This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 000295 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OTI 
NSC FOR CHRIS BARTON 
USCINCSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV VE OAS
SUBJECT: DAS DESHAZO'S MEETING WITH G-5 OPPOSTION LEADERS 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Charles S. Shapiro for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) On January 22, WHA DAS Peter DeShazo gave opposition 
leaders (4 of 5 of the members of the so-called G-5) a 
positive assessment of his meetings earlier in the day with 
officials from the OAS, Carter Center, and UNDP, and of their 
ability to monitor the signature verification process in the 
CNE. GOV officials, he said, had expressed their commitment 
to respect the decisions of the CNE. He stressed the 
international attention focused on Venezuela, and his belief 
that the CNE would act as a fair arbiter of the referendum 
process. The leaders of the G-5 all stressed their lack of 
confidence in the Government, and their fear that the CNE was 
subject to pressures and might favor the government by either 
openly disallowing the signatures, or delaying a recall until 
after August, when the Vice President would serve out the 
President's term. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (U) The Ambassador hosted a dinner for DAS DeShazo with 
Julio Borges (Primero Justicia), Juan Fernandez (Gente de 
Petroleo), Henry Ramos Allup (Accion Democratica) and Enrique 
Salas Romer (Proyecto Venezuela) represented the G-5. Enrique 
Mendoza (COPEI) had accepted but did not attend. Also present 
were the Political Counselor, the Public Affairs Officer, and 
EmbOff (notetaker). 
 
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AD Concerned About National Assembly 
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¶3. (C) Henry Ramos Allup spoke first of the opposition's deep 
concern about the functioning of the National Assembly and 
the push for rules changes. He feared that the changes would 
be used to approve a far-reaching package of legislation, 
such as the reform of the Supreme Court, over the objections 
of the opposition. The TSJ law, Ramos said, is the most 
important threat to the opposition, since it would give the 
government almost complete control over the interpretation of 
the Constitution, and the governing body of the judiciary. 
Ramos stressed changes in Accion Democratica, from opening up 
its usually closed internal governing meetings to the press, 
and instituting a far reaching policy of alliances. He 
proposed that polls should be taken prior to the electoral 
campaigns for governorships, and all parties agree to back 
the candidate with the best chance to win. Enrique Salas 
Romer pointed out that this eliminated the campaign's ability 
to develop new candidates. Ramos stressed the need for the 
opposition to remain united even after the referendum, to win 
elections. 
 
¶4. (C) Ramos and Salas played down various polls including 
one showing up to 60 percent support for President Chavez in 
a recall referendum. Salas attributed President Chavez' 
tendency rise in the polls at Christmas to lavish spending, 
and seasonal optimism. He predicted it would then fall 
sharply afterwards. Both expressed confidence that Chavez 
would lose the referendum. 
 
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CNE 
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¶5. (C) DeShazo told the leaders he was pleased to see the 
technical competency of the OAS observation team working at 
the CNE, and their own confidence in their ability to closely 
monitor the verification of the signatures collected for the 
referendum drives. He stressed the importance of the OAS in 
the process, and his optimism that they would guarantee the 
fairness of the process. He stressed the interest in 
Washington, among both business and government leaders, in 
the resolution of the political crisis in Venezuela, and that 
the message he and the USG have conveyed to the GOV is that 
the democratic process represented by a transparent and fair 
referendum campaign must be respected.  VP Jose Vicente 
Rangel and FM Roy Chaderton had given him assurances that the 
government would respect the decision of the CNE. He also 
 
mentioned TSJ Chief Justice Ivan Rincon's optimism and 
confidence in his institution's ability to fulfill its role 
in the process. 
 
¶6. (C) The four opposition leaders stressed their lack of 
confidence in the GOV, and their fear that it was pressuring 
the CNE. The delays in the verification of the signatures 
were cited as evidence that the CNE is not acting in good 
faith. Borges pointed out that not one signature had yet been 
verified, and that the stated goal of finishing in 22 days 
was impossible.  All the leaders acknowledged 70 percent 
public trust in CNE, but they did not share it. When asked by 
the Ambassador what they wanted to achieve from President 
Carter's visit, they all stressed "fair play." 
 
