This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RANGOON 000161 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, EB, DRL 
COMMERCE FOR ITA JEAN KELLY 
TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ECON BM
SUBJECT: SPDC TRIES TO ENHANCE "UNDERSTANDING" OF BURMA 
 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.5 (b,d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: A two day seminar on "Understanding Myanmar" 
on January 27-28 was certainly the first time we have seen 
the government willing to discuss its policies in even a 
reasonably open forum.  However, few attendees took the 
opportunity to publicly push important issues with the often 
senior-level panelists.  All sessions were characterized by a 
lack of substantive presentations from the panels (expected) 
and generally laudatory remarks and overwhelming support of 
Burma's "recent efforts" by the non-diplomat conference 
attendees. The seminar was useful in some ways: we received a 
clearer picture of the purported mechanics of the roadmap; it 
illustrated that the comfort zone that the regime has 
constructed among its ASEAN neighbors and China, Japan, and 
India extends deeply into the academe of the region and it 
shows that in its own clumsy way, the regime sees the need 
for greater public relations efforts. END SUMMARY. 
 
Khin Nyunt - Ready for Prime Time 
 
¶2. (C) Before an audience of diplomats and carefully selected 
friendly academics from around the world, Prime Minister 
General Khin Nyunt kicked off a two-day conference on 
"Understanding Myanmar" on January 27.  The PM spoke in 
English, with a a TelePrompTer, and his message was heavy on 
unbelievable statistics purportedly demonstrating Burma's 
alleged advances in health care and higher education.  The PM 
also stressed the country's "steady course in its effort to 
promote a market-oriented system in spite of the unilateral 
sanctions instituted by some Western countries."  The PM 
(resplendent in his military uniform and surrounded by a 
large entourage, many also in uniform) stressed familiar 
themes, such as the importance of national unity and peace 
and stability as prerequisites for a transition to a 
democratic system.  The PM took no questions after his circa 
20-minute speech, although, in somewhat presidential fashion, 
he remained in the meeting hall shaking hands and chatting 
with diplomats and academics amidst the glare of camera 
flashes (FYI: A reliable embassy contact with very good 
access to the highest levels of the SPDC told the COM later 
that the PM and his entourage had wanted to appear in 
national dress rather than military uniforms, but after an 
exhaustive attempt to convince Senior General Than Shwe of 
the public relations benefit of this tactic, he insisted on 
the military regalia). 
 
We Have the Roadmap - Here's How to Read It 
 
¶3. (U) Throughout the address on the regime's road map, 
"Burma Road Map to Democracy: The Way Forward," presented by 
Deputy Foreign Minister Khin Maung Win, there was no specific 
mention at all of the NLD or its leader Aung San Suu Kyi 
(ASSK).  However, the DepForMin made what may have been the 
only direct allusion to the NLD and ASSK, noting that the 
previous National Convention had failed because of the 
"activities of one person and one political party". 
 
¶4. (U) The DepForMin mercifully did not read a prepared 
paper, instead speaking extemporaneously in English for 
around 40 minutes and smoothly, although superficially, 
addressing questions such as the significance of the road map 
("it is a demonstration of our commitment to democratic 
principles"), timing for the National Convention ("this 
year"), and what Burma means by "disciplined democracy" ("a 
democracy that does not adversely effect historical 
traditions or national unity").  The DepForMin provided an 
outline of the envisioned future Burmese democratic state, 
which will include an executive president limited to two, 
five-year terms; a bicameral legislature, one elected by 
national vote and the other comprised of equal numbers of 
representatives from each of Burma's states; regional 
legislatures headed by Chief Ministers; and judicial organs 
at the center and in the regions.  The DepForMin asserted 
that Burma would not go back to a one-party state and would 
have a multi-party system based on the "universal principles 
of liberty, justice and equality."  In regard to reconvening 
the National Convention, the DepForMin said that it would be 
a continuation of the previous one (a point he reiterated 
several times) and that its composition would not change.  In 
terms of party delegates, it would be entirely up to the 
individual parties to determine who to send to the reconvened 
Convention. 
 
¶5. (C) After the DepForMin concluded his presentation, there 
were several interventions in which participants from several 
ASEAN countries as well as China and Japan read universally 
laudatory prepared statements regarding the road map.  In the 
ensuing Q and A session, the COM asked the DepForMin what 
policies were being developed and what measures would be put 
in place to give its citizens the knowledge and confidence to 
express their needs and opinions in a free and open manner. 
But he was spared answering when the panel chairman declared 
the session closed.  During the break between sessions, the 
DepForMin told the COM he could not answer this publicly but 
there would be programs to advise the citizens of their right 
to express their opinions "as long as they did not adversely 
affect the stability of the country." 
 
