This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001258 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
AMMAN PLEASE PASS TO U/S GROSSMAN 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PTER PINS ECON TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR U/S GROSSMAN'S VISIT TO TURKEY: 
WHERE DOES TURKEY FIT INTO THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST (GME) 
INITIATIVE? 
 
 
REF: ANKARA 1230 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: E.O. 
12958 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Your visit to Ankara is a key opportunity 
to explain the Greater Middle East Initiative (GME) and to 
listen to Turkey's ideas about GME.  Although GME has 
generated considerable commentary, few here understand its 
methods or aims.  Internally, Turkey's path towards EU 
accession dovetails well with GME objectives, but success is 
not assured.   Regionally, Turkey's example of internally 
generating NATO and EU-oriented reform will be instructive 
for others.  However, in helping the Turks to fashion their 
regional GME role, we must be cognizant of the Turks' 
historical baggage in the region and the problematical 
question of Islam in Turkey, and we must avoid a perception 
of Turkey as the U.S.'s regional gendarme.  End Summary. 
 
 
GME in Turkey:  Lots of Comments, Little Understanding 
 
 
¶2.  (C) In the last month, GME has been the subject of 
considerable press commentary, both negative and positive. 
Some Embassy interlocutors have asked us about GME and 
Turkey's role (the TGS, for example, reftel).  Your 
interlocutors are eager to hear Washington's thinking on the 
details of GME -- and to give you their input. 
 
 
¶3.  (C) This latter point is crucial, because GME's emphasis 
on supporting reforms originating within the region is in 
danger of being drowned out by a chorus of nay-sayers who 
paint GME as enforcement of Washington-imposed ideology, with 
Turkey playing the role of Washington's gendarme.  Your 
willingness to listen to and incorporate Turkey's ideas will 
be a good antidote. 
 
 
Making Turkey a Success 
 
 
¶4.  (C) At the January Islamic Economic Forum in Jeddah and 
in his speech at Harvard University during his U.S. visit PM 
Erdogan spoke out in favor of democracy and reform in the 
Islamic world.  At preceding OIC meetings in Tehran and Kuala 
Lumpur, FM Gul laid out an even broader vision for 
democratization and reform.  In many senses, both men were 
also talking obliquely but very consciously about the need 
for transformation in their own country. 
 
 
¶5.  (C) The movement to improve Turkey's democracy, in the 
political sphere, hinges on the resolution of three 
fundamental questions: 
 
 
-- the place of religion (both Islam and "minority" 
religions) in society; 
-- ethnic identity and national identity; 
-- individual rights and the relation between citizen and 
State (e.g., establishing real rule of law). 
 
 
¶6.  (C) It will be important to stress to the Turks that GME 
is not only about changing politics, but also about 
encouraging economic policies that produce greater 
prosperity.  Turkey can lead by example via pursuit of sound 
economic policies and reforms, and also can make the point to 
its neighbors that the region will only succeed economically 
if it adopts sound, market-based policies based on rule of 
law. 
 
 
EU Accession:  A Ready Vehicle, But Beware Complacency 
 
 
¶7.  (C) Turkey's current focus on EU accession has been a 
ready vehicle for the internal changes Turkey needs to be 
successful.  Turkey's focus on getting a date to begin EU 
accession talks has translated into an effective impetus for 
reform.  Although the Copenhagen Criteria are a de facto 
external discipline, there is widespread sentiment that these 
are things Turkey needs to do for its own good. 
 
 
¶8.  (C) However, Turkey's success is not a given.  The Turks 
have done well in passing laws, but now need to implement 
them.  Everyday life in Ankara yields up examples where the 
basic elements of individual rights and rule of law are not 
respected.  Turkey's EU supporters stress that complacency 
now will jeopardize Turkey's chances of getting a date in 
December.  Even if Turkey does begin accession talks, the 
road to accession will be arduous.  Faced with a long haul, 
the current political focus and burst of energy for reforms 
could flag. 
 
 
¶9.  (C) The Turkish economy has improved significantly over 
the past year, greatly reducing fears of renewed financial 
crisis and generating hope for sustained, low-inflation 
growth.  However, this improvement has generated complacency 
among government leaders, who fail to understand that the 
economy's huge debt and structural weaknesses leave it 
vulnerable.  Unless Turkey implements reforms systematically, 
it will miss the opportunity to move toward sustainable 
prosperity and away from the boom-and-bust cycles that have 
haunted it. 
 
 
¶10. (C) Your interlocutors will readily agree when you stress 
the importance of fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria before 
December, and they will welcome your point that this 
dovetails with GME objectives.  This is an opportunity to 
make the point that we view GME as a generational commitment, 
requiring long-term political and economic momentum. 
 
 
Turkey's Regional GME Role 
 
 
¶11.  (C) Some of our Turkish interlocutors have asked us 
about what Turkey's regional GME role will be.  While 
recognizing that Turkey's democracy and economy are still 
works in progress, Turks are proud of their achievements, 
especially over the last year, and many are willing to play a 
regional role.  Several GOT officials have encouraged us to 
consult closely with Ankara on GME, believing that Turks' 
long association with the region can be useful in refining 
the initiative. 
 
 
¶12.  (C) Turkey has for decades seen itself and been seen as 
an east-west bridge.  Turks are accustomed to being NATO's 
eastern bridge and are on the verge of becoming the EU's 
eastern bridge.  Turkey's experiences in integrating itself 
into these institutions are consistent with core GME 
objectives.  Turkey's example of internally generating reform 
will be instructive for others.  Moreover, Ankara will 
welcome opportunities to share its experiences with others in 
the region -- experiences in making laws more democratic, 
training military and police to respect civilian rule and 
human rights, opening up markets.  Turks can also deliver 
some messages about the need for Middle East societies to 
face up to their problems more easily than the U.S. 
 
 
 
 
Avoiding Pitfalls 
 
 
¶13.  (C) However, in working together with the Turks to 
fashion their GME role, we need to avoid three pitfalls. 
First, we must recognize that Turkey has considerable 
historical baggage in the region and can easily engender 
resentment in its neighbors.  Turks have a difficult time 
understanding and accepting this.  The GME challenge for 
Turkey is to create a constructive regional role that avoids 
pushing the wrong buttons with its neighbors. 
 
 
¶14.  (C) Second, we need to recognize that dubbing Turkey a 
model of a successful "Muslim country" poses internal and 
external problems.  Internally, the unresolved question of 
Islam's place in Turkey is the source of considerable tension. 
 
 
¶15.  (C) Third, we need to avoid feeding the misperception 
that Washington views Turkey as its regional gendarme.  The 
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative will focus on hard power, and 
the Turks will want to take a leading role as NATO pursues 
it.  However, we should make sure that the Turks and others 
in the region understand that GME is chiefly about assisting 
reform -- political, economic and military -- not the 
application of hard power. 
EDELMAN