This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 003009 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
PM FOR AMBASSADOR BODINE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2013 
TAGS: PREL PTER PARM PGOV KDEM YM COUNTER TERRORISM TERFIN DOMESTIC POLITICS
SUBJECT: PM SENIOR ADVISOR BODINE'S 12/17 MEETING WITH 
SALEH: U.S. AND SAUDI CT COOPERATION, IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION, 
YEMENIS' REJECTION OF "EXTREME" POLITICAL PARTIES 
 
REF: A. SANAA YM IIR 6 906 0004 04/DRAGON FIRE 
 
     ¶B. SANAA 2773 
     ¶C. SANAA 2552 
     ¶D. SANAA 2440 
     ¶E. SANAA 2701 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Edmund J. Hull for reasons 1.5 (b and d) 
 
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: In an extended 12/17 meeting with 
President Saleh, PM Senior Advisor Bodine welcomed 
U.S.-Yemeni CT cooperation and, along with the Ambassador, 
requested greater access for U.S. interrogation teams. 
Supporting U.S. assistance for Yemen's security and 
development, Ambassador Bodine and the Ambassador calmed 
Saleh's concerns with the December visit of an Export and 
Border Security (EXBS) team to the Haradh border crossing 
point.  Saleh and Ambassador Bodine also exchanged views on 
Iraq and former Secretary Baker's successful efforts on debt 
rescheduling.  Saleh briefed on the advanced status of the 
Saudi-Yemeni border demarcation.  Ambassador Bodine's meeting 
with FM Qirbi will be reported septel.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) PM Senior Advisor Ambassador Barbara Bodine, 
accompanied by the Ambassador, DCM and Pol/Econ Chief 
(notetaker) called on President Saleh on December 17 during 
Bodine's 2-day stay in Yemen.  The meeting lasted an hour and 
forty-five minutes. 
 
SALEH: SAUDI CT COOPERATION IS NOT A PRECEDENT FOR U.S. 
ACCESS TO DETAINEES 
 
¶3. (S/NF) In response to Ambassador Bodine's question about 
developments on the CT front, Saleh cited to the recent 
apprehension of Abu Asim (refs a and b), and the rolling up 
of "3 or 4 cells" related to al-Qaida.  He noted there has 
been no recent violence and that "tribal kidnapping is over." 
 He gave a brief overview of the al-Sharif cell's proposed 
targets (refs c and d), which included the British and 
Italian Embassies, the French cultural center, ROYG officials 
and buildings, as well as the American Ambassador.  He said 
that most importantly, "those arrested had all graduated from 
holy Mecca," and included one Yemeni-American and ten Saudis. 
 Saleh claims that Yemen has gotten ten suspects from the 
Saudis, 8 of them Yemeni, and has requested four more. 
 
¶4. (S/NF) Saleh said Yemen has focused on stopping terrorist 
financing and that cutting off financial resources has 
noticeably improved things.  He then said that when the ROYG 
got names from Abu Asim, they invited Saudi officials to 
Yemen.  Both Ambassador Bodine and the Ambassador strongly 
advocated that Yemen should accord the same privileged access 
to U.S. experts.  Saleh stated that on December 16 he gave 
instructions to ORCA to see key detainees, including Hadi 
Dulqum, in order to "clear up any doubts" that they were in 
custody and immediately got on the phone with Presidential 
Security Office (PSO) Chief General Gamish to confirm that 
the visits had taken place.  Both Ambassadors pointed out 
that this was not the same as approval for appropriately 
trained U.S. experts to directly interrogate the detainees. 
Saleh insisted that the Saudi situation is different because 
of the flow of money from Saudi Arabia and that the Saudi 
officials only got information and were not permitted to 
directly question the detainees.  Following a second call to 
Gamish, Saleh explained that the information provided to the 
Saudis concerned Abdo Abdullah al-Khatani and a possible 
terrorist attack at a wedding in Saudi Arabia.  He suggested 
that if the U.S. wants information, it should give the 
questions to the PSO in writing.  He later amended this and 
said the U.S. could submit questions to the detainees related 
to "threats to the U.S. or terrorist elements in Yemen" and 
the ROYG would relay their answers. 
 
¶5. (S/NF) The Ambassador pointed out that the arrest and 
questioning of Saddam Hussein produced information that led 
to arrests of more militants, which prevented further 
terrorism and saved lives.  Saleh claimed that Saddam is a 
totally different situation because of the U.S. occupation. 
He continued that the U.S. can have information, through the 
PSO, that relates to "U.S. interests, headquarters, citizens 
or employees," but that he will not permit the direct U.S. 
interrogation of any Yemeni.  The Ambassador raised the issue 
of Abu Asim -- the ROYG insisted he was in al-Jowf, but the 
Ambassador told Saleh and PSO that Abu Asim was in Sana'a, 
which was correct and resulted in his arrest (ref e).  Saleh 
acknowledged good U.S.-Yemen cooperation, but complained that 
U.S. demands equated to U.S. interference in Yemeni internal 
affairs. 
 
¶6. (S/NF) Saleh berated the Ambassador for "provoking" him 
and protested that there is a military guard for the U.S. 
Embassy compound, but not one soldier in front of the Yemeni 
Embassy in Washington.  The Ambassador reasoned that there 
should be a practical way to meet the interests of both sides 
without violating the Yemeni constitution and cited a number 
of countries, including Pakistan, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, 
where we were able to find an acceptable solution.  Saleh 
agreed that the issue could be discussed, but emphasized that 
Yemen is "not under U.S. mandate" and that it would deal with 
the U.S. on its own terms.  He said that cooperation should 
be done under the auspices of an agreement and complained 
that Yemen submitted a working paper/security MOU to 
Washington that was rejected.  The Ambassador noted that the 
U.S. has already gone beyond the terms of any proposed MOU. 
 
¶7. (S/NF) Saleh was upset by the Export and Border Security 
(EXBS) team's visit to Haradh on December 7.  He claimed that 
members of the team demanded to see passports and lists of 
names to know exactly who was crossing back and forth from 
Yemen to Saudi Arabia.  (Note:  The team did not inspect 
either passports or any lists, as far as we know.  End note.) 
 Both Ambassadors assured him that the purpose of the program 
is to strengthen border security.  The visit was only to 
assess what procedures are already in place and to determine 
what technical assistance the U.S. could best provide.  Saleh 
retorted that the visit was done in a "provoking manner" and 
that the region is a "pit of terror" that Yemen is trying to 
keep calm.  He continued to insist that Yemen welcomes 
training and equipment, but that he would prefer to sign an 
MOU regarding the exchange of information.  Even when 
confronted with the facts that the MFA had helped arrange the 
trip and that the team was accompanied by Yemeni officials, 
Saleh's response was that Yemen cooperates with the U.S. 
"like no one else in the region or world," but the U.S. 
administration provides only promises.  He again said he 
would not be provoked and that the U.S. needs to stop its 
"internal intervention." 
 
¶8. (S/NF) Turning to the issue of money, Saleh railed that 
Yemen got $20 million for vehicles, and that it was promised 
$21 million if Abu Asim was arrested.  He complained that 
there are now additional conditions and that the U.S. is 
attempting to renegotiate terms.  Both Ambassadors assured 
him that the U.S. is not trying to bargain, but Saleh 
interrupted that FBI Director Mueller promised a $5 million 
reward for Jaber al-Banna and that he is now being told that 
the reward is only for American citizens.  (Comment: 
Director Mueller made no/no such promise during his visit to 
Sana'a.)  Ambassador Bodine said that assistance and 
cooperation are both part of an on-going process and 
highlighted the increased programming for security, military 
and political cooperation since her departure over two years 
ago. 
 
¶9. (S/NF) Saleh expressed deep dissatisfaction with what he 
characterized as the United States, lack of recognition of 
Yemen,s counter-terrorism accomplishments and complained 
that he has not heard "thank you.8  In response, the 
Ambassador said &shookran8 (&thank you" in Arabic) several 
times.  He also asked whether Saleh had been briefed on the 
three U.S. planes that recently arrived carrying supplies and 
equipment for the Central Security Forces (CSF), the PSO, and 
the Presidential Guard and whether Deputy Prime Minister 
Sofan had told him of the progress on a 416(b) agreement for 
dry milk products.  Saleh dismissed the 416(b) plan, but both 
Ambassadors encouraged him to reserve judgment.  Saleh 
bragged that the ROYG is the &police force of the region8 
and bemoaned U.S. &stinginess,8 but promised to maintain 
the level of security even if cooperation were to cease. 
 
