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Viewing cable 04CARACAS101, VENEZUELAN OIL PRODUCTION: A LOOK AHEAD FOR 2004

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04CARACAS101 2004-01-09 19:34 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Caracas
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 000101 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR TSHANNON 
ENERGY FOR D.PUMPHREY AND A. LOCKWOOD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2014 
TAGS: EPET VE
SUBJECT: VENEZUELAN OIL PRODUCTION: A LOOK AHEAD FOR 2004 
 
 
Classified By: Amb. Charles S. Shapiro; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C) Despite a number of optimistic predictions that 
Venezuelan oil production will increase by the end of 2004 
(which seem largely to be attributable to the success of 
Venezuelan lobbying efforts in the U.S.), our sources in 
Venezuela are not as sanguine.  While some believe that 
Venezuela's 2004 production can be expected to remain roughly 
in the 2.5-2.6 million b/d range where it is generally 
believed to be at the current time, there are others who 
believe that, in the absence of significant investment either 
on the part of PDVSA itself or the international oil 
companies, Venezuelan production could drop to as little as 
2.0-2.2 million b/d by the end of 2004.  PDVSA President Ali 
Rodriguez announced January 5 that PDVSA will boost spending 
in 2004 with investment of $6 billion out of a total budget 
of $9.5 billion.  If the budgeted money is actually spent, 
PDVSA may yet be able to arrest the decline, although it 
faces a tough job.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------- 
GOV STAYS ON MESSAGE 
-------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) On January 7, PDVSA spokesmen informed visiting U.S. 
Congressional staffers that daily production is 3.4 million 
b/d including condensates, natural gas liquids, and the heavy 
crude processed into Venezuela,s patented Orimulsion fuel. 
Despite this posture on the part of the GOV as well as the 
success of its lobbying efforts in the U.S. (we have seen at 
least one New York bank analysis stating that production will 
increase to 2.9 million b/d by the end of 2004), local 
industry sources continue to be skeptical.  With the 
opposition's competing oil production report not yet out for 
the month of December, the most recent hard numbers come from 
the November report which maintains that production in the 
eastern and western production areas was 1,750 million b/d 
and 830,000 b/d respectively for a total of 2.58 million b/d. 
 (Note:  these are numbers for crude production and do not 
include condensates and the other products now included in 
the GOV numbers.  In the past, these were not customarily 
included in Venezuela's production numbers.  If PDVSA's 
current methodology were used, the opposition estimate might 
look more like 2.8 million b/d.  End Note.)  While production 
in both areas appears to have stabilized, the report asserts 
that PDVSA's own production (1.62 million b/d out of the 2.58 
million; production by international operators would be 
956,000 b/d) continues to drop slowly. 
 
------------------- 
HOW LOW WILL IT GO? 
------------------- 
 
3. (C) Some local sources, such as a consultant who works 
closely with former PDVSA President Luis Giusti, believe that 
Venezuela's 2004 production will remain roughly in the 
2.5-2.6 million b/d range (without counting condensates, 
etc.).  They believe that modest production increases by the 
four "Strategic Associations" (i.e., extra heavy crude 
upgrading projects) as well as by international companies 
working in Venezuela under operational agreements will serve 
to make up for continuing losses in PDVSA's own production. 
 
4. (C) ExxonMobil de Venezuela President Mark Ward, however, 
argues that production will continue to decline.  Ward, who 
believes national production has already fallen to or below 
2.5 million b/d, told econoff to remember the fundamentals of 
reservoir decline in Venezuela, i.e., a 20-25 percent annual 
decline rate that can only be overcome by continuous 
investment in maintenance of existing projects and 
development of new ones.   With fields that are generally 
believed to have been operated at the maximum rate in 2003, 
Ward speculates that the 2004 decline rate may be worse than 
normal.  Ward adds that he sees no evidence of concerted 
action by PDVSA to address the fundamental issues facing a 
production operation, i.e., a lack of maintenance of both 
reservoirs and support systems as well as the failure to do 
enough workovers and drilling to support old or new 
activities.  Ward is also skeptical that production increases 
 
by international operators will be sufficient to maintain 
current production levels. 
 
---------------------- 
SOME IOC'S CAN DO MORE 
---------------------- 
 
5. (C) In a January 6 conversation, Joaquin Moreno, President 
of Shell Venezuela, confirmed to econoff that Shell has 
increased its production of valuable light crude from the 
Urdaneta West field in western Venezuelan to 53,000 b/d. 
Moreno added that PDVSA is anxious to receive as much oil as 
Shell can produce and that he expects production from the 
field to increase to as much as 60,000 b/d in 2004. 
ChevronTexaco President Ali Moshiri then commented to econoff 
that, with oil at $34/barrel, all the international oil 
companies are anxious to produce as much as they can -- or as 
much as PDVSA will allow or can accept.  Moshiri, however, 
pointed to another problem -- infrastructure.  According to 
Moshiri, ChevronTexaco's Boscan field in western Venezuela is 
currently producing 115-118,000 b/d.  If PDVSA were to ask 
that Boscan production be increased to 130,000 b/d 
ChevronTexaco could do it quickly, he added, but PDVSA would 
be unable to lift the crude.   Moshiri underlined that the 
infrastructure must be there to handle the product, marketing 
and transportation.   He said that chaos still reigns in 
PDVSA's crude trading and shipping functions and that the 
current inefficient system can only handle a maximum of 
2.5-2.6 million b/d. 
 
