This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 THE HAGUE 003038 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR CHUPA 
WINPAC FOR LIEPMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC) - WRAP-UP FOR 
THE 35TH EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 
 
REF: A. A) STATE 328754 
     ¶B. B) STATE 335665 (NOTAL) 
 
This is CWC-135-03. 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Having resolved most critical policy issues at the 
October Conference of the States Parties, the 35th Executive 
Council managed only to remove a bit of the administrative 
underbrush.  Russian hostage-taking of the U.S. plans 
regarding the Aberdeen destruction facility continued, 
although a larger discussion of the issue of end point of 
destruction was initiated within the Western Group and more 
widely among States Parties.  Russia continued to be 
uncooperative regarding its combined plans and notifications 
of changes at former CW production facilities.  While India 
blocked agreement on a document addressing "captive use," 
there was greater attention to the entire range of industry 
issues, which will likely continue in 2004.  Finally, there 
was extensive and heated discussion on the pending 
introduction of results based budgeting, indicating that the 
Technical Secretariat will need to undertake a major 
educational effort next year to pave the way for the 
introduction of RBB.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
AGENDA ITEM THREE: STATEMENT BY THE DG 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) The Director-General's statement focused on the 
accomplishments of 2003 and significant decisions taken this 
year.  The statement (faxed to AC-CB) touched on the Review 
Conference, the tenure decision, chemical weapons 
destruction, national implementation, universality, and the 
financial health of the OPCW (e.g., 2004 program and budget, 
stabilization fund, results based budgeting).  The DG also 
announced that Alexander Khodakov (former Russian Ambassador 
to the Netherlands) would be the new Director of Special 
Projects and that the Mexican Ambassador (Santiago Onate 
Laborde) will be the Legal Advisor. 
 
--------------------------------- 
AGENDA ITEM FOUR - GENERAL DEBATE 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (U) General debate opened with Ambassador Javits' 
delivery of the U.S. statement.  Japan, the UK, Russia and 
China followed, citing as key accomplishments of 2003 the 
success of the Review Conference, the decision on limiting 
staff tenure, agreement on a budget allowing expansion of key 
program activities, and completion of action plans on 
Universality and National Implementation.  Japan and Russia 
also pointed to the agreements on demilitarization deadline 
extensions among the year's top accomplishments.  Most 
statements pointed to the implementation of the action plans 
and introduction of results based budgeting (RBB) as leading 
challenges for 2004. 
 
¶4.  (U) India, Iran, and South Africa's national statements 
highlighted serious reservations about introducing RBB. 
While insisting that it did not object to RBB per se, India 
said prior CSP endorsement of RBB was a statutory 
requirement, and called on the TS to prepare a draft decision 
to that effect.  South Africa echoed those points and said it 
remained to be seen whether RBB was policy-neutral as claimed 
by the TS and its consultant.  Iran said it supported RBB in 
principle but that its introduction required a positive 
decision by policy-making organs.  These NAM statements 
foreshadowed extended debate on RBB under the Financial 
Issues agenda item.  India also trumpeted its 
ahead-of-schedule CW destruction program, and received 
congratulations from the Council Chairman and many other 
delegations. 
 
¶5.  (U) China announced that the 2 July 2003 legislative 
council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) 
had passed CWC implementing legislation, the legislation was 
published on 11 July 2003, and the SAR will designate the 
data of Hong Kong's EIF shortly.  China announced that its 
National Authority will submit Hong Kong's declaration to the 
OPCW. 
 
--------------------------------- 
AGENDA ITEM FIVE: DETAILED PLANS 
FOR DESTRUCTION OF CW 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (U) Aberdeen:  Once again the Russian Federation blocked 
the U.S. document due to our declaration of the commercial 
facility as part of the Aberdeen CWDF.  In making its 
argument, the Russian delegation confused the issue by 
arguing that the commercial facility does not meet the 
Verification Annex, part IV(A), section C, paragraph 13, 
requirement that CW only be destroyed at "specifically 
designated and appropriately designed and equipped 
facilities," and therefore cannot be declared as part of a 
CWDF.  While this reference is clearly specious, it had its 
intended effect.  Moreover, the Russian delegation asserted 
that there were numerous "technical questions" remaining with 
regard to Aberdeen, which Russia proposed to discuss further 
with the U.S. in bilateral consultations. 
 
¶7. (U) Russia did not acknowledge or respond to the U.S. 
proposal to insert language stating that approval of the U.S. 
plans do not set a precedent.  Ambassador Javits rebutted the 
RF position from the floor of the Council.  At delegation's 
request, the Technical Secretariat delivered a brief, 
non-polemical statement about destruction and verification at 
the Aberdeen CWDF.  On hearing of the U.S. request, the 
Russian delegation insisted the TS do likewise for Gorniy. 
The TS statement was positive but so technical as to do 
little to clarify that end point of destruction was not an 
open question at Aberdeen.  That the "end products" were CO2 
and waste-water was stated, but lost in a jumble of technical 
references.  Consequently, and when combined with Russia's 
assertions that it still has unanswered questions, some 
delegations remain under the mistaken impression that there 
are still "technical" questions related to Aberdeen. 
 
¶8.  (U)  Del began the process of educating WEOG and others 
about the importance of this issue and Russia's political 
linkage of Aberdeen to the end-point of destruction question, 
particularly Russia's interest in "getting credit" for 
destruction of its nerve agent after stage one of the 
process.  Del believes that the education process must 
continue and, critically, must emphasize that while end point 
of destruction is an outstanding issue for the Council to 
address, it is not an issue at Aberdeen, except to the extent 
Russia has created this linkage.  Russia's "technical 
questions" to the U.S. about whether hydrolysate is still 
considered CW, the transportation implications if it is 
considered CW, why we need or want to destroy hydrolysate at 
a CWDF if it is not CW, etc., etc., are merely outgrowths of 
the same "problem": our declaration of the commercial site as 
part of the CWDF.  At the end of the session, the Russian 
delegation presented the U.S. del with a draft, amended set 
of Aberdeen documents in which the only apparent change is to 
remove the declaration of the commercial facility as part of 
the CWDF. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Therefore, the primary effort the Del intends to 
make with other delegations in the coming weeks is to clarify 
the confusion Russia has created, by emphasizing that there 
are not multiple, technical questions or issues before them 
with regard to Aberdeen, as Russia suggests.  Rather, there 
is but a single, simple question before them: does the U.S., 
or indeed any possessor state, have the right to declare a 
commercial facility to be part of a CWDF?  156 States Parties 
appear to believe the answer is "yes," while only one asserts 
the answer is "no".  Del believes it would be ill-advised to 
engage in a point-by-point debate with Russia over its 
"technical questions" or to re-enter bilateral consultations, 
which would serve only to create the illusion that there is 
something "technical" left to talk about.  Russia's position 
and its motives are crystal clear at this stage, and our 
efforts ought to focus on letting everyone know what they are. 
 
¶10.  (U) Belgium, France, Germany, UK and Canada all made 
statements of general support for the U.S. position and cited 
the need for the Council to take on the issue of end point of 
destruction.  However, only Canada and UK specifically called 
for approval of the Aberdeen documents.  While attempting to 
support us, Germany unhelpfully suggested linking end point 
of destruction with the Aberdeen documents during informal 
consultations, which it proposed to engage in during the 
upcoming intersessional period.  As noted above, Del worked 
to de-link the issues of the Aberdeen documents and the end 
point issue, but as evidenced by Germany's attempt at 
"helping" us, the issue remains nebulous for even the 
comparatively well informed.  While no decision was taken, 
there is a notion in the minds of some Council members that 
informal consultations on end point of destruction will 
likely be required, and sooner would be better than later. 
WEOG members did not object to a proposal by the coordinator 
(Ruth Flint, Switzerland) that the end point issue be 
discussed on a regular basis in WEOG. 
 
------------------------------------ 
AGENDA ITEM SIX: COMBINED PLANS FOR 
DESTRUCTION OR CONVERSION 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶11.  (U) The Executive Council deferred until the next EC 
session the Russian combined plans for the destruction or 
conversion and verification of CWPFs (production of a VX-type 
substance and filling into munitions), EC-32/DG.8 dated 19 
February 2003 and the draft decision approving this plan 
(EC-32/DEC/CRP.8, dated 11 March 2003).  U.S. CW experts yet 
again met with a Russian expert to reemphasize that the 
proposed changes are mainly to make this plan consistent with 
other Russian CWPF combined plans for conversion such as the 
aminomercaptan and chloroether.  No progress could be made, 
as Russia did not come prepared with the relevant experts to 
discuss and resolve this issue. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) The U.S. combined plan for destruction and 
verification of the QL production and fill facility at Pine 
Bluff, (EC-35/DG.3, dated 14 October 2003), and the draft 
decision approving this plan (EC-35/DEC/CRP.2, dated 14 
October 2003) were deferred until the next EC session.  Per 
guidance, Del stated during destruction informals and on the 
floor of the Council that because of the rapid pace of 
destruction of the PB QL production facility, this session 
would probably be the last opportunity for the Council to 
take meaningful action on the document.  Nonetheless, China 
stated that its experts had not yet reviewed it.  Informally, 
Chinese delegate Kang lamented the glacial pace of the 
bureaucrats in Beijing and indicated that he had no reason to 
believe there were any problems with the verification plan. 
 
