This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 000540 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2014 
TAGS: PREL FR GM UK IT ITALIAN POLITICS
SUBJECT: TRILATERALISM: ITALY NOT ANNOYED, BUT, FOR NOW, 
NOT OVERLY CONCERNED 
 
REF: LONDON 470 
 
Classified By: POLMINCOUNS TOM COUNTRYMAN. REASON: 1.5 (B)(D). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  The last thing Europe needs is a new 
troika.  That's the consistent line taken by Italian 
government officials, in both public statements and 
conversations with Embassy Rome staff. The UK-French-German 
"trilateral" initiative (as described reftel) is divisive, 
diverts attention from constitutional treaty negotiations, 
and sends the wrong signal to the rest of Europe, not least 
to the accession states.  Further, if Italy had been asked to 
join the club, it would have refused.  There's clearly an 
element of rationalization in this principled stance. Still, 
the MFA is clearly concerned that this latest iteration of an 
EU "directorate" will disillusion accession states already 
wary of Brussels' increasing authority over their affairs. 
The menu of issues on which the "trilaterals'" views coalesce 
is limited enough, though, that it should naturally constrain 
their ability to drive too much EU policy.  Italy agrees that 
a core group of members coming together, under the right 
circumstances, to push the EU forward may induce the other 
members to come to agreement on the institutional changes 
required to run the EU more efficiently at 25.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  In an aside during a lunch with visiting US G-8 
Poldir Glynn Davies (septel), MFA Political Director (and 
Ambassador-designate to the UK) Giancarlo Aragona, while 
clearly irritated about the "trilateralism" initiative, 
opined that the UK "had inserted itself" into an ongoing 
Franco-German dialogue simply in order to protect its own 
interests.  Though member-states had long understood the 
"special psychology" underpinning the Franco-German 
relationship, they had little patience for a triumvirate that 
shared so few common positions, especially on internal EU 
issues.  "We feel strongly" that it's simply a bad idea," 
Aragona underscored. 
 
¶3. (C) MFA director for EU institutional issues, Giuseppe 
Buccino-Grimaldi, said that Prime Minister Frattini's public 
statement on January 20 and follow-up press interviews made 
clear that Italy agrees the EU integration process must 
accelerate, but disagrees on the trilateralism methodology. 
Frattini underlined (in that interview) that if Italy had 
been offered the opportunity to join the three, it would have 
refused.   Most worrying, according to Buccino-Grimaldi, is 
that the initiative diverts attention from the ongoing effort 
to forge an EU constitution, and could undermine efforts to 
integrate new members.  Italy is not necessarily opposed to 
smaller groups eventually taking the lead on key EU 
initiatives, but only in the context of structured 
cooperation as prescribed in a constitutional treaty, and 
with the ultimate aim of forging consensus on required 
institutional changes. 
 
¶4. (C) Buccino-Grimaldi's view is that the inherent 
differences in how the three view key EU issues (particularly 
defense) will ultimately limit the influence of 
"trilateralism" in the long run, especially if ongoing 
negotiations begin to indicate chances for adoption of the 
constitutional treaty during the Irish or Dutch Presidencies. 
 While echoing Frattini's assertion that  Italy would have 
refused if asked to join the three, he did not close the door 
on Italy's participation in such a grouping should it become 
apparent that agreement on a constitutional treaty is not 
possible. 
 
¶5. (C) Daniele Mancini (who reports directly to the Secretary 
General on U.S.-EU relations) told PolMilOff that "if Italy 
had been asked to join the club, my hope is that it would 
have refused, although a core group of all the founding 
members coming together to push the EU forward would make 
some sense."  The UK-French-German initiative is divisive, he 
continued, and sends the wrong signal to the rest of Europe, 
not least to the accession states.  Moreover, moving forward 
at three plays into the hands of those who would divide 
Europe into new and old camps. 
 
¶6. (C) Comment:  Leaving the door open to possible Italian 
participation in a core group, even under the condition of 
the collapse of debate on the constitution, calls into 
question Italy's claim that if asked, it would not have 
joined the UK-French-German initiative.  Readers who recall 
how hard Italy fought to join exclusive foreign policy 
groupings like the Quint and the Contact Group may also find 
it hard to believe that the Italians are anything other than 
insulted at not being invited.  But times change.  Italian 
officials are clearly dismayed by efforts to create an EU 
avant-guard at such a crucial moment in the EU constitutional 
process. Our initial soundings suggest Italy will neither try 
to break into the club nor seek to create a counterbalancing 
axis.  Rather, it will continue to call for more majority 
decision making on foreign policy and seek to position itself 
 
 
as the high-minded champion of inclusive decision making 
within the EU, hoping that inconsistencies within the 
"directorate" prevent it from getting political legs. On 
February 17 (the eve of the next trilateral summit) FM 
Frattini will make a major foreign policy address to 
Parliament.  We expect that ongoing debate within the Italian 
government on how to deal with "trilateralism," from both 
Italian and EU perspectives will be a major theme of his 
speech. 
 
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 2004ROME00540 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL