This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000103 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, EAP/J; NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC 
 
C O R R E C T E D COPY(COLOMBO MRN #0102 TEXT CHOPPED AT MARGIN) 
 
E.O. 12958:   DECL: 01-20-14 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINS EAID CE JA NO LTTE
SUBJECT:  Ambassador Lunstead and Japanese Special Envoy 
Akashi discuss Sri Lankan situation and next steps 
 
Refs:  (A) State 11999 
 
-      (B) Colombo 88, and previous (All Notal) 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. 
Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Ambassador Lunstead met January 20 
with Japanese Special Envoy Yasushi Akashi.  The two 
discussed Sri Lanka's ongoing cohabitation impasse and 
its impact on the peace process.  Both agreed it was 
important for the U.S. and GoJ to continue to consult in 
the leadup to the meeting of the Tokyo process co-chairs 
slated to take place in Washington on February 17. 
Akashi was basically in a listening mode during the 
meeting, but was clearly very concerned about the 
cohabitation deadlock.  Per Ambassador's comments to 
Akashi, the U.S. side plans to underscore the need for 
the international community to support the underlying 
peace process during the January 23 Tokyo follow-up 
meeting in Colombo.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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Akashi Reviews Visit 
-------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Ambassador Lunstead met with Japanese Special 
Envoy Yasushi Akashi on January 20.  Akashi was 
accompanied by Japanese Ambassador Akio Suda and several 
other GoJ officials.  DCM, AID Director, and Polchief 
also sat in on the meeting.  Akashi arrived in Colombo 
on January 19 to kick off a week-long visit, which will 
culminate in a meeting of donor and international 
organization representatives scheduled to be held in 
Colombo on January 23.  Akashi noted that he wanted to 
use his visit to obtain first-hand impressions of the 
ongoing political deadlock between Sri Lanka's President 
Kumaratunga and Prime Minister Wickremesinghe, and its 
impact on the peace process.  To accomplish this, he had 
a full plate of meetings in Colombo and would travel to 
the northern town of Kilinochchi on January 22 to get 
the viewpoint of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) on the situation. 
 
¶3.  (C) Regarding Japanese government positioning on the 
Sri Lankan situation, Akashi said the GoJ agreed that 
there should be a linkage between aid and progress in 
the peace process, but that it should be a positive, 
rather than a negative linkage.  To this end, assistance 
should be "used as a stimulant" to encourage further 
progress in the peace process and to pressure the two 
sides to return to negotiations.  Stressing the need to 
concentrate on upholding the ceasefire agreement, he 
said the Tigers could cause an "untoward event," and 
noted that "no-one should be complacent" regarding the 
ceasefire.  Given the heightened risk of an LTTE-GSL 
confrontation caused by a misunderstanding, it was vital 
that the President and the PM find a way to end their 
cohabitation infighting soon and refocus on ways to re- 
energize the peace track. 
 
----------------------------- 
Analysis of Current Situation 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Akashi then asked Ambassador Lunstead for his 
assessment of the situation in Colombo, and of the 
likelihood of a rapprochement between the President and 
Prime Minister.  Ambassador responded by noting that the 
impasse between the two was very serious.  This was 
ironic in that the President and PM had agreed on 
roughly 80 percent of the issues necessary for a 
compromise, but the two were hung up on the last 20 
percent.  Ambassador Lunstead noted that the question 
was now one of which Defense Ministry powers would be 
given back to the PM, and which kept in the President's 
hands (see Ref B).  Ambassador further noted that, in 
his view, the underlying motive for the President's 
action was her demand that she not be treated by the PM 
for the next two (or three) years of her term in the 
same way she felt she had been treated in the past two 
years -- excluded from decision-making.  That said, the 
Ambassador continued, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party 
(SLFP)/Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) alliance 
decreased the prospects of the President reaching a 
compromise with the Prime Minister, and the prospect 
that the President might call for general elections 
seemed more likely now.  Elections would probably solve 
little and could well make things worse. 
 
¶5.  (C) Turning to the linkage between politics and 
assistance, Ambassador made the point that there was a 
need to distinguish between progress in peace 
negotiations, which had been stalled since April 2003, 
and progress in the peace process.  Progress in the 
peace process continued and the international community 
could use its assistance to reinforce that progress. 
Akashi agreed with this distinction.  At the same time, 
given the absence of progress in peace negotiations, the 
full amount of aid pledged at the June 2003 Tokyo donors 
conference would not be possible to deliver at this 
point. That said, both the Ambassador and Akashi agreed 
that the international community could move forward on 
humanitarian assistance and other short-term forms of 
relief activities in the north and east, and on some 
assistance to the south -- all activities in support of 
the peace process. 
 
---------- 
Next Steps 
---------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Turning to next steps, Akashi and the Ambassador 
discussed the modalities of the Tokyo follow-up meeting 
of donor and international organization representatives 
scheduled to take place in Colombo on January 23. 
Akashi said the meeting would be two-part:  the first 
part would involve only bilateral and multilateral donor 
representatives; the second part, would include these 
representatives plus GSL and LTTE representatives if the 
Tigers decided to accept their invitation and 
participate.  Ambassador Suda noted that the Tigers had 
not yet stated if they would attend, and he thought 
there was a less than 50 percent chance that the group 
would show up.  The GoJ side was committed to working on 
ways to minimize the possibility of interaction between 
the U.S. and the LTTE sides at the January 23 meeting if 
the Tigers did attend.  Wrapping up, Ambassador Lunstead 
said he felt the January 23 meeting would be very 
constructive, and should prove a valuable stepping stone 
for the February 17 co-chairs meeting in Washington.  He 
urged that the two sides continue to consult in the 
leadup to the February meeting.  Akashi said he welcomed 
the February co-chair meeting in Washington and agreed 
that continued consultation was important for the GoJ. 
Both agreed that it was important for members of the 
international community to be on the same page regarding 
Sri Lanka; the February meeting would help ensure that 
that continued to be the case. 
 
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COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Akashi was basically in a listening mode 
throughout the meeting and used the discussion to gain 
insight into the complicated, shifting situation in Sri 
Lanka.  He was obviously extremely worried about the 
serious cohabitation impasse which has cropped up in 
Colombo since his last visit in September 2003 and its 
negative impact on efforts to bring the GSL and the LTTE 
back to the negotiating table.  At the same time, he was 
receptive to Ambassador's distinction between the peace 
process, which continues every day, and the peace 
negotiations, which are currently stalled, and he agreed 
that the international community can use its assistance 
to reinforce the underlying peace process in targeted 
ways (the U.S. side plans to underline this key point 
during the January 23 Tokyo follow-up meeting in 
Colombo).  Akashi also agreed that the February 17 
meeting in Washington presents a signal opportunity to 
engage with the other co-chairs and set a common course 
on Sri Lankan assistance issues in light of the negative 
developments in Colombo.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶8.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
LUNSTEAD