This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KUWAIT 000069 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/NGA 
NSC FOR THEROUX 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2013 
TAGS: ETRD EAID MOPS PREL PGOV IZ IR KU
SUBJECT: HUMANITARIAN FUEL CONVOYS IN SOUTHERN IRAQ: THE 
VIEW FROM KUWAIT 
 
REF: A. KUWAIT 5630 
     ¶B. KUWAIT 5539 
 
Classified By: CDA Frank Urbancic for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  A survey of the provision of gasoline and 
kerosene to southern Iraq under the humanitarian fuel program 
showed bottlenecks inside Iraq that are slowing truck convoys 
coming from Kuwait.  The downloading depots at Diwaniyah and 
Latifiyah lack adequate pumps to download fuel from trucks, 
and Latifiyah is hindered by an intermittent electricity 
supply. Convoy movements are also slowed by shortages of 
escorts, and delays as convoys are handed off from one escort 
unit to another. Several officers pointed to inadequate 
coordination and communication between the Ministry of Oil, 
Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR)/Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil 
(RIO), Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the 
multinational force, and US Army units. On a related issue, 
Iraqi Ministry of Oil officials said at a December 28 meeting 
that they are negotiating with Iran for the importation of 
kerosene. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) In coordination with CPA, Kuwait econoff traveled 
overland through southern Iraq December 18 - 20 to canvass 
procedures for moving and downloading truck convoys providing 
humanitarian fuel to meet shortages in Iraq. These convoys 
originate in Kuwait (Reftels) and carry gasoline and kerosene 
to various downloading depots south of Baghdad.  Escorts are 
provided by US and multinational forces, beginning and ending 
at the Navistar staging area just south of the Kuwait - Iraq 
border. 
 
MPs Stretched Thin 
----------------- 
 
Cedar 
---- 
 
¶3. (C) Cedar is a logistical base located near the town of 
Nasiriyah. We spoke with US Army traffic control officers, 
who confirmed that movement of military and civilian fuel is 
the top priority of their units. Cedar is a point where 
military police (MP) units hand-off convoys; generally 
speaking, Cedar - based MPs handle convoys to-from Navistar, 
while Scania-based MPs (see below) handle the Cedar - Scania 
run.  Due to a shortage of MPs, this situation sometimes 
results in convoys having to hold for hours or to overnight 
at Cedar, despite having driven only a few hours north from 
Navistar.  These circumstances are currently aggravated by 
limited daylight in the winter months, as the convoys do not 
move at night; northbound convoys are departing only between 
0500 and 1400. (Note- In comparison, TF-RIO officials told us 
the humanitarian fuel convoys crossing the Turkey - Iraq 
border are generally escorted by the Army only as far as 
"Foxtrot", a staging area near Mosul roughly three hours from 
the border. These convoys sometimes number in the hundreds of 
trucks. From there, unescorted convoys and individual trucks 
are dispatched to depots and gas stations throughout northern 
Iraq. End Note.) 
 
Scania 
----- 
 
¶4.  (C) We spoke with US Army officers at the Scania base, 
roughly 25 miles northeast of Diwaniyah. Convoys overnight 
and refuel at this base, and are escorted onward to depots or 
south to Cedar.  Officers who are involved daily with the 
humanitarian fuel program said the long turn-around time for 
convoys is largely due to the limited capacity of the 
downloading points.  This situation is made more difficult by 
the lack of MPs (MPs at Scania were tasked to escort 669 
vehicles on December 19, a typical day). 
 
¶5.  (C) They told us the Latifiyah depot is generally open 
only from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., and runs particularly 
slowly on Thursdays and Fridays (the local "weekend").  They 
said the speed of downloading is variable, depending on the 
number of pumps running - on December 17, only one 
downloading point was operational.  As at Cedar, convoys are 
hindered by short winter days - convoys will not move north 
later than 1400. Spanish units are responsible for the escort 
of convoys from Scania to Diwaniyah. On December 19, 75 full 
trucks had already waited two days at Scania for Spanish 
escort; officers told us this was not unusual. 
¶6.  (C) The Army officers suggested using other downloading 
points to reduce waiting times, mentioning An Najaf in 
particular.  They also suggested approaching the Spaniards to 
provide escorts for convoys directly from Cedar to Diwaniyah 
(roughly a four-hour trip), which could make a 1-day Navistar 
to Diwaniyah run possible. The MPs said the assignment of a 
civil affairs officer for liaison between them and the 
Ministry of Oil and KBR/RIO would increase the  efficiency of 
their operations. 
 