------------------------------------ 
AGENDA ITEM SEVEN: NOTIFICATIONS OF 
CHANGES AT FORMER CHEMICAL WEAPONS 
PRODUCTION FACILITIES 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (U) The EC deferred the DF facility Volgograd, 
Notification of Changes to Chemical Process Equipment 
(EC-34/DG.1 dated 4 June 2003) and the facility for filing of 
non-chemical parts of chemical munitions, Volgograd, 
EC-34/DG.3, dated 10 June 2003) until the next session.  The 
U.S. was again unable to join consensus to these notification 
changes until the TS prepared and circulated to the EC the 
combined plans for conversion and verification as is required 
in accordance with Part V, paragraphs 79-80 of the 
Verification Annex.  During bilateral consultations with 
Russian CW experts, the U.S. again expressed it concerns 
about the delay in the submission to the EC of the respective 
combined plans for conversion and verification for these two 
facilities. 
 
¶14.  (U) The EC noted the notification of changes at the 
former aminomercaptan production facility at Novecheboksarsk 
(EC-35/DG.5, dated 5 November 2003).  The U.S. joined 
consensus on this agenda item but provided to Russian experts 
two clarification questions related to equipment, which they 
agreed to take back to capital. 
 
¶15.  (U) Russia provided a brief update on the status of 
conversion activities still in progress at its former CWPFs. 
In its update, Russia stated that 15 of 16 CWPFs have been 
converted and the only remaining effort is at the VX facility 
at Novocheboksarsk that is estimated to be completed in 2007. 
 However, the TS has issued only 6 certifications of 
completion.  During bilateral consultations, U.S. experts 
inquired about the status of conversion activities of four 
CWPFs at Volgograd that are of concern to the U.S.  Russian 
expert Leonoid Liangastov, informed us that the destruction 
of a bunker at the preparations for filling of non-chemical 
parts facility has been delayed due to lack of funding.  He 
stated that all conversion activities has been completed at 
the sarin, soman and sarin/soman filling facilities.  U.S. 
experts also reminded Russia that revised schedules of 
incomplete conversion activities are to be provided to the TS 
and the EC on its CWPFs. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
AGENDA ITEM EIGHT: FACILITY AGREEMENTS 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶16.  (U) The EC deferred the draft decisions on the U.S. 
facility agreement for the Aderdeen Chemical Agent Disposal 
Facility at Aberdeen Proving Ground (EC-332/DEC/CRP.6, dated 
10 March 2003).  See paras 6-10 above. 
 
¶17.  (U) The EC deferred the Russian Federation facility 
agreement for the Gorniy chemical weapons destruction 
facility (EC-33/DEC/CRP.1, dated 23 September 2003).  The 
U.S. informed Russia and the Council that answers to 
questions provided by Russia were still under review in 
Washington.  China indicated that the appropriate officials 
in Beijing had not had an opportunity to adequately review 
the document. 
 
¶18. (SBU) The EC adopted the Republic of Korea's facility 
agreement for a schedule 1 facility for protective purposes 
(EC-33/DEC/CRP.1, dated 14 May 2003) after the TS issued a 
corrigendum (EC-33/HP/DEC/CRP.1/Corr.1).  After this item was 
adopted, the U.S. made a statement from the floor, per Ref A 
instructions, that this agreement does not, in the view of 
the U.S., constitute a binding precedent for future 
agreements. 
 
¶19. (U) The Council noted the agreed modifications and 
updates to 11 chemical weapons storage facility agreements 
between the OPCW and the U.S. (EC-32/S/1, dated 24 November 
2003). 
 
--------------------------------- 
AGENDA ITEM NINE: INDUSTRY ISSUES 
--------------------------------- 
 
----- Clarification of Declarations ----- 
 
¶20.  (U) The Council deferred consideration of the 
Clarification of Declarations (EC-34/DEC/CRP.8, dated 24 Sep 
03) until its next session, since proposed text on this issue 
has not yet reached consensus. 
 
