This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 DJIBOUTI 000018 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR DS/DSS/IP, DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA, DS/DSS/OSAC 
ADDIS FOR RSO AND ESO 
NAIROBI FOR ESO 
PRETORIA FOR ESC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC KSEO DJ
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI: 4TH QUARTERLY STATUS REPORT - OCT, NOV, 
DEC 2003 
 
REF: 03 STATE 49137 
 
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¶1. Summary of Significant Events 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶A. Narrative Overview of Significant Events 
 
¶1. (U) RSO continues to manage a very intensive portfolio 
with little to no assistance.  As the mission continues to 
expand the need for security services increases, but the 
security section remains the same.  Post has gone from 8 
direct hire Americans to a current staff of 15 with 7 long 
term TDYers and a projected staff of 20 by the spring of 
2004, all of which need security services in one form or 
another. 
 
¶2. (U) From 10/19 to 10/27, RSO participated in the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) 
conference located in Philadelphia.  RSO accompanied the 
chief of the Djibouti National Police Force, as one of 6 
personal invitees of Ambassador Taylor. 
 
In addition to the IACP conference, RSO participated in 
several visits to Post: 
 
-     10/12 to 10/14 Visit of AF/EX PMO Ray Maxwell 
-     10/29 to 11/03 - STS Jack McKenna to repair technical 
security equipment.  Post continues to suffer 
from technical malfunctions of its Lock & Leave systems.  RSO 
is working closely with SEO Addis to address technical issues 
as they arise. 
-     11/02 - Visit of USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios 
-     11/04 - Visit of ORA RMO Dr. Allen Ries 
-     11/14 to 11/19 - DS/MSD/MTT Training Visit 
-     11/28 to 12/02 - DS/FSE/FSB X-Ray team 
-     11/30 to 12/03 - FSI Instructor Michael Braxton; Crisis 
Management Exercise 
-     12/07 to 12/13 - Phillip Carter; Deputy Director East 
African Affairs 
-     12/07 to 12/16 - Terrorist Interdiction Program 
assessment team 
 
¶3. (U) RSO has not received any reports of attacks on 
Americans during this quarter. As reported before, RSO and 
embassy personnel continue to monitor crime trends and RSO 
continues to work closely with host nation police to ensure 
the safety of all personnel. Reports of petty theft, fraud, 
assault, battery, sexual deviation, and unlawful trade 
continue to be reported informally, but host nation police 
forces continue to report that crime is decreasing. 
 
¶4. (U) RSO is working closely with DS/ATA in coordinating law 
enforcement training for local security personnel. One ATA 
course was successfully completed and 2 more courses were 
offered during the 4th quarter. 
 
¶5. (U) RSO supported the visit of the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs General Richard Myers and several other sub CINC 
visits of military personnel during this quarter. RSO 
continues to work closely with and support Other agencies at 
post to coordinate visits and security Briefings. 
 
¶B. Mission Wide Emergency Action Drills: 
 
¶1. Chancery: 
 
(a) Bomb Drill - 30 June 2003 
(b) Fire Drill - 11 November 2003 
(c) Emergency Destruction Drill - Unable to accomplish 
(d) D&C Drill - 27 August 2003 
(e) Crisis Mgmt Ex - 01 December 2003 
 
¶2.  Constituent posts: Not applicable. 
 
¶3.  MSG activities: Not applicable. 
 
-------------------------- 
¶2.  Threats and incidents: 
-------------------------- 
 
¶A.  (SBU) Post has Convened the EAC 1 time during the quarter 
in response to threat information and other agencies at post 
have submitted numerous threat related reports back to their 
head Quarters. Post continues to be rated as critical for 
trans-national terrorism. RSO continues to work closely with 
Host nation security to monitor activity and strengthen the 
physical security measures surrounding the embassy in 
response to that activity.  Post received an additional 
130,000.00USD at the end of the fiscal year to supplement the 
physical security of the perimeter.  RSO is working closely 
with GSO to acquire the materials and implement the 
countermeasures as fast as possible. 
 
