This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000393 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E FOR ANNE PENCE 
EB/IFD/OIA FOR MARSHA KELLEY AND TIM HAUSER 
INL/C FOR DAVID LUNA AND JOHN BRANDOLINO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KCOR ETRD NI
SUBJECT:  MOVING AHEAD WITH NIGERIA ON THE EVIAN 
TRANSPARENCY/ANTI-CORRUPTION PILOT PROGRAM 
 
REF: A. STATE 33364 
     ¶B. ABUJA 35 
     ¶C. STATE 350 
     ¶D. MAXSTADT-HAUSER TELCON 2/24/04 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED, NOT FOR POSTING ON THE 
INTRANET OR INTERNET. 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (SBU) Finance Minister Ngozi and Presidential 
Advisor Ezekwesili have given Post concrete expression 
of Nigerian government interest in a G-8 
transparency/anti-corruption pilot program in January 
(Ref B), and reaffirmed that in February to Post and 
also in their meetings with U/S Larson at Davos.  Post 
believes it is necessary to move forward with the Evian 
program, given that Nigeria has been identified as an 
Evian pilot country and that EITI is already publicly 
moving forward in Nigeria under the GON, British and 
World Bank (Ref C).  Partly to ensure that EITI does 
not get too far ahead of the Evian framework, Post has 
been coordinating with G-8 missions, the World Bank and 
IMF here, and will host all of them March 17 for a 
coordination meeting. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Per the Reftelcon D request for ideas on the 
way forward, Post believes it possible to begin a G-8 
coordinating body in Abuja at the March 17 meeting, to 
begin negotiations with the GON on the joint Political 
Statement as soon as Department instructions are 
received, and to aim for negotiations thereafter to 
produce the consolidated G-8/GON Technical Plan -- 
before the G-8 summit if desirable.  Nigeria is 
different from the other Evian pilot countries in that: 
 
-- Several G-8 members, and the World Bank and IMF, 
already have major transparency/anti-corruption 
programs in place in Nigeria, and thus the Technical 
Plan exercise will be more looking for small gaps and 
negotiating GON milestones than the start-from- scratch 
program approach necessary in other countries. 
 
-- Because of Nigeria's importance and the size of the 
major transparency/anti-corruption programs in place, G- 
8 Embassies, Missions and the World Bank already have 
political and technical capacity on the ground to 
conduct both of the negotiations. 
 
-- The GON has already named an anti-corruption czar, 
Dr. Ezekwesili, and is already moving forward through 
her on EITI.  End Summary. 
 
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WHERE WE STAND WITH NIGERIA 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Events are moving rapidly in Nigeria, with or 
without us.  The same senior Nigerian Government (GON) 
officials have told U/S Larson and us in February that 
Nigeria is interested in being a pilot country for the 
Evian transparency/anti-corruption program.  Those 
senior GON officials are already doing many of the 
things they would do under an Evian pilot program, 
including EITI, whether we do an Evian pilot program or 
not.  G-8 countries have extensive transparency/anti- 
corruption programs here, again whether or not Nigeria 
is an Evian pilot. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The gains we make in having an Evian program 
here are that it would coordinate these activities, and 
commit the GON to specific milestones and performance. 
Post does not envision much if any additional USG 
funding above the considerable programs already funded, 
and our consultations with other G-8 countries, the 
World Bank and IMF lead us to believe little additional 
will come from them for similar reasons.  It is more 
likely -- and here we are unlike the smaller country 
pilots -- that the Evian technical plan with Nigeria 
will identify small gaps we will seek to fill with 
small funding, first from Canada, Japan and Russia 
which have Embassies here but no anti-corruption 
programs. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Coordination will be critical.  EITI is 
already far in front, having been launched publicly and 
already working on policy issues (Ref B).  The GON is 
pushing ahead on EITI for its own reasons, and delay on 
Evian will make it appear separate and make 
coordination more difficult.  Transparency/anti- 
corruption programs are a growth industry in Nigeria, 
and we must also use Evian to map out the G-8's 
combined existing programs to prevent duplication and 
to prevent forum-shopping by Nigerians. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Most existing G-8 members' transparency/anti- 
corruption programs have performance benchmarks, but 
they tend to be limited results from the particular 
program instead of overall progress and performance 
toward transparency and against corruption.  The G-8 
Evian pilot program will give us opportunities in the G- 
8/GON Political Statement and in the comprehensive 
Technical Plan to work with the GON on broader 
performance-oriented milestones. 
 
