This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000215 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: EXEMPTION 1.6 X5, X6 
TAGS: PREL MARR TU IZ SY IR CY
SUBJECT: TURKEY CLAIMS SYRIA AND IRAN SHARE CONCERN OVER 
KURDISH AMBITIONS IN IRAQ 
 
(U)  Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman.  Reasons: 1.5 
b and d. 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Syria and Iran have expressed concerns to 
Turkey about the Kurds' ambition for maximum autonomy over a 
greater territory in Iraq, according to MFA U/S Ziyal. 
Ankara says it is resisting "ganging up" on the Kurds with 
Damascus and Tehran, and is urging the Kurds to be 
reasonable.  Ziyal told the Ambassador that Turkey would like 
a written response to the January 9 letter from PM Erdogan to 
the President on Iraq.  He voiced the hope that developments 
in Iraq would not distract Ankara from focusing its attention 
over the next few months to reaching a Cyprus settlement. 
End Summary. 
 
 
¶2. (C) During a January 12 meeting on another subject with 
MFA Under Secretary Ugur Ziyal and other senior MFA 
officials, the Ambassador raised Iraq.  He noted that the 
recent letter from PM Erdogan to the President was thoughtful 
and asked whether the GOT expected a response or whether the 
letter would simply contribute to the exchange the President 
and PM would have on this subject when they meet on January 
¶28.  Ziyal confirmed that a written response would be best. 
 
 
¶3. (C) Ziyal noted that the Kurds were making a play for 
Kirkuk, but they have a "different concept of democracy." 
They were moving people into the villages around both Kirkuk 
and Mosul, Deputy U/S Ali Tuygun added.  They do not hesitate 
to use arms to get their way.  The Ambassador responded that 
the US was also concerned by recent developments in Kirkuk 
and has begun taking steps to prevent any group from 
effecting change through force, inspecting political party 
offices, confiscating weapons, etc.  It was important for all 
of the communities there to remain calm and avoid provocation 
 
 
¶4. (C) Ziyal noted that the concept of federalism in Iraq was 
growing and that this was not a good development.  He claimed 
that both Syria and Iran had approached Turkey about their 
concerns for this development.  Turkish public concern was 
also growing, he noted.  The safety of the Turkomen in 
northern Iraq would be an issue for Turkey, but the 
overriding concern was that the political structure should be 
decided democratically and not by the gun.  The Ambassador 
reiterated US commitment to Iraq's territorial integrity, 
noting that CPA was encouraging the Iraqis to develop a 
framework that would not risk the break up of the country. 
Regarding the Kurds' proposals for greater autonomy, some 
Arab members of the IGC were no happier about them than were 
Turkey, Syria or Iran. 
 
 
¶5. (C) The GOT has been warning the Iraqi Kurds "not to shoot 
themselves in the foot again," Ziyal said.  They should learn 
the lessons of the past; "we do not want Kurds and Arabs 
shooting at each other again."  PUK leader Jalal Talabani 
appeared to be more reasonable, Ziyal observed, noting that 
he had some "political acumen," while KDP leader Masoud 
Barzani "has gone over the edge of Kurdish nationalism." 
Turkey does not want to be pushed back into the tripartite 
(Turkey-Syria-Iran) framework, he repeated.  Tuygun added 
that three-party talks would appear as the neighbors "ganging 
up" on the Kurds.  Whatever happens, "we don't want the US to 
be blamed for it," Ziyal added. 
 
 
¶6. (C) The Ambassador noted that the US had a number of 
overriding objectives in Iraq that the US has spelled out for 
the Kurds:  preserving the territorial integrity and 
political unity of the country, opposing any change to the 
status quo by force, abolishing militias, preserving oil 
resources as national patrimony, and central government 
control of Iraq's borders.  There is a process underway now 
addressing each of these subjects, which will continue. 
Finally, even after the transfer of sovereignty to a 
transitional authority, the US would maintain a strong 
military presence to help ensure territorial integrity, 
stability and security. 
 
 
¶7. (C) Ziyal worried that the Transitional Authority would 
simply be a new name for the Governing Council; Jalal 
Talabani had told the Turks that the IGC members would 
constitute the new body.  This will not change the dynamics 
in Baghdad, Ziyal lamented.  Arab members of the IGC, like 
Chalabi, have not developed domestic support and cannot stand 
up to the Kurds.  (Instead, they may be focusing more on 
maximizing their financial gains while in office, he opined.) 
 
 
¶8. (C) The point Ziyal said he really wanted to make was, 
that in early 2003 an opportunity to resolve the Cyprus issue 
was missed because the GOT was focused on the impending US 
action against Iraq.  The May 1 deadline for a Cyprus 
settlement was quickly approaching, and Ziyal hoped that Iraq 
would not again distract the parties from reaching a 
settlement.  (The subsequent discussion of Cyprus is reported 
septel--notal.) 
 
 
¶9. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
EDELMAN