¶B.  Constituent posts: Not applicable 
 
-------------------------------- 
¶3. DS initiated investigations: 
-------------------------------- 
 
Number of cases generated by headquarters offices: 
                    opened   closed   pending   overdue 
¶1. PSS                 (7)      (9)       (0)       (0) 
¶2. VF                  (1)      (0)       (1)       (0) 
¶3. PF                  (0)      (0)       (0)       (0) 
¶4. CIL                 (0)      (0)       (0)       (0) 
¶5. PR                  (0)      (0)       (0)       (0) 
¶6. CI                  (0)      (0)       (0)       (0) 
¶7. PII                 (0)      (0)       (0)       (0) 
 
Number of cases generated by post: 
 
¶1. Post FSN/PSC        (5)      (0)       (16)      (0) 
¶2. Other Agency RFAS   (0)      (0)       (0)       (0) 
¶3. Host Govt RFAS      (0)      (0)       (0)       (0) 
¶4. RSO Criminal        (0)      (0)       (0)       (0) 
 
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¶4. Action cables/e-mails not answered by DS: 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
22 Dec 03 and previous emails With OBO/PE/SM/TSB - Overdue 
replacement of cracked laminate for CAC.  Efforts have been 
made to replace this laminate for almost a year now with no 
results. 
 
03 Djibouti 988 - Reactivation of an MSG Det.  Post has yet 
to officially her from the Department on this matter, which 
was submitted in May 2003. 
 
-------------------------------- 
¶5. Summary of separate reports: 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶A.   CIWG report: 01/05/04 - 04 Djibouti 00010 
 
¶B.  Emergency action plans: completed and distributed by DS 
on 12/19/2001 via 02 State 217606.  Next full revision of the 
EAP is due 06/05.  An update of the EAP will be conducted in 
early 2004. 
 
¶C.  Security surveys: 
Chancery - 02 March 2003 
Warehouse - 02 March 2003 
EMR - 02 March 2003 
 
¶D.  Procedural security survey: 01/12/03 
 
¶E.  Comprehensive SPE inventory: 01/30/03 
 
¶F.  RSO quarterly travel report: none. 
 
¶G.  DSS overseas firearms qualification policy: RSO 
re-qualified 15 November 2003 during the MTT visit (03 
Djibouti 2140). 
 
¶H. Annual Crime Evaluation Questionnaire and OSAC 
Crime/Safety report:  There have been no significant changes 
in the crime posture of Djibouti since last years report. 
 
¶I. ACEQ - 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Crime Mobility - response (c). 
 
Comments: Although criminals have easy access to embassy 
residential areas, there have been no reports of theft, 
burglary or other crimes against Americans in the past six 
months. The 24hr local guard coverage is acting as an 
excellent deterrent. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Crime Ambience - response (b). 
 
Comments: Due to the proximity of the high crime port area, 
just 1 mile from the embassy residential area, the potential 
for criminal activity especially at night still exists. 
Physical security measures coupled with 24hr guard coverage 
has helped deter would be burglars.  Post has acquired new 
housing within an area of the city that is farther away from 
the upper scale district of Heron.  Not enough time has 
passed to adequately survey the impact of criminal activity 
towards these residences.  Should criminal activity begin to 
surface in this area RSO will report accordingly. 
 
¶3. (U) Aggressiveness of Criminals - response (b). 
 
Comments: Due to the habitual use of the amphetamine Khat, by 
the majority of the male populace, the potential for 
aggressive behavior on behalf of the criminal could be 
exhibited, but no reports have been submitted that document 
such behavior. 
 
¶4. (U) Arming of Criminals - response (b). 
 
Comments: Violent crimes involving firearms are rare, but the 
presence of firearms is becoming more prevalent due to the 
porous borders between Djibouti, Somalia, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea. Knives and sharp objects seem to be the weapon of 
choice for the would be assailant. 
 
¶5. (U) Aggregation of Criminals - response (b). 
 
