This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 003103 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SECSTATE FOR WHA/AND,INL,DRL// 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR PHUM CO TAGS
SUBJECT: THE FUTURE OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY STRATEGY 
(ISS) PROGRAM REF: MSG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA/112201Z JUNE 03 
SUBJ INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY STRATEGY CONFERENCE (ISS) 
WRAP-UP 
 
REF: MSG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA/08 JULY 03 SUBJ IMPACT FROM 
 
     LACK OF FUNDS ON THE INFRASTRUCTURE 
     SECURITY STRATEGY (ISS) PROGRAM 
 
¶1.    SUMMARY: THE EMBASSY COUNTRY TEAM RECENTLY COMPLETED 
ALMOST A YEAR AND A HALF OF WORK IN ARAUCA DEPARTMENT. IN 
THAT TIME THE US HAS TRAINED ALMOST A BATTALION AND A HALF OF 
COUNTERGUERRILA SOLDIERS, CONDUCTED NUMEROUS MEDICAL 
ASSISTANCE VISITS, AND ESTABLISHED A COMBINED INTELLIGENCE 
CENTER. HOWEVER, TRAINING FOR GROUND FORCES WILL END IN 
DECEMBER 2004, AS THE FUNDS WILL BE COMPLETELY EXPENDED. THE 
HELICOPTER PACKAGE DESIGNED TO COMPLEMENT THE GROUND 
COMPONENT TO ESTABLISH AN AIR-GROUND QUICK REACTION FORCE 
WILL NOT FULLY ARRIVE UNTIL MARCH 2005. THIS WILL LEAVE THE 
PROGRAM HALF WAY TOWARDS ITS INTENDED GOAL. THE COUNTRY TEAM 
RECOMMENDS THAT THIS PROGRAM SHOULD BE EXTENDED FOR A YEAR AT 
A MINIMUM TO ALLOW EFFECTIVE AIR GROUND INTEGRATION TRAINING 
AND AT A MAXIMUM FOR THREE YEARS TO ACCOMPLISH THE LONGER 
TERM GOAL OF SECURING THE ENTIRE PIPELINE AND SURROUNDING 
INFRASTRUCTURE. //END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.    DISCUSSION: IN RESPONSE TO 170 ATTACKS ON THE CANO 
LIMON OIL PIPELINE THAT SHUT DOWN THE PIPELINE FOR 247 DAYS 
IN 2001, THE US AND COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENTS HELD SEVERAL 
BILATERAL CONFERENCES TO ASSESS THE SITUATION AND DEVELOP A 
LONG TERM RESPONSE TO THESE TERRORIST CHALLENGES (THIS 
PIPELINE CURRENTLY PRODUCES APPROXIMATELY 97,000 BARRELS A 
DAY, EARNING AN ESTIMATED ONE BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR OF WHICH 
THE COLOMBIAN ECONOMY RECEIVES ROUGHLY 85 PERCENT). AS A 
RESULT OF THESE MEETINGS, THE US CONGRESS ALLOCATED USD 99 
MILLION FOR THE PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN 
ARAUCA DEPARTMENT. THE COUNTRY TEAM, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE 
COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT, USED THE APPORTIONED FUNDS TO PURCHASE 
A HELICOPTER PACKAGE AND INITIATE A PLANNING ASSISTANCE AND 
TRAINING PROGRAM IN NOVEMBER 2002.  THE INTENT OF US SUPPORT 
IS TO ENABLE COLOMBIAN SECURITY FORCES TO TAKE A MORE 
PROACTIVE APPROACH TO SECURING THE PIPELINE AND OTHER VITAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE.  THIS CONCEPT PLACES HEAVY EMPHASIS ON 
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, OPERATIONALIZING THAT INTELLIGENCE 
INTO ACTIONABLE PLANS, AND RESPONDING WITH QUICK REACTION 
FORCES. 
 
