This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 000283 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR CHUPA 
WINPAC FOR LIEPMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2014 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC):  WRAP-UP FOR 30 
JAN 
 
 
Classified By: ERIC M. JAVITS, AMBASSADOR TO THE OPCW.  REASONS: 1.5 (B 
, D). 
 
 This is CWC-14-04. 
 
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OLYMPIC CHEMICAL PROTECTION MEASURES 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶1.  (C) Greek OPCW Attache Vassilios Kraniotis provided us 
with an update on planning for a potential terrorist attack 
using chemical agents at the Olympic games.  Most of these 
plans, he said, had been downgraded from "Confidential" to 
"Official Use Only" by his government, but he asked us to 
protect the information he provided.  According to Kraniotis, 
chemical antidotes and detection equipment ordered from 
domestic and international suppliers are starting to come 
on-line.  This includes chemical sensors to be placed at some 
Olympic venues.  The military hospital in Athens has the lead 
in responding to any suspected attack, while twelve hospitals 
have been tasked with preparing to treat victims and provide 
other assistance. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Kraniotis said that Greek officials are consulting 
with the OPCW, as well as with the U.S and a number of other 
countries, about contingency planning.  Domestically, 
consultations have expanded beyond a core Counter-Terrorism 
group to include Olympic officials and numerous government 
departments involved with preparations for the games.  To 
avoid heightening public fears, Kraniotis said, there is no 
plan to highlight these preparations in advance of the games. 
 However, he anticipated that Greek and Olympic officials 
will publicly recognize the OPCW contribution to security 
when the games have ended. 
 
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UNIVERSALITY 
------------ 
 
¶3.  (U)  Huang Yu, Keith Wilson and Ioan Tudor of the TS 
External Relations Division hosted a January 13 meeting to 
discuss and possibly refine the concept of Points of Contact 
(POC) in the Action Plan.  Four States Parties (SP) had 
nominated POCs: Chile nominated two individuals in its 
National Authority; Mexico nominated the office responsible 
for international organizations in its MFA; Poland nominated 
Krzysztof Paturej, MFA, with no specific regional focus 
noted; and the U.S.  Huang reported that no SP had yet 
volunteered as a POC for African or Asian countries who had 
yet to join the CWC.  The TS officials questioned the need 
for continued facilitations by Consuelo Femenia (Spain). 
They also reported receipt of recent voluntary contributions 
from Norway, China and South Korea and advised delegations 
that Huang had met with the Libyan Ambassador that morning 
and discussed possible TS assistance with its national 
implementation efforts.  Huang noted that the workshop for 
National Authorities in Senegal would include universality 
elements, and that non-SPs and Libya had been invited to 
attend. 
 
¶4.  (U) Several other countries raised consideration of 
nominating a POC: France (in conjunction with its EU 
partners), Russia, India, Iran, Australia, and South Korea. 
Among the topics discussed were the lack of detail regarding 
how the POC efforts would work, what types of individuals or 
organizations other countries had nominated, and how the TS 
plans to structure and coordinate the POC effort. 
Netherlands, France, and Spain called for more structure, 
while the UK and Russia asked for continued flexibility, 
noting that one size does not fit all. 
 
¶5.  (U) China, France and the UK protested the focus on the 
POC issue, noting that the Action Plan had a variety of 
elements and requesting updates on those issues as well. 
China stated it was hosting the second regional meeting of 
Asian National Authorities and that universality issues would 
be included.  Finally the Netherlands reported the EU had 
sent demarches to all non-SPs, and that Belize acceded as a 
result. 
 
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MEETING OF EXPERTS TO REVIEW SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶6.  (U) The OPCW hosted a January 28-30 meeting to review the 
Note by the Director General's note on the Report of the 
Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) on Developments in Science 
and Technology and the recommendations of the SAB for the 
first Review Conference.  Of particular importance was 
India's obstruction of the entire process as well as the 
subject matter, in addition to its refusal to support the 
draft Chairman's Report of facilitator Steve Wade (UK). 
India indicated that it would reopen various issues during 
the paper's presentation at the 36th Executive Council 
meeting, March 23-26. 
 
¶7.  (U) Delegations concurred with the SAB recommendation 
that relevant new chemicals be monitored but that the 
schedules of chemicals should not be amended at this time. 
They agreed that the SAB should continue to monitor trends in 
new chemical production technologies.  Delegations were 
divided regarding the advisability of increasing the number 
of compounds referenced in the OPCW Central Analytical 
Database (OCAD), with India in particular opposed to any 
expansion.  Delegations recommended that the SAB look for 
alternatives to GC-MS, particularly for portable on-site use 
during OCPF inspections.  Delegations agreed that the SAB 
should consider how S&T developments might affect TS training 
programs and welcomed suggestions on how these developments 
might be incorporated into future training programs. 
 
