This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ZAGREB 002642 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI- AMBASSADOR PROSPER AND 
EUR/SCE-KABUMOTO 
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/ACE - PASQUAL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2013 
TAGS: KAWC PREL HR
SUBJECT: CROATIA WILL SOON BE READY FOR AMBASSADOR PROSPER 
TO PUSH WAR CRIMES ISSUES 
 
REF: A. A) ZAGREB 2199 B) ZAGREB 2237 C) ZAGREB 2248 
     ¶B. D) ZAGREB 2283 E) ZAGREB 2343 F) ZAGREB 2362 
     ¶C. G) ROBERTS-FRIEDMAN E-MAIL 9/6/03 
     ¶D. H) ROBERTS-FRANK E-MAIL 12/16/03 I) ZAGREB 2174 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph Frank, reasons 1.5 (b) & (d) 
 
SUMMARY and ACTION REQUEST 
-------------------------- 
 
¶1. (C) Prime Minister-Designate Ivo Sanader and his new-look 
HDZ will take office in late December following their strong 
showing in the November 23 parliamentary elections.  Although 
the HDZ's voter base still includes many hard-line 
nationalists, Sanader's pro-European / pro-U.S. campaign 
included promises to cooperate fully with the ICTY.  We want 
to ensure Sanader follows through, but believe that at this 
time, a concerted but private approach would be most 
effective.  While the Ambassador continues to encourage 
Sanader to deal directly and personally with Carla del Ponte 
and vigorously seek to find and deliver ICTY fugitive Ante 
Gotovina to The Hague, we would like to delay any additional 
public campaign of the Rewards-for-Justice program to give 
Sanader the opportunity to make good on his campaign 
promises. 
 
¶2. (C) We think the time will be right for Ambassador Prosper 
to come to Zagreb as soon as the new government settles into 
office ) mid to late January ) to reinforce our non-public 
pressure before Sanader's promises to cooperate with the ICTY 
are lost in the push and pull of local politics.  The new 
government should also be pushed to implement recently-passed 
laws that will support development of domestic war crimes 
prosecution capabilities, as Ambassador Prosper was promised 
on his last visit to Zagreb (ref A).  Post recommends that 
the long-planned war crimes assistance assessment team come 
to Zagreb immediately following Ambassador Prosper's visit, 
but only if we can identify sufficient funding for an 
assistance program.  End Summary and Action Request. 
 
Sanader's ICTY Promise 
---------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Prime Minister-designate Ivo Sanader made repeated 
pledges on the campaign trail that, if elected, the HDZ would 
cooperate fully with the ICTY.  Part of this may well have 
been Sanader's calculation that the international community 
needed to hear this message to calm fears that a restored HDZ 
would mean a return to the bad old days of Franjo Tudjman. 
However, while he was careful never to say explicitly that 
his government would transfer PIFWC Ante Gotovina, Sanader 
took a real risk of alienating part of his party base.  Since 
winning a plurality of seats in the Sabor, Sanader has 
signaled that he is ready to follow through on ICTY 
cooperation, including comments this week that the GoC would 
cooperate with the ICTY even when it does not agree with it, 
a veiled reference to Gotovina.  He rejected a coalition with 
the hard-right HSP, even though his government will have only 
the slimmest of majorities.  More importantly, Sanader has 
announced that he will personally manage the issue of ICTY 
cooperation. 
 
Holding Him To His Word 
----------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) The Ambassador has developed a frequent but very 
non-public dialogue with Sanader and Foreign 
Minister-designate Miomir Zuzul on ICTY cooperation and other 
issues.  Sanader and Zuzul confirm their intention to work 
with the ICTY.  Further, they have floated trial balloons 
with the ICTY head of office about modalities for PIFWC Ante 
Gotovina to turn himself in to the Tribunal.  We will 
continue to reiterate our private message to Sanader that 
ICTY cooperation is a precondition for the new government to 
build a positive relationship with the U.S.  While we cannot 
be sure whether Sanader can deliver Gotovina, we continue to 
make it clear that the U.S. agrees with the international 
community consensus: Croatia must demonstrate full and 
complete cooperation on all issues with the ICTY, including 
Gotovina. 
 
Time is right for Ambassador Prosper 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (C) With Sanader's cabinet just about to settle into 
office, a visit to Zagreb in the third or fourth week of 
January by Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues Pierre 
Prosper would maximally reinforce our message on Croatian 
 
 
behavior on war crimes issues.  Ambassador Prosper can make 
clear in face-to-face meetings with Sanader and the key new 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, and Justice 
that the U.S. expects the new government to prove itself 
ready to join Euro-Atlantic institutions by the actions it 
takes on war crimes issues.  Beyond cooperation with the ICTY 
and the surrender of Gotovina, we should push the new 
government to move quickly to create special war crimes 
courts and to implement the witness protection program called 
for in laws passed at the end of the last government's 
mandate.  Ambassador Prosper can seek to renew commitments on 
this made to him by the previous government. 
 
