This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 000545 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR CBARTON 
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD 
STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OTI FOR RPORTER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2014 
TAGS: PGOV VE
SUBJECT: ARIAS CARDENAS: OPPOSITION FACES UPHILL BATTLE 
WITH CHAVEZ IN CHARGE 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Charles S Shapiro, for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D 
) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) Francisco Arias Cardenas, former presidential 
candidate and ex-Governor of Zulia, told the Ambassador 
February 11 that President Hugo Chavez's increased control of 
the military and the state oil company (PDVSA) following the 
events of April 11, 2002, make it unlikely that he could be 
forced from power in the short term.  Arias lamented that if 
the National Electoral Council (CNE) chooses to deny a recall 
referendum on Chavez, opposition protests and panic would 
ensue.  If, instead, a recall was approved and Chavez lost, 
any new administration would have to contend with a large 
minority of Chavez sympathizers, including armed fanatics. 
Multiple opposition parties will be hard pressed to maintain 
unity campaigning against the blackmail and bribes of 
Chavista politicians for August regional elections.  End 
Summary. 
 
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Chavez in Control of Military: Forced Departure Unlikely 
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¶2. (C) Former presidential candidate and ex-Governor of Zulia 
Francisco Arias Cardenas told the Ambassador February 11 that 
President Hugo Chavez's solid control of the military and the 
state oil company (PDVSA) makes Chavez's involuntary 
departure from power unlikely in the short term.  Arias, now 
head of the Union party, claimed President Chavez purged 
military leadership very effectively since the events of 
April 11, 2002, placing loyalists in key positions.  Although 
he conceded there are still "one or two" higher-ranking 
officers and many mid-level officers that might support the 
opposition if Chavez flagrantly violated the constitution or 
rigged National Electoral Council (CNE) decisions, he 
discounted their overall significance.  He said Chavez 
informants have thoroughly infiltrated the military, that 
there is no mutual understanding between officers about what 
events would trigger open dissent, and that there is an 
inclination that "this is not the right time" for such 
dissent.  Chavez's public relations barrage, legitimizing his 
rule as just and democratic, and his constant, but 
"selective," use of the Constitution make it difficult to 
justify any military break with his regime.  "He is a 
dictator with the appearance of a democrat... There is no way 
for the military to organize against him."  Arias claimed 
Venezuelans have been approaching him on the street to tell 
him "we're depending on you," implying Arias should use his 
military background to oppose the GOV if the recall effort 
fails.  But Arias said he did not have the influence in the 
military to provide such help. 
 
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PDVSA: Onetime Opposition Base, Now Chavez Lifeblood 
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¶3. (C) Arias claimed that Chavez was using the same methods 
he used to secure control of the military with the state oil 
company (PDVSA), a process that accelerated after the 
two-month national strike that started December 2, 2002. 
Arias found it ironic that PDVSA once led the fight against 
Chavez, but was now keeping him afloat by financing his 
"revolution."  He lamented that Chavez's increasing control 
of the armed forces, PDVSA, and the business sector would 
make any future challenge significantly more difficult for 
the opposition than previous attempts.  "The most serious 
problem," said Arias, "is that we do not have power anymore." 
 
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Failed Recall Will Lead to Protests and Panic 
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¶4. (C) Arias said that if the presidential recall is not 
approved by the CNE, there will be significant opposition 
protests and panic.  However, many public employees and 
 
 
recipients of government aid will forgo participating in any 
uprising for fear of losing their jobs or assistance, just as 
many of them decided not to participate in the signature 
drive calling for a presidential recall.  Their fear of 
reprisal will be vindicated if the recall is denied, proving 
the GOV's power and will to impose its political will on 
Venezuelan institutions. 
 
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Post-Chavez Administration Should Incorporate Chavistas 
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¶5. (C) If the recall is approved by the CNE, Arias predicted 
a thorough defeat for Chavez.  "We will show them that they 
are the minority."  He added, however, that Chavez has 
significant support in poor neighborhoods and has armed his 
most rabid supporters.  Even if Chavez leaves peacefully, the 
next administration will have to deal with these potentially 
violent extremists, as well as Chavez sympathizers in the 
armed forces.  Arias argued that the "war would not be won" 
with a referendum that leads to Chavez leaving power, but 
rather when the opposition demystifies the Chavez revolution 
and incorporates the 35 to 40 percent of Venezuelans with 
pro-Chavez sympathies. 
 
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National and Zulian Political Diagnosis 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Arias conceded that opposition parties would have 
difficulty maintaining unity during regional elections slated 
for August as "they are all trying to protect their own 
space."  The Ambassador agreed, adding that the opposition 
would have to propose an agenda beyond opposing Chavez. 
Arias said this was "slowly" happening, and that 
gubernatorial and mayoral candidates fundamentally understand 
that they need to campaign to improve people's day-to-day 
lives, rather than on the coattails of national politics. 
Arias was concerned that pro-Chavez politicians have been 
successful blackmailing and corrupting both government 
officials and business leaders, particularly Interior and 
Justice Minister Lucas Rincon, and that this will prove 
useful to them during elections as they offer incentives and 
threaten to punish those tainted by deals with Chavismo. 
Although there are far more opportunists than true believers 
in Chavista ranks, Arias cautioned that appealing to 
opportunism "has worked well" for the GOV. 
 
 
¶7. (C) Arias stressed the importance of Zulia's oil 
resources, political significance, and the border with 
Colombia.  Neither of the Fifth Republic Movement's (MVR) 
front runners for governor, Calixto Ortega or Rodrigo Cabezas 
(both National Assembly), have a chance of beating Zulia 
Governor Manuel Rosales, according to Arias.  (Note: Ortega 
told poloff February 12 that he is confident he will win both 
the nomination and election.  He claimed Governor Rosales is 
not as popular as his reputation and that the Democratic 
Action party will nominate another candidate, splitting the 
opposition vote.  End Note.)  GOV forces are working hard in 
Zulia to shore up support for the eventual nominee, Arias 
noted, particularly in south Maracaibo, where they are 
"spending a great deal of money" through government programs 
and outright bribery.  Arias discounted the eventual success 
of this strategy.  He proposed regional and local governments 
of states on both sides of the Venezuelan-Colombia border 
take the initiative to combat border problems, as the federal 
government is not addressing border problems satisfactorily. 
 
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Chavez the Great Communicator 
----------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Arias claimed Chavez skips conventional political 
discourse by speaking directly to the people.  He said Chavez 
uses baseball and religious analogies deftly to make 
political points, using Venezuela's two most popular 
institutions to strip out political complexities and opposing 
viewpoints.  This is dangerous, considering many Venezuelans 
 
 
rely exclusively on his comments for social and political 
information, and is one reason his supporters remain loyal. 
Arias lamented that it is "almost impossible" to convince 
Chavez's core supporters that their "savior" might be wrong 
about anything, but that it would be impossible for Venezuela 
to "go on without the Chavistas." 
 
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Comment 
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¶9. (C) Unlike many opposition leaders, Arias has full 
appreciation for Chavez's intellect and abilities, and his 
assessment of the military's incapacity to stand up to Chavez 
is sobering.  His analysis of the importance of incorporating 
Chavistas in a post-Chavez Venezuela is sound.  Former 
Chavistas like Arias will be key to convincing Chavez's 
supporters that there is life after Chavez. 
SHAPIRO 
 
 
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      2004CARACA00545 - CONFIDENTIAL