Comments: Criminals generally aggregate by ethnic 
affiliation, clanship or tribalism. Incidents in the past 
indicate that victims are spared gratuitous violence if they 
comply with the perpetrators. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Deterrence/Response of Police - response (c). 
 
Comments: The national police force is under trained, under 
resourced and under paid. They lack sufficient and adequate 
equipment and do not have the budget, experience or knowledge 
to effectively combat crime. The local criminal sees this and 
is not deterred by the presence or actions of the police. 
Embassy officers rely on the RSO and LGF to respond to any 
incident that may occur at their residences. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Training/Professionalism of Police - response (d). 
 
Comments: It has been three years since the attempted, but 
failed, coup was carried out against the current president. 
The police forces have appeared to bounce back and are in the 
daily process of carrying out their duties.  RSO works 
closely with senior level police on a weekly basis and 
believes that a concerted effort to change the past is being 
made. The lower levels of police officers still suffer from 
low salaries, virtually no benefits, poor equipment and 
inadequate training. In FY-03, DS/ATA provided the government 
of Djibouti with a series of courses that are designed to 
enhance the law enforcement capabilities of their security 
services.  The ATA program continues to evolve for Djibouti 
in FY-04. 
 
¶J. OSAC/CSR - 
 
¶1. (U) Overall crime and safety situation:  the State 
Department,s Bureau of Diplomatic Security rates Djibouti as 
a high crime threat post.  Endemic poverty, widespread 
unemployment and a growing refugee population have led to an 
increase in criminal activity over the past several years. 
Most reported incidents are crimes of opportunity for 
immediate gain such as pick-pocketing and petty theft. 
Violent crimes committed at knifepoint, are also reported but 
not common.  There have been burglary attempts against 
expatriate residences, but perpetrators generally lack the 
sophistication required to 
Overcome home alarm systems and security guards.  The large 
number of unemployed males loitering downtown and in other 
areas frequented by expatriates allows criminals to roam 
undetected.  The port, bus terminal and downtown areas of 
Djibouti are considered at greatest risk for street crime. 
Criminal activity is exacerbated by the widespread abuse of 
Khat, an amphetamine that tends to increase aggressiveness 
among users. 
 
¶2. (U) Political violence:  The government and community 
leaders have stated publicly their strong support for the 
U.S. and coalition efforts in the Global War on Terrorism 
and.  Although anti U.S. demonstrations broke out at the 
beginning of the Iraqi conflict, the focus of the 
demonstrations was aimed at the war and not Americans 
overall.  The demonstrations lasted approximately 5 days, but 
there have been no signs since of anti-American sentiment. 
65 percent of Djiboutians are ethnic Somalis, and the rest 
are afar or foreigners. 
 
Domestic political violence is a less significant threat than 
during the civil war (1990-1996), but rivalry persists 
between Djibouti,s Somali and Afar ethnic groups.  Since the 
may 2001 signing of a peace accord, many former rebels have 
been integrated into the National Police and Defense Forces. 
Demonstrations, often protesting against the Government,s 
nonpayment of salaries, sometimes take place and police 
occasionally use non-lethal force to disperse unauthorized 
demonstrators.  Civil unrest could also result If the daily 
air delivery of Khat from neighboring countries were 
disrupted or delayed for any reason.  Visitors are advised to 
avoid political gatherings and large crowds. 
 
Djibouti lies at the crossroads between the middle east and 
the horn of Africa and hosts a substantial population of 
refugees from throughout the region.  The governments of 
Libya, Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Russia, 
China, France, The United States and other nations maintain 
diplomatic or honorary representation in Djibouti. 
Djibouti,s proximity to a number of conflict-torn states and 
the governments limited capacity to monitor border controls 
has raised concerns over the possibility of cross-border 
terrorist acts. 
 
¶3. (U) Post-specific safety concerns: 
 
Road travel to the north of the country is considered unsafe 
due to poorly constructed roads and the lack of service or 
emergency stations. 
 
