This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NASSAU 000364 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SMIG BF HA
SUBJECT: ANXIOUS PRIME MINISTER REQUESTS MEETING ON HAITI 
 
REF: A) NASSAU 211 B) NASSAU 212 C) NASSAU 263 D) 
     NASSAU 322 
 
Classified By: CHARGE ROBERT M. WITAJEWSKI FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
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Summary 
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1  (C)  At a special luncheon function to honor Junior 
Achievement on February 19, Prime Minister Christie twice 
came to the Charge's table to request an "urgent" meeting the 
morning of February 20, later set for 12:30 in the PM's 
office.  As events in Haiti continue to deteriorate, the 
sense of vulnerability by the Government of the Commonwealth 
of The Bahamas (GCOB) at being overwhelmed by mass Haitian 
migration continues to grow.  In this light, both the PM and 
Foreign Minister Fred Mitchell have exerted considerable time 
and energy in recent weeks to mediate peace talks between 
President Aristide and the opposition (reported reftels A, B 
and C).  Increasing deterioration in conditions in Haiti are 
also reinforcing the Bahamian Government's sense of 
dependence on the United States in the event uncontrolled 
Haitian migrant outflows occur.  At the 60 minute meeting on 
February 20 in his private office, PM Christie updated Charge 
on recent developments on Haiti from his Government's 
perspective. 
END SUMMARY 
 
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FOREIGN MINISTER BRIEFS THE UN 
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¶2. (C)  Christie initiated the discussion with a report on 
Foreign Minister Mitchell's just-concluded presentation at 
the United Nations General Assembly that morning.  The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs later faxed the Embassy a copy of 
Mitchell's speech, which focused on the CARICOM proposal, 
including a constitutional role for a Prime Minister, rules 
governing protests and demonstrations by the opposition, the 
professionalization of the Haitian National Police, and 
additional security and economic support.  FM Mitchell also 
called for the international community to "provide immediate 
security assistance to bring stability to Haiti, including 
helping the legitimate authority of Haiti to restore law and 
order and disarm the elements that now seek to violently 
overthrow the government, and who have interrupted 
humanitarian assistance."  Mitchell continued using -- for 
him -- unusually strong language: "Those armed gangs who seek 
now to overthrow the constitutional order should be urged to 
lay down their arms and if not they should be disarmed." 
 
¶3. (C)  Christie related to Charge that in New York Mitchell 
had sought out and obtained additional support, particularly 
from Central and South American countries, for the CARICOM 
approach.  Christie was particularly proud that Bahamian 
efforts had resulted in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Argentina 
agreeing to send police or military to Haiti as he observed, 
wryly, that these three countries did not normally agree with 
the U.S. of late.  Christie also announced that FM Mitchell 
and Assistant Secretary Roger Noriega would fly to Haiti 
Saturday to continue to work all sides of the issue. 
Christie spoke authoritatively about conversations between FM 
Mitchell and A/S. Noriega and between Mitchell and NSC 
Western Hemisphere Director Tom Shannon. He also indicated 
that he had been in contact with members of the U.S. 
Congressional Black Caucus to allay their "deep concerns" 
about the "good faith" of the U.S. and others in seeking a 
resolution to Haiti's crisis. 
 
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A RELUCTANT ROLE IN HAITI FOR MITCHELL? 
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¶4. (C)  The Prime Minister described his week of frantic 
conference calls on the Haitian crisis and a U.S. preference 
for the Bahamian Foreign Minister to play a new, and 
significant on-going role in Haiti as the third member in a 
tripartite committee that, Christie seemed to believe would 
effectively serve as a kind of "Council of Wise Men" in 
governing the country.  Christie said that as he understood 
current plans, the council would be composed of three 
members: a representative from the Haitian Opposition, an 
independent Haitian Prime Minister, and Bahamian FM Mitchell 
representing Caricom and others.  According to the Prime 
Minister, however, President Aristide had expressed 
reservations about the constitutionality of formally creating 
such a body.  However, Christie continued, he believed from 
his conversations with him that President Aristide would 
accept an arrangement in which the same group would 
"informally" advise him on matters. 
 
¶5. (C)  Continuing his exposition, Christie then went on to 
say that his preferred solution would be for the United 
States or the French to assume the leadership of this body 
and supply the "third member" rather than The Bahamas. 
 
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PRIME MINISTER WORKS THE PHONES IN NASSAU -- DEFERS TO U.S. 
AS "TOP DOG" 
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¶6. (C)  The Bahamian Prime Minister appeared comfortable in 
his newly-assumed role of international mediator. He noted 
that he had spoken "at least a dozen times" with Haitian 
President Aristide of late, and this week alone reported that 
he had spoken with the Haitian President at least once each 
day.  Explaining his frequent telephone conversations, PM 
Christie declared that, given the urgency of the situation, 
he did not want to risk having his message diluted or 
distorted "by leaving (the resolution of the crisis) to 
ambassadors." 
 
¶7. (C)  Noting that President Aristide had claimed that 
"bandits" were responsible for attacking the Opposition, not 
government forces, PM Christie said that each time he spoke 
with Aristide he had stressed the importance of Aristide 
appealing directly to the U.S., France, or Canada for 
assistance in re-equipping Haitian police so that law and 
order could be restored.  Christie indicated some sympathy 
for Aristide's claimed plight, telling Charge that "there is 
simply no way that a demoralized police force of less than 
5,000 can maintain law in order in a country of more than 7 
million."  Christie seemed hopeful that the U.S. would 
reconsider its position against supplying the Haitian police 
with lethal weapons, and at a minimum do more to support the 
Haitian police with non-lethal support. 
 
¶8. (C)  Christie indicated his preference for continued 
direct high-level involvement in Haiti.  He felt that it was 
important that he and others at the head of state level 
continue to involve themselves in the situation and interact 
directly with Aristide in order to reinforce the urgency of 
the situation. Christie said that it had been his idea to 
contact South African President Thabo Mbeki to try to involve 
him in Haiti.  It would be appropriate, he said, for the 
world's "newest black nation" to help the world's "oldest 
black nation."   At regular intervals during the one-hour 
meeting, Christie reiterated the pleas for assistance to 
restore law and order in Haiti made by himself and others to 
Secretary Powell, President Bush, Secretary General Annan, 
and the O.A.S. 
 
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SYMPATHIZES WITH ARISTIDE'S CONCERNS 
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¶9. (C)  Christie stressed his agreement with his Foreign 
Minister that the best resolution would be an agreement that 
conferred some "dignity" to Aristide.  Christie specifically 
sympathized with Aristide's complaint that he (Aristide) was 
being asked to take unconstitutional actions.  The Bahamian 
Prime Minister indicated that based on his conversations with 
Aristide, he believed that Aristide was not opposed to 
working with the opposition on the joint appointment  of a 
new Prime Minister and subsequently a new cabinet, but is 
objecting to being left out of the process or becoming a 
figurehead for the remainder of his term in office.  Christie 
also made clear his position that President Aristide is 
Haiti's legitimately elected constitutional leader.  But 
Christie then coupled this principled stand with an 
evaluation of the state of the Haitian opposition from his 
position as a practicing politician.  "Even with a year to 
organize," he said, "the opposition will not match Aristide's 
level of support, and would lose if Aristide decided to run 
again, which he will not." 
 
¶10. (C)  In this vein, Christie volunteered what he thought 
might be the outcome of the February 21 talks in Port au 
Prince, Christie said that he assumed that the United States 
had the power to achieve a solution.  Christie said that he 
was confident that A/S Noriega "had the clout" to bring 
Haitian Opposition leader Apaid around, and that once Apaid 
signed on to an agreement, the rest of the Opposition "would 
follow" in permitting President Aristide to serve his term 
out since they couldn't organize themselves to win an 
election now. 
 
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TURNING TO THE U.S. IN EVENT OF AN OUTFLOW FROM HAITI 
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¶11. (C)  Turning from the crisis in Haiti to the consequences 
for The Bahamas if that country's political instability 
results in a migrant outflow, PM Perry Christie went on at 
great length to reiterate his determination to build a deep 
water port at Great Inagua that would serve as his country's 
strategic southern base.  As he lamented: "The Haitian 
problem isn't going to go away for years to come."  Given 
this reality, he was convinced that the Royal Bahamian 
Defence Force (RBDF) will always need to patrol the country's 
vast southern waters.  Moreover, he continued, the drug 
problem will always be there, and The Bahamas faces a 
consistent problem of fish poaching in by neighboring 
countries.  According to Christie, "Last year the Dominican 
Republic exported $2 million in conch, and their ain't no 
conch in Dominican waters!"  Clearly, he declared, it is in 
the best interests of The Bahamas to have a deep water port 
and refueling station at its southern tip.  Christie 
reiterated the common interests of the United States in 
having access to a similarly-situated facility and again 
asked for the Charge's help in obtaining U.S. funding for 
construction of a harbor and breakwater at Great Inagua. 
 
¶12. (C)  Charge responded that the U.S. would like to support 
the Bahamian plan, but that it had been extremely difficult 
to get RBDF and National Security officials to go beyond 
global declarations and obtain specific plans regarding GCOB 
intentions on Great Inagua.  Given budgetary constraints in 
the United States, Charge explained that until specific plans 
were forthcoming, backed up by a GCOB actually committing its 
own funds, U.S. agencies would be reluctant to even consider 
blocking off possible funding.  Noting that the U.S. was 
already looking at FY 06 budgets, Charge urged the Prime 
Minister to accelerate internal GCOB decision-making on Great 
Inagua.  The Prime Minister agreed, indicating that his 
government is willing to work out the details immediately. 
 
