This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 000307 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT FOR G, DRL, EUR, AND SA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2014 
TAGS: PREL PHUM KDEM AFGHANISTAN
SUBJECT: CHR-60: ITALIANS SHOP STRATEGIES ON AFGHANISTAN, 
IRAN, DEMOCRACY CAUCUS 
 
REF: A. A) BUTLER/BASS E-MAIL JAN 26 
 
     ¶B. B)STATE 13279 
 
Classified By: Pol M/C Tom Countryman, reasons 1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (U) Italian MFA Human Rights Director Giuseppe Calvetta 
reviewed with us January 27 ministry thinking on several 
CHR-related elements following the January 21 meeting of EU 
human rights experts (COHOM). 
 
Iran 
---- 
 
¶2. (C) The Irish presidency would be contacting Tehran in the 
coming days to try to organize the next session of the 
EU-Iranian HR dialogue for the first week in March.  EU 
members were cautiously optimistic that Tehran would agree to 
resume the dialogue despite lingering anger over EU support 
for the Canadian UNGA resolution.  Perhaps hedging their 
bets, COHOM experts had agreed to adopt the same approach on 
Iran at CHR-60 as last year: the EU would not/not co-sponsor 
a resolution, but member states sitting on CHR would support 
a resolution.  The open question was whether Canada intended 
to sponsor a resolution again this year. 
 
Possible resolutions: Chechnya, 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) EU members were pondering how to proceed regarding 
possible resolutions on China, Iraq and Chechnya and Calvetta 
asked for U.S. intentions on all three.  Chechnya posed a 
special challenge for the MFA; it had asked the Council of 
Ministers for a formal recommendation on how to proceed on 
the issue, given PM Berlusconi's oft-expressed (including, on 
occasion, when it shouldn't be) personal support for 
President Putin. 
 
Afghanistan, 
------------ 
 
¶4. (C) Regarding an Afghan resolution,  we replied that 
informal soundings in Washington revealed strong opposition 
to a resolution.  We believed it would be counterproductive 
to continue to criticize the current proto-government for a 
situation largely created by its predecessors.  However, the 
U.S. might be prepared to countenance a chairman's statement, 
if it concentrated on deficit areas where the international 
community, or specific donors, were committed to supporting 
the Afghan government to correct them -- i.e., a statement 
that was forward-looking and encouraging rather than critical 
of circumstances largely created in the past. 
 
¶5. (C) Calvetta tried again, suggesting the resolution could 
be 'technical.'  We replied that our clear impression was 
that Washington would not support that approach;  since the 
bulk of attention invariably would focus on 'resolution' 
rather than the 'technical' qualifier, it would have the same 
effect of sending the wrong signals to the Afghans and to 
donors. 
 
Iraq 
---- 
 
¶6. (C) Calvetta wondered if the U.S. might contemplate a 
similar approach (i.e. chairman's statement identifying 
elements/areas that would be focus of international 
community's assistance to a nascent government) regarding 
Iraq.  We replied that we were uninstructed, but judged it 
highly unlikely that the U.S. would countenance even a 
chairman's statement, given the timing of CHR-60 relative to 
transition process in Iraq and the temptation for 
mischief-making from those critical of U.S. policy in the 
region. 
 
Democracy Caucus 
---------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Reaffirming Italy's strong push to help develop a 
democracy caucus in UN fora, beginning with CHR-60, Calvetta 
said Italy was itching to do more but was having difficulty 
developing tactics for proceeding.  He lamented the 
difficulties involved in persuading more desirable, 
democratic countries to buck comfortable regional rotations 
and take on regional offenders who invested lots of time, 
energy -- not to mention other sources of suasion -- in 
winning seats in UN fora.  For example, how could core 
Community of Democracy members persuade Uruguay to compete 
actively against Cuba for a CHR seat?  Italy was working to 
 
 
develop the CD's practical promise, but it was difficult to 
overcome the habits and psychology of the current regional 
groupings.  We suggested that Italy and other interested, 
activist CD members needed to brainstorm on incentives we 
might, individually or collectively, offer to such countries 
to offset the perceived risks 
 
Swedish Grading Curve 
---------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) In an aside as the discussion concluded, Calvetta 
noted that the Swedish rep had announced at the January 21 
COHOM Stockholm's publication of its annual assessment of 
human rights.  The assessment reportedly concluded that 
adherence to human rights norms had improved across the 
globe, with two notable exceptions: the United States and the 
Russian Federation.  Shaking his head, Calvetta said he'd 
asked for a copy of the report and was told that it thus far 
was only available in Swedish. 
SEMBLER 
 
 
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 2004ROME00307 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL