This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000298 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
AF/S FOR SDELISI, LAROIAN, MRAYNOR 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR JFRAZER, DTEITELBAUM 
LONDON FOR CGURNEY 
PARIS FOR CNEARY 
NAIROBI FOR TPFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2009 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ZI ZANU PF
SUBJECT: GOZ SETS PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS FOR MARCH AS 
PLAYING FIELD TILTS STEEPER FOR RULING PARTY 
 
REF: (A) HARARE 268 (B) HARARE 249 (C) HARARE 199 (D) 
     HARARE 188 (E) HARARE 174 (F) HARARE 73 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton under Section 1.5(b)(d) 
 
¶1.  SUMMARY: The GOZ's February 19 announcement that 
parliamentary elections would be conducted in March 2004 
follows a series of setbacks to prospects that their conduct 
would be free and fair.  During the past week, the GOZ 
withdrew its request for UN involvement in elections; 
extended the permissable period of detention without charge 
to a month; and continued to prevent The Daily News from 
publishing.  The ruling party gives no indication that it 
will brook a fair election contest next year, leaving the 
frustrated opposition contemplating an election boycott. 
Instead, the message is that ZANU-PF is prepared to run 
elections in its own flawed manner and intensify internal 
repression while defying any international reaction this 
provokes.  END SUMMARY. 
 
March Election Date 
------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) State radio announced on February 19 that President 
Mugabe had stated that parliamentary elections would be held 
in March 2005.  The constitution requires that elections be 
conducted by June 2005.  The announcement appeared to squelch 
rumors that the government would declare snap elections in 
the coming months.  Minister for Justice, Parliamentary and 
Legal Affairs (and principal inter-party interlocutor) 
Patrick Chinamasa announced that voter registration would 
begin in May.  No mention was made of the timing of 
presidential elections, which are scheduled for 2006 but have 
been the subject of inter-party talks on talks (refs A and 
D), or of any potential electoral reforms. 
 
¶3.  (C) UN officials confirmed to the Embassy press reports 
that the GOZ had withdrawn its request for UN assistance in 
the parliamentary election's administration.  They indicated 
that the GOZ may reconsider but that the visit of a UN 
election assessment team scheduled to begin March 3 had been 
cancelled. 
 
Due Process Further Curtailed 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (U) The GOZ on February 13 promulgated by executive fiat 
the "Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Amendment of 
Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act" (text e-mailed to AF/S), 
which permits police to hold individuals for seven days 
without charge pending investigation of a crime, and for an 
additional 21 days if the state produces prima facie evidence 
of a crime.  The measure prohibits a court from granting bail 
in such instances.  The GOZ trumpeted the measure as 
necessary for its counter-corruption agenda and, indeed, the 
measure has first been employed against a ZANU-PF politburo 
member, James Makamba, in connection with alleged illegal 
forex dealings. 
 
¶5.  (U) According to initial state media reports and 
officially circulated summaries of the new measure, it was to 
apply only to "economic" crimes, such as foreign exchange 
"externalization" and trading in controlled items such as 
grains or minerals.  However, the measure's annexes include a 
host of non-economic offenses, including those under the 
Public Order and Security Act (POSA), the law that often 
serves as a pretext to arrest those criticizing the 
government. 
 
¶6.  (U) The MDC and Zimbabwe's legal community have vocally 
condemned the new act in forceful terms.  Objections include: 
 
-- The measure violates a constitutional provision limiting 
detention of an individual without charge to 48 hours. 
 
-- It violates separation of powers principles as an 
unconstitutional usurpation of legislative authority by the 
executive. 
 
-- It represents an unconstitutional usurping of judicial 
prerogative on bail by the executive. 
 
Courts Temporizing 
------------------ 
 
¶7.  (U) We are reporting via septel on the recess of 
opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai's treason trial and 
deferral of decision on the consolidated appeal of issues 
relating to operation of The Daily News (TDN).  In the 
meantime, TDN, the country's only independent daily, has not 
published since the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the Access to Information and Protection 
of Privacy Act (AIPPA) on February 5 (ref E). 
 