-- Discrepancies in Scheduled Chemical Imports and Exports -- 
 
¶21.  (U) The Council decided to continue work on this issue 
during the intersessional period.  Regarding the 
discrepancies identified in the paper on imports and exports 
of scheduled chemicals (EC-34/S/1, dated 3 Sep 03 and Corr.1, 
dated 12 Sep 03), the Technical Secretariat issued an 
addendum (Add.1, dated 3 Dec 03) indicating that 
discrepancies resulted from administrative errors on behalf 
of both the Technical Secretariat and States Parties, which 
have all been clarified.  To facilitate the efficient and 
effective conduct of clarification requests regarding imports 
and exports in the future, the U.S. circulated proposed 
report language to establish a facilitation to discuss 
process improvements.  Although States Parties did not 
support specific establishment of a facilitation in EC report 
language, States Parties committed to continue work on this 
issue.  Specifically, Japan, Canada, Italy, Iran, ROK, and 
India all indicated they would support discussions to improve 
the process. 
 
----- Captive Use ----- 
¶22.  (U) The Council deferred decision on "Captive Use" 
(EC-34/DEC/CRP.5/Rev.1, dated 22 Oct 03) due to a refusal to 
join consensus by the Indian Delegation.  The position of the 
U.S. and other Council members is that all production of 
monitored chemicals must be declared if applicable 
concentration and quantity thresholds are exceeded, whether 
the chemical is isolated or not.  The Indian position is that 
if a chemical is produced, above relevant thresholds, but can 
only be isolated if "significant modifications" were made to 
the plant (e.g., the addition of costly or complex equipment 
or extraction units), then chemical production should not be 
declared.  The Indian position is inconsistent with the 
requirements of the Convention and poses a serious 
verification and chemical weapons proliferation loophole in 
which production above applicable thresholds could be carried 
out without a declaration requirement.  Del requested U.S. 
demarche New Dehli on the issue, which was issued on 7 Dec 03 
(Ref B). 
 
----- Article VI Project to Assist State Parties in 
Identifying New Declarable Facilities ----- 
 
¶23.  (U) The Council noted the update on the project to 
assist States Parties in identifying new declarable 
facilities under Article VI of the Convention (EC-35/S/3, 
dated 26 Nov 03).  Brazil made a protracted statement 
regarding the use of open-source information and questioned 
the responsibility of the TS in this area, but received no 
support from other Council members. 
 
------------------------------------- 
AGENDA ITEM TEN: CHANGES TO THE LIST 
OF APPROVED EQUIPMENT AND TECHNICAL 
SPECIFICATIONS FOR APPROVED EQUIPMENT 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶24.  (U) The Council decided to return to the issue of the 
Director-General's note on the item recommended for inclusion 
on the list of approved inspection equipment (EC-35/DG.1, 
dated 10 Oct 03).  The Council also considered the revisions 
for the two items of approved inspection equipment 
(EC-35/DG.2, dated 10 Oct 03.).  However, Germany and India 
noted concerns that the Technical Secretariat did not meet 
the approved procedures and timeline for State Party 
consideration of such proposals.  Therefore, the TS left open 
the time period for State Party comments until 14 Dec 03, and 
left the agenda item open for consideration at the next 
Council session. 
 
------------------------------------- 
AGENDA ITEM ELEVEN:  LIST OF NEW 
VALIDATED DATA FOR INCLUSION IN 
THE OPCW CENTRAL ANALYTICAL DATABASE 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶25.  (U) The Council adopted the list of new validated data 
for inclusion in the OPCW Central Analytical Database 
(EC-35/DG.4, dated 31 Oct 03) without debate.  The Council 
also deferred consideration of the Chemical Abstracts Service 
registry numbers report (EC-35/DG.8, dated 25 Nov 03) due to 
the late submission of the report for consideration during 
this Council Session. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
AGENDA ITEM TWELVE:  AGREEMENTS ON 
THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE OPCW 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶26.  (U) All four agreements before the Council were approved 
(Burundi, Cyprus, Bosnia, Slovakia). 
 
---------------------------------------- 
AGENDA ITEM THIRTEEN:  FINANCIAL ISSUES 
---------------------------------------- 
¶27.  (U) The Council "received with appreciation" the 
Director-General's Note on Results Based Budgeting 
(EC-35/DG.9), but deferred consideration of a TS paper on 
non-service incurred death and disability insurance 
(EC-35/S/4).  DG Pfirter introduced RBB by stating that it 
was being presented to States Parties early, before the 
beginning of 2004, for use in preparing the 2005 budget. 
This would allow the States Parties ample time to familiarize 
themselves with the new tool, which for the first year would 
be used in parallel with the traditional budget process.  He 
stressed that RBB was policy-neutral and would not affect 
budget allocations for 2005, which would be subject to the 
usual intercessional consultations and final approval by the 
Conference of States Parties.  The States Parties would 
decide at CSP-9 whether to adopt the RBB-format or 
traditional format for the 2005 budget.  NAM delegations led 
by India, South Africa, and Iran took issue with the 
contention that they were being consulted "early" about RBB 
or that it was policy-neutral.  They subjected the 
Secretariat and RBB consultant Robert Smith to lengthy 
 
SIPDIS 
questioning about the concept and the implementation of RBB. 
By contrast, Western delegations and the TS strongly endorsed 
RBB.  Many stated that they anticipated consultations on RBB 
in tandem with the 2004 budget consultations. 
 