------------------------------------- 
WHERE WE GO FROM HERE -- COORDINATION 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) To keep up, Embassy Abuja is already 
coordinating with other G-8 members, the World Bank and 
IMF here in Abuja.  Post is working with them to draw 
up a comprehensive list of existing G-8 member 
programs, and compare their goals to find synergies. 
At the meeting Embassy Abuja will host on March 17, we 
will ask our G-8 colleagues for their ideas on timeline 
and mechanisms for working with the GON under Evian. 
We originally planned this Abuja coordinating body to 
coordinate the growth in the various countries' 
transparency/anti-corruption programs here with a mind 
to using it for Evian if Nigeria became a pilot.  With 
EITI already making progress, that coordination will 
become critical. 
 
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POLITICAL STATEMENT 
------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) The farther Evian is behind EITI, the more 
difficult the G-8/GON joint Political Statement will be 
to accomplish.  EITI is already mapping out milestones 
with the Nigerians; Evian could be limited to those 
milestones if we do not begin similar work soon with 
the Nigerians on a broader Political Statement.  The 
GON's continuing effort on their own new programs will 
have a similar limiting effect on our room to maneuver. 
Moreover, at some point the GON could begin to see an 
Evian pilot program with Nigeria as unlikely to be 
consummated, considering that they have been expressing 
interest for months without further action from us. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Neither we nor the British, for different 
reasons, have given the GON the "Indicative Statement" 
model from paragraph 10 of Ref A.  We did not after 
learning (Reftelcon D) that another model is being 
discussed by Washington and London.  The British did 
not because their instructions to do so came after the 
Sous Sherpa meeting February 17-18, and the 
instructions said to do so before that meeting.  Both 
we and the British have gone over the gist of that 
model with GON interlocutors since. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Post believes negotiating the Political 
Statement can be done by G-8 member staff already in 
Nigeria, augmented by experts from Washington if 
desired, soon after we get the new instructions.  All G- 
8 members here have sizable Embassy political/economic 
staffs and expertise on transparency/anti-corruption 
issues that are already a priority for most of them. 
USAID and DFID have large democracy and governance 
units in Abuja with senior American and British staff 
devoted to planning and running their existing 
transparency/anti-corruption programs. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Post believes negotiations on the Political 
Statement should start with the GON in March, so Evian 
does not get farther behind.  One benefit of the G-8 
having so many transparency/anti-corruption programs 
already in Abuja is that we can work up much of the 
technical program mapping among G-8 members here while 
we negotiate the Political Statement with the 
Nigerians, allowing for faster work with the GON on the 
comprehensive Technical Plan. 
 
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TECHNICAL PLAN 
-------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) The process will be: 
-- Map out existing G-8 programs in Nigeria (already 
underway). 
 
-- Map out existing GON transparency/anti-corruption 
programs. 
 
-- Find the gaps where those two sets do not coincide, 
seeking to expand GON efforts where the G-8/World 
Bank/IMF are able to help and seeking to fill gaps 
where GON programs could use help that G-8 countries 
are willing to add.  Canada, Japan and Russia are doing 
no such programs in Nigeria now, and perhaps could fill 
some of those small niches. 
 
-- Most important, seek agreement with the GON on 
milestones for overall progress and performance. 
 
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FIRST TO MARKET ADVANTAGES 
-------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Post sees several opportunities from moving 
forward quickly, most of them basically "first to 
market" advantages: 
 
-- The Political Statement and Technical Plan can be 
done much faster in Nigeria than in the other pilot 
countries, because so much already exists here, and 
Nigeria's Statement and Plan can serve as models in 
both form and process for the others. 
 
-- Likewise, a Nigeria pilot that can produce Political 
Statement and Technical Plan before the G-8 Summit will 
show off the Evian program to non-pilot countries, as 
well as be a coup for the USG as Summit host. 
 
-- Programs packaged in that way for Nigeria can be 
models for programs by other donors in other countries. 
 
¶14. (SBU) The flip side is also true.  If Evian does 
not move forward in Nigeria as EITI has and is, all of 
those advantages will apply to EITI alone instead of 
EITI as part of Evian. 
ROBERTS