This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000359 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP, S/CT, DS/DSS, AND DRL/IRF; 
CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2014 
TAGS: PHUM PREL PINR YM KICC
SUBJECT: YEMENI ISLAMIC MODERATE ON THE RELEASE OF 
DETAINEES, RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE AND ICC RATIFICATION 
 
REF: A. FBIS RESTON 301554Z JAN 04 
     ¶B. SANAA 146 
     ¶C. 03 SANAA 2767 
     ¶D. 03 SANAA 2753 
     ¶E. 03 SANAA 2743 
     ¶F. 03 SANAA 2454 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Edmund J. Hull, for reasons 1.5, b and d 
 
¶1. (c) Summary: Pol/Econ Chief, Counter-terrorism Coordinator 
and Political Specialist (as translator) met with Judge 
Hamoud al-Hitar,  leading cleric of the ROYG committee 
responsible for the dialogue with security detainees, on 
February 9.  Concerning the dialogue, al-Hitar said that 
there are fewer than 30 detainees recommended for release, 
and that the rest are facing criminal prosecution, including 
those suspected in the bombings of the USS Cole and French 
tanker Limburg  He stated that information from detained 
al-Qaida member Abu Asim al-Makki has led to a small number 
of arrests and suggested the possibility of extraditions, if 
"such an action would strengthen U.S.-Yemeni relations." 
Al-Hitar also confirmed that there is a very high likelihood 
that the International Criminal Court (ICC) will be ratified 
by Parliament soon.  While he did not provide specific 
proposals for follow-up from the January HR/Democracy/ICC 
conference (ref b), al-Hitar  believes that democracy is a 
"weapon" to change regimes from within and that a dialogue on 
democracy is the way to restore U.S.-Islamic relations. 
Because of concerns that external factors would lead to an 
unpalatable outcome, he recommended indefinite postponement 
of a proposed conference on moderation of religious messages 
to be hosted by Yemen's Ministry of Awqaf (ref a).  End 
summary. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Fewer Than 30 Recommended for Release; 
Remaining Detainees Face Criminal Charges 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (c) On the status of the dialogue, Judge al-Hitar said 
that there are fewer than 30 detainees remaining that have 
been recommended for release by the group, and that the rest 
are slated for criminal prosecution.  He said that it is not 
in the interests of either the U.S. or Yemen to imprison 
innocent individuals, but that this standard certainly "did 
not apply to suspects in the Cole or Limburg bombings," and 
cited our mutual interest in moving the prosecutions of these 
suspects forward, which he believes will have a deterrent 
effect.  Al-Hitar said he recommended that the last group of 
less than 30 be let go over the Eid-al-Ahda holiday (February 
1-3), but claims that the security forces have concerns that 
have delayed the process.  When asked about the timing of 
releases, al-Hitar said that it was dependent on the 
particular number of prisoners in detention at any one time, 
and not on a pre-determined holiday schedule.  (Note: the 
first two groups were released over or just after Ramadan in 
2002 and 2003.  End note). 
 
¶3. (c) Al-Hitar said that elements of the parliamentary 
opposition have used the detainee issue, and ROYG resistance 
to releases, to pursue their own agenda by attempting to show 
a tie between the regime and the "extremist" detainees -- 
which they believe has a deleterious effect on the regime's 
reputation.  He also confirmed that security forces had 
recently arrested a small number of suspects based on 
information developed from detained Al-Qaida member Abu Asim 
al-Makki. 
 
¶4. (c) When asked if he had participated in the dialogue on 
Constitutional issues related to extradition for criminal 
cases, al-Hitar claimed that he was out of the country. 
However, he counseled "patience" on the issue because: (1) 
the ROYG needs to be very sensitive to public 
opinion/reaction, e.g., harsh criticisms of the government 
because of the 2002 al-Harithi incident accompanied by 
accusations from the opposition that it had abandoned its 
sovereignty; and (2) the ROYG and the opposition are both 
committed and very close to ratifying membership in the ICC, 
which would automatically lead to constitutional amendments. 
 
¶5. (c) On the extradition issue, al-Hitar said that if there 
is a "possibility that such an action would strengthen 
U.S.-Yemeni relations, then it would certainly be 
considered," but the ROYG would need to be very sensitive to 
ensure that such an action would not provide ammunition to 
the political opposition/extremists.  Comment:  Along with 
Foreign Minister Qirbi's comments in a February 5 Al-Jazeera 
interview on Jaber al-Banna that "the question should be 
whether the Yemeni law applies to him as a Yemeni or as a 
Yemeni who abandoned his Yemeni citizenship," this seems to 
constitute a softening from the blanket denial from various 
sources that stated extradition was impossible due to 
constitutional prohibitions.  End comment. 
 
 
¶5. (c) At the invitation of the UK government, Al-Hitar is 
likely to be traveling to the UK later this month to discuss 
the dialogue process.  He welcomed the opportunity to meet 
with U.S. visitors to Yemen to discuss the issue, and hinted 
several times that he would welcome an invite to travel to 
the U.S., even mentioning that his 1995 trip to the U.S. (on 
an IVP program) changed both his thinking and personal 
behaviors in a positive way. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
Democratic Dialogue Will Restore U.S.-Islamic Relations 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶6. (c) Asked about follow-up from the recent HR/Democracy/ICC 
Conference hosted by the ROYG (ref b), al-Hitar said that he 
would like to see a U.S. strategy for the Middle East based 
on the outcome of the January meeting.  He commented that 
Yemen is "competing" for a role in the region, and that 
democracy is its only card.  He clarified that the conference 
was put forward in the context of creating a "slow-burn" or 
simmering effect for democratic dialogue and reforms, and 
that democracy can be used as a "weapon" to change regimes 
from within countries.  He stated several times during the 
meeting that a dialogue on democracy is the primary way to 
build/restore U.S.-Islamic relations. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
Conference on Moderate Preaching Postponed Indefinitely 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶7. (c) On the proposed Ministry of Awqaf (Endowments and 
Religious Guidance) conference on religious moderation (ref 
a), al-Hitar said that a cabinet-level committee has already 
prepared a program and proposed guest list for the event, but 
that over Ramadan he counseled against going forward because 
of concerns that Iraq would dominate the discussion.  He 
characterized the conference as a "double-edged sword," 
saying that although it is aimed at moderating religious 
messages, it could result in a more hard-line message.  He 
believes things are too "emotional" right now and that 
outside influences (e.g., Afghanistan, Iraq) would be too 
strong for participants to ignore. 
HULL