This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 WELLINGTON 000173 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR EAP/FO/MDALEY AND EAP/ANP 
NSC FOR MGREEN AND CJONES 
USINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD/JHOLZMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2014 
TAGS: PREL NZ
SUBJECT: THE U.S.-NEW ZEALAND RELATIONSHIP: WHAT WE COULD 
NOT SAY IN THE MISSION PROGRAM PLAN 
 
REF: 03 WELLINGTON 0339 
 
Classified By: Charge David R. Burnett; Reasons 1.5 (B and D) 
 
 ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Since New Zealand walked away from the 
ANZUS pact in 1986, we have had growing doubts about its 
willingness and ability to contribute to regional security. 
New Zealand remains a relatively friendly, like-minded 
partner in many policy areas. But the ad hoc nature of the 
its security commitments, decline of its defense capabilities 
under successive governments, the current government,s view 
of multilateralism as a means to limit U.S. power, and its 
flirtation with China and France to limit U.S. and Australian 
influence in the Pacific raise questions about the extent to 
which we can count on New Zealand on security issues in the 
future.  The March 9-13 visit of CINCPAC Fargo to New Zealand 
could make an important contribution to our dialogue with New 
Zealand on its commitment to and capacity for sharing 
regional security responsibilities, as well as the growing 
compatibility gap with our other South Pacific partner, 
Australia.  The visit may have a direct bearing on release of 
the opposition National Party,s paper on U.S.-New Zealand 
relations and will follow a March 3 meeting between PM Clark 
and Australian PM Howard, events that are expected to raise 
these same concerns.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (S/NF)  COMMITMENT:  New Zealand,s decision to sit out 
the invasion of Iraq was a reminder of how far its security 
policies and interests have drifted from those of its 
traditional allies since NZ walked away from the ANZUS pact 
in 1986 (reftel).  Subsequent deployment of 60 combat 
engineers to Basra has allowed the current government to 
offset some of the damage done to its traditional 
relationships while continuing to place criticism of the 
Coalition in local media.  But the drift in policy is more 
fundamental than just differences over Iraq.  In laying 
groundwork for the visit of Chinese President Hu, the Clark 
government privately mooted that it was necessary for New 
Zealand to work more closely with other powers such as China 
and France to curtail U.S. and Australian influence in the 
region.  During the visit of the Chinese Vice-Minister for 
Trade, NZ Trade Minister Sutton publicly claimed that China 
was New Zealand's most important and valued trading partner, 
a claim that left Australian officials here scratching their 
heads in wonder.  Officials of the current government 
continue to tout the importance of using the UN and other 
multilateral organizations as a means of containing, rather 
than engaging with or influencing, the United States. 
 
¶3. (S/NF)  Meanwhile, beneath the political level, 
long-standing military and intelligence ties continue 
virtually unabated.  One can make the case that restrictions 
levied by the USG on programs in those areas in the wake of 
New Zealand's 1986 withdrawal from ANZUS have been 
progressively weakened over the intervening years.  Increased 
use of waivers to provide training or intelligence support 
for New Zealanders undertaking missions of interest to the 
United States makes sense. Indeed, in this Mission's view, 
any military-to-military or intelligence activity that can be 
shown to have net benefit to the United States is clearly 
worth pursuing.  However, it is important to be aware that 
these activities are used in New Zealand's domestic political 
arena as a counterweight to opposition claims that the GNZ is 
neglecting the bilateral relationship or is letting New 
Zealand's strategic policies drift.  This is why the GNZ 
routinely attempts to bypass normal diplomatic channels to 
press for further weakening of the restrictions imposed in 
the wake of the introduction of the anti-nuclear policy. 
 
¶4. (S/NF)  It is also useful to note that the degree of 
commitment expressed by military or intelligence counterparts 
is often stronger than that of their political masters. For 
example, in a discussion with State Counterterrorism 
Coordinator Cofer Black on Indonesia, NZ military and 
intelligence officials were enthusiastic about the 
possibility that they could augment U.S. and Australian 
efforts.  However, the PM's senior policy advisor immediately 
interjected that past Indonesian repression in East Timor 
would make it impossible for New Zealand to engage in CT 
activities there.  The same individual also agreed after 
lengthy discussion of various CT threats in the region that 
these matters were indeed serious, but said New Zealand's 
senior political leadership was far more concerned about food 
security than physical security.  With commitment gaps like 
these, it is important that we take our cue on New Zealand's 
commitment to regional security from those who set the 
budgets and mandate the policies. 
 
¶5. (S/NF) CAPABILITY:  Successive governments have allowed 
New Zealand's defense capabilities to decline since the 
mid-1980s.  We have been told by retired GNZ officials who 
were in senior positions in the Lange government at the time 
the anti-nuclear policy was instituted that one of the 
considerations favoring the policy was that it would lead to 
NZ withdrawing or being pushed out of ANZUS, thereby 
lessening the country's defense spending requirements at a 
time of fiscal and economic crisis.  Defense budgets since 
that time have not even been adequate to cover replacement 
costs for basic coastal defense hardware.  To its credit, the 
Clark government, after scrapping the previous government's 
agreement to buy F-16s, has moved to replace aging frigates, 
helicopters and light-armored vehicles.  It has allocated 
NZ$3.0 billion over 10 years for this purpose.  We have asked 
repeatedly at all levels where that number came from, and 
have never gotten a satisfactory answer.  In any case, given 
this apparently arbitrary budget figure, the military has 
done its best to set priorities consistent with basic 
defense, a limited peacekeeping role and an occasional nod to 
its previous allies (e.g., sending an appropriately 
configured frigate to the Persian Gulf).  Some of the new 
equipment, such as the LAV-IIIs, is less versatile than the 
equipment it is replacing.  Other hardware will be limited in 
scope because it is meant to be used with systems that the 
NZDF will no longer have -- e.g., combat helicopters but no 
joint strike fighters.  Finally, maintenance of the new 
systems is not fully accounted for in the acquisition and 
deployment costs covered by the NZ$3.0 billion budgeted. 
 
¶6. (S/NF)  Cuts in hardware and redefinition of the 
military's role as peacekeepers rather than peacemakers have 
made recruitment and retention more difficult.  Fighter 
pilots have left the Air Force in droves.  The NZDF is 
hard-pressed to come up with two rotations of troops for 
peacekeeping operations when even that is less than the 
minimum three rotations required for effective long-term 
operations.  Only the elite SAS (three squadrons) is still 
fully equipped and funded for missions relevant to the new 
threats emerging in the region and beyond.  The combat 
engineers in Basra and the PRT in Bamian Province have 
acquitted themselves well, but have been heavily dependent 
for transport and other support services on ourselves and the 
British.  Closer to home, when the Australians asked the 
Kiwis for help in the Solomon Islands, New Zealand's initial 
offer was to keep an army company "on reserve" in New 
Zealand.  Meanwhile, Fiji sent 400 or so troops.  Finally, 
after great pressure from the Australians, the GNZ relented 
and agreed to send troops.  After all that, according to the 
Australian High Commissioner (protect), due to an equipment 
breakdown, the troops had to be flown to the Solomons on 
Australian aircraft. 
 
¶7. (S/NF) COMPATIBILITY:  Given reduced commitment levels and 
declining capability, the ability to work with 
better-equipped, more focused forces would seem to be crucial 
to maintaining an appropriate level of influence in the 
region and beyond.  This Mission does not expect a country of 
four million people to punch at the same level as the United 
States, or even Australia.  However, the growing gap between 
what the Australians can do in the South Pacific and the 
ability of the Kiwis to help them do it is of great concern 
to Australia, and should be of concern to us as well.  For 
example, we are pleased that New Zealand plans to equip its 
new frigates with communications systems compatible with our 
own.  However, the contribution those frigates could make to 
peacekeeping operations in Melanesia or Indonesia is limited, 
and the military assets the NZDF could contribute to such 
operations will not be interoperable with either Australian 
hardware or our own. 
 
¶8. (S/NF) OUR MESSAGE:  We have already begun to raise the 
above concerns with the GNZ.  Beginning with Admiral Fargo's 
visit, we would like to give them a higher profile in private 
and in public.  In doing so, we must be careful not allow 
ourselves to be painted by the Clark government as bullies 
telling Kiwis how to spend their tax dollars.  We would 
suggest the following themes: 
 
-- We value our long-standing military and intelligence 
relationship with New Zealand and the commonality of values 
on which that relationship is based. 
 
-- We are facing a world that has become increasingly 
uncertain since the end of the Cold War; we all need to know 
whom we can count on, for what, and when. 
 
-- Many decisions by successive New Zealand governments over 
the past 20 years beginning with, but not limited to, the 
anti-nuclear policy have raised questions about whether we 
can continue to count on New Zealand as a partner in ensuring 
the security of this region. 
 
-- While we may differ on any number of aspects of foreign 
policy, the security of this region is clearly of mutual 
concern. 
 
-- We look forward to continued consultations with the 
Government of New Zealand on your country's commitment to 
this vital objective, your capability to join with us and 
others to contribute to achieving our shared goals, and the 
compatibility of New Zealand's future contributions with 
those of its other partners. 
 
¶9. (S/NF)  Comment:  We believe the message themes outlined 
above will reduce the Clark government's wiggle room on 
whether it prefers to work with us and Australia in the 
region, or against us.  We also believe engaging in an honest 
dialogue on these themes will reassure New Zealanders that, 
while we sould like to be able to count on a New Zealand with 
greater capability, compatibility and commitment, we are not 
asking them to do more than their fair share.  In sum, the 
creative ambiguity in our relationship since 1986 has 
permitted us to do a great deal together in areas of mutual 
interest, despite a major policy difference.  It has also 
allowed New Zealand to drift farther and farther from its 
former alliance partners in its commitment to what should be 
shared foreign policy goals.  It has permitted a generation 
of New Zealanders to believe our shared history began, and 
perhaps ended, with the Vietnam War.  Worst of all, it has 
encouraged them to ignore any parallels between China's 
interest in the region today and that of Japan in the 1920s 
and '30s. 
 
¶10. (S/NF)  One of the most common questions we have run into 
in discussing the remote prospect that the  GNZ might scrap 
all or part of the anti-nuclear policy is "If we were to do 
so, would you expect us to resurrect the commitments of 
ANZUS?"  At present, we do not have a good answer to that 
question. Replying "Change the policy and we will see," is of 
scant help to those Kiwis who would like to see a closer 
U.S.-NZ relationship. This Mission believes a frank 
discussion of our mutual expectations on regional security 
commitments, capabilities and compatibility would be useful 
in furthering the bilateral relationship. If carefully 
handled, it could also make a fruitful contribution to the 
public discussion of the U.S.-New Zealand relationship 
sparked by the U.S.-Australia FTA negotiations. 
Burnett