turning to UNCHR issues, Ambassador provided Pedrosa 
with papers containing a number of points on USG perspectives 
on CHR cooperation with GRULAC and on a range of other 
issues, noting the points had been provided by the Embassy in 
earlier demarches to the MRE human rights division, and that 
we looked forward to further reactions (refs C and D).  She 
also asked whether Pedrosa wished to outline some of the 
GOB's priorities for the UNCHR.  Pedrosa expressed the hope 
that the USG and GOB could work together on issues where 
their perspectives are similar, though some divergence would 
be inevitable. 
 
¶9. (C) On the issue of Cuba, Pedrosa indicated that the GOB 
delegation to the CHR had already been instructed to abstain 
on any single-country resolution, based on "our customary 
reasons."  She said that a quiet dialogue on human rights 
with Castro is Brazil's preferred method to try to effect 
improvements. 
 
¶10. (C) Ambassador responded that, at a minimum, it would be 
helpful if the GOB could encourage Cuba to accept a UN 
special rapporteur mission, and she asked whether the GOB 
believed its quiet diplomacy is producing results.  Pedrosa 
said the decision to accept UN rapporteurs should be made by 
national governments for their own reasons, as Brazil had 
done.  Neither she nor Washington Pereira could offer 
examples of positive developments on human rights in Cuba, 
but Pedrosa noted that a new generation of Cubans -- both in 
Cuba and in Miami -- offer hope for a peaceful evolution on 
the island. 
 
HRINAK