¶13. (C)  In addition to construction of a southern strategic 
base in Great Inagua, the Prime Minister also revealed that 
he was in negotiations to conclude an agreement with Royal 
Caribbean Cruise Line to build a deep water port at Great 
Inagua.  Though the island is currently barren, it is home to 
more than 50,000 pink flamingos, a huge Morton Salt plant, 
and at least one nice beach.  He was hoping that the flamingo 
national park would provide cruise ship passengers with an 
interesting diversion to the normal Caribbean port of call. 
Christie took on board Charge's suggestion that costs of 
constructing a base on Great Inagua could effectively be 
reduced if any Royal Caribbean construction were to be made 
part of the GCOB's plans. 
 
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NO ASYLUM 
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¶14. (C)  Regarding what The Bahamas would do in the event 
that large numbers of Haitians started appearing on Bahamian 
territory, the Prime Minister indicated that he would turn to 
the United States to effect repatriation.  The Bahamas, he 
said, simply had no capacity to maintain large numbers of 
migrants for any period of time.  Declaring that he had no 
concert with "those liberals" on this issue, he declared that 
there would never be asylum in The Bahamas for Haitians.  The 
total population of The Bahamas was, he said, "less than that 
of a small town in the United States.  We simply cannot do 
what Amnesty International and other groups would insist on 
us." 
 
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OPERATION COMPASSION HAS A NEW RELEVANCE 
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¶15. (C)  Christie was surprisingly well versed on the 
proposed latest iteration of Operation Compassion, a joint 
patrolling exercise that involves enhanced communication and 
coordination between the RBDF and the U.S. Coast Guard.  PM 
Christie reported that the Cabinet had discussed 
participation in "Op Compassion" the previous day and had 
approved Bahamian involvement.  As the Haitian crisis has 
evolved, the GCOB has deliberately taken steps in its public 
comments to publicize an increased RBDF presence in southern 
Bahamian waters.  Charge indicated that we believed that the 
USCG would be prepared to engage in planning discussions for 
this iteration of Op Compassion as early as March 3-4. 
 
¶16. (C)  However, as Ref D reports, only four of the eight 
RBDF vessels capable of long range patrolling are 
operational.  Charge queried the Prime Minister on the return 
to service date of the HMBS Bahamas noting that effective 
Bahamian participation in this six-month extended "Op 
Compassion" required that there be at least three functioning 
RBDF vessels (the HMBS Bahamas, Nassau, and Yellow Elder) so 
that one would be on station 24/7 throughout the exercise. 
Similarly, Charge noted that the logistics of keeping a 
Bahamian vessel on site 24/7 also presumed that the RBDF 
vessels would re-fuel and re-provision at Guantanamo Naval 
Base rather than make extended return trips to its home port 
of Coral Harbour in New Providence.  Finally,  Charge noted 
that we would need assurances of the commitment and 
cooperation of RBDF Commodore Rolle to commit the necessary 
assets to the operation.  PM Christie responded that the 
repairs have started and completing them is a government 
priority.  He also acknowledged Commodore Rolle's reluctance 
to commit the necessary assets by explaining that Rolle 
claims he needs to keep some ships in reserve in the event of 
other problems in other areas of the country.  The Prime 
Minister said that he overrode the Commodore's objections by 
asking him rhetorically, "What other crisis could impact on 
The Bahamas right now that is more critical than preventing a 
migrant outflow from Haiti?" 
 
¶17. (C)  Closing this part of the discussion,  the Prime 
Minister also urged the U.S. to simplify matters by providing 
fuel to RBDF vessels at no cost, as the relative costs are a 
mere "drop in the bucket" for the U.S.  As Charge responded 
that refueling costs to the GCOB would probably be much lower 
at Guantanamo than in Nassau, the Prime Minister jokingly 
accused Charge of "trying to nickel and dime me!" while 
thanking him for not yet pressuring him for an Article 98 
agreement in the meeting. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶18.  (C)  The fact that the over-programmed Prime Minister 
would budget more than one hour for a meeting on one day's 
notice speaks to the overriding importance Haiti has in local 
politics.  PM Christie is clearly committed to remaining 
engaged on finding a solution to the Haitian problem, and 
accepts that this is currently the dominating project of his 
Foreign Minister, who is also the Minister of Public Service. 
 While his decision-making style may be protracted and 
indecisive, Bahamian Prime Minister Perry Christie is also an 
impressive, dynamic, charismatic  and ebullient presence and 
an indefatigable seeker of consensus.  For the purpose of 
promoting peace in Haiti, his personality compliments that of 
Foreign Minister Mitchell, which is steadier, stealthier, and 
more methodical.  Given The Bahamas' proximity to Haiti, both 
feel The Bahamas has no choice except engagement. 
WITAJEWSKI