This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 000533 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR CBARTON 
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD 
STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OTI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM VE
SUBJECT: THE "TROPICAL UNITY" OF THE OPPOSITION 
 
REF: A. CARACAS 437 
 
     ¶B. CARACAS 503 
 
Classified By: Mark Wells, Acting Political Counselor, for 
Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) The opposition remains convinced that the referendum 
is on track, according to a top aide for Enrique Mendoza. 
Organizers of the February 14 march to defend the signatures 
calling for a recall vote on President Hugo Chavez are 
planning on 100,000 (some hope for one million) to 
participate with some sporadic violence possible.  The march 
is an attempt to keep pressure on CNE after a month of 
relative calm among the opposition that saw little progress 
on the count.  The Democratic Coordinating Committee (DCC) 
receives its CNE information from a variety of sources and 
then takes consensus decisions that are often not the most 
effective.  Traditional parties form one bloc of opinion 
within the opposition, while three parties -- Primero 
Justicia, Proyecto Venezuela, and Causa R -- flip-flop.  The 
DCC's executive group known as the G-5 rarely meets.  The DCC 
is close to forming a campaign committee to oversee the 
referendum.  End summary. 
 
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Opposition Still Hopeful at CNE 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Poloff met February 11 with Daniel Thiman (PROTECT), 
an aide for Miranda State Governor Enrique Mendoza, to 
discuss the Democratic Coordinating Committee's (DCC) views 
on the referendum process against President Hugo Chavez. 
(Note:  Thiman works on operations and logistics for Mendoza 
in the DCC.  While he sees himself as "not a politician," he 
attends most DCC planning meetings.  End note.)  Thiman said 
the DCC remains convinced of the inevitability of the 
referendum, though he admitted some increased doubts over the 
last week due to the issue of "plana" signature forms (filled 
out but not signed in the same handwriting).  Still, he said 
that the date the DCC is using internally for getting a 
response from the National Electoral Commission (CNE) on the 
referendum is February 27 (Comment:  This is much sooner than 
the OAS/Carter Center estimate that the CNE would finish on 
March 16 at its current pace.  End comment.) 
 
¶3. (C) Poloff asked Gente de Petroleo chief Juan Fernandez on 
February 12 about the opposition's expectations at the CNE. 
Fernandez admitted that many opposition members are not 
following the signature count as closely as they should.  In 
the end, he said, the politicians in the opposition believe 
the CNE will strike a political solution and avoid the messy 
details.  (Comment:  This may well be the "Venezuelan" 
solution to the CNE's many troubles, though we wonder whether 
this meeting of the minds will happen.  End comment.) 
 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
February 14 March:  Caracas-Only Or Greater? 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Asked why the opposition is pushing the February 14 
march, Fernandez said it is based on resentment between the 
DCC and the CNE.  Fernandez said that CNE director Jorge 
Rodriguez (pro-GOV) asked Mendoza in January to lower 
pressure in the media against the CNE so that the work could 
be carried out.  The DCC believes they were tricked once it 
became apparent the CNE was not going to meet the arbitrarily 
set deadline of February 13.  The DCC decided it was time to 
ratchet up the pressure, lest the count drag on interminably. 
 
¶5. (C) Thiman said DCC organizers of the February 14 march to 
the CNE are planning on 100,000 participants (refs a and b). 
He described the march as a "metropolitan march," meaning 
that demonstrators would not be bussed in large numbers from 
around Venezuela, with the exception of some 2,000 Proyecto 
 
Venezuela participants from Carabobo.  The tactic of having 
six smaller marches rally at Plaza Venezuela and head toward 
the CNE downtown is designed to imitate a military maneuver 
that will intimidate Chavez, Thiman added.  (Note:  the GOV 
announced a "megamercado" of meat sales on February 14 and 15 
on Avenida Bolivar, in the path of the opposition march.  In 
the past, the opposition has skirted such events.) 
 
¶6. (C) Thiman expressed concern that the GOV seemed to be 
setting up the opposition for an April 11-like event in which 
an opposition march to the presidential palace turned bloody. 
 Thiman said the march did not intend to go all the way to 
CNE headquarters, which is currently surrounded by radical 
Chavez loyalists led by premiere street activist Lina Ron. 
Though organizers do not plan to come close to the Chavistas, 
Thiman worried that the march could "get out of control." 
 
