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Viewing cable 04SANAA393, SCENESETTER FOR SANAA VISIT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04SANAA393 2004-02-18 12:55 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Sanaa
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SANAA 000393 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2012 
TAGS: PREL MARR YM COUNTER TERRORISM MARITIME SECURITY TERFIN
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SANAA VISIT 
 
Classified By: Charge Alan G. Misenheimer for reasons 1.5 (a), (d). 
 
1.  (U) Embassy Sanaa warmly welcomes the visit of GEN 
Abizaid and his staff.  You will find that operational 
counterterrorism cooperation between the USG and the ROYG has 
increased since your last visit. 
 
2.  (SBU) The grant transfer patrol boats for the Yemen Coast 
Guard arrived on 15 February and we are now in the process of 
getting them operational and training the Yemen Coast Guard 
in their operation and war-fighting techniques.  The Yemenis 
plan a gala inaugural event for the YCG boars in mid-March, 
and we will help the ROYG use that event to boost other donor 
support for the YCG. 
 
3.  (C) Through SOCE-Yemen we have extended our &reach8 
beyond Sanaa by conducting MTTs in outlying areas such as 
Marib, Mukalla, Aden, and Hodeidah.  These MTTs enhance the 
credibility of in-country CT cooperation, as we help the 
Yemenis project a visible and increasingly capable presence 
in areas where the terrorists have operated and/or found 
safehaven in the past. 
 
4.  (C) The USOMC has allocated all its FMF grant monies 
through FY03 and has a viable plan for the FY04 allocation of 
$14.9M once the allocation is formalized.  We are working 
through export license issues with the State Department, and 
the recent Bloomfield memo should alleviate prior approval 
problems.  The Yemen MOD still does not have an authorized 
freight forwarder under contract despite spending $500K 
already for a non-authorized shipper.  Under U.S. law, Yemen 
is responsible for providing transportation for its FMF buys. 
 The USOMC and myself have been involved in this issue on a 
daily basis with the Yemen MOD. 
 
5.  (C) Yemen,s regional policy is currently focused on 
Saudi Arabia.  Saleh is visiting the KSA this week to discuss 
the bilateral contretemps over Saudi construction of sand and 
concrete barriers along several stretches of the shared 
border.  The 2000 Jeddah Agreement ended decades of wrangling 
by demarcating the border, but the current dispute -- which 
hinges on the ROYG complaint that KSA has violated the 
Agreement by building within an agreed 20km "no-construction" 
zone -- has opened up old wounds.  This is significant, since 
bilateral cooperation to close the border to smuggling and 
terrorist infiltration is key to security of both KSA and the 
Gulf states. 
 
6.  (S) FM Qirbi,s recent U.S. visit was mostly upbeat, and 
yielded Yemeni agreement to permit U.S. teams to come (timing 
TBD) and interrogate al-Qaida detainees here.  On the other 
hand, the ROYG is resisting U.S. plans to freeze the assets 
of prominent Yemeni Sheikh Abdulmajid al-Zindani for 
terrorist financing.  Ramifications of this issue are not yet 
clear; but the overall bilateral relationship, especially CT 
cooperation, is on a positive footing. 
 
7.  (C) There are still threats in Yemen; but Yemeni security 
services have been prompt and effective in responding to 
security issues (including active threats) and the overall 
threat level continues to decline thanks to U.S.-Yemeni 
security cooperation.  Embassy planning for coming FYs is 
shifting toward greater emphasis on development assistance, 
especially in outlying areas where al-Qaida has been active 
in the past.  We are working with CJTF-HOA on a civil 
military opns program that will complement this positive 
evolution in U.S. engagement, even as we also focus on 
sustaining the effective CT engagement established over the 
past two years. 
 
8.  (C) Your meeting with Saleh will afford an important 
opportunity to update his knowledge of the mutually 
beneficial U.S. military engagement with Yemen and -- 
importantly -- to reinforce his personal relationship with 
you.  Again, we are truly looking forward to your visit. 
 
MISENHEIMER