This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 000437 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR CBARTON 
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD 
STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OTI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM VE
SUBJECT: SIGNATURE COUNT FACES ROCKY WEEK 
 
REF: CARACAS 407 
 
Classified By: Mark A. Wells, Acting Pol Couns, for Reasons 
1.4(b) and (d). 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) The National Electoral Commission (CNE) faces a tough 
week, as the politically symbolic deadline of February 13 
will come and go without a definitive decision on the recall 
referendum against President Chavez.  Opposition groups plan 
a march on February 14 to "defend" their signatures and keep 
public pressure on the CNE.  Chavistas have countered with 
provocative statements and already occupy the grounds 
adjacent to the CNE building.  The CNE is stalled on how to 
treat fingerprints and whether to permit signature forms 
filled out in the same handwriting (called "planillas 
planas").  How the CNE comes down on these issues may 
determine whether the referendum goes forward.  OAS observers 
privately tell us the CNE cannot finish their work until 
March 15, assuming major roadblocks are removed.  End summary. 
 
-------------------------------- 
A Chain of Events To February 14 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) This is a key week for the National Electoral 
Commission's (CNE) effort to verify the 3.4 million 
signatures collected by the opposition in support of a recall 
vote against President Hugo Chavez.  The CNE began the 
signature count in earnest on January 13 and, by regulation, 
has 30 days to verify the signatures plus two days to approve 
the results.  Political squabbling and poor organization, and 
the need to constantly invent procedures and standards have 
delayed the process significantly, however, to at least March 
1 (see para 8).  The 30 days end on February 13 and the 
opposition plans a series of street actions designed to 
pressure the CNE to render a decision.  Current plans are for 
the NGO Sumate on February 13 to make copies of the signature 
forms available to those who signed the petition against 
Chavez.  Opposition leaders will visit the CNE the same day 
to demand the CNE hurry deliberations.  On February 14, the 
opposition will stage a march in which signers will carry the 
copy of their signature form to the CNE to "defend" their 
signatures. 
 
¶3. (C) CNE Director Jorge Rodriguez (pro-GOV) announced 
February 6 that the CNE would release partial results of the 
signature counts, specifically, the pro-GOV signature drive 
to recall opposition deputies of the National Assembly. 
Opposition representatives have suggested to us that 
Rodriguez is hoping to lower tension by demonstrating that 
the CNE is working and will soon have final results.  One 
opposition representative told us that the CNE's partial 
disclosure could agitate Chavez supporters because key 
opposition deputies targeted by the GOV will, by press 
accounts, likely escape the recall. (Comment:  If the CNE 
releases partial information, it will likely pertain to 
petition drives against certain deputies whose revocation 
threshold is very low.  It is doubtful the partial results 
will cover the presidential referendum.  End comment.) 
 
¶4. (C) Minister of Interior and Justice Diosdado Cabello 
inflamed the situation further on February 6 when he 
announced that Chavez supporters would occupy Caracas Plaza 
next to the CNE building and that no one would enter the 
plaza until the CNE makes its decision.  "We're not trying to 
scare the CNE directors," he said, "but to protect them from 
the fascists that invent things ... we're going to support 
the rectors in the street."  Cabello made the statements at a 
ceremony commemorating the foundation of Venezuelan Popular 
Unity (UPV), a new political party headed by radical Chavista 
street activist Lina Ron.  Ron, who was also inducted into 
the "Comando Ayacucho" campaign committee during the 
ceremony, said the GOV is facing "an electoral battle ... if 
someone tells me the signatures are valid and that they are 
going to remove Chavez, we can't accept it.  One way or the 
 
other, there will be combat."  Minister Cabello added that he 
was sure the opposition did not collect a sufficient number 
of signatures and, therefore, there would be no referendum. 
Asked by a reporter how the international community would 
react, Cabello responded, "I don't give a ---- what the 
international community thinks." 
 
