This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 000577 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR CBARTON 
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD 
STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OTI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM VE
SUBJECT: CARTER CENTER/OAS RAISE CONCERNS WITH DAS DESHAZO 
 
REF: CARACAS 552 
 
Classified By: Abelardo A. Arias, Political Counselor, 
for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) WHA DAS Peter DeShazo expressed USG support for the 
OAS and the Carter Center in a lunch on February 16 for 
representatives of both organizations hosted by the 
Ambassador.  OAS Chief of Staff Fernando Jaramillo said it is 
clear the National Electoral Council (CNE) is attempting to 
invalidate as many signatures as possible to terminate the 
recall referendum petition against President Chavez.  Noting 
that the CNE cut off information after the OAS-Carter Center 
statement of February 14, Jaramillo expressed doubt that the 
observation mission could continue under such conditions. 
Carter Center representative Francisco Diez said his 
organization had also been told that requests for information 
must be made in writing and be approved by the CNE board. 
Diez said the situation of the observers is precarious. 
DeShazo emphasized the importance of both institutions to 
ensuring the transparency of the process.  End summary. 
 
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OAS Chief Doubtful of Mission Success 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) The Ambassador hosted a lunch on February 16 for WHA 
DAS Peter DeShazo to hear from representatives of the OAS and 
Carter Center about the signature verification process at the 
National Electoral Council (CNE).  The OAS was represented by 
OAS SYG Gaviria's Chief of Staff Fernando Jaramillo, OAS 
country representative Patricio Carbacho, OAS head observer 
Edgardo Ries, and OAS observer Marcelo Alvarez.  Francisco 
Diez and Andres Araya represented the Carter Center.  DCM, 
Polcouns, and poloff also attended. 
 
¶3. (C) Jaramillo said he sees no purpose in the OAS mission 
remaining in Venezuela.  He said CNE President Francisco 
Carrasquero launched into a tirade against him on February 13 
after the OAS and Carter Center made a joint statement 
pointing out that excessive technicalities were delaying the 
signature count process.  (Jaramillo also noted that the 
February 13 statement said that the observers had not seen 
evidence of fraud in the process, a poke at the GOV's 
contention that the opposition was engaged in "megafraud.") 
Jaramillo said that since then OAS observers had been cut off 
from information from CNE mid-level officials with requests 
now having to go through the CNE board. 
 
¶4. (C) Jaramillo asserted that from the point when the CNE 
changed the rules halfway through the physical verification 
of the presidential signature forms, the CNE has tried to 
invalidate as many signatures as possible.  The "planillas 
planas" issue (signature forms that were apparently filled 
out by one person but signed by another) is a clear example 
of this strategy, he said.  Jaramillo said it was likely the 
CNE board's decision on which criteria to apply to the 
"planas" would be decisive, though he thought it likely the 
CNE would put off that decision until the last.  Jaramillo 
noted that when the CNE's self-appointed deadline of February 
29 arrives, the CNE will not/not be ready to make 
announcement regarding the referendum. 
 
¶5. (C) Acknowledging that he was brainstorming, Jaramillo 
said the OAS could not sit back and wait for the process to 
be pronounced dead.  Their credibility as observers would be 
at stake if they simply continued to go along, attesting to 
procedures that ran counter to the spirit of recognized 
electoral and legal concepts, he noted.  Asked by the 
Ambassador if his views reflected OAS SYG Gaviria's 
perspective on the situation, Jaramillo said yes.  Diez 
cautioned that any decision by the observers to curtail 
activities should be based on actions, not fears of what 
decisions will be made.  Diez said President Carter would 
likely agree that if the CNE refused to provide access and 
 
information necessary for completing the mission, the Carter 
Center would have to withdraw. 
 
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Carter Center Still On the Good Side 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) Francisco Diez said the CNE was probably more angry at 
the OAS than the Carter Center, but noted that access to 
information had also become more complicated.  Diez said that 
on February 14, an "informal flow of information" at the 
mid-level that Carter Center was using to extract samples 
from the signature forms was cut off.  Diez conceded that 
written permission made sense and immediately submitted the 
request to the CNE board.  He said the Carter Center had 
collected only half of the signature forms needed for the 
statistical sample when access was cut.  (Note:  Diez and 
Jaramillo met with the CNE on February 17 and told reporters 
they had discussed with the CNE directors ideas for how to 
proceed with their observation mission, noting they would 
follow up in writing shortly.) 
 
¶7. (C) Regarding the CNE's announcement that it would invite 
additional international observers, most believed it would 
not help the process.  Jaramillo noted that no reputable 
observers would join the process in mid-stream.  He did not 
preclude the possibility that the GOV would find 
personalities that would be nonetheless willing to lend 
themselves to the affair.  Diez said he had suggested to the 
CNE "for the sixth time" that they extend an invitation to 
the UNDP; the board refused.  (Note:  Opposition groups also 
called for the UNDP's involvement, as they are part of the 
tripartite committee that facilitated the May 29 agreement.) 
 
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Support For OAS/TCC 
------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) DAS DeShazo briefed the observers on his meetings with 
Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel and ambassadors of 
interested countries (septels).  He told the observers the 
USG fully supports their work "in the trenches" on helping 
Venezuela reach a solution to the political impasse. 
 
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Comment 
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¶9. (C) The situation for the electoral observation mission is 
deteriorating.  The GOV has taken a hostile position toward 
the international observers, whom they portray as a threat to 
the credibility of the CNE's ability to block the referendum. 
 The situation could improve if and only if Chavez were to 
change his approach.  The observers are still in place and 
CNE directors still speak with the observer chiefs.  The 
CNE's ruling on the "planillas planas," which has been once 
again postponed, will give an indication as to the CNE's -- 
and Chavez's -- determination to fulfill its mission in a 
transparent manner. 
 
¶10. (C) It is encouraging that OAS and the Carter Center are 
willing to take action sooner rather than later.  If they 
don't act while the patient still has a chance of pulling 
through, their report is likely to be a coroner's report on 
the cause of death. 
 
¶11. (U) DAS DeShazo cleared this cable. 
SHAPIRO 
 
 
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      2004CARACA00577 - CONFIDENTIAL