A significant percentage of Djiboutian males are under the 
influence of Khat on a daily basis.  The drugs effects may 
escalate what would otherwise be a casual interaction (such 
as a bumped elbow) into a confrontation. 
 
Djibouti is an Islamic country; visitors should dress 
conservatively and observe local customs. 
 
¶4. (U) Police response:  The Djiboutian National Police Force 
is severely under resourced.  The police lack transportation, 
fuel, and communications equipment, which severely affects 
Police responsiveness.  The government is generally 3-6 
months in arrears for payment of police salaries.  In 
addition, the Government will be forced to reduce its Police 
Force by 40% in 2004 in order to meet economic demands. 
 
Visitors requiring police assistance are advised to appear in 
person at the commissariat of police, located across from the 
general post office on the Boulevard de la Republique.  The 
central police telephone number is 352-343.  Private security 
guards for residences and facilities are generally hired on 
an ad-hoc basis.  There are few security guard companies, 
none that are capable of providing patrol response services. 
 
¶5. (U) Medical emergencies:  Local medical facilities do not 
generally offer standards of care available in western 
countries, although there are a few French-trained doctors 
who cater to the expatriate community.  Visitors with medical 
problems are advised to contact the hospital Bouffard (French 
Military hospital) at 351-351 ext.53015. 
 
Falciparum-type malaria (chloroquine-resistant) is widespread 
in Djibouti; prophylaxis is advised. 
 
HIV/AIDS is also a serious concern, especially among the 
urban population; approximately 12 percent of all Djiboutians 
are infected. 
 
¶6. (U) Tips to avoid being a victim: 
 
a) Street Safety:  Visitors to Djibouti should remain 
vigilant at all times and maintain a high security awareness 
while on the streets.  Additional caution should be exercised 
around the port, bus terminal, central market (Quartiers 2 
and 3) and downtown, especially after dark.  Panhandlers and 
street children target foreigners for petty theft by creating 
distractions.  Visitors should Avoid isolated areas, 
particularly along the urban coastline. 
b) Traffic Safety:  road conditions are poor throughout 
Djibouti.  Drivers should beware of potholes, unskilled 
drivers, and the presence of non-roadworthy vehicles on urban 
and rural roads.  Pedestrians and livestock often appear on 
roadways without warning.  Reports indicate that nomads in 
rural areas place rocks on the roads to stop vehicles and 
demand water and/or transportation.  The theft of high-value 
items from stopped vehicles has been reported.  Drivers 
should keep their windows up and doors locked and are 
especially vigilant at intersections. Unattended vehicles 
should always be locked, with valuables secured in an 
inconspicuous location. 
 
Visitors who are involved in traffic accidents should attempt 
to exchange insurance information with the other party and 
summon a traffic policeman if one is nearby.  It is 
inadvisable to make restitution at the scene, especially if 
livestock or pedestrians are involved.  Drivers should be 
weary of crowds gathering at the scene of an accident and 
should depart immediately if they perceive a threat to their 
Safety. 
 
c) Hotel Safety:  US Government personnel on temporary 
assignment to Djibouti are advised to stay in one of four 
hotels:  The Sheraton, The Plen Cielle, The Bellevue and The 
Europa.  Other hotels are considered inadequate.  Visitors 
have reported incidents of robbery and aggressive 
solicitation by prostitutes.  Visitors are advised to lock 
their doors and admit only expected visitors into hotel rooms. 
 
¶7. (U) Further information:  There is no OSAC country council 
in Djibouti.  American citizens are encouraged to register 
with the embassy by appearing in person at the Consular 
section. The embassy is located on Avenue Marechal Joffre at 
the Plateau du Serpent (near the Sheraton hotel). Business 
hours are 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., Sunday through Thursday. 
Telephone numbers are (253) 353-995.  Americans are welcome 
to visit the consular section any time during business hours 
or to telephone the embassy 24 hours a day in case of an 
emergency. 
 
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¶6. POC is RSO Marc Ramos at 253-35-39-95 ext 2307. 
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SMITH