¶8.  (U) Delegations also generally supported the SAB 
recommendation that the number of OCPF inspections be 
increased, as long as this effort does not interfere with the 
overall effectiveness of the verification regime (note: this 
also was supported by India).  Delegations also welcomed 
continued SAB review of possible ways to improve activities 
associated with Article VI-related verification activities as 
well as those associated with verification of CW destruction 
programs.  Delegations concurred that gaps in protective 
capabilities need to be identified, and welcomed SAB 
consideration of ways to improve OPCW outreach to the S&T 
community.  Finally, delegations advised the SAB to consider 
OPCW International Cooperation and Assistance efforts, 
specifically how S&T developments might impact ICA programs. 
 
¶9.  (U) India, Iran, and South Africa challenged the SAB's 
work in general, stating that the SAB needed to consider 
initiatives in the political context in which they would be 
reviewed by States Parties.  Canada intervened, stating that 
the SAB exceeded its authority by broaching political 
subjects and that in the future it should focus only on S&T 
work, and EC priorities would be set accordingly.  OPCW 
representative Ralf Trapp responded that the SAB was an 
independent advisory body that is responsible for advising 
the DG on science and technology developments that could 
impact the CWC.  Iran raised its concerns about 
implementation of Article XI, in particular requesting the 
SAB consider the issue of chemical transfers for peaceful 
purposes. 
 
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NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (NIST) 
CHEMICAL DATABASE 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶10.  (U)  At the request of the Technical Secretariat, Gary 
Mallard, DOC/NIST, presented NIST-developed chemical database 
software (InCHI)  for Carlos Trentadue (TS/DEB) on January 12 
as a potential way to augment TS outreach efforts to 
resource-challenged States Parties.  The software allows for 
an end-user to input any number of synonyms (chemical names, 
structural formulas, or other common references) to generate 
a yes/no result for declaration purposes.  The TS was very 
interested in the product and noted that such a database 
could assist States Parties lacking chemical/technical 
expertise in identifying Article VI-monitored chemicals for 
declaration purposes. 
 
-------------------------------- 
SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS PROCEDURES 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (U) Discussions on procedures for Sampling and Analysis, 
held on January 12, went nowhere.  States Parties remain 
divided over the presence of an observer (UK and 
Austria/Swiss on one side -- all the rest on the other side). 
 The facilitator (Wills, Netherlands) was ill so Mallard 
facilitated and Brandon Williams sat in the chair.  Del 
worked with the UK before the meeting to request them to 
reconsider, but with no agreement.  The UK rationale is that 
they do not want an SP to influence the selection of a 
laboratory, hold up analysis or tinker with the process.  On 
the other side, SPs advocating the presence of an observer 
(France, in particular) argue that VA Part II, paras 49 and 
50, provide the right for inspected SP access to information 
collected to support compliance judgments.  Discussion 
concluded with no progress achieved. 
 
¶12.  (U)  COMMENT: Del notes that the two sides focused on 
the presence of an observer and not the underlying reason why 
the observer is necessary, namely, the inspected SPs right 
to:  1) be ensured of seal/sample integrity and 2) timely 
access to raw data to allow for sufficient response (in 
alternative documentation, comments to a preliminary 
findings, or other means).  In all other cases, to include 
challenge inspections, inspected SPs are guaranteed the right 
to inspector notebooks, offered opportunities to reconcile 
anomalies or questions on-site through additional/alternative 
records or physical access, and being briefed by inspection 
teams of preliminary findings on-site.  Basically, inspected 
SPs are offered the opportunity to address concerns as they 
arise and be provided evidence against them to allow for 
sufficient response.  Del suggests Washington evaluate 
whether options exist that address the two main points that 
do not involve a "look over the shoulder", but which 
accommodate the inspected SPs need for sufficient information 
and security. 
 
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CONSULTANTS 
----------- 
 
¶13.  (U) In a January 22 lunch hosted by the French 
delegation, Sophie Moal-Makambe raised the future of General 
Gregoire Diamantidis, a consultant in the TS Verification 
Division, and asked the U.S. representatives their opinion of 
him.  In response, the French noted that their support for 
moving the general from his current consultancy on 
optimization of verification activities to a Director 
position at the OPCW was tepid at best.  They noted that 
Paris might take a different view, but at this point they had 
no instructions on this matter. 
 
¶14.  (U)  Javits sends. 
SOBEL