 
Depots Struggle to Handle Convoys 
-------------------------------- 
 
Latifiyah: 
-------- 
 
¶7.  (C) The majority of fuel from Kuwait is downloaded at one 
of two depots: Latifiyah or Diwaniyah. The depot at Latifiyah 
provides fuel to the Baghdad area, and is located roughly 15 
miles south of Baghdad International Airport and two hours 
north of Scania. Mr. Hussein Thabt, acting manager of 
Latifiyah when we visited, told us an undependable 
electricity supply is his biggest problem. Although the plant 
has its own backup generator for when grid power goes down, 
the number of pumps downloading fuel is subsequently reduced. 
Pump maintenance is also a problem. On December 19 the fuel 
depot had 94 trucks of gasoline and 46 trucks of kerosene 
waiting to download (most carrying 32,000 liters). These 
trucks had left Kuwait on December 14 and 15. Drivers told us 
they sometimes wait four days to download at Latifiyah. 
 
¶8. (C) Thabt told us the depot has a total of 6 pumps for 
gasoline and 2 pumps for kerosene, but these can run 
simultaneously only if grid power is available (the morning 
of December 19, only 3 gasoline pumps and 1 kerosene pump 
appeared to be running). In general, it takes one hour to 
download a truck. Thabt said the maximum the depot could 
handle is roughly 100 trucks/day. On December 18, during what 
Thabt described as a typical day with full electricity, 44 
trucks carrying 1,300,000 liters of gasoline and 27 trucks 
carrying 788,000 liters of kerosene were downloaded. 
 
¶9. (C) The shortage of escorts also creates a backlog of 
empty convoys. On December 19, four convoys totaling 92 
trucks were on the grounds, waiting to be escorted back to 
Scania (and then south to Kuwait). These trucks had departed 
Kuwait on December 12, 13 and 14; drivers told us they had 
been waiting between one and three days to depart. 
 
¶10.  (C) Given their flammable cargo, holding large numbers 
of trucks in close proximity to each other presents an 
inviting target for attack.  Thabt told us the truck holding 
area was attacked with RPGs and mortars 3 weeks prior to our 
visit, but without significant damage. 
 
Diwaniyah: 
--------- 
 
¶11. (C) The download depot at Diwaniyah provides fuel for the 
surrounding provinces. The acting manager there on Dec. 19 
told us the biggest problems are under-capacity pumps that 
break down often and require constant maintenance. A KBR 
representative agreed, adding that the lack of parking space 
for trucks hinders operations.  He expressed concern over 
weak security around the depot. The manager said this 
facility has 4 download points for benzene and 5 for 
kerosene, allowing for the downloading of 9 trucks/hour. 
Unlike the depot at Latifiyah, this compound has a generator 
capable of providing sufficient electricity when the grid 
power is down. 
 
¶12. (C) During our December 19 visit, the kerosene convoy 
being downloaded had departed Navistar the morning of 
December 16. Drivers told us on some trips they must wait up 
to three days to download their cargo at Diwaniyah. Also on 
the grounds were two empty convoys waiting on Spanish troops 
to provide escorts to Scania, roughly 25 miles away. These 
convoys had departed Kuwait on December 15, and their drivers 
told us they had already waited two days for escorts to 
arrive. The drivers told us convoys downloading at Diwaniyah 
generally return to Scania and remain overnight, or fill 
their tanks and move south to Cedar. They said if convoys 
could refuel at the Diwaniyah depot, then head directly 
south, they could avoid a 50-mile detour through Scania. 
 
¶13. (C) As at Latifiyah, trucks are parked close together, 
presenting an exposed target. Although we were told a new 
parking lot is under construction, parking space remains very 
limited -- on the afternoon of December 20, two convoys 
waiting to download were staged on the highway outside of the 
depot, with another convoy ten miles to the south. In a 
snapshot of the distribution difficulties to be overcome, the 
gas station directly in front of the depot had more than one 
hundred cars in line waiting to get gasoline, while across 
the highway gasoline was being sold out of 55-gallon drums 
and jerry cans. These lines and the bootleg vendors were 
evident in many places, particularly on the road between 
Hilla and Samawah. 
 
Multinational Force Involvement 
------------------------------ 
 
¶14. (C) We spoke December 20 with civil affairs officers at 
the Multinational Forces HQ in Hilla. These officers are 
responsible for, among other things, the humanitarian fuel 
program in the five surrounding provinces, including the 
towns of Hilla, An Najaf, Karbala and Al Kut. Multinational 
forces are also escorting fuel convoys every other day from a 
refinery in Basra. A round-trip, they say, takes from 3 to 4 
days. 
 
¶15. (C) The officers said a better overall view of the 
distribution plan for civilian fuel would help them in 
achieving their mission. They also noted the need for more 
coordination among coalition forces, to include the CPA. One 
specific recommendation was to assign an officer to CPA 
regional headquarters in Hilla to help coordinate the fuel 
program. The officers also noted that the distribution of 
fuel from depots to retail stations (generally handled by the 
Ministry of Oil) lacks overall planning, and suffers from a 
lack of communication between district offices.  They said, 
however, that the Poles are pressing Iraqi officials to 
better coordinate fuel distribution.  This effort is made 
more administratively difficult since existing Iraqi fuel 
distribution districts do not correspond to coalition 
military districts geographically. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) The civil affairs officers believe the depot at Al 
Kut could download one convoy a day of either kerosene or 
benzene, and said that Karbala and An Najaf also have depots 
capable of downloading trucks.  They suggested that 
Hilla-based soldiers should pick up convoys in Scania and 
move them out to these depots.  They noted Hilla has a 
facility to download diesel and kerosene from railroad 
tankers, but so far has received only one delivery via rail. 
On a more positive note, the officers said they thought 
renewed rioting over fuel shortages was unlikely in the five 
provinces under their responsibility. 
 
Iran a Player? 
-------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) During a December 28 meeting attended by Kuwait 
econoff in Baghdad between CPA, TF-RIO and the Ministry of 
Oil, ministry officials charged with fuel distribution 
mentioned they are nearing completion of an agreement to 
bring an initial shipment of fifty trucks of kerosene from 
Iran, and are exploring options to import Iranian LPG. The 
officials said the "Iraqi transportation union" is 
negotiating with the Iranians to allow Iraqi trucks to travel 
to Iran to transport fuel. 
 
¶18. (U) TF-RIO personnel are actively engaged in meeting the 
challenges described above. During a late December visit to 
their offices in Baghdad, TF-RIO officers, in conjunction 
with CJTF-7 officers and CPA-Oil personnel, told us they have 
been focusing on improving fuel import performance from 
Turkey, Jordan and Kuwait. They noted that  Kuwaiti imports 
for the last week of December verses the first week of 
December  increased from 59% to 88% of the weekly benzene 
goal and from 71% to 98% of the weekly kerosene goal, and 
that performance has improved by 30% overall for the month. 
They have also focused on  electric power grid and generator 
problems at Latifyiah and the Rusafa fuel distribution depot 
(near Baghdad). Recently, grid power has been restored to the 
Rusafa Depot, two inoperative generators have been turned 
into one operational generator and TF RIO has arranged for 
the 249th EN BN  to conduct a detailed technical inspection 
and assessment of all generators at the Latifiya and Rusafa 
Depots. To improve the efficiency of convoy escorts, they are 
working to provide close coordination among US Army units, TF 
RIO, CJTF7, KBR, Al Tanmia, CPA-Oil, and the Iraqi Ministry 
of Oil. 
 
Comment 
------ 
¶19.  (SBU) Significant amounts of fuel are being delivered 
from Kuwait for civilian use into southern Iraq, under 
difficult circumstances, into an aging system that was 
designed around pipelines instead of truck convoys. 
Nevertheless, our interlocutors said more fuel could be 
delivered more efficiently. Among the people we spoke with 
there is a consensus that the biggest bottleneck restricting 
the humanitarian fuel program is insufficient downloading 
capacity. There was also consensus, particularly among 
military units and truck drivers, that there are insufficient 
security escorts assigned to this high priority operation. 
This is exacerbated by "seams" between units, both within the 
US Army and among multinational forces. According to our 
contacts, the hardest piece in getting additional 
humanitarian fuel supplies into Iraq is increased 
communications and coordination among the many players on the 
scene. 
 
¶20. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
URBANCIC