This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000196 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR CA/ACS/CI 
RIYADH PASS TO DHAHRAN AND JEDDAH 
DHAHRAN FOR CAROLINA MELARA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CASC CMGT BA
SUBJECT: LESSONS LEARNED FROM RECENT CHILDREN'S ISSUES CASES 
 
REF: A. MANAMA 153 
 
     ¶B. STATE 26772 
     ¶C. MANAMA 149 
 
¶1. (SBU) Last week, Emb Manama (with assistance from the 
Department and CONGEN Dhahran) helped resolve two difficult 
children's issues (CI) cases involving disputes between Saudi 
fathers and Amcit mothers, with their dual-national children 
in between.  Both concluded successfully, but one was far 
more difficult than the other.  The lessons that we are 
drawing from the Al-Shalawi and Al-Balawi cases may be 
helpful should we and the Department confront similar cases 
again. 
 
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LESSON 1:  USE THE SAME PASSPORT TO ENTER AND EXIT BAHRAIN 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU).  In the Shalawi case, the mother had the Saudi 
passports for her and her six children when she went through 
exit controls at Bahrain International Airport.  Using the 
same passport for entry and exit allowed the immigration 
officer to verify by computer that she and her children 
entered Bahrain legally on the Saudi passport.  Their 
departure was unhindered.  Their US passports were necessary 
only to show the airline that they would be able to enter the 
US upon arrival. Above all, the mother's presence helped make 
the travel appear entirely routine. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In contrast, the four Al-Balawi children were 
traveling alone and on new US passports.  This raised GOB 
suspicions.  The new passports provided the Bahrainis with no 
entry record, which raised an immediate flag.  Moreover, a 
senior official in the MOI said that if an immigration 
officer suspects children traveling are subject to a child 
custody case, they are to check with their superiors.  The 
Balawis' ran afoul on both counts quickly, pushing the 
decision to higher levels of the GOB and engaging the MFA. 
If the children had been able to carry their Saudi passport, 
they might have been able to leave Bahrain the same night 
they arrived at the Embassy. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
LESSON 2:  THE GOB LIVES FOR THE WEEKEND--REALLY 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Al-Balawi children showed up on a Thursday 
night, the first day of the local weekend.  As the Embassy 
began addressing ever-higher levels of the GOB to get a quick 
decision--while trying to show as much sensitivity towards 
local mores as possible by avoiding calls during naptimes and 
meals--it became more and more apparent that the GOB, 
especially the Foreign Ministry, was positively hostile to 
being pressured into making a quick decision on a weekend. 
One high-level MFA official angrily told the Charge to "stop 
calling all around town about this," while another told 
CONOFF that the USG was not helping its case by pushing so 
hard for a quick decision on a weekend. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
LESSON 3:  KEEP CI CASES IN THE INTERIOR MINISTRY 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶5. (SBU) For reasons that are still not entirely clear, the 
MFA appears to have been unhelpful in the case of the Al 
Balawis.  One very knowledgeable GOB source that that at a 
core Cabinet meeting on February 7, only the MFA argued 
against letting the Balawi children travel immediately.  In 
contrast, the upper echelons of the Ministry of Interior 
(MOI) were consistently in favor of letting the children 
travel.  We suspect that the MFA was more sensitive to the 
Saudi reaction than was the MOI--a sensitivity that led the 
MFA to commission a "legal study" of the issue.  (COMMENT: 
This "study" appears to have not been completed.  END 
COMMENT).  Given this sensitivity, resolving these types of 
cases through the MOI may be preferable. 
 
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LESSON 4:  HAVE A CLEAR EXIT STRATEGY 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) In the Al Shalawi case, Dhahran CONOFF was in 
regular communication with both Manama CONOFF and Mrs. Al 
Shalawi in the weeks prior to the event.  This communication 
allowed both CONOFFs to plan exactly what was needed for the 
Al Shalawis to depart.  In contrast, the Al Balawi children 
had no clear idea how they expected to leave Bahrain, and 
neither did their mother.  Without knowing more about exactly 
how, when, or with what documents the children would arrive 
at the Embassy, Post was not able to lay the groundwork for 
an easy departure, nor were we able to effectively allay the 
anxieties of the mother or children about what was going to 
happen. 
 
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LESSON 5:  A LITTLE LUCK ALWAYS HELPS 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) The willingness of the Saudi father to allow the 
children to travel to their mother on a "temporary visit" was 
instrumental in the children receiving GOB permission to 
depart Bahrain for the US.  The father's consent gave the MFA 
the escape it was hoping for--it could placate the US without 
angering the Saudis.  However, this escape required a senior 
MFA official to explain (unconvincingly) to the Charge that 
it was illegal for someone to enter Bahrain on the passport 
of one nationality and depart using the passport of another 
nationality, but since the father did not object, it was OK 
for the children to leave using their US passports. 
(COMMENT:  A knowledgeable legal source looked at the 1965 
Bahraini Immigration Law and said that the law was silent on 
the issue of whether or not an alien had to enter and leave 
Bahrain using the same passport.  END COMMENT) 
 
¶8. (SBU) Our pressure certainly had the GOB looking for an 
escape, but if the father had reacted differently to what his 
wife told him, or if he believed that the children were still 
in Bahrain, the Al-Balawi children likely would still be in 
Bahrain. 
 
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LESSON 6:  TRUST BUT VERIFY, AND THEN VERIFY AGAIN AND AGAIN 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) After receiving assurances from senior levels of the 
GOB, verified through two different channels, that 
"everything was taken care of" and that the Al Balawi 
children would be allowed to depart, CONOFF showed up at the 
airport with the Al Balawis only to find that the GOB had 
failed to inform the immigration officers that the children 
had GOB permission to travel.  This time, the immigration 
officers said that not only was there still no entry record 
for the US passports, but also a missing persons report on 
the children filed by the father.  We had anticipated this 
scenario, and RSO was standing by to contact the Deputy 
Interior Minister, with whom we work closely on many security 
issues.  After several telephone calls and a 30-minute wait, 
the children were able to depart Bahrain. 
 
FORD