Peace and Stability - What It Takes to Get Them Back In the 
Fold 
 
¶6. (U) During the session on "Efforts for the Prevalence of 
Peace and Stability", Brigadier-General Kyaw Thein, the 
Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence Head of 
Department and chief interlocutor on drug issues, focused on 
what he described as the indispensable role of "genuine" 
peace mediators during the Government's negotiations with 
Burma's various insurgent groups.  In conclusion, Kyaw Thein 
stressed that success depended on the commitment of both 
sides and that the Government maintains an open door policy 
in regard to talking to remaining armed insurgent groups. 
One of the panelists, retired Professor U Htun Aung Chien, an 
ethnic Karen who was identified as having played a 
significant role in the KNU negotiations, made a number of 
interesting albeit vague remarks about the importance of both 
trust and "gentleman's agreements" in achieving positive 
results.  Neither the presenter nor the panelists mentioned 
the importance of a tripartite dialogue to the achievement of 
lasting peace or stability. 
 
Suppression of Narcotic Drugs - It's a Myanmar Problem 
 
¶7. (SBU) Perhaps the most professional and straightforward 
presentation was that of Police Colonel Hkam Awng, Joint 
Secretary of the Central Committee for Drug Abuse.  Col. Hkam 
 
SIPDIS 
Awng is our key police contact and has worked closely with 
DEA for many years.  His presentation, in nearly flawless 
English, relied on slides with statistics from the UNODC and 
the joint US/Burma opium yield surveys that have been taking 
place since 1993.  He emphasized that precursor chemicals for 
amphetamine and heroin production are not manufactured in 
Burma and that cultivation and production were steadily 
declining.  The presentation was notable in its emphasis on 
Burma's responsibility for the situation and for the detailed 
explanation of its efforts to combat its narcotics problem. 
There was little attempt to blame the US or other western 
countries.  The only reference to external influences was 
that "...the much lower level of inflow of external 
assistance has" not "diminished Myanmar's determination" to 
overcome the problem, and he asked that "more and more 
countries...join hands with Myanmar." 
 
Foreign Relations -- Metaphors and Allusions 
 
¶9. (SBU) Director General of the MOFA's Political Department 
U Thaung Thun led the first session on January 28 on 
"Priorities in Burma's Foreign Policy."  In contrast to the 
Deputy Foreign Minister's presentation the day before, the DG 
did not stray from his prepared remarks and gave little more 
than a historical overview of significant events in Burma's 
recent history, beginning with its loss of independence to 
the British.  The highlight was the somewhat dated example 
given to illustrate Burma's independent foreign policy -- the 
stand Burma took in 1956 UN voting on the Hungarian issue 
(pre-dating the military's seizure of power in 1962).  The DG 
did make several enigmatic and unscripted remarks during his 
speech, including, "you can either have a beautiful mosaic or 
a house of Babel" in regards to the national races issue and 
"if it is true that whoever rules the heartland rules all, 
Burma is the heartland," during his comments on the strategic 
location of Burma between south and southeast Asia. 
 
How Many Bridges Does it take To Build an Economy? 
 
¶10. (C) The presentation on Burma's economic and development 
situation was equally fatuous.  The main speaker, the rector 
of Burma's Institute of Economics, turned in a superb 
performance as a talking head giving a stupefying 40 minute 
regurgitation of the SPDC's propaganda (roads and bridges 
equal development).  He insisted the current government had 
taken great strides in economic reform, but could only come 
up with one example -- the loosening of restrictions on the 
private sector for trading and exporting rice. 
Unfortunately, the SPDC had "temporarily" suspended this very 
liberalization not three weeks ago.  The most useful 
contribution came from one of the designated discussants who 
gingerly proposed that the private sector in Burma needs 
better "enabling conditions and more stability" and that 
Burma's system needs to provide a social safety net for 
people and for businesses that fail. 
 
The United Nations - Cooperation Burmese Style 
 
¶11. (SBU)  The MOFA's Director General for International 
Organizations and Economic Affairs U Win Mra gave a 
presentation on "Cooperation with the United Nations."  He 
talked mostly about human rights rather than UN cooperation, 
bemoaning the "undeserved" foreign criticism of Burma's human 
rights record, clarifying for all that "the Government 
protects human rights by providing food and shelter to the 
people."  U Win Mra proudly noted that Burma was the first 
country to sign the 1949 Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights, "which forever associates Burma with the values of 
the declaration."  He neglected to mention that the 1949 
signature was made by a new democratic government.  The DG 
said globalization has brought exposure to human rights in 
the country, that it was impossible to even hold a discussion 
like this in the past, and that "we are trying to change, 
step by step -- gradually."  On forced labor, U Win Mra 
announced the GOB has brought laws into line with 
international expectations, and will carry out the ILO's plan 
of action.  On AIDS, he took umbrage with outsiders who say 
"we aren't giving enough money to fight HIV/AIDS -- we are!" 
 