¶3.    TO DATE THE ISS PROGRAM HAS SUCCEEDED IN TRAINING OVER 
SIX COMPANIES CAPABLE OF RAPIDLY RESPONDING TO INTELLIGENCE, 
EXECUTING EFFECTIVE PATROLLING TECHNIQUES, AND CONDUCTING 
URBAN OPERATIONS. THESE CAPABILITIES HAVE ALLOWED THE BRIGADE 
TO GREATLY REDUCE ATTACKS AGAINST THE PIPELINE (DOWN TO 18 
AND 32 IN 2002 AND 2003 RESPECTIVELY) WHILE ALSO HELPING 
RESTORE GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY IN THE DEPARTMENT. THE PLANNING 
AND ASSISTANCE ROLE OF THE US SPECIAL FORCES (USSF) PERMITTED 
THESE HIGHLY SKILLED SOLDIERS TO PROVIDE ADVICE ON HOW TO 
IMPROVE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF OPERATIONS. HOWEVER, THIS 
IS MORE THAN A USMILGP PROGRAM, IT IS A MULTI-AGENCY EFFORT 
WITH OFFICES FROM NAS, ORA, AND USAID PROVIDING CRUCIAL 
SUPPORT.  THE COLOMBIANS, WITH THE SUPPORT OF US SERVICE 
MEMBERS, WERE ABLE TO OPERATIONALIZE THE INTELLIGENCE GAINED 
FROM THE 
ORA-FUNDED COMBINED INTELLIGENCE CENTER. NAS HAS BEEN HEAVILY 
ENGAGED WITH THE COLOMBIANS REGARDING INCOMING AIRCRAFT, 
WHILE USAID ASSISTED WITH THE DELIVERY OF SCHOOL SUPPLIES 
THAT WERE DONATED TO LOCAL SCHOOLS. 
THE INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO) CAMPAIGN IS ANOTHER SUCCESS 
STORY AND A STRONG REINFORCING EFFORT TO THE OPERATIONS AND 
INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES. ALREADY THERE HAVE BEEN TWO MEDICAL 
ASSISTANCE VISITS (OVER 4700 MEDICAL AND DENTAL PATIENTS 
TREATED), A VETERINARY ASSISTANCE VISIT, REPAIR PROJECTS FOR 
A MEDICAL CLINIC AND SCHOOLS THAT HAS ENCOURAGED THE LOCAL 
POPULACE TO LOOK TOWARDS THE GOVERNMENT FOR HELP IN PROVIDING 
BASIC NECESSITIES. A ROBUST PYSOP PROGRAM THAT RELIES ON 
RADIO, LEAFLETS, AND POSTERS HAS ENCOURAGED THE TOWNSPEOPLE 
AND CAMPESINOS TO RESIST TERRORIST ACTIONS WITHIN THEIR AREA 
AND ALSO TAUGHT THEM HOW TO REACT TO A TERRORIST ATTACK. THE 
IO PROGRAM HAS DECREASED CIVILIAN INTERFERENCE WITH SECURITY 
OPERATIONS AND IMPROVED HUMINT SOURCES AS THE MESSAGE OF WHO 
REALLY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR NEGATIVELY AFFECTING THE 
CIVILIANS, STANDARD OF LIVING AND SENSE OF SECURITY HAS BEEN 
EFFECTIVELY TRANSMITTED. THE ISS PROGRAM HAS ALSO HELPED 
WEAKEN THE NARCOTERRORISTS, STRANGLEHOLD ON LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS. 
 
¶4.    THE PROBLEM: THE GROUND ELEMENT OF THE ISS PROGRAM WILL 
TERMINATE IN DECEMBER 2004 WITH THE EXHAUSTION OF THE 
ALLOCATED FUNDS, AND THE OVERALL PROGRAM WILL CEASE SHORTLY 
AFTERWARDS WITH THE MISSION ACCOMPLISHING BUT A SMALL PART OF 
THE OVERALL VISION. 
 
¶5.    DEFINING THE PROBLEM:  THE ISS PROGRAM WAS DESIGNED TO 
FUNCTION AS AN INTEGRATED GROUND AIR OPERATION SUPPORTED BY A 
PLANNING AND ASSISTANCE TEAM FROM A USSF COMPANY. 
UNFORTUNATELY, DUE TO CONTRACTUAL DELAYS THE AIR COMPONENT (8 
HUEYS AND 2 BLACKHAWKS) WILL NOT FULLY ARRIVE IN COUNTRY 
UNTIL MARCH 2005 AT THE EARLIEST AND WILL NOT BE READY FOR 
AIR-GROUND TRAINING UNTIL JUNE 2005. WITH USSF TROOPS 
SCHEDULED TO DEPART IN DECEMBER 2004 (WITH THE END OF FUNDS 
FOR GROUND TRAINING), THIS WILL HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE 
AIR ASSAULT TRAINING BETWEEN AIR AND GROUND UNITS AS THE 
LEADERS AND MEN OF BOTH COMPONENTS WILL NOT HAVE HAD THE 
OPPORTUNITY TO RECEIVE APPROPRIATE TRAINING FROM USSF FORCES. 
WHILE USMILGP-BOGOTA HAS WORKED TO AMELIORATE THIS PROBLEM BY 
HAVING UNITS IN ARAUCA TRAVEL TO TOLEMAIDA FOR ABBREVIATED 
AIR ASSAULT TRAINING (WHERE OTHER COLOMBIAN PILOTS ARE 
UNDERGOING BASIC ROTARY WING TRAINING FOR THE PLAN COLOMBIA 
HELICOPTERS), THE FACT IS THAT THIS TRAINING DOES NOT 
ENCOMPASS THE ENTIRE BRIGADE, COVERS ONLY THE BASICS, AND IS 
NOT CONDUCTED WITH THE PILOTS WITH WHOM THEY WILL CONDUCT 
OPERATIONS. ADDITIONALLY, THE ABSENCE OF USSF TRAINERS WILL 
ALSO MEAN THE 18TH BRIGADE STAFF (HIGHER HEADQUARTERS IN 
ARAUCA DEPARTMENT) WILL NOT RECEIVE PLANNING ASSISTANCE FROM 
US EXPERTS ON HOW TO BEST INTEGRATE THIS NEW MOBILITY 
CAPABILITY INTO COMBAT OPERATIONS. FINALLY, MOST OF THE 
EQUIPMENT FOR THE GROUND UNITS WILL NOT ARRIVE UNTIL THE FALL 
OF 2004. 
 
¶6.    THE US PRESENCE HAS HAD A POSITIVE IMPACT ON THE 
SECURITY SITUATION AND THE COLOMBIANS HAVE ADJUSTED TO 
COMPENSATE FOR THE LACK OF HELICOPTERS, HOWEVER, THE 
NARCOTERRORISTS HAVE COUNTERED THESE EFFORTS BY GOING AFTER 
ELECTRICAL TOWERS AND OTHER INFRASTRUCTURE. THIS NEW 
DIRECTION OF ATTACK HAS EXCEEDED THE COLOMBIANS CAPABILITY TO 
RESPOND TO ATTACKS ON NUMEROUS TOWERS IN THE REGION WITHOUT 
THE USE OF ROTARY WING ASSETS. NEVERTHELESS, THIS IS ANOTHER 
EXAMPLE WHERE THE USSF STRUCTURE IS CURRENTLY ASSISTING THE 
COMMANDER AND HIS STAFF WITH DEVELOPING NEW WAYS TO LESSEN 
THE IMPACT OF THESE ADDITIONAL ATTACKS--A CAPABILITY NOT 
AVAILABLE AFTER 31 DECEMBER 2004. 
 
¶7.    AS TO THE LONGER TERM PROBLEM, BOTH THE US AND 
COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENTS SIGNED A MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT THAT 
SPECIFIED THE OBLIGATIONS OF EACH GOVERNMENT. THE US 
GOVERNMENT HAS DILIGENTLY AND RESPONSIBLY WORKED TOWARDS 
FULFILLING THESE OBLIGATIONS. TRAINING FOR THE GROUND UNITS 
IS ON TARGET TO HAVE TRAINED AT LEAST THREE (OUT OF SIX) 
COUNTERGUERRILLA BATTALIONS OF THE 18TH BRIGADE AND PROVIDED 
CONTINUAL PLANNING AND ASSISTANCE TO THE 18TH BRIGADE STAFF. 
THE HELICOPTER PROGRAM IS ON TRACK TO PROVIDE THE REQUIRED 
INFRASTRUCTURE, HELICOPTERS, PILOT AND CREW TRAINING. 
HOWEVER THE VISION AS STIPULATED IN THE MOA, SHOULD 
ADDITIONAL FUNDS BECOME AVAILABLE, IS THAT THE PROGRAM WOULD 
ENHANCE THE PROTECTION OF THE ENTIRE PIPELINE. THE ISS 
PROGRAM HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL, AND THE US GOVERNMENT SHOULD 
REINFORCE THIS SUCCESS BY ENSURING THE COLOMBIAN MILITARY 
DEVELOPS A MATURE AND WELL ROUNDED CAPABILITY TO REACT TO 
ATTACKS EXECUTED BY NARCOTERRORISTS. 
 
¶8.    RECOMMENDATIONS: 
 
¶A. NEAR TERM (PHASE 1): THE ISS PROGRAM SHOULD BE EXTENDED AT 
LEAST AN ADDITIONAL YEAR, UNTIL THE END OF THE 1ST QUARTER 
FY06, IN ORDER TO ENABLE GROUND FORCES TO TRAIN WITH THE AIR 
ASSETS PROVIDED TO THE 18TH BRIGADE BY THE US GOVERNMENT. 
THIS WILL ENSURE THE COLOMBIANS BECOME PROFICIENT IN THE 
PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS TO SUPPORT 
THE PIPELINE PROTECTION INITIATIVE. 
 
(1) THE US GOVERNMENT WOULD EXECUTE THESE SPECIFIC TASKS: 
(A) INTEGRATION OF GROUND AND AIR COMPONENTS 
(B) EXTEND SUPPORT TO NORTE DE SANTANDER DEPARTMENT 
(C) CONTINUE SUPPORT FROM KM 0 TO KM 178, AS THIS IS THE MOST 
VULNERABLE AREA TO ATTACK BASED ON HISTORICAL AND CURRENT 
RECORDS. 
 
(2) WE ANTICIPATE THAT THE COST TO EXTEND THE PROGRAM FOR AN 
ADDITIONAL YEAR (JAN-DEC 05) AND TO TRAIN AND PARTIALLY EQUIP 
ADDITIONAL UNITS WILL BE: 
 
(A) $5.50M FOR TRAINING AND TRAINING AMMUNITION 
(B) $1.00M FOR LOGISTICAL SUPPORT 
(C) $0.50M FOR FP INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
¶B. LONG TERM (PHASE 2): IN THE SPIRIT OF THE MOA BETWEEN OUR 
GOVERNMENTS, WHICH IS BASED ON A LONG TERM APPROACH, TO 
SECURE THIS IMPORTANT INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION INITIATIVE IT 
IS RECOMMENDED THAT THIS PROGRAM BE FUNDED UNTIL 2007. 
CONTINUATION OF THIS MISSION WOULD ALSO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT 
TIME FOR THE EXTENSION OF INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONAL 
PLANNING TO THE NORTH ALONG THE PATH OF THE PIPELINE. 
 
(1) THE US GOVERNMENT WOULD EXECUTE THESE SPECIFIC TASKS: 
(A) EXTEND SUPPORT AND INTEGRATION OF PIPELINE AND OTHER 
SUPPORTING INFRASTRUCURE TO THE COAST. 
(B) TRAIN AND ASSIST UNITS ALONG THE PIPELINE BASED ON A 
THOROUGH STUDY OF THE SITUATIONAL AND INTELLIGENCE PICTURE OF 
THE AREA TO INCLUDE THE STANDING MISSIONS OF THE UNITS, 
TERRAIN, AND ENEMY TACTICS. 
(C) CONTINUE SUPPORT FROM KM 0 TO KM 178 OF THE PIPELINE FOR 
THE REASONS STATED IN PHASE I. 
 
(2) THE ANTICIPATED COST OF THIS PROGRAM WOULD BE AS FOLLOWS: 
 
(A) JAN-DEC 06: 
            $5.50M FOR TRAINING AND TRAINING AMMUNITION 
              $3.00M FOR EQUIPMENT 
              $2.00M FOR INFRASTRUCTURE 
              $1.50M FOR LOGISTICS SUPPORT 
 
(B) JAN-DEC 07: 
  $5.50M FOR TRAINING AND TRAINING AMMUNITION 
              $3.00M FOR EQUIPMENT 
              $0.50M FOR FP INFRASTRUCTURE 
              $1.50M FOR LOGISTICS SUPPORT 
 
(C) THE DIFFERENCE IN COSTS BETWEEN 2005 AND YEARS 
2006-2007 REFLECTS THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH TRAINING 
ADDITIONAL UNITS AND AT NEW BASES AS THE PROGRAM EXTENDS TO 
THE NORTH WHEREAS THE 2005 FUNDS ARE FOR A CONTINUATION OF 
THE ONGOING TRAINING (AND INTEGRATION OF THE AIR COMPONENT 
INTO MILITARY OPERATIONS). THE FORCE PROTECTION MONEY FOR 
2005 IS TO INSURE THE BASES IN NORTE DE SANTANDER DEPARTMENT 
HAVE MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF PROTECTION FOR US FORCES 
PROVIDING PLANNING AND ASSISTANCE FOR ONGOING OPERATIONS, BUT 
IS NOT INTENDED FOR A CONTINUAL US PRESENCE. THE 
INFRASTRUCTURE COSTS IN 2006 ARE FOR A CONTINUAL US PRESENCE 
(AS IN SARAVENA) AND IS FRONTLOADED SO ALL INFRASTRUCTURE 
IMPROVEMENTS ARE COMPLETE PRIOR TO 2007. 
 
 
¶9.    YOUR PRIMARY POC AND SPONSOR IS LTC DANIEL GETTINGS, 
COMMERCIAL TEL (571) 266-1208. 
DRUCKER 
 
 
 
 
DRUCKER