This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 000572 
 
SIPDIS 
 
TAGS: OVIP KU
SUBJECT: SEDCDEF SCENESETTER FOR KUWAIT 22-24 FEB 04 
 
CLASSIFIED BY JOHN MULHOLLAND FOR REASONS 1.5 A,B. 
DECLASSIFY ON 19 FEB 14 
 
 ¶1. (U) WELCOME TO KUWAIT. THE KUWAITIS ARE DELIGHTED TO HAVE 
YOU BACK ON THEIR TURF, AND THEY ARE AGAIN EXTENDING FULL 
COURTESSIES TO YOU AND GENERAL ABIZAID AT BAYAN PALACE. THIS 
SCENESETTER PROVIDES THE CURRENT STATE OF ON-GOING HN ISSUES 
IN ORDER TO PREPARE YOU FOR MEETINGS WITH KUWAIT OFFICIALS. 
WE HAVE TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED A MEETING WITH THE PRIME 
MINISTER (PM) ON THE EVENING OF 22 FEB 04. 
 
¶2. (C) PRIME MINISTER: SHEIKH SABAH AL-AHMED AL-JABER 
AL-SABAH (HIS HIGHNESS). UNPRECEDENTED APPOINTMENT AS PM JUL 
03 (CROWN PRINCE HISTORICALLY HELD THE TITLE OF PM).  YOU 
LAST MET THE PM IN WASHINGTON D.C. IN SEP 03.  IN A MEETING 
ON 27 JAN 04 (SEE PARA 4 BELOW), THE PM STATED KUWAIT WOULD 
CONSIDER THE U.S. REQUEST TO CONTINUE THE FUEL SUPPLY FOR 
U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS.  ACCORDING TO A CLOSE ADVISOR, HIS 
DOMESTIC AGENDA IS TO OVERCOME TRIBALIST (CONSERVATIVE) 
ELEMENTS IN KUWAIT TO ACCOMPLISH THE FOLLOWING: OPEN THE OIL 
SECTOR TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT (PRESSING NEED EXISTS FOR 
FOREIGN UP-TO-DATE TECHNOLOGY); PRIVATIZATION (REDUCING THE 
WELFARE STATE); EDUCATION (ESTABLISH PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES); 
AND WOMEN,S RIGHTS ISSUES (INCLUDING VOTING RIGHTS). 
 
¶3. (U) CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF U.S. / KUWAIT RELATIONSHIP. 
 
3A. (U) THE GOK CONTINUES TO PROVIDE A STRATEGICALLY-VITAL 
SECURE OPERATIONAL REAR AREA ISO OIF AND USCENTCOM 
INITIATIVES. 
 
3B. (C) AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL (PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF 
DEFENSE) KUWAIT REMAINS STRONGLY SUPPORTIVE OF U.S. 
OBJECTIVES.  SENIOR KUWAIT GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE 
ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT OPPORTUNITIES TO SUPPORT OUR EFFORTS.  THE 
PRIME MINISTER KNOWS THAT THE SUCCESS OF OUR EFFORTS IN IRAQ 
IS CRITICAL TO THE WELL BEING OF KUWAIT. AT THE SAME TIME, 
THE GOVERNMENT MUST ANSWER TO AN ACTIVE PARLIAMENT THAT CAN 
AND DOES CALL MINISTERS TO ACCOUNT FOR THEIR ACTIONS AND A 
CONSERVATIVE MINORITY SEGMENT OF THE KUWAITI PUBLIC THAT IS 
SUSPICIOUS OF U.S. MOTIVES.  THE RECENT ACCUSATIONS AGAINST 
HALLIBURTON CORPORATION IN KUWAIT HAVE CAUSED THE MINISTER OF 
ENERGY TO REFER THE MATTER TO THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR FOR 
INVESTIGATION.  LOCAL MEDIA HAVE REPORTED PARLIAMENTARY 
DEBATE ON THE MATTER INVOLVING THE PM. 
 
3C. (C) AT THE ARMED FORCES LEVEL CHIEF OF STAFF LTG FAHAD 
INCREASINGLY ASKS FOR DETAILED JUSTIFICATION FOR OUR SUPPORT 
REQUESTS.  BUDGET CONSTRAINTS INCREASINGLY DOMINATE HIS 
DECISION MAKING.  U.S. SUPPORT REQUESTS IN EXCESS OF THOSE 
AGREED TO IN YEARS PAST ARE SUBJECT TO INCREASED SCRUTINY. 
 
¶4. (C) WHAT YOU SHOULD EXPECT FROM THE PM. HE WILL ASK FOR 
YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN IRAQ AND YOUR VISION FOR 
THE WAY AHEAD.  KUWAITIS ARE ANXIOUS BUT OPTIMISTIC 
CONCERNING THE POLITICAL TRANSITION.  KUWAIT,S MAJOR 
CONCERNS ARE: THAT IRAQ BE A STABLE FRIENDLY NEIGHBOR; 
MAINTAIN ITS NATIONAL UNITY; AND THAT NO ONE (SPECIFICALLY 
THE SUNNIS) BE DISENFRANCHISED. 
 
¶5. (U) WHAT THE PM WANTS TO HEAR. 
 
5.1. (C) THANK HIM AND HIS GOVERNMENT FOR THE OUTSTANDING 
SUPPORT IN TERMS OF BASING, AND ASSISTANCE IN KIND INCLUDING 
FUEL.  KUWAIT IS OUR ONLY INDISPENSABLE ALLY IN SUPPORTING 
OIF.  CURRENT ESTIMATES BY AMEMB KUWAIT PLACE GOK COSTS BORNE 
ISO U.S. FORCES AND OPERATIONS DURING 2003 ALONE AT 
APPROXIMATELY $677M (NOT INCLUDING INTANGIBLE COSTS SUCH AS 
WAIVED PORT AND IMMIGRATION FEES, SECURITY PROVIDED FOR U.S. 
CONVOY OPERATIONS ETC).  THIS FIGURE REPRESENTS ROUGHLY 15 
PERCENT OF THEIR ENTIRE MILITARY BUDGET. 
 
5.2. (U) REASSURE THE PM THAT THE U.S. IS DETERMINED TO STAY 
THE COURSE IN IRAQ.  WE ARE COMMITTED FOR AS LONG AS IT TAKES 
TO ENSURE A UNITED AND STABLE IRAQ. 
 
5.3. (U) COMMEND HIM FOR HIS LEADERSHIP IN SUPPORTING IRAQ,S 
INCLUSION IN THE 14-15 FEB MEETING OF THE NEIGHBORING 
COUNTRIES OF IRAQ HELD HERE IN KUWAIT.  THIS MEETING RESULTED 
IN SUPPORT FOR THE INTERNEL IRAQI POLITICAL PROCESS AND SET A 
PRECEDENT FOR IRAQI INCLUSION IN THIS FORUM. 
 
5.4. (U) ASSURE HIM THAT THE U.S. SUPPORTS KUWAIT IN ITS 
EFFORT TO LOCATE AND RETURN ITS POWS AND MISSING PERSONS FROM 
¶1991. TO DATE, REMAINS OF 75 OF THE 605 MISSING HAVE BEEN 
POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED (NO LIVE POWS HAVE BEEN LOCATED). 
 
 
¶6. (U) ON-GOING BILATERAL ISSUES 
 
6.1 (C) FUEL SUPPLIED AS ASSISTANCE IN KIND (AIK).  THE 
INTER-AGENCY (DOS/DOD) NEGOTIATING TEAM LED BY DOS A/S FOR 
POLITICAL MILITARY AFFAIRS LINCOLN BLOOMFIELD JR. AND JOINED 
BY PDASD/ISA PETER FLORY MET ON 27 JAN 04 WITH 
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MINISTRIES OF FINANCE, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS, DEFENSE, AND ENERGY, AS WELL AS THE KUWAIT PETROLEUM 
CORPORATION.  THE MEETING OCCURRED AT THE REQUEST OF HOST 
COUNTRY AFTER GOK SERVED EMBASSY W/ $85M BILL FOR FUEL 
CONSUMED AFTER 1 MAY 03. (THE BILL DID NOT SPECIFY THE AMOUNT 
OF FUEL OR AN END DATE FOR THE BILLING PERIOD, BUT WAS DATED 
1 DEC 03).  THE GOK,S PRIMARY DESIRE IS A WRITTEN AGREEMENT 
TO SERVE AS THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THE FUEL,S PROVISION.  THE 
GOK REPRESENTATIVES AGREED TO REFER USG CONSUMPTION DATA AND 
USG REQUEST FOR A CONTINUATION OF AIK FUEL SUPPORT TO THEIR 
MINISTRIES, LEADERSHIP.  WE HAVE RECEIVED NO RESPONSE TO 
DATE ALTHOUGH FUEL CONTINUES TO BE SUPPLIED. 
 
6.2. (U) JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION (JMC):  THE JMC WILL OCCUR 
IN WASHINGTON, DC 30-31 MAR 04.  OMC-K IS ASSISTING IN 
PREPARATION OF AGENDA ITEMS ICW CFLCC, CENTCOM, AND THE 
KUWAIT ARMED FORCES. 
 
6.3. (U) BORDER CROSSING / CUSTOMS / COMMON ACCESS CARD (CAC) 
MOU.  ON 18 JAN 04 THE EMBASSY FORWARDED A DIPLOMATIC NOTE TO 
THE MFA CONTAINING OUR PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT OF THE BORDER MOU 
WHICH WILL REGULARIZE BORDER CROSSING, CUSTOMS AND 
IMMIGRATION PROCEDURES USED BY COALITION FORCES IN KUWAIT. 
ALSO PROPOSED: 1) CFLCC RECEPTION BOOTH AT KCIA; 2) GOK TO 
PROVIDE MULTIPLE-ENTRY VISAS (VICE SINGLE-ENTRY VISAS) AS THE 
NORM; 3) ESTABLISH A WORKING GROUP TO DEAL WITH CONTRACTORS 
PRESENTLY IN COUNTRY WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTATION; 4) 
COMMITMENT BY THE U.S. TO HONOR HOST-COUNTRY IMMIGRATION 
LAWS.  THIS LAST TERM REFLECTS U.S. INTENTION TO REQUIRE 
CONTRACTORS AND OTHER NON-U.S. PERSONNEL TO ENTER/LEAVE THE 
COUNTRY WITH A PASSPORT AND VISA.  TO DATE, THE MOU HAS NOT 
BEEN SIGNED PENDING AGREEMENT ON WHICH SIDE WILL PROVIDE 
X-RAY EQUIPMENT AT THE U.S.-MANAGED BORDER CROSSING POINT 
TO/FROM IRAQ.  KUWAIT CUSTOMS SEEKS LANGUAGE IN THE MOU 
ASSIGNING RESPONSIBILITY TO USG.  CFLCC IS RESEARCHING THE 
MATTER. TOTAL ANTICIPATED COST OF THIS GAMMA RAY EQUIPMENT IS 
APPROXIMATELY $7 MILLION. 
 
6.4. (S) TAXATION OF USG CONTRACTORS: SEVERAL USG CONTRACTORS 
IN KUWAIT HAVE RECEIVED NOTICE OF GOK,S INTENT TO TAX INCOME 
EARNED FROM USG CONTRACTS.  THE EMBASSY HAS SENT A DIP NOTE 
TO MFA REMINDING THE GOK IT CANNOT TAX U.S. CONTRACTORS 
REGARDLESS OF WHERE INCOME IS EARNED, PER DCA.  ONE USG 
CONTRACTOR SUBSEQUENTLY LEARNED ITS TAX LEVY WAS CANCELLED. 
 
6.5. (S) Need For A Kuwait-Focused Strategic Review.  Kuwait 
clearly needs to conduct a strategic review to define the 
current and future strategic environment that it will operate 
in, and will need our help in doing so.  LTG Fahad has 
specifically asked for our assistance in doing so, referring 
to the Defense Review Group conducted in 1991 that ultimately 
became the blueprint for the current Kuwaiti military.  The 
Kuwaiti military is looking to move towards a 
capability-based force vice the current, threat-based force. 
Such a review, guided and shaped by the U.S., would 
significantly address the requirement for Kuwait to 
re-examine its national military strategy and that 
strategy,s relationship to USG/CENTCOM regional strategy in 
the wake of OIF.  Additionally, such a review would spur 
development of an appropriate, corresponding Kuwaiti force 
structure, an accompanying acquisition strategy, and outline 
for a continuing military-to-military relationship with the 
U.S.  We believe strongly that this is a premier opportunity 
to focUS Kuwait,s National Security Strategy and draft a new 
blueprint for the Kuwaiti Armed Forces consistent with U.S. 
regional strategic intentions.  To that end, we have 
scheduled a Defense Resource Management Study for Kuwait 
through OSD.  Although primarily oriented to resource 
management, we recommend that this study primarily focus on 
the strategic assessment in order to shape the subsequent 
requirements as outlined above.  The upcoming JMC will be the 
forum for initial discussions on the way ahead. 
 
6.6. (C) FORCE PROTECTION FOR DOD CONTRACTORS:  THE INCREASED 
NUMBER OF CONTRACTORS IN KUWAIT HAS RAISED THE QUESTION OF 
WHO HAS FP RESPONSIBILITY OVER THEM:  COM, CENTCOM, OR 
NEITHER. THE UNIVERSAL MOU ON FP DOES NOT MENTION CONTRACTORS 
PER SE.  THE COM HAS SENT A CABLE TO DOS ASKING IT TO ADDRESS 
THE ISSUE (KUWAIT 566, FORCE PROTECTION RESPONSIBILITY TO DOD 
CONTRACTORS IN KUWAIT, DTG 1813382 FEB 04).  THE MATTER ALSO 
RECEIVED HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION FROM RECENTLY COMPLETED (17 FEB 
04) DOS/IG INSPECTION OF EMBASSY.  CURRENTLY, THERE IS NO 
COMPREHENSIVE ACCOUNTING FOR DOD CONTRACTORS IN KUWAIT.  FULL 
ACCOUNTING IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE ALL PERSONNEL ENTITLED TO 
FP ARE RECEIVING IT. THIS IS NOT A BILATERAL ISSUE THAT YOU 
SHOULD ANTICIPATE RAISING WITH YOUR HOSTS.  IT WILL BE 
RESOLVED THROUGH THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS IN WASHINGTON. 
 
MULHOLLAND