This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000039 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ATA, DS/ITA, NEA/EX 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2014 
TAGS: ASEC
SUBJECT: BAHRAIN MOI'S PLANNING, PREPARATION, AND C2 AVERT 
NEW YEAR'S EVE RIOT REPEAT 
 
REF: 03 MANAMA 0059 
 
Classified By: CDA Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.5 (b and d) 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY:  RSO has obtained details from senior GOB 
Interior Ministry (MOI) officials on how the Ministry 
planned, prepared for, and executed a major police deployment 
in Bahrain to prevent a repeat of last year's New Year's eve 
riots.  The MOI's preparations were impressive and 
demonstrated clear progress in the MOI's capability to 
provide security to major events.  The MOI's drawing on 
lessons learned from ATA training is also a clear testimonial 
to the value of the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (S/NF)  BACKGROUND CONTEXT:  On New Year's Eve, 31 DEC 
2002, Bahrain was rocked by spontaneous, violent, and 
damaging, albeit relatively disorganized, riots that 
destroyed over 100 cars, caused more than USD 250,000 total 
damage in area hotels, and left the country shaken, confused, 
and in search of a motive and organizer (RefTel).  Various 
Embassy contacts offered a range of hypotheses on the 
composition and motivations of the rioters from "saboteurs," 
committing "deliberate acts" intended to "create chaos and 
instability, provoke the police, and undermine the country's 
stability and achievements," to laying blame on the numerous 
Shi'a political societies.  Some asserted that most of the 
rioters were opportunist hooligans who capitalized on an 
event that spun out of control.  At any rate, the riots stung 
the Interior Ministry, humiliating their law enforcement 
efforts, and undermined the credibility of an already 
oft-maligned government department.  END BACKGROUND CONTEXT 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  On Wednesday, 01/07/04, Asst. RSO spent an hour 
with Colonel Ibrahim Al Ghaith, Director of the "Training and 
Guards Directorate."  Col Al Ghaith put together the MOI New 
Year's Eve 2003 plan, implemented it under the authority of 
the MOI Undersecretary, MajGen Daij Khalifa Daij Al Khalifa, 
and briefed it to Asst. RSO as follows. 
 
¶4. (SBU)  Several weeks before the event, Col Al Ghaith met 
with an entire working shift (about 450 policemen) from the 
various police sub-stations around Bahrain.  The purpose of 
this meeting was to ascertain, from the viewpoint of the 
"street-level" patrolmen, where problems were anticipated and 
what the policemen recommended as appropriate countermeasures 
thereto.  The policemen recommended robust foot patrols in 
the areas of Exhibition Avenue, downtown Manama, the Bahrain 
Exhibition Center, and Gudaibya.  They further requested that 
patrols consist of two officers each. 
 
¶5. (SBU)  Col Al Ghaith explained that, upon reflection, he 
preferred patrols consisting of 5 officers each.  These 
patrols were deployed in the aforementioned areas.  Further, 
each patrol of 5 policemen was comprised of 1 policeman from 
the cognizant sub-station supplemented by 4 policemen from 
the "Guards" Directorate.  This way, the leader of the patrol 
was highly familiar with the area, plus he had a capable team 
under him.  On the ground, they utilized dispersion by 
breaking each 5-man patrol into two smaller groups of 2/3 and 
separated them by a half-block.  They worked together, but 
did not cluster too closely. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Each of these foot patrols was assigned an area of 
responsibility.  Multiple teams covering the larger 
jurisdiction would report to a high-level officer resident at 
the cognizant sub-station, who then reported to the MOI's 
Command Center at the Fort (HQ). 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Special Security Force Directorate (SSFD, the 
Directorate that provides the riot police/tactical teams) 
pre-positioned a react force at the Manama, Gudaibya, and 
Exhibition Center police stations and two at the Fort.  These 
teams were on standby to react to an incident beyond the 
capabilities of the above-mentioned foot patrol teams.  The 
chain of command and communications worked like this:  The 
foot patrol leader would call the OIC at the sub-station, who 
would call the Command Center at the Fort.  The Command 
Center would deploy the React Forces as needed. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Col Al Ghaith and his counterparts ran the Command 
Center and remained there all night.  The Undersecretary was 
in charge overall. 
 
¶9.  (C)  COMMENT:  Of note, this demonstrates the benefits of 
Post's robust ATA training agenda.  Senior police officials 
solicited input from lower ranks with ground-level knowledge, 
developed a cohesive plan, and then effectively executed this 
plan.  Through pre-event publicity and advertising, meetings 
and discussions with various political society leaders, a 
well-organized force, and sound Command, Control, and 
Communications, the effort was by all accounts a success. 
The MOI officers are clearly learning these skills, in large 
part, through the various ATA courses.  Col Al Ghaith added 
that this plan and methodology will be the model for future 
coverage of large/special events.  This is good news for the 
future.  Col Al Ghaith is completely sold on ATA and the 
modern method of assessing a task and accomplishing a 
mission.  He is a strong contact for the RSO office and, as 
we have come to learn from his superiors, one of the future 
leaders of the MOI.  He has already been identified for the 
senior-level echelons in the near future.  END COMMENT 
FORD