MDC to Sit Out? 
--------------- 
 
¶8.  MDC Spokesperson Paul Themba-Nyati reiterated on SW Radio 
Africa February 18 that the party was seriously weighing a 
boycott of the parliamentary elections if the GOZ did not 
undertake meaningful reforms, including the establishment of 
an independent electoral commission and significant curbs on 
intimidation.  MDC Shadow Minister for Legal Affairs David 
Coltart circulated to diplomats and civil society 
representatives the same day a missive (e-mailed to AF/S) in 
which he suggested that the party impose conditions on 
inter-party talks and boycott a flawed electoral process.  He 
also took donors to task for extending certain assistance to 
the GOZ and for their indulgence of "quiet diplomacy". 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9.  (C) The GOZ's withdrawal of its solicitation of UN 
electoral assistance is just the most recent, though perhaps 
most telling, indication that ZANU-PF has no intention of 
countenancing a fair election contest or even a South 
African-sponsored dialogue leading to presidential and 
parliamentary elections in 2005.  If ZANU-PF cannot entice 
the MDC into a government of national unity (which still 
seems unlikely), it will be content to have the opposition 
participate in an election it will not be permitted to win. 
The ruling party is unlikely to be moved by MDC threats to 
boycott the election; it probably calculates on a quiescent 
response to a flawed (even uncontested) election from enough 
neighbors and developing countries to meet its low threshhold 
of desired respectability.  We see no evidence that the party 
is considering the balancing -- even superficially -- of a 
heavily tilted playing field to mollify its critics, as it 
appears to fear the risks of a level field more than it does 
any diminution of international assistance.  The 
non-substantiveness of the recent cabinet shuffle (ref B) 
offers little hope of new perspectives in GOZ thinking; 
indeed, it reflects a circling of wagons and preparation for 
a campaign to crush the opposition electorally. 
 
¶10.  (C) For the MDC leadership, the election is a Hobson's 
choice: it fears that the opposition's participation in a 
flawed process will confer greater legitimacy on Mugabe's 
party while a boycott will simply marginalize themselves in 
the eyes of their electorate and many in the international 
community, particularly within the region.  The detention 
measure may significantly complicate prospects for mass 
action by the MDC or civil society.  In the past, arrested 
demonstrators could effectively count on being released 
within 48 hours; they must now weigh the costs to job and 
family of a month's detention.  The MDC's growing frustration 
is likely to sharpen their appeals for international support. 
 
 
¶11.  (S/NF) Why did the GOZ implement its controversial new 
measure via executive fiat instead of through a parliament it 
thoroughly controls?  Speed was important; sensitive 
reporting indicates that Mugabe personally wanted to engineer 
a quick, legal, and onerous sanction to shackle Makamba.  In 
addition, the ruling party wanted to avoid another brouhaha 
like the one instigated by the opposition in parliament over 
the recent Land Acquisition Act Amendments (ref C).  Finally, 
the party leadership may been nervous about the reaction of 
its own MPs over the measure: several had been outspokenly 
critical of the lengthy police detention without charge of 
ZANU-PF MP Philip Chiyangwa (ref F), a practice effectively 
legalized by this measure and one that can now be employed 
against each of them. 
 
¶12.  (U) The coming months will offer a number of litmus 
tests for government intentions toward individual liberties, 
democratic processes, and the opposition.  The MDC awaits a 
response to its various proposals, including key electoral 
reforms, in the inter-party talks on talks.  The Supreme 
Court has deferred a decision on TDN's consolidated appeals, 
which may decide the paper's fate, until March 3.  Nomination 
filings for the Zengeza parliamentary by-election, often an 
occasion for intimidation of opposition candidates, are 
scheduled for February 20, with the by-election set to be 
held March 27-28.  A by-election for a formerly MDC-held 
parliamentary seat in the rural district of Lupane will 
follow at a date to be announced. 
 
 
SULLIVAN