¶7. (C) Juan Fernandez said he received word that supporters 
were coming in from all over Venezuela, causing him to 
estimate that up to one million people might attend the 
march.  Fernandez said he was very worried about violence, 
pointing out that each side has radicals who want to force a 
conflict.  (Comment:  Fernandez is informed by his network of 
ex-PDVSA workers around Venezuela, but is not a march 
organizer.)  Fernandez said he was sure the main march would 
not come close to the Chavistas. 
 
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Opposition:  An Idiot Savant? 
----------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Speaking candidly, Thiman said the opposition suffers 
from several asymmetries when it comes to political battle: 
they have lots of guts but few brains.  He said the DCC has 
tremendous operational capability (organizing marches and 
signature drives) but lacks strategic sense.  He suggested 
this was the reason the opposition opted for a march on 
February 14 in order to keep pressure on the CNE. 
 
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The Opposition's CNE Connection 
------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Thiman described how the opposition collects and 
processes information from the CNE.  The opposition's chief 
operative at the CNE is Enrique Naime (COPEI), seconded by 
Nelson Rampersaad (MAS).  Naime also has had an official 
sleeping at the CNE for the last 30 days.  In addition, each 
major political party has, as tradition has dictated, 
officials placed in key leadership positions throughout the 
CNE.  These officials report their observations to Naime and 
to their respective party chiefs.  Thiman noted also that 
opposition witnesses observing the verification process also 
report to Naime. 
 
¶10. (C) Naime and Rampersaad visit DCC headquarters daily and 
brief political party chiefs (secgens and presidents), who 
also receive information directly from their party members in 
the CNE.  Thiman said these meetings had been twice weekly, 
but are now being held daily.  The information is discussed 
and a consensus opinion emerges over next steps to take. 
Thiman also mentioned that Naime meets periodically with the 
OAS and Carter Center.  Thiman conceded that the need for 
consensus often prevents the opposition from choosing the 
first best solution, but it is a political reality. 
 
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The Opposition's Party Blocs 
---------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Thiman said that political parties are the principal 
actors in the DCC; civil society groups do not have 
significant influence on major decisions.  Traditional 
parties (AD, COPEI, and MAS) usually side together on DCC 
decisions with a collection of minor parties (Bandera Roja, 
Solidaridad, Union, etc.).  The pendulum votes are Primero 
Justicia, Proyecto Venezuela, and Causa R.  These parties 
banded together in January to chastise the other parties for 
putting priority on the regional elections instead of the 
 
referendum.  Thiman said these parties have about 15 
candidates between them, which made them averse to regional 
elections.  However, he noted that since then none of the 
parties have been in the press fighting over regional 
candidates, an example of what he called the "tropical unity" 
of the opposition. 
 
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A Campaign Committee Coming 
--------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) The DCC's executive committee, the so-called Group of 
5 (or G-5, consisting of Enrique Mendoza, Henrique Salas 
Romer, Julio Borges, Henry Ramos Allup, and Juan Fernandez) 
has not met in months, Thiman said.  The DCC's political 
committee, consisting of 60 representatives of parties and 
NGOs, will be augmented by a new "G-17" of full-time 
officials that will function as a campaign committee 
("Comando de Campana").  Opposition leaders believe the 
campaign committee will make the opposition more agile in 
responding to Chavez on a day-to-day basis.  Thiman said 
there is almost full agreement on the formation of an 
executive campaign committee, with up to nine members, that 
will steer the DCC.  Enrique Mendoza will continue to head 
the DCC, he added. 
 
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Comment 
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¶13. (C) Thiman's report that the DCC is still optimistic for 
a February 27 announcement by the CNE is worrisome given the 
OAS and Carter Center believe the process will trudge on for 
another month.  We suspect this is a combination of the 
inaccurate and incomplete information as well as an 
intentional desire to maintain morale among opposition 
workers.  Still, these insights help explain why the 
opposition seems prone to error and miscalculation.  Against 
the autocratic style of its opponent, the opposition needs 
all the help it can get. 
 
¶14. (C) Both Thiman and Fernandez are concerned over possible 
violence on February 14, expecting a trap laid by the GOV to 
slice off another layer of potentially disloyal followers in 
the GOV and military.  Both agreed that fringe groups on 
either side could start something, which would most certainly 
be counterproductive for the opposition's efforts. 
 
SHAPIRO 
 
 
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      2004CARACA00533 - CONFIDENTIAL