6. (C)  For his part, ExxonMobil's Ward acknowledged that 
there will be "some small incremental increases from the 
IOC's," but he does not believe that the increase will be 
enough to offset the natural decline rate.  Ward added that 
the Hamaca project (ConocoPhillips/ChevronTexaco extra heavy 
crude upgrading project; the fourth and last of the so-called 
"Strategic Associations"), the only big project expected to 
come on line in 2004, is already producing crude at or close 
to what will be its base level of production.  Further 
expansion of this or other of the Strategic Association 
projects will be impeded by the fact that they use shared 
pipelines and, of course, by the fact that the GOV has not 
moved ahead quickly with negotiations to allow expansion of 
these projects.  (Note:  Vice Minister for Hydrocarbons Luis 
Vierma informed econoff January 7 that PDVSA will meet with 
Total the week of January 12 to discuss the expansion of the 
Sincor project, the Total/Statoil Strategic Association.)  No 
other larger projects are due to be turned on until the 
ExxonMobil La Ceiba field and the ConocoPhillips Corocoro 
field start production in 2005 (these were both projects 
originating in profit sharing deals inked in 1996). 
 
------------- 
PDVSA,S PLANS 
------------- 
 
7. (C)  Long time observers of Venezuela's oil scene, such as 
ExxonMobil's Mark Ward, say that Venezuela must invest in the 
range of $3-4 billion a year in order to stay ahead of its 
decline curve.  Ward stated bluntly to econoff that PDVSA 
would have to invest $8 billion in 2004 in order to recover 
lost production.  PDVSA has not made its 2003 spending 
figures available yet, although the Finance Ministry has 
reported that PDVSA's overall budget was cut by $2.6 billion 
from its original $8 billion in 2003.  PDVSA President Ali 
Rodriguez announced January 5 that PDVSA will boost spending 
in 2004.   He said that PDVSA's total budget will be $9.5 
billion (15.2 trillion bolivars) with investment comprising 
$6 billion (9.64 trillion bolivars).  However, in a January 7 
meeting with U.S. Congressional staffers, Vice Minister 
Vierma told econoff that PDVSA's investment budget in 2004 
will be $5 billion. 
 
8. (SBU) In an investment summary presented to U.S. 
Congressional staffers on January 7, PDVSA claims it will 
invest $35.4 billion during 2004-2009.  According to the 
presentation, about $13 billion will be invested in 
production over the next five years.  It also predicts that 
production capacity will be 5.04 million b/d by 2009.  (Note: 
 In November 2003, PDVSA announced that its 2004-2009 
investment program envisioned investing $39 billion to raise 
production capacity to 4.8 million b/d in 2009.  An earlier 
version contemplated an investment of $43 billion to yield a 
 
production capacity of 5.0 million b/d.  We are not sure how 
an investment program that seems to have been cut by  almost 
$8 billion according to the January 7 presentation will yield 
the same results. It is also worth remembering that, in 1998, 
PDVSA was talking about achieving a 6 million b/d capacity by 
2006.  End Note) 
 
9. (C) PDVSA has also announced that it will itself develop 
the Ceuta-Tomoporo field, the crown jewel of possible new oil 
projects that had multiple international oil companies lined 
up to express their interest.  The Ministry of Energy and 
Mines had stated publicly in late 2003 that Tomoporo would be 
spun off to a third party contractor in a bid process.   The 
Caracas rumor mill, however, holds that PDVSA President Ali 
Rodriguez went directly to President Chavez to protest, 
saying that the new PDVSA had to be able to show that it 
could take on such a project.  PDVSA has also stated publicly 
that it will itself develop other major new projects.  Where 
the money will come from for development of these projects is 
unclear. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
10. (C) PDVSA may yet be able to arrest Venezuela's 
production decline if it moves ahead quickly with substantial 
investment in maintenance of existing projects and 
development of new ones.  ExxonMobil's Ward, however, 
believes that PDVSA could reach a point where it would be 
impossible to invest fast enough to arrest the decline and 
save itself.  The hard fact is that the 2002-2003 oil strikes 
followed on two other events that boded ill for Venezuelan 
oil production:  1) the end of an investment cycle by the 
international oil companies that had seen some $20 billion in 
investment since the early 1990's; and 2) the dimunition of 
PDVSA's own investment since the beginning of the Chavez 
government.  And, of course, the investments by the 
international oil companies ground to a halt because of the 
changes in the regulatory environment fostered by the Chavez 
government.  No new projects have been developed since the 
passage of the Hydrocarbons law in 2001 and this government's 
antipathy towards allowing major new involvement by 
international oil companies in the oil sector (as opposed to 
off-shore gas projects) seems to continue as the recent 
announcement about the Tomoporo field demonstrates.  Even if 
the political and regulatory environment were to improve 
substantially in 2004, there would be a significant lead time 
before this would be reflected in improved production numbers. 
SHAPIRO 
 
 
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