¶28.  (U) The TS report on options for non-service incurred 
death and disability insurance (EC-35/S/4) was widely praised 
for allowing for a 12% reduction in premium payments, but it 
was also criticized by a number of Western delegations. 
Italy complained that it did not respond to the specific 
tasking of EC-34 to "include options for a legally sound, 
phased transition to a new system of insurance coverage." 
Canada, citing PrepCom negotiation of staff regulations, 
argued that they were never intended to harmonize with the UN 
system.  Still, there was widespread agreement that OPCW 
staff had acquired rights to coverage for non-service 
incurred damages.  Several delegates also argued that staff 
morale should be considered, particularly in light of the 
impact of the implementation of the tenure decision.  The UK 
alone unequivocally defended the report.  In deferring the 
issue to EC-36, the Council repeated its call for the TS to 
provide more options regarding insurance. 
 
¶29.  (U) The Council also noted three reports on income and 
expenditure by the Director-General (EC-35/DG.6, 7, 11) and a 
status report on the SmartStream Project (EC-35/S/2).  The EC 
also considered the DG's Note on using the Working Capital 
Fund as a budget stabilization mechanism (EC-35/DG.12), with 
U.S. Del making clear that the proposal was under active 
review but had not been approved by the USG. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
AGENDA ITEM FOURTEEN:  IMPLEMENTATION 
OF THE HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶30.  (U) The Council noted the DG's note.  India took 
exception to the statement in the note that there are no 
problems with the Host Country, but did not elaborate. 
 
----------------------------------- 
AGENDA ITEM 15: ANY OTHER BUSINESS 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶31.  (U) Date for EC-37:  The Council agreed that EC-37 will 
be held from June 29 - July 2, 2004 and that intersessional 
consultations will continue throughout July 2004. 
 
¶32.  (U) The request to reclassify two posts was referred to 
ABAF. 
 
¶33.  (U)  Ambassador provided a letter to the 
Director-General expressing concern over late documents as 
noted in Ref A instructions.  The DG provided a response 
which was faxed to AC/CB.  Del will continue to press the TS 
on the issue of timely documents as part of the discussion on 
improving the efficiency of Executive Council sessions. 
 
--------------------- 
Destruction Informals 
--------------------- 
 
¶34.  (U) Albania made its initial presentation on the status 
of its CW demilitarization program during the informal 
session on CW destruction.  The presence of senior MOD 
officials from Tirana was appreciated by the TS and member 
states alike and the presentation was well received.  GOA 
officials held bilateral consultations with the U.S. 
delegation, Switzerland, Holland, and senior TS officials. 
 
-------------------------- 
DISCUSSIONS ON THE MARGINS 
-------------------------- 
 
¶35.  (SBU) Albania:  U.S. Del met on the margins of the EC 
with Switzerland, Canada, UK, and Italy.  (Note: We had heard 
that their governments may be interested in making financial 
contributions in the effort to destroy the GOA stocks.  End 
Note.)  While no pledges were made, the Spiez laboratory in 
Switzerland and Italy are clearly interested in providing 
assistance.  The UK and Canada stated that the issue would be 
referred to capitals.  U.S. deloff Weekman provided a general 
overview of U.S. efforts to date to secure the stockpile and 
conduct a technology assessment in anticipation of 
accelerating preparation work in 2004 and completing the 
destruction in 2005.  Deloff left open the possibility of a 
foreign firm taking the lead on the actual destruction 
project but, in any event, stated that the U.S. would seek 
approval for funding to assist in the destruction effort as 
soon as we have a better understanding of the projects total 
cost.  Deloff also reinforced our desire to keep detailed 
consultations on Albania restricted to only a small number of 
countries that are seriously interested in making a financial 
contribution.  (Note:  Switzerland and Italy remain irritated 
that Albania has not responded to their respective offers of 
assistance and continue to read this as a sign of 
non-interest -- i.e., an American project.  Deloff explained 
that GOA is likely not responding because Tirana does not yet 
have a firm understanding of the total project cost and 
likely do not know what is required at this point.  Italian 
and Swiss reps both stated that an interim reply of some kind 
would be helpful.  Washington should consider asking GOA to 
provide an interim reply.  End note.) 
 
¶36.  (U)  Ito sends. 
SOBEL