Wait on Rewards-for-Justice Push 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) We believe that any U.S.-backed publicity campaign now 
to push for PIFWC information via the Rewards-for-Justice 
(RFJ) program would send the wrong message: the U.S. does not 
trust the sitting government to make a concerted effort to 
find PIFWCs like Gotovina.  Further, Ambassador Prosper's 
comments during his last visit on the RFJ program were widely 
miss-construed by the press (refs A & B).  There have been 
only 68 calls and almost no useful information coming to the 
embassy's hot line as a result of the publicity generated for 
the RFJ program (refs C & E).  Thus, we believe that any U.S. 
public comments on Croatian PIFWCs should focus on the 
opportunity the new government has to demonstrate by its 
actions toward the ICTY and the international community its 
full adoption of the core values of the Euro-Atlantic 
community.  We should give Sanader a grace period in office 
to deliver on Gotovina before reconsidering the need for 
another targeted RFJ push in Croatia. 
 
ICTY Completion Strategy Needs Jump-start 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) ICTY representatives have told us that Croatia should 
be prepared to take over approximately 25 major war crimes 
cases under the Completion Strategy.  The outgoing government 
leaves for the HDZ a mixed legacy on building domestic war 
crimes prosecution capabilities (refs D & F).  It brought to 
Zagreb Chief State Prosecutor Mladen Bajic, who is widely 
regarded as an honest and fair prosecutor with a deep 
interest in building the institutional capacities of his 
office.  Likewise, the outgoing government brought in as 
Director General of Police Ranko Ostojic, who is also 
generally respected by the international community.  While 
Ostojic was unable to deliver Gotovina, he did catch PIFWC 
Ivica Rajic and, with Bajic, helped dig out key information 
on the Tudjman-developed Operation Haag to hide PIFWCs in 
Croatia.  Further, Bajic led the effort to convict Croatian 
war criminal Mirko Norac.  However, the Paulin Dvor 
investigation has languished, possibly to avoid uncomfortable 
revelations during the recent elections. 
 
¶8. (C) While Ostojic may not survive the government 
transition, Sanader appears inclined to keep Bajic on for 
now.  We need to take advantage of positive personalities in 
key professional positions now, to help institutionalize 
reforms they have initiated.  The challenges remaining should 
not be overblown, but remain significant.  Local prosecutors 
continue to waste court time pursuing trials-in-absentia 
against Serbian suspects.  While one judge was widely praised 
for impartiality in a highly charged war crimes case against 
a Croatian, another judge recently issued a war crimes 
verdict that reads more like the rantings of an angry mob 
than the reasoned consideration of a judicial professional. 
 
Let's Deliver Promised War Crimes Assistance 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) We can help firm up the position of key players who 
promote institutional reform ) who would be most receptive 
to our assistance ) by delivering on our long-standing 
commitment to begin a war crimes assistance program.  This 
should start with the visit of an assessment team immediately 
following Ambassador Prosper's visit.  The team should be 
prepared to consider focusing initial assistance on helping 
the police develop their witness protection program. 
Although the State Prosecutor's office has developed strong 
capabilities with our assistance, we should look at following 
up with programs on complex case management and task force 
development as a priority.  The EU CARDS program has a 
comprehensive judicial training project that is only just 
beginning to get rolling.  We should consider focusing our 
efforts on judicial training on specific, practical issues 
such as the sensitivities of managing a war crimes trial and 
 
 
the requirements for accepting evidence developed outside of 
Croatia, i.e. either in Serbia or Bosnia and Herzegovina or 
by the ICTY. 
 
Funding Problem 
--------------- 
 
¶10. (C) In preparing previous outlines of a war crimes 
assistance program, post had relied on commitments by the 
Department to provide USD 1 million each of SEED FY-03 and 
FY-04 regional funds (ref G and previous).  Post understands 
that FY-03 funds were redirected to assist in the creation of 
Bosnia's war crimes court.  Post has just received 
information (ref H) that FY-04 regional SEED funds are also 
no longer available.  While we will review our resource 
allocations, we are not optimistic about finding additional 
funds as we have previously fully programmed bilateral FY-04 
SEED funds (ref I).  Launching a credible war crimes 
assistance program requires adequate funding.  If we cannot 
identify sufficient funds, we should not initiate such a 
program. 
FRANK 
 
 
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