------------------------- 
Meanwhile, Inside the CNE 
------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Verification of the signature forms continues in the 
Superior Technical Committee (CTS).  Some 94,000 signature 
forms (averaging about nine signatures per page) from the 
presidential recall drive were referred to the CTS for 
further review, about 25 percent of the total number of 
forms.  OAS observers Edgardo Reis and Marcelo Alvarez told 
poloff February 9, that because of changes in criteria, the 
number of forms referred to the CTS is expected to increase 
to half of all the signature forms (which could contain up to 
1.6 million signatures).  The work of the CTS is to confirm 
or deny "observations" made by the CNE temporary workers who 
noted irregularities in the forms during the physical 
inspection stage.  In theory, the CTS may deny an observation 
and send the signature form for transcription; confirming an 
observation essentially kicks the decision up to the National 
Elections Board, headed by Jorge Rodriguez.  The observers 
noted a tendency in the CTS for examiners, for lack of clear 
rules, to confirm the observations, thus forcing the 
decisions to a higher level. 
 
¶6. (C) OAS observers noted two crucial problems with the 
signature forms under review in the CTS.  First, more than 
half of the forms are filled out with the same handwriting 
(called "planillas planas"), which Chavez supporters claim is 
evidence of fraud.  The opposition dismisses the allegation, 
noting that table workers during the signature drive filled 
out the forms for signers to ensure the writing was legible 
and correct.  The rules are silent on the issue, though OAS 
observers pointed out that representatives from both sides 
signed the back of each signature form.  The second problem 
is smudged or irregular fingerprints.  So far, there is no 
decision on how the fingerprints will be analyzed (see ref). 
 
¶7. (C) Rodriguez announced February 6 that a sample of 8,600 
signature forms (including 3,700 from the presidential drive) 
would be analyzed to see whether the same hand that printed 
the information also made the signature.  CNE Director 
Sobella Mejias publicly criticized Rodriguez, saying that 
such a decision required a decision by the CNE board.  OAS 
observers told poloff the CNE was looking at analyzing about 
80,000 signatures (30,000 for the presidential drive), not 
feasible considering a lack of time and qualified handwriting 
experts.  Given the quantity of signatures in dispute, the 
OAS observers concluded that if the CNE decides to reject the 
"planas" and forms with questionable fingerprints, there 
would be no referendum. 
 
------------------- 
Conflict and Delays 
------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Reis and Alvarez said they worried that violence could 
break out either before or after the February 14 march.  They 
showed poloff a timeline they created in consultation with 
CNE employees that showed the process ending by March 15. 
Alvarez also pointed out that the complaint process for those 
whose signatures were rejected could take months if the 
normal electoral complaint process were used.  Reis and 
Alvarez criticized the opposition for bungling several issues 
during the process, such as demanding strict treatment for 
the pro-GOV signature drive, not realizing that the same 
treatment would be reciprocated on the signatures against 
Chavez.  Alvarez opined that if the process is pushed into 
April, the situation would "explode."  Alvarez proposed that 
the OAS issue a statement on February 12 calling on all 
parties to respect the process. 
 
¶9. (C) Primero Justicia Deputy Ramon Jose Medina told poloff 
 
February 9 that the opposition took the decision to pressure 
the CNE on February 14 to avoid further delays.  Medina said 
violence was possible during the march, though much would 
depend on how the CNE handles the run-up.  Medina admitted 
that the decision to march could be falling into a trap by 
the GOV to force a confrontation that might impede the 
referendum process, but he said the opposition could not 
"stand by with arms crossed" while the CNE process drags on. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10. (C) Rather than strike a conciliatory tone, the 
opposition has opted for pressure tactics.  The Chavistas 
have responded with threats and intimidation.  Any time the 
two sides mount parallel demonstrations, as they appear to be 
doing for February 14, there is potential for conflict and 
violence.  Much depends on how the drama inside the CNE plays 
out.  The CNE is quickly reaching the point where decisive 
rulings -- such as what to do with the "planas" -- cannot be 
put off.  If the CNE is able to make these decisions, one 
side or the other will likely become inflamed. 
 
¶11. (C) As the battle within the CNE heats up, the role of 
the OAS and Carter Center observers becomes more important. 
Venezuelans want to have a credible CNE, but the obvious 
partisan politics indicate that the CNE, like other 
institutions, may well be broken.  The Carter Center and OAS 
need to ensure that the will of individual citizens is not 
trampled by wholesale invalidation of signatures using flimsy 
pretexts. 
 
SHAPIRO 
 
 
AAAA 
NOTE:  POSSIBLE MISSING ADM AID OR AIDAC CAPTI 
NNNN