This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 001704 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PTER PINR SNAR CO AUC
SUBJECT: APPREHENSION IN URABA FOR AUC DEMOBILIZATION 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, reasons 
1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: On January 29, a USAID contracting team 
tasked to analyze the GOC's demobilization plans for the 
United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), USAID 
personnel, and poloff visited Apartado, in the Uraba region 
of Antioquia Department.  The GOC expects to implement an AUC 
demobilization in 2004 in Uraba, which has a heavy AUC 
presence.  Dario Mejia from the High Commissioner for Peace 
Office arranged meetings with the local military commander, 
Chamber of Commerce, a Church representative, a plantain 
farming cooperative, and a private security firm to hear 
their views on a potential AUC demobilization.  Many of the 
interlocutors expressed apprehension about the GOC's ability 
to provide security if the paramilitaries units in the region 
were to demobilize.  Much of the Uraba region has been 
controlled by the AUC since about 2001.  The area has been 
historically plagued by violence and instability until 
recently when murder, kidnapping, and other crimes decreased. 
 End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Uraba, which covers northern Antioquia Department and 
western Cordoba Department, is likely to be one of the first 
AUC demobilization areas in 2004.  The GOC's ability to 
provide legitimate state security and social services there 
could prove crucial to the peace process's continued 
progress. 
 
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Potential Security For an AUC Demobilization 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) General Paulino La Torre, head of the Army's 17th 
Brigade, which is responsible for Uraba and parts of Choco 
Department, acknowledged that there is public concern that 
the military and police will not be able to provide adequate 
security in the event of an AUC demobilization and that the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) will seek to 
re-take the region.  However, he is confident that his 
brigade is up to the task for the following reasons: 
 
-- A greater public security presence since President Uribe 
took office: there are now police units of approximately 40 
men each and hometown soldiers in all 13 municipalities, in 
addition to the permanent presence of three Army companies. 
La Torre noted that there are over 3,000 soldiers and police 
operating in Uraba.  When asked why this many soldiers have 
had problems subduing only several hundred illegally armed 
combatants, La Torre replied that: (1) the brutal 
intimidation methods used by both groups enables them to 
control large parts of the region with a relatively small 
fighting force; and (2) the region traditionally has had a 
small state presence, especially in the heavily forested, 
mountainous uplands. 
 
-- Violence in the region -- while still a major problem -- 
has decreased dramatically in the past year.  La Torre claims 
this is in part because the paramilitaries who operate in the 
area have largely obeyed the cease-fire agreed upon in late 
¶2002.  Data from the Vice Presidency's Office corraborates 
this assertion: of the approximately 370 confirmed 
paramilitary human rights violations nationwide since 
November 2002, only three or four have been in the Uraba 
region. 
 
¶4. (C) La Torre estimated that there are about 300 
paramilitaries in Uraba in three groups: Carlos Castano's 
AUC, drug trafficker Diego Murillo's (alias "Don Berna") 
forces, and the Central Bolivar Bloc.  These groups have 
dominated most of the region since about 2001 after several 
years of violent clashes with the FARC.  There are an 
estimated 150 FARC guerrillas, who have been pushed by the 
AUC into pockets of territory in the region's upland areas. 
 
 
----------------------------------- 
Community Representatives Skeptical 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Several members of the Chamber of Commerce said they 
were concerned about the consequences of a paramilitary 
demobilization.  Many acknowledged that they had personally 
been extorted, threatened, or had family members killed or 
kidnapped in years past by the FARC.  They said that the AUC 
presence had stabilized the region during the past four or 
five years, resulting in increased investment, especially in 
the banana growing areas.  They feared retaliation by the 
FARC if the paramilitaries were to demobilize.  They 
emphasized, however, that they are in favor of a paramilitary 
demobilization, but only if the GOC can guarantee a secure 
and viable state presence. 
 
¶6. (C) Father Leonides Moreno from the Roman Catholic church 
of Apartado supports all peace efforts, including the AUC 
peace process.  He acknowledged that an AUC demobilization 
would be complicated, especially in light of the region's 
widespread drug trafficking activity. 
 
¶7. (C) Dario Mejia from the Peace Commissioner's Office 
conducted a confidential question and answer session with 
about 20 plantain farmers to determine their views of 
security in the region.  Very few said that they had been 
directly hurt by the armed conflict.  However, about one 
third claimed that they did not think the GOC was capable of 
providing adequate security at the present time, suggesting 
that they feel that some other group -- most likely the AUC 
-- is protecting them. 
 
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Former CONVIVIR Confident 
------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Two managers of a private security firm that was 
founded ten years ago as part of the then-legal, 
state-sponsored self defense groups (convivir) expressed 
their opposition to all illegal armed groups, including the 
AUC.  The firm, which has about 100 employees, is willing to 
offer jobs to ex-paramilitaries, in an un-armed capacity.  It 
currently employees several former guerrillas.  The managers 
expressed confidence that the GOC would not leave the area 
vulnerable to attack from the FARC.  They also suggested that 
private firms, such as their own, could play an important 
role in providing security after an AUC demobilization. 
(Comment: In many respects the private security firms would 
be performing much of the functions now performed by the AUC, 
but presumably within a framework of law and without drug 
trafficking.  End Comment.) 
 
¶9. (C) Comment: Uraba illustrates a complicated conjunction 
of issues: (1) Citizen fear of violence, especially by the 
FARC; desire to return to normalcy; and lack of confidence in 
the ability, not the goodwill, of government forces; (2) the 
benefits, already in place of President Uribe's policy to 
strengthen the public security presence throughout the 
country; and (3) the complexity of the paramilitary problems, 
especially regarding the peace process. 
 
WOOD