This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MAPUTO 000112 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CVIS KFRD MZ KCOR KCRM
SUBJECT: IMMIGRATION & VISA FRAUD IN AND OUT OF MOZAMBIQUE 
 
 
¶1. (U) Summary: Visa fraud in Mozambique continues to be 
less prevalent than the otherwise high level of corruption 
throughout the country would suggest. New anti-fraud 
investigation and validation studies at post indicate, 
however, that attempted non-immigrant visa fraud among third 
country nationals is a growing problem, specifically among 
the South Asian, West African and Cuban communities. Visa 
fraud among emigrants to Mozambique and South Africa is also 
on the rise, creating secondary effects at our visa window. 
Post has, in response, altered its visa issuance practices 
for certain third country national groups, and maintains a 
watchful eye for further illegal immigration trends in 
Mozambique. 
 
¶2. (U) US Embassy Maputo experiences relatively low levels 
of visa fraud at the consular window, particularly among 
Mozambican applicants. Mozambicans within the United States 
number less than 5,000 - the closest thing resembling a 
Mozambican community can be found in New York/New Jersey - 
and only a few nationals see non-immigrant visas as a ticket 
to emigrate illegally to the U.S. To verify this 
assumption, post conducted unofficial validation studies in 
late 2003 on 50 of that year's Mozambican B1 and J1 visa 
recipients who we considered to be high flight risk 
candidates. Of these, 47 are confirmed returnees and only 
one is a confirmed overstay - at least a 94% returnee rate. 
 
¶3. (U) Mozambicans who wish to emigrate in search of 
economic opportunity almost always target South Africa, 
occasionally Portugal. The South African High Commission 
consequently has a visa fraud problem very similar to what 
U.S. Embassies see throughout much of Latin America and West 
Africa, including false passports, residency documents, 
identity cards, letters from employers, and bank account 
statements. Much of the traffic place takes place in full 
view of their gates. We see no signs of organized NIV 
document fraud at our embassy, though we do see the 
occasional false residency document or bank account 
statement. 
 
¶4. (U) The high rate of return and relatively low levels 
of fraud among Mozambican NIV applicants contrast with 
patterns detected among third-country national applicants. 
Unofficial validation studies at post in 2003 have verified 
the return of 5 of our last 20 approved Cuban NIV applicants 
scheduled to return in the past year, 12 of 20 West Africans 
(Nigeria 6/7, Guinea 2/7), and 13 of 20 Pakistanis. Based 
on these results, post has become much more stringent on 
issuing NIVs to Cubans, who formerly had a relatively high 
approval rate based on the fact that most applicants were 
doctors or engineers with long-term residency in the 
country. 
 
¶5. (U) (It should be stressed that prior to this 
validation study, Post already had a long history of NIV 
approval rates below 50% for West African applicants and, 
post 9-11, the NIV approval rate for South Asians also had 
fallen into the 35% range. Due to our already-low approval 
rates, it was necessary to conduct our validation study on 
all third-country applicants who had returned in the past 12- 
16 months in order to have a viable sample size. Since our 
timeframe for contacting returned TCN NIV applicants is much 
longer than we used for Mozambican NIV applicants, it likely 
increases and somewhat exaggerates the rate of non-response 
among TCNs.) 
 
¶6. (SBU) At the same time that Post has confirmed a high 
rate of non-return among third-country applicants, it has 
detected increased signs of organized immigration fraud by 
third-country nationals within Mozambique. Since November 
2003, Post has been approached three times by members of a 
group of recent Indian and Pakistani immigrants to South 
Africa/Mozambique, inquiring about the possibility of 
acquiring U.S. non-immigrant visas for the group, which 
numbers at least 33 strong. Background checks on the 
handful of passports secured from our sources indicate that 
the applicants received NIVs for South Africa or Mozambique 
from Mumbai and Karachi. Many have applied for NIVs to the 
U.S. in the past and been turned down. The leader of the 
group has been identified as Hanifo Shiraz (sp?), a 
Pakistani exporter-importer with residency in Nampula, 
Mozambique and business interests in Pretoria. Mr. Shiraz 
has been tied to the drug trade by various sources, but his 
name does not show up on INK, and our knowledge of him is 
limited. 
 
