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Diana T Fritz  03/15/2007 03:08:04 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

Cable 
Text:                                                                      
                                                                           
      
SECRET

SIPDIS
TELEGRAM                                           March 07, 2004


To:       No Action Addressee                                    

Action:   Unknown                                                

From:     AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 630 - UNKNOWN)          

TAGS:     PREL, PGOV, PARM, MOPS                                 

Captions: None                                                   

Subject:  SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL ABIZAID'S VISIT TO THE UAE     

Ref:      None                                                   
_________________________________________________________________
S E C R E T        ABU DHABI 00630

SIPDIS
CXABU:
    ACTION: POL 
    INFO:   USLO RSO DAO AMB DCM P/M ECON 

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:MMWAHBA
DRAFTED: POL:JFMAYBURY
CLEARED: DCM:RAALBRIGHT, USLO:RSIMM, DAO:BKERINS, CG:JDAVIS

VZCZCADI428
OO RUCAACC RUCNRAQ RUEKJCS RUEHC RHEFDIA
DE RUEHAD #0630/01 0671409
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 071409Z MAR 04
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUCAACC/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OSD/NESA//
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3440
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 000630 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
CENTCOM FOR POLAD AMB LITT AND CCJ2 
NSC FOR THEROUX 
DOD FOR OSD/ISA/NESA 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/NGA AND PM/RSAT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM MOPS GCC IZ TC
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL ABIZAID'S VISIT TO 
THE UAE 
 
Ref: (A) Abu Dhabi 568 (B) State 35891, (C) Abu Dhabi 
286 
 
Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba, reasons 
1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) General Abizaid:  I would like to welcome you 
back to the UAE.  During your visit, we have requested 
meetings with Abu Dhabi Deputy Crown Prince and UAE 
Armed Forces Chief of Staff LTG Shaykh Muhammad bin 
Zayed Al Nahyan (MbZ), and Dubai Crown Prince General 
Shaykh Muhammad bin Rashid Al Maktoum (MbR).  Your 
itinerary in the UAE will include a visit to the Al 
Dhafra Air Base for a visit to the Gulf Air Warfare 
Center. 
 
¶2. (C) In your visit, our Emirati hosts will be 
interested to hear your views on the latest 
developments in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as your 
perspective on the Greater Middle East initiative, 
especially the security component. 
 
---------------- 
Suggested Themes 
---------------- 
 
¶3. (S) We propose that you touch on the following key 
bilateral military issues, in addition to the more 
general themes below in para four: 
 
-- Express concern about the status of pending major 
weapons acquisition programs, specifically the F-16 
and E2-C (MbZ); 
 
-- Offer congratulations for the success of the 
inaugural course recently concluded at the Gulf Air 
Warfare Center (MbZ); 
 
-- Express enthusiasm for our first Joint Military 
Commission on May 1-2 in Abu Dhabi as a forum for 
high-level strategic dialogue on mutual bilateral 
issues (MbZ); 
 
-- Provide a look ahead on our likely military 
footprint both in the UAE specifically and the region 
more generally (MbZ, MbR); 
 
-- If raised, note that the Greater Middle East 
Initiative is an effort to support reforms that must 
emanate from the region (MbZ, MbR). 
 
¶4. (S) More broadly, you may also wish to: 
 
-- Express thanks for the UAE's exemplary support for 
U.S. and coalition efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
namely access to bases and logistical support, 
including the continuing UAE SOC deployment at Bagram, 
as well as extensive intelligence coordination.  The 
UAE is on the verge of sending Emirati intel officers 
to CJTF-7 in Baghdad and CJTF-180 in Afghanistan to 
work with U.S. forces.  Major General Fast visited the 
UAE March 6 to brief military intelligence 
professionals and deploying DMI officers.  Reassure 
MbZ that we are still intent upon deploying Seeker II 
UAV's at the earliest possible opportunity; 
 
-- Consult and provide assurances on need to maintain 
Iraq's territorial integrity, minimize external 
influence (Iran) and manage sectarian rivalries (MbZ, 
MbR); 
 
-- Express appreciation for UAEG's condemnation of 
terror acts, as well as its financial support for Iraq 
reconstruction (MbZ, MbR); 
 
-- (If raised) Discuss our intelligence engagement, 
particularly cooperation with the UAE in Iraq and 
Afghanistan (MbZ). 
 
------------------------- 
BILATERAL MILITARY ISSUES 
------------------------- 
 
Shift in Budget Priorities? 
--------------------------- 
 
¶5. (S) The UAE's decision to reject the F-16 Block 60 
Training FMS Case is a serious setback to this key 
engagement program.  Major General Khalid al Buainain, 
UAE Air Force and Air Defense Commander, indicated 
that the decision was largely driven by the cost of 
the program.  Although the USG portion of the case is 
relatively modest ($85 million for two years, with an 
option for five years at $178 million), the UAE 
estimates that the total cost (logistics and personnel 
support, including transportation, per diem, family 
housing, vehicles, medical and dental, etc.) will be 
closer to $1 billion.  In lieu of US-based F-16 Block 
60 training, the UAE has requested USAF Instructor 
Pilots and a Technical Assistance Field Team to assist 
them with training in the UAE.  Such an option is 
unlikely, since USAF has no surplus of F-16 IPs or 
maintainers to dedicate to UAE.  We are examining 
options to support our partners in this dilemma, and 
hope to impress upon UAE leadership the complexity of 
the F-16 Block 60 weapons system and our ability to 
help them succeed in the critical training arena.   As 
of this writing, MGen. Khalid was scheduled to lead a 
UAE delegation to the U.S. on March 9 to explore 
alternatives. 
 
¶6. (S) Concurrent with the UAE decision to reject the 
F-16 Block 60 Training Case, we have learned that UAE 
will also delay or reject a draft request to acquire 
ATACMS/HIMARS.  This decision is also reportedly due 
to the cost of the weapons system.  Meanwhile, we have 
been unable to obtain a commitment on several other 
key FMS and DCS programs, including the AH-64 Apache 
A-to-D Remanufacture, E-2C Hawkeye, and Harpoon.  All 
of these LOAs have expired without comment from UAE. 
Taken in conjunction with proposals for several other 
large, pending US programs (such as SIGINT aircraft, 
Enhanced Sea Sparrow Missile, Combat Training Center, 
and Remote Sensing), we believe UAE may be over- 
extended in their defense budget.  We are attempting 
to obtain an understanding of UAE's current and future 
year defense priorities in order to assist them with 
an integrated and executable acquisition, operations, 
and maintenance plan. 
 
¶7. (S) We are awaiting an OSD policy decision on the 
issue of the UAE's desire to procure the Predator B. 
The Emiratis believe this system will provide the UAE 
with the much-needed capability to survey and defend 
its long, porous coasts, islands, and inland borders. 
They are not interested in the Predator A. 
 
Air Warfare Center 
------------------ 
 
¶8. (C) The opening of the GAWC at Al Dhafra Air Base 
outside Abu Dhabi illustrates the expanding nature of 
our bilateral military relationship with the UAE.  Our 
two air forces have worked together for at least three 
years to bring this project to fruition.  Our 
bilateral and regional interests also are served by 
broadening our presence and access at Al Dhafra, an 
important strategic facility in the Gulf.  The 
inaugural course was held January 24-February 24 (ref 
C).  Graduates hailed from the UAE, the UK, and the 
U.S.  At both the inaugural and graduation ceremonies, 
MGen. Khalid emphasized that cultural interoperability 
was as important as the training.  We assessed this 
first course to be a success and look to build upon 
the lessons learned for the coming classes, the next 
of which is set for May. 
 
Joint Military Commission 
------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) The first JMC between our two countries is 
scheduled for May 1-2 in Abu Dhabi.  Our agenda 
priorities will be the Global War on Terrorism, 
counter-proliferation, and the burgeoning regional 
narcotics trade and its relationship to terrorism.  We 
have solicited UAE participation in developing a 
mutual agenda for discussion and are awaiting their 
input. 
 
Regional Footprint 
------------------ 
 
¶10. (S) If appropriate, I would recommend that you 
outline with the leadership - MbZ - what we see in 
terms of our likely regional footprint, and 
specifically what we have in mind for the UAE.  MbZ 
and his Air Force Commander have dropped strong hints 
at being open to a more robust presence, but we need 
to prepare them for the direction in which we may wish 
to move here, before we submit a basing plan to 
Congress where the UAE will be mentioned. 
 
"The Greater Middle East" 
------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) There have been no official UAEG 
pronouncements on the new Greater Middle East (GME) 
plan.  The local media have expressed frustration that 
Arabs have not been consulted about this new 
initiative.  The press has carried the text of the 
proposal that was leaked to "Al Hayat" and there have 
been several op-ed articles about the issue.  We have 
seen only one reference to the security component of 
the Greater Middle East initiative (ref B). 
Essentially, it is that the USG wants to engage 
governments in working together with the U.S. and 
European allies (through NATO) to address common 
security concerns, including proliferation, terrorism, 
and border security; to improve the interoperability 
of forces so we can work together more effectively in 
stability and peacekeeping operations; and to offer 
individual countries of the GME region these 
opportunities, on an entirely voluntary basis.  We 
recommend that you tell MbZ and MbR that we agree that 
reform should come from within the Middle East. 
 
Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Due to the direct personal involvement of MbZ 
and UAE Air Force Chief of Staff Mgen Khalid, we are 
making progress on an ACSA.  Talks between GHQ, 
CENTCOM J4, and USLO on March 7 were very productive 
and we believe we are very close to an agreement on 
the language. 
 
-------------- 
BROADER ISSUES 
-------------- 
 
Afghanistan and Iraq: Support for Coalition Efforts 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶13. (S) The UAE Armed Forces has deployed a 35-man 
Emirati Special Operations contingent to Bagram Air 
Base.  The Directorate for Military Intelligence has 
requested to assign intelligence officers to Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  As you know, the UAE continues to play a 
very helpful role in Afghanistan, particularly in the 
provision of humanitarian and reconstruction 
assistance.  The UAE Armed Forces provided the Afghan 
National Army with approximately $50 million in 
assistance in kind in 2002.  Total assistance is more 
than $150 million.  This includes over $50 million in 
humanitarian assistance, a $30 million pledge for 
development assistance, plus costs of deploying 
special forces to Bagram.  The UAEG also continues to 
provide substantial personal financial support for 
President Karzai. 
 
¶14. (S) Additionally, UAE plans to deploy its squadron 
of Seeker II UAVs to Bagram beginning in late summer 
¶2004.  Although this deployment was delayed from the 
original plan (December 2003) due to environmental and 
operational constraints at Bagram, preparations are 
on-track and we are working the details to ensure a 
successful deployment. 
 
Iraq: Financial Support and Timely Public Statements 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶15. (U) We understand that the UAE has disbursed the 
$215 million pledge made at Madrid both in providing 
humanitarian assistance and on buying Siemens 
generators for power plants in Iraq.  In addition, on 
February 28-29, Abu Dhabi hosted a successful follow- 
up Iraq donors' conference that confirmed the donors, 
the UN, and the World Bank were all cooperating on 
behalf of Iraq.  The Emiratis continue to issue strong 
public statements against terror attacks, such as the 
ones that occurred on March 2 in Baghdad and Karbala 
(ref A). 
 
Iran: Worries Persist 
--------------------- 
 
¶16. (S) All of our senior Emirati interlocutors worry 
about Iran's intentions in Iraq and in the Arabian 
Gulf region as a whole.  Iran is one of the major 
reasons the UAEG has been pursuing acquisition of 
ATACMS, remote sensing technology, and is so keen to 
get Predator.  The Emiratis have urged us to help 
prevent Iran from meddling in Iraq's domestic affairs. 
They view Iran's nuclear program with deep concern and 
have consistently supported a tough approach by the 
IAEA. 
 
Intelligence engagement (If raised) 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶17. (S) If MbZ talks about the threat from Iran, or 
from Afghans or Al Qaida, we would recommend that you 
describe some of the ways we are helping the UAE. 
U.S. intelligence agencies are assisting the Space and 
Reconnaissance Center to consolidate its mapping 
functions.  The U.S. and UAE are working with the 
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency to obtain air 
photo interpretation training.  CENTCOM is providing 
technical assistance and advice to the UAE to create 
an intelligence fusion center that will give threat 
indications and warnings to the UAE leadership.  The 
UAE is also taking steps to re-energize efforts to 
conclude a SIGINT agreement. 
WAHBA