This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 000230 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS AND PRM/ANE, LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY, 
NSC FOR MILLARD, GENEVA FOR PLYNCH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2013 
TAGS: PREF PREL PGOV BH NP
SUBJECT: BHUTANESE REFUGEES: REPATRIATION INDEFINITELY 
DELAYED, BUT REFUGEES STILL WANT TO RETURN HOME 
 
REF: A. (A) 03 KATHMANDU 2501 
     ¶B. (B) NEW DELHI 584 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert K. Boggs for reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  From January 19-22, PRM/ANE Melissa Pitotti 
and PolOff met with various Government of Nepal (GON) and 
UNHCR officials and visited two of the seven Bhutanese 
refugee camps to discuss the status of negotiations between 
Nepal and Bhutan to find a durable solution for the refugees. 
 The repatriation of Bhutanese refugees from Khudunabari 
Camp, originally scheduled for November 2003 and then for 
February 2004, has been delayed indefinitely due to the 
December 22 incident in Khudunabari Camp (reported ref A). 
Discussions between the Government of Nepal (GON) and Royal 
Government of Bhutan (RGOB) may resume on the margins of the 
BIMSTEC conference in Thailand, but GON officials are not 
optimistic that repatriation will begin in the near future. 
Feelings in Nepal among GON officials, UNHCR and the refugees 
are that the RGOB is intentionally discouraging large numbers 
of refugees from voluntarily returning to Bhutan.  The 
primary obstacle to repatriation now appears to be a 
deep-seated mistrust between the RGOB and the refugees.  The 
refugees need an avenue not only to communicate their 
concerns to the RGOB and GON, but also to feel that certain 
demands are being accommodated.  International assistance in 
opening channels of communication between the two sides might 
go far to resolve the current impasse.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Reports on the December 22 Incident 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) Accounts from the GON, UNHCR and refugees regarding 
the December 22 incident between the Bhutanese Joint 
Verification Team (JVT) and Khudunabari Camp residents 
differed greatly from accounts provided by the Royal 
Government of Bhutan (RGOB) in press releases and during Ref 
B meetings.  All of the Nepal-based accounts agreed on the 
following: 
 
-- Neither the GON, UNHCR, nor the refugees were informed of 
the  substance of the Bhutanese JVT's presentation prior to 
December 22. 
 
-- The Bhutanese JVT briefed the refugees on conditions for 
repatriation in much greater detail than what was contained 
in the Terms and Conditions publicized in July 2003.  These 
details were not presented to the GON prior to the December 
presentation. 
 
-- Conditions outlined by the Bhutanese JVT included that 
Category I returnees, or those "forcibly evicted" who had 
sold their land would not receive any land or compensation; 
Category II returnees would be treated "like foreigners," 
forced to reside in "detention" camps, not be permitted 
freedom of movement, and only one family member would be 
allowed to work as "a road laborer;" none of the appeals 
submitted by Category III refugees would be overturned; and 
Category IV returnees would be taken immediately into police 
custody upon return to Bhutan while their families must 
reside in separate camps. 
 
-- The Bhutanese JVT spoke "good" Nepali during the briefing. 
(According to GON officials, the RGOB spoke Nepali during the 
verification interviews and in bilateral negotiations.) 
However, on December 22, the Bhutanese JVT used the 
dimunitive/lower status ("timi") form to address the 
refugees, used other harsh language, and was intentionally 
provocative. 
 
-- The briefing seemed intended to discourage refugees from 
voluntarily returning to Bhutan. 
 
-- The refugees' angry reaction to the Bhutanese JVT's 
presentation was spontaneous.  Neither the GON, UNHCR nor the 
refugees were aware that the Bhutanese JVT would brief the 
refugees on repatriation conditions until the night before 
the briefing. 
 
-- Reports from inside the meeting hall suggested that no 
violence occurred inside the hall, although a large number of 
refugees, mostly youths, pelted stones at the Bhutanese and 
tried to hit them with bamboo sticks while they attempted to 
leave the camp.  The Nepali JVT members present at the 
briefing did not feel threatened and regarded the violence 
and injury to the Bhutanese JVT members as unfortunate, but 
minor. 
 
-- It remains unclear who arranged the logistics for the 
briefing at Khudunabari Camp: UNHCR assumed it was the GON's 
Refugee Coordination Unit (RCU), but RCU officials suggested 
it was the Bhutanese JVT. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Government Officials: 
Bilateral Process Is the Only Way Forward 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) In a January 19 meeting, Secretary Madhu Raman Acharya 
noted that, despite the December 22 incident, the RGOB has 
expressed interest in "getting the process back on track." 
He hoped that meetings between the two governments on the 
sidelines of BIMSTEC in Thailand would help to move the 
process in the right direction.  Acharya indicated that the 
GON had proposed sending mid-level officials to Thimpu to 
resolve any misunderstandings over the December incident, but 
had received no response from the RGOB. 
 
¶4. (C) Acharya emphasized that, according to the GON-RGOB 
agreement, the GON has no role or responsibility in 
determining repatriation conditions or communicating them to 
the refugees.  He was disappointed that the December briefing 
"did not meet expectations" and went "well beyond" the terms 
and conditions outlined in July 2003.  "Our sense of euphoria 
is gone," Acharya said.  He suggested that perhaps the RGOB 
intentionally sought to discourage repatriation after 
realizing that large numbers of refugees intended to return 
to Bhutan.  According to Acharya, the GON repeatedly has 
encouraged the RGOB to involve the refugees and/or the 
international community in the bilateral process, but to no 
avail.  Although the RGOB has said it remains committed to 
repatriation, he said, the resumption of the bilateral 
process will depend upon the RGOB revising the conditions of 
return, particularly regarding access to property. 
 
¶5. (C) Both Joint Secretary Sushil Rana, Head of the Nepali 
JVT, and Basanta Bhattarai, Deputy Head of the Nepali JVT, in 
separate meetings on January 20 and 23 indicated that the 
Bhutanese had designed their briefing to provoke a negative 
reaction.  Rana was discouraged by the many deadlocks and 
delays in the bilateral process.  Like the other GON 
officials, he opined that the RGOB appeared unwilling to 
repatriate large numbers of refugees.  Rana explained that 
the GON's only role would be to ensure a voluntary 
repatriation.  The process is now in the hands of the RGOB 
and the refugees, he said.  But he believed both sides could 
benefit from confidence-building measures. 
 
¶6. (C) On verification, Rana noted that the RGOB had 
responded negatively to the GON proposal that both 
governments appoint a second JVT in order to complete 
verification of the six remaining camps within two years. 
Rana was uncomfortable with UNHCR's decision to phase-down 
assistance in the camps and worried that this would harm the 
repatriation process.  He emphasized the continued need to 
include a reliable third party in the process and to clarify 
conditions of repatriation, which he believed would "not be 
easy."  Rana was extremely reluctant to discuss local 
integration of refugees in Nepal, saying that repatriation 
must precede plans for local integration. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
UNHCR: Focused on Phased Withdrawal from the Camps 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶7. (SBU)  Reporting on security in the refugee camps, UNHCR 
Sub-Office Head Milagros Leynes denied that there is any 
connection between Nepal's Maoists and the refugees. 
However, another UNHCR officer indicated that the Bhutanese 
Communist Party (BCP) has launched recruitment efforts in all 
seven camps, distributing leaflets and posters, mostly 
targeting youths who are dissatisfied with camp life and have 
little hope for the future.  One refugee leader later 
estimated that perhaps as many as 2,000 students in the camps 
support the BCP cause. 
¶8. (SBU) Because UNHCR is not involved in the verification or 
repatriation process, it has focused its efforts on how 
gradually to reduce care and maintenance in the camps. 
Certain food products, such as turmeric and chiles, have been 
cut already from the program because of their lack of 
nutritional value, Leynes said.  UNHCR has two teams on the 
ground in Jhapa District in Eastern Nepal to plan a 
socio-economic survey, which will assess the refugees' levels 
of self-reliance, and a re-registration exercise, including a 
head-count and family profiling.  Through the re-registration 
exercise, UNHRC will assess vulnerable refugees who might 
best be served through third-country resettlement.  (Note: In 
a later meeting, UNHCR Protection Officer Giulia Ricciarelli 
estimated that the head count and basic biodata could be 
gathered by end-March, but that proper protection profiling 
through individual interviews would not be complete until the 
end of CY 2004.  End Note.)  Leynes commented, and members of 
the UNHCR team from Geneva agreed separately, that few 
refugees have shown specific interest in resettlement abroad 
and most still wish to return to Bhutan. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Refugees: Want to Return, But Not At Any Price 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶9. (C) On January 21, Pitotti and PolOff met with refugee 
leaders S.B. Subba and Hari Adhikari.  Besides discussing the 
December 22 incident in Khudunabari Camp, they outlined the 
six core refugee demands: 1) repatriation to their own homes 
with safety and dignity; 2) involvement of the international 
community; 3) assistance from the Indian government; 4) 
respect for their human rights by the RGOB; 5) restoration of 
citizenship; and 6) safety, security and social welfare of 
the returnees.  They both felt that the RGOB should adopt a 
"softer stance" than was portrayed by the Bhutanese JVT in 
December and that a compromise solution could be found.  The 
refugee leaders preferred the Government of India (GOI) as a 
third-party facilitator, but recognized that, in the 
aftermath of the RGOB's crack-down on Indian insurgents in 
Southern Bhutan, GOI's involvement was unlikely.  Subba and 
Adhikari also looked to the USG to press Bhutan to soften its 
position and to the UN Human Rights Commission or Amnesty 
International to act as third-party monitor.  In their view, 
ICRC would not be an impartial or effective third party 
because that organization has been active in Bhutan since 
1993 and is required to maintain confidentiality with host 
governments. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Refugees in both Khudunabari and Sanischere camps 
expressed the view that the verification and repatriation 
process has been designed in such a way to prevent the return 
of refugees to Bhutan.  They continue to reject the 
categorization of refugees into four categories, arguing that 
only two categories should exist: Bhutanese and 
non-Bhutanese.  Many refugees were also concerned about their 
safety and security upon return to Bhutan.  On one hand, the 
refugees generally mistrusted the RGOB's intentions, but, on 
the other hand, felt a sense of nationalism and love for 
their homeland.  Of utmost importance to the refugees was 
involvement of a third-party.  They felt strongly that a 
meeting between the RGOB and refugee groups could go far to 
further repatriation efforts. 
 
------------------------ 
Comment: The Way Forward 
------------------------ 
 
¶11. (C) The December 22 incident in Khundunabari Camp has 
exacerbated already existing tensions and mistrust between 
the RGOB and GON on one hand, and the RGOB and the refugees 
on the other.  The refugees clearly have grievances they have 
not been able to express through the bilateral process until 
this unfortunate confrontation.  Under the conditions 
described by the Bhutanese JVT, it appears that few if any 
refugees will decide to return voluntarily.  The refugees 
need an avenue not only to communicate their concerns to the 
RGOB and GON, but also to feel that certain demands are being 
accommodated.  Detailed, written information on the terms and 
conditions for both repatriation and local integration should 
be provided to the refugees at the earliest opportunity. 
Third-party involvement may be essential to assist in opening 
channels of communication between the refugees and the RGOB. 
End Comment. 
MALINOWSKI