¶7. (SBU) We became aware of this potential NIV fraud ring 
at the same time that a Beira-based newspaper, Zambeze, ran 
an article detailing NIV fraud at the Mozambican Consulate 
in Karachi. According to the author, the Mozambican consul, 
Abdul Kalid Tawab, by some accounts a Pakistani national and 
by others a Mozambican of Pakistani descent, had been 
detained for selling non-immigrant visas at a rate of $500- 
$800 per visa, presumably on every visa issued. The Karachi 
Consulate typically issues about 400 visas per month. No 
names of the offending officials were listed, and subsequent 
Embassy contact with the newspaper was unable to unearth any 
further information. Contacts within the Mozambican 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Immigration confirmed that 
visa fraud had been a problem in Karachi, probably for a few 
years, but insisted the level was greatly exaggerated, and 
said that the offending official had been removed. 
Immigration officials at the Maputo airport insist that they 
have turned away many travelers with false visas from 
Karachi, but offered no proof. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Over the past two years, the South Asian 
(especially Pakistani) community has grown considerably in 
Mozambique. The Director of Immigration indicated to us 
that his offices have been receiving up to 500 new Pakistani 
applicants for residency per month over the past several 
months. (He did not know the specific number.) Nampula 
city has seen a particularly large spike; local officials 
estimate that the Pakistani community has doubled in 
population in the past 2-3 years. The city has also become 
a hub for African immigrants from a wide range of countries, 
particularly Nigeria. New South Asian residents generally 
enter the country through Maputo airport and then migrate to 
Nampula. Land routes from Malawi and Tanzania have been 
noted as the most common means of illegal entry for 
Africans. In addition, post has noticed that the Nampula 
Immigration office has become increasingly corrupt, issuing 
improper visas and residency documents to South Asians and 
West Africans at a price (and also forcing Americans to pay 
bribes for their residency documents). Some of these TCNs 
have appeared at our visa window in recent months, and much 
of the relatively limited NIV fraud found in Mozambique 
originates from the Nampula area. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Many of these TCNs are content to live and work 
in Mozambique, and Indians and Pakistanis are particularly 
active in trading a wide range of goods. They have also 
made inroads into the money exchange and banking sphere in 
Nampula. Others are looking to move onward. The South 
African High Commission in Maputo estimates that NIV 
applications from Pakistanis and Indians have grown by about 
10% in each of the past two years. Applications from third- 
country Africans have risen at a slower rate. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Larger numbers of South Asians and West Africans 
(and Mozambicans) bypass the visa route to South Africa 
altogether, traveling illegally by land. Many pass straight 
through the border at Ressano Garcia-Komatipoort in vans, 
via smugglers who may be South African, Mozambican, or, in 
some instances, recent South Asian immigrants tied to Mr. 
Shiraz or others. The typical fee involves 500R to 800R to 
the smugglers, with some of that money paid to border 
guards. (The International Office for Migration reports 
that traffickers in women and children will pay 150R to 
border guards in order to allow a group of Mozambican women 
to crawl under a fence 2-3 kilometers away from the border. 
Bribes to drive a group straight through the border run much 
higher. This same price range probably holds for smuggling 
of South Asians.) The Swaziland border at Naamacha is 
equally porous for those wishing to cross in vans, and 
perhaps easier to cross on foot, but requires a second 
crossing into South Africa, and is therefore less favored. 
Other more creative methods of entry have been noted, such 
as driving to the beaches of Ponta do Ouro, and crossing to 
South Africa by foot. It is very likely that South Africa 
is the end destination for the vast majority of these 
desperate migrants; very few appear to have the financing or 
the inclination to attempt a jump to the United States. 
 
¶11. (U) The patterns of migration from Mozambique to South 
Africa resemble those used by traffickers in women and 
children, with an apparently lesser emphasis on Ponta do 
Ouro as a migration point. It should be pointed out, 
however, that we have no indication that South Asian and 
West African immigrants have been the perpetrators or 
victims of trafficking in women and children. In addition, 
post has not seen any evidence that intending illegal 
immigrants from South Asia, West Africa, or Cuba have 
engaged in any anti-American activities, per se. The worst 
that can be said is that the leaders of the illegal 
immigration rings are allegedly involved in the drug trade 
and other forms of contraband. 
 
¶12. (U) Post continues to be vigilant of intending NIV 
fraud, especially as our percentage of NIV applicants from 
TCNs continues to rise, from 20% in 2002 to 28% in 2003 - 
with an especially high percentage in the later months of 
the year. (This spike is due in part to the Department's 
decision in April 2003 to extend the validity of Mozambican 
visas from three-month, single-entry visas to one-year, 
multiple-entry, which has stopped the growth rate in 
Mozambican NIV applications.) We have already taken 
measures to significantly curtail NIV issuance to TCNs, and 
to nearly prohibit issuance of NIVs to any third country 
national that has not proven long-term residency within the 
country. Finally, post has made strengthening of 
Mozambique's border security a mission-wide priority, which 
will be reflected as one of the top goals within our Mission 
Performance Plan. 
LA LIME