null
Diana T Fritz  03/15/2007 03:01:52 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

Cable 
Text:                                                                      
                                                                           
      
SECRET

SIPDIS
TELEGRAM                                           March 29, 2004


To:       No Action Addressee                                    

Action:   Unknown                                                

From:     AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 905 - UNKNOWN)          

TAGS:     PREL, PTER                                             

Captions: None                                                   

Subject:  CENTCOM COMMANDER DISCUSSES IRAQ, SYRIA, TERRORISM     
          FINANCING WITH SHAYKH MOHAMMED BIN ZAYED               

Ref:      None                                                   
_________________________________________________________________
S E C R E T        ABU DHABI 00905

SIPDIS
CXABU:
    ACTION: POL 
    INFO:   P/M ECON DAO USLO RSO DCM AMB 

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:MMWAHBA
DRAFTED: POL:JFMAYBURY
CLEARED: A/DCM:HOLSIN-WINDECKER USLO:RSIMM

VZCZCADI251
OO RUEHC RHEFDIA RUEKJCS RUEKJCS RUCJACC RUCQSOC
RHMFISS RHRHDAB RHRMDAB RUCNRAQ RUEHEE RHEHNSC RUEAIIA RUEHDE
DE RUEHAD #0905/01 0891245
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 291245Z MAR 04
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3748
INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//ISA/NESA// IMMEDIATE
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ2/CCJ4/CCJ5// IMMEDIATE
RUCQSOC/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/COMUSCENTAF SHAW AFB SC IMMEDIATE
RHRHDAB/CJFMCC CENT  IMMEDIATE
RHRMDAB/COMUSNAVCENT //N2// IMMEDIATE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 3895

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 000905 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, AND NEA/NGA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2014 
TAGS: PREL PTER AF SY IZ PK TC
SUBJECT: CENTCOM COMMANDER DISCUSSES IRAQ, SYRIA, 
TERRORISM FINANCING WITH SHAYKH MOHAMMED BIN ZAYED 
 
Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba, reasons 
1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (S/NF) Summary:  CENTCOM Commander General John 
Abizaid on March 17 discussed Iraq's transfer of 
sovereignty and potential future leadership, 
Pakistan's military operations against Al Qaida along 
the Afghan border, terrorism financing, U.S. 
approaches to Syria, with Abu Dhabi Deputy Crown 
Prince and UAE Armed Forces Chief of Staff LTG Shaykh 
Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MbZ) in Abu Dhabi.  The 
two sides also reviewed U.S.-UAE military cooperation, 
including the UAE's request for Predator.  General 
Abizaid also visited the 1,200 U.S. troops stationed 
at Al Dhafra Air Base.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (S) The Ambassador, CENTCOM Polad Ambassador Litt, 
Executive Officer Col. Reynes, Col. Gauthier (J5), 
Brig. Gen. Custer (J2), USLO, and Polchief (notetaker) 
attended.  MbZ was accompanied by Land Forces 
Commander Major General Saeed Al Rumaithy and Special 
Advisor Jack McGuinness. 
 
-------- 
Pakistan 
-------- 
 
¶3. (S/NF) Abizaid and MbZ discussed Pakistan's role in 
the war on terror and Pakistan's recent campaign 
against Al Qaida in Waziristan.  MbZ said Pakistan was 
taking the kind of action that will make a difference. 
MbZ asked Abizaid if Pakistan was coordinating its 
operation with the U.S. and sharing information with 
the U.S. about the Taliban.  Abizaid said that he 
would be meeting with President Musharraf in two days 
to discuss ways to improve cooperation. 
 
------------------- 
Terrorism financing 
------------------- 
 
¶4. (S/NF) Abizaid and MbZ exchanged views about where 
terrorists, such as those responsible for the Madrid 
bombings, get their financial support.  Abizaid 
suspected that the Madrid bombings were carried out by 
an Al Qa'ida-related "franchise group" with financial 
links to the Gulf, most likely Saudi Arabia.  He told 
MbZ that the financial backers are as guilty as those 
who planted the bombs.  MbZ said it was important to 
understand the long-established connections terror 
groups have with with charities.  He also opined that 
the U.S. needed to examine more closely how terror 
groups recruit their members as well as their 
operational logistics.  MbZ also inquired about 
prisoners taken by Coalition forces and their 
interrogation.  He also inquired as to whether Zarqawi 
was still alive.  Abizaid said there was no doubt that 
he was. 
 
----- 
Syria 
----- 
 
¶5. (S/NF) MbZ strongly recommended that the U.S. deal 
with Syria's Bashar forcefully.  He said the UAE tried 
very hard to talk to Bashar about allowing resistance 
elements to infiltrate Iraq from Syria.  "I am afraid 
Bashar didn't get the message yet," MbZ said.  MbZ 
urged the U.S. to send the right message to Bashar - a 
message he can understand.  MbZ said the Arab press 
accuses the U.S. of dictating policy to the Arab 
world, so the U.S. might as well dictate its terms to 
Syria.  Abizaid acknowledged that the Syrians are in 
trouble and are unable to keep extremists from 
crossing the border into Iraq. 
 
---- 
Iraq 
---- 
¶6. (S/NF) With respect to Iraq, MbZ told Abizaid that 
he had heard the Iraqis had requested that martial law 
be imposed for a period of three months following the 
transfer of sovereignty.  He said he agreed with this 
because Iraqis need to feel there is a command 
structure and that the situation is under control. 
MbZ and Abizaid also exchanged views about the 
proposed Iraqi leadership structure during the interim 
period and possible candidates for the three 
presidency positions and the prime ministership.  MbZ 
said he liked the idea of a strong prime minister who 
takes decisions and shows strength and leadership. 
MbZ also favored the Iraqi decision to have a civilian 
heading the Ministry of Defense.  MbZ said he thought 
that Iyad Alawi, a Shi'a with the Iraqi National 
Accord, is a promising candidate for the Prime 
Minister slot.  MbZ said that he had met Alawi a week 
earlier in London and liked the fact that he put 
Iraq's interests before his sect.  The two sides said 
they admired Adnan Pachachi, and MbZ asked whether 
Abizaid thought Pachachi might become one of the three 
presidents given that he is widely respected and wise. 
Abizaid said it was true that he is seen as the elder 
statesman, but he may not be taken seriously in some 
quarters. 
 
¶7. (S/NF) MbZ also told Abizaid that it would be very 
detrimental to delay the transfer of sovereignty to 
the Iraqis scheduled for June 30.  "I am afraid that 
would have a very negative effect on the Arab world 
and on European countries," he said.  Abizaid 
concurred, saying that July 1, 2004 was a chance to 
move from occupation to partnership. 
 
¶8. (S/NF) The discussion also included a review of 
U.S.-UAE military cooperation, including the F-16 
program, the Gulf Air Warfare Center, the UAE's 
request for Predator, and UAE Special Operations 
participation in Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan.  MbZ said he was very satisfied with the 
military relationship, and relieved that the UAE's F- 
16 training program is on track.  On Predator, MbZ 
said he was looking forward to receiving good news 
from the Washington community by the time he visits 
Washington in early April. 
 
¶9. (U) This cable was cleared by General Abizaid. 
WAHBA