¶12. (C) Conveniently, the DG spoke so long that there was 
little time for real discussion or questions.  However, a 
Malaysian attendee managed to squeeze in a final word, 
lauding the GOB on its labor practices, asking "why only now 
do other countries care about using porters when Asian 
militaries and the British used them for years."  When 
Emboffs buttonholed the DG after his presentation, U Win Mra 
agreed that it would be better for Burma if the GOB allowed 
diplomats and press to travel and report on what is really 
happening in the countryside, instead of forcing total 
reliance on Burmese exiles in Thailand for news.  Regarding 
the March release of the Human Rights Report on Burma, U Win 
Mra seemed genuinely interested in updating the Embassy next 
time around on positive actions the GOB has taken in reported 
cases of rapes in ethnic areas, but cautioned that the 
military doesn't want to be embarrassed by an international 
investigation such as the one Special Rapporteur Pinhiero has 
proposed. 
 
Human Rights - Nobody Likes Me, Everybody Hates Me... 
 
¶13. (C) The most disappointing and cliche'd performance was 
that of Burma's Ambassador to the UK, Kyaw Win.  Rather than 
the theme of a Burma intent on pursuing an independent 
foreign policy and reliant on its own resources as set out by 
the Prime Minister and echoed in the presentations of the 
DepForMin and others, Ambassador Kyaw Win presented an 
endlessly detailed litany (complete with Power Point) of 
Burma's victimization by the US and others through a 
corruption of the mechanisms of the UN.  He also 
characterized political opposition to the regime as merely a 
"reflection of the desires of western countries."  At the end 
of his presentation, a few very supportive interventions were 
allowed (one by a British invitee who lauded the government's 
strides in addressing the need for training in human rights, 
labor rights, etc., and the other a garment factory owner 
lambasting the US for the trade ban which he claimed 
destroyed his business), followed by an attempt to close the 
session quickly by eyeballing the audience and claiming there 
were obviously no questions. 
 
¶14.  (C) However, the COM and the UK Ambassador in Rangoon 
insisted on asking questions to the dismay of the session 
chair.  The COM asked Kyaw Win why his presentation, with its 
portrayal of Burma as a victim rather than as a country 
intent on pursuing an independent foreign policy, was so at 
odds with the vision presented by the Prime Minister and 
other members of the senior leadership.  Kyaw Win at first 
pretended he did not understand the question (he speaks 
flawless English) and when the COM repeated her question, he 
said he just wanted to "explain the evolution of the UN 
process" and would say no more.  The UK Ambassador then rose 
to challenge his point about the democratic opposition being 
a reflection of the West, pointing out that it was a 
reflection of the will of the Burmese people as expressed in 
the 1990 elections. The UK Ambassador also said she would 
welcome the chance to continue this debate in the session or 
in the press, noting that of course this would not be 
possible as there is no free press.  The session was 
immediately brought to a close. 
 
Comment 
 
¶16. (C) This was certainly the first time we've seen the 
government willing to discuss its policies in even a 
reasonably open forum.  However, few attendees took the 
opportunity to publicly push important issues with the often 
senior-level panelists.  All sessions were characterized by a 
lack of substantive presentations from the panels (expected) 
and generally laudatory remarks and overwhelming support of 
Burma's "recent efforts" by the non-diplomat conference 
attendees (disappointing).  Although several academics asked 
questions and made minor suggestions which could have been 
construed as being (at least a teeny, weeny bit) critical of 
the regime there was no genuine dialogue or exchange of 
ideas. Even the Indian Ambassador, who can be counted on to 
be sympathetic to the regime's performances, remarked to the 
COM how "inappropriate" it was for the PM and his entourage 
to show up in uniform and behave as if it was a "state 
occasion" when the event was purported to be an academic 
seminar.  He also remarked that a conference on Burma during 
which no one mentioned the NLD or Aung San Suu Kyi was not a 
real conference. Burma specialist Dr. Robert Taylor commented 
that "he had learned little" from the seminar. Interestingly, 
many of us were apparently in a a different seminar from 
former UK Ambassador to Thailand Derek Tonkin, who made an 
intervention praising the seminar as "the non-governmental 
face" of the Bangkok Process, and as heralding a "new dawn 
for democracy." 
 
¶17. (C) The seminar was useful in some ways: we received a 
clearer picture of the purported mechanics of the roadmap; it 
illustrates that the comfort zone that the regime has 
constructed among its ASEAN neighbors and China, Japan, and 
India includes academia as well as governments; and it shows 
that in their own clumsy way, the regime sees the need for 
public relations efforts.  It also shows that Senior General 
Than Shwe can tell PM Khin Nyunt what to wear. 
Martinez