¶7. (C) Ramos related VP Rangel's assertion that the 
opposition had not gathered more than 1 million signatures 
with the exhortation immediately afterwards that everyone had 
to accept the CNE's decision. He found this a clear sign of 
government pressure on the CNE, or even a sign of a deal. 
Ramos charged that the collection of signatures had not been 
fair, being stacked against the opposition with rule changes 
and military pressure.  Ramos talked of his fear that the CNE 
would try to prove its independence by disallowing some of 
the pro-government parties signatures against opposition 
deputies, and then disallow the recall referendum on the 
President. He pushed hard several times for a plan under 
which the opposition would accept all the signatures against 
their deputies, including 9 from Ramos' AD, and go right to 
the recall elections.  This would put pressure on the 
government to do the same, and eliminate the opportunity for 
the CNE to use the recall referendums against deputies as 
legitimating for its throwing out the presidential 
referendum. 
 
¶8. (C) Salas responded strongly to DAS DeShazo's comment that 
the opposition parties' negative sniping at the CNE was 
perceived as counterproductive and that they were seen as 
lacking a unified, positive message. Salas declared that the 
opposition was responsible for making the CNE an acceptable 
arbiter, despite it having a pro-government majority, and 
they had every right to want to them to be closely watched, 
and reminded of their responsibilities. He said the CNE had 
not earned its credibility, but been given it. 
 
¶9. (C) Borges also stressed the delays of the CNE in 
verifying the signatures, and asked DAS DeShazo if it would 
be acceptable to the international community if the delays of 
the CNE led to the recall referendum taking place after 
August, when the VP would substitute a defeated Chavez, 
rather than a popularly elected leader. He suggested this 
might be the CNE's intention in drawing out the verification 
process. DAS DeShazo responded that there was a limit, though 
not quantified, as to how much delay was acceptable, and that 
the circumstances and reasons for any delay would be a factor 
in determining the response of the international community. 
He stressed that both the GOV and CNE have pledged that the 
process will be transparent and fair and that the USG regards 
these as markers upon which to judge results.  Borges 
stressed that the constant addition of new rules to a 
signature verification process added uncertainty to the 
process. 
 
¶10. (C) Juan Fernandez stressed the tremendous distrust 
between the two sides, and the need to complete actions 
according to a pre-established timetable to build trust. He 
also suggested an agreement between the sides not to run to 
the courts to contest any outcome, as this would generate 
further tension. The Ambassador pointed out that a 
constitutional right was involved, but Fernandez suggested 
that the situation required some sort of corporative 
agreement between the sides to protect the peace. He also 
suggested Carter to help set up a direct line of 
communication between the two sides to help bring down 
tension. 
 
¶11.  (C) In a sustained aside conversation with AD leader 
Henry Ramos, DeShazo opined that for the opposition to be 
effective, it needed to reach out to public opinion with a 
coordinated, coherent, and positive public message, put 
 
forward a program or plan of action, and reach out not only 
to oppositionists but also to independents and chavistas.  He 
noted that he was hearing in many circles that opposition 
carping at the CNE at this early stage in the verification 
process was counterproductive.  Ramos agreed, offering strong 
criticism of the disunity of the opposition and its public 
affairs and seconding the need to reach agreement soonest on 
coordinating action and designing a platform. 
 
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Comment 
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¶12. (C) The leaders welcomed this opportunity to meet with 
DAS DeShazo. The concern about CNE foot-dragging is the 
preponderant theme for the opposition.  They discount that 
pressuring the CNE could backfire and will no doubt continue 
to make their views known. The marches January 23 are part of 
the strategy. DeShazo's message was unmistakable throughout 
his visit: support for the CNE -- and the important OAS and 
Carter Center observation -- as the way to achieve the OAS 
resolution's call for a democratic, peaceful, constitutional, 
and electoral solution. The G-5 bristled at the implied 
criticism of their carping, but took the message on board. 
 
¶13. (U) DAS DeShazo reviewed this message. 
SHAPIRO 
 
 
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