¶10. (S/NF) Towards the end of the meeting, Saleh said he 
would like to see greater transparency, and denied that he 
was trying to &twist arms,8 calling such an approach 
undemocratic.  The Ambassador noted that there are problems 
in every important U.S. bilateral relationship.  He explained 
that we will continue to ask for more cooperation, but that 
it will be done in an appropriate way that will not create 
problems for Yemen, and that we will continue to try to 
expand our support for development, cultural and security 
cooperation.  Saleh reiterated his request for transparency 
and praised the idea of fruitful cooperation based on mutual 
trust, saying without trust, cooperation is meaningless.  He 
said &we are ready8 and asked both Ambassadors to carry 
back the correct impression, closing with the observation 
that &the problem with the Europeans is that they are not 
like the Americans, who are open and frank.8  Ambassador 
Bodine echoed this sentiment and reassured Saleh that his 
candor is appreciated and that trust and honesty is important 
for a healthy relationship.  Saleh said only the future will 
tell, but Ambassador Bodine noted that the past is a good 
guide. 
 
SALEH ON IRAQ:  U.S. Should "Distribute the Cake" to France 
and Germany 
¶11. (C) Saleh inquired about Ambassador Bodine's involvement 
in Iraq.  She commented on strong Iraqi efforts to rebuild 
their country.  Saleh said that if the situation improves, it 
will good for the U.S., but if it worsens, it will be the 
responsibility of the U.S. administration.  Expressing 
confidence that the situation will improve, Ambassador Bodine 
commented that some Iraqis were afraid that Saddam would 
return and that with his capture the Iraqi people can now 
begin to look to the future, not over their shoulder to the 
past.  Calling former Secretary James Baker a friend, Saleh 
noted the success of his trips to Germany and France and said 
that the U.S. should "distribute the cake" and reconsider 
giving France and Germany a role in Iraq's reconstruction. 
 
¶12. (C) Citing Oman and Bahrain, Saleh referred positively to 
the region's gradual steps toward democracy and said that 
Oman is taking "smart" steps to quell unjustified fears about 
democratic elections.  He noted Yemen's progress on local 
councils since 2001, and cited the fact that there were 7,000 
candidates "from every village" this time around.  He said 
that the recent local council by-elections for 92 seats 
yielded 8 seats for Islah and 4 seats for YSP.  He also said 
that the GPC reclaimed 19 seats formerly held by Islah and 
that this represents the public's rejection of Islamic 
extremists.  (Comment: Islah is Islamist but not all elements 
are extremist.  Its leadership encompasses a broad spectrum 
that includes both moderate and extreme elements.  End 
comment.) 
 
¶13. (C) Ambassador Bodine commented that it is important to 
maintain balance in the system and that the GPC would lose 
credibility if it captured 99.5 percent of the vote.  Saleh 
acknowledged the point and said that the GPC wants others to 
participate and advocates complete transparency.  He joked 
that Islah always claims that they know the election results 
in advance - if they win, it should have been by more; if 
they lose, it was rigged, but there is always an excuse at 
the ready for any outcome.  He reiterated that Yemenis are 
not happy with the more radical/extremist parties and noted 
that the socialists left a poor legacy by pushing for 
separation and expounding bad economic policy.  He said that 
he has called on the opposition parties to form a joint forum 
and provided financial support for its formation, an effort 
he claims is aimed at making sure the ruling party (GPC) does 
not get 99.5% of the vote. 
 
YEMEN-SAUDI BORDER DEMARCATION IN FINAL STAGES 
 
¶14. (C) Saleh said that they are finalizing the technical 
review of the Yemen-Saudi land border.  He claims that Yemen 
has spent $1.1 billion on the project, which is being done by 
a German company and a Lebanese sub-contractor. 
 
COMMENT:  SALEH'S PUBLIC FACE DOES NOT ALWAYS MIRROR HIS 
PRIVATE MESSAGE 
 
¶15. (S/NF) Comment:  Some of Saleh,s blustering about 
&provocation8 may have been posturing for his advisors and 
others in the room (there was one ringer later identified as 
a Nassarite "cultural" advisor).  Iryani tried to give us a 
heads up at the start of the meeting asking Ambassador Bodine 
if she had a "private message" for the President.  We missed 
the hint. Had the meeting taken place in private or with 
fewer participants, Saleh may have been more willing to admit 
that U.S.-Yemen CT cooperation has, in spite of its 
successes, not yet fully evolved and has room for 
improvement.  Clearly recognizing that the tone of the 
meeting was more confrontational than the situation 
warranted, Presidential Advisor Abdelkarim al-Iryani (who was 
present at the meeting) called Ambassador Bodine on December 
18 to apologize on behalf of President Saleh and reiterate 
Yemen and Saleh's confidence in the fundamental strength of 
the relationship. End Comment. 
 
¶16.  (U) This cable was cleared by Ambassador Bodine. 
 
HULL