This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 003010 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AC/CB, NP, CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S, SA/INS 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR CHUPA 
WINPAC FOR LIEPMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL IN CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): REQUEST FOR 
DEMARCHE IN NEW DELHI ON "CAPTIVE USE" 
 
 
(U)  This is CWC-132-03. 
 
------------------------- 
Summary and Action Request 
-------------------------- 
 
¶1.   (U)  India is blocking agreement on a document supported 
by the U.S. and all other delegations to the OPCW concerning 
the technical issue of "captive use."  Failure to reach 
consensus on this important document before the end of the 
current Executive Council session on Friday, December 5 will 
effectively kill the current proposal and the years of work 
that have been devoted to finding consensus on a document. 
U.S. Delegation recommends that Washington consider a 
demarche in New Delhi at the senior political level to 
convince the Indians to join consensus.  End Summary and 
Action Request. 
 
---------- 
Background 
---------- 
 
¶2.   (U)  At the current Executive Council meeting (December 
2-5)  of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons (OPCW), the Indian delegation is completely isolated 
on the technical issue of "captive use."  Captive use 
addresses a situation where a monitored chemical is produced 
(i.e., formed through chemical reaction) above applicable 
quantity and concentration thresholds and subsequently 
consumed (i.e., converted into another chemical via a 
chemical reaction) or processed (i.e., physically blended, 
extracted or mixed to form another chemical but where no 
reaction takes place) below applicable quantity and 
concentration thresholds during subsequent, or "downstream" 
manufacturing steps.  Since declarations for activities under 
the Convention are based on chemistry and not chemical 
engineering, captive use merely clarifies that a State Party 
must declare all production of monitored chemicals, whether 
they are isolated from the process stream or not. 
 
¶3.   (U)  The position of the U.S. and all other attending 
Council members (minus India) is, clearly, that all 
production of monitored chemicals must be declared if 
applicable concentration and quantity thresholds are 
exceeded, whether the chemical is isolated or not.   The 
Indian position is that if a chemical is produced, above 
relevant thresholds, but could only be isolated from the 
manufacturing stream if "significant modifications" were made 
to the plant (e.g., the addition of costly or complex 
equipment or extraction processes), then chemical production 
should not be declared. 
 
¶4.  (U)  Numerous informal consultations and bilateral 
consultations with GOI representatives (including Ambassador 
Cowsik and the Head of the Indian National Authority) have 
been unable to resolve the issue.  U.S. del understands that 
Canada and the UK are preparing to demarche New Delhi as 
well.  The period for technical discussions and proposals for 
"adjusting the text" is over.  U.S. del believes that 
continued consultations or proposals for modifying the text 
(even from Western nations) is counter-productive in that it 
could lead to: 
 
-- text that is acceptable to others but not the U.S., which 
could lead to the U.S. becoming isolated at the end of the 
week; and 
-- alleviating the pressure on the GOI because the Indian 
"problem" essentially becomes a multilateral problem for all 
others to resolve. 
 
¶5.  (U)  In addition, this would entail an effective end to 
negotiations, as delegations have instructions to accept the 
current version of the text.  Any alterations would likely 
require review in capitals that would make a consensus based 
decision this week virtually impossible, which would open the 
possibility for re-opening of the entire text during 
subsequent consultations. 
------------------------------ 
CWC Delegation Recommendation 
------------------------------ 
¶6.  (U)  It is important for the U.S. that the "captive use" 
proposal as it now stands is adopted in this Executive 
Council session.  The document as it now stands would be a 
valuable tool in our effort to control production of 
monitored chemicals.  It would close a serious verification 
and chemical weapons proliferation loophole in which 
production above applicable thresholds could be carried out 
without a declaration requirement.  For that reason, the U.S. 
delegation strongly recommends that Washington consider a 
demarche at the senior political level in New Delhi on this 
issue. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  GOI CWC National Authority reps are currently in 
The Hague and, according to the Indian Ambassador, are 
subject to influence from the chemical industry producers. 
Therefore, for this demarche to have a chance of changing the 
instructions of the Indian delegation, U.S. del strongly 
recommends that this demarche will need to be made at a 
senior political level (i.e., above the CWC National 
Authority level). 
 
¶8.  (U)  Suggested points for the demarche 
 
--The Captive Use decision creates no new obligations.  It 
only clarifies those already established by the Convention in 
Article II, paragraph 12(a). 
-- The U.S. believes that it is important to reach consensus 
on the document regarding "captive use" currently under 
consideration at the Executive Council of the OPCW. 
-- All other OPCW delegations are in agreement on the 
document as it now stands. 
--Declarations are based on activities conducted. 
-- The focus of Indian objections appear related to 
theoretical capability to production or technical capability 
to isolate chemicals, once produced, and are irrelevant for 
declaration purposes. 
--There are no chemical engineering or "downstream" process 
activities (e.g., storage, in-line destruction, drumming) 
which negate or mitigate a State Party's obligation to 
declare production if relevant concentration and quantity 
thresholds are exceeded. 
--Past and current Indian proposals have found no support 
among delegations.  This is due to the fact that in each 
instance, proposed text has created a loophole by which a 
chemical, which is stable and capable of isolation, would not 
be declared simply because the capability to isolate is not 
currently integrated into the plant.  Because such a 
integration may be possible, this creates a verification 
loophole. 
 
¶9.  (U)  Javits sends. 
SOBEL