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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 SANAA 002979 
 
SIPDIS 
 
S/CT FOR REAP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER YM COUNTER TERRORISM TERFIN
SUBJECT: YEMEN: 2003 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT 
 
REF: STATE 301352 
 
¶1.  Embassy Sana'a responses to instructions for the 
"Patterns on Global Terrorism" report are keyed to lettered 
paragraphs in State 301352. 
 
¶2.  Post responses: 
 
A) SIGNIFICANT ACTIONS TAKEN BY HOST GOVERNMENTS TO SUPPORT 
THE GLOBAL COALITION AGAINST TERRORISM, PARTICULARLY LAW 
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS TAKEN AGAINST AL-QAIDA OPERATIVES, BUT 
INCLUDING DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS AND  ACTIONS TO BLOCK TERRORIST 
ASSETS, ENACT NEW COUNTERTERRORISM LAWS, AND RATIFY EXISTING 
TREATIES. 
 
-- Law Enforcement:  There was continuing law enforcement 
cooperation between Yemeni and U.S. law enforcement 
authorities throughout 2003, which has produced tangible 
results and progress on dismantling al-Qaida in Yemen: 
 
On November 25, the Republic of Yemen government (ROYG) 
arrested Saudi-born Mohammed Hamdi al-Ahdal (AKA Abu Assam 
al-Maki), who has been implicated in the October 2000 attack 
on the U.S.S. Cole.  Abu Assam is suspected to have been a 
close associate of Ali al-Harithi, who was among the six 
al-Qaida suspects killed in November 2002 in Marib and is 
believed to have been a mujahidin facilitator connected to 
the Cole attack.  U.S.-trained and equipped Central Security 
Forces (CSF) put their training into action and played a 
central role in the operation to apprehend Abu Assam. 
 
Hadi Dulqum, a weapons dealer, al-Qaida associate and 
supplier of weapons for the group also arrested by the ROYG 
in 2003 and remains in custody. 
 
In mid-September 2003, the ROYG disrupted an al-Qaida cell 
operating in Sana'a, Yemen and targeting Western interests. 
The cell was headed by Afghanistan-trained 'Amr al-Sharif, 
who was trying to reconstitute al-Qaida in Yemen.  In 
October, however, the ROYG expressed confidence that the 
"danger was over" for Western targets in Yemen and asserted 
that all cell members inside Yemen had been captured.  The 
government provided further information on the ROYG's 
investigation into the cell's activities and members, 
particularly information on several arrests in Yemen and 
Saudi Arabia. 
 
In cooperation with Yemeni officials, the FBI actively 
participated in the investigation of the December 30, 2002 
shootings of three American health care workers in Jibla. 
Pursuant to the joint investigation, the shooter, Abed 
Abdulrazak al-Kamel, was tried, convicted and sentenced to 
death in an open trial in May 2003.  This decision was upheld 
by the appellate court and is being referred to the Yemen 
Supreme Court (see also, response to Question B). 
 
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, an Iraqi Intelligence Service 
(IIS) sleeper cell was disrupted by the ROYG in Sana'a and 
its members arrested.  This cell was planning attacks on U.S. 
Embassy personnel. 
 
There was one significant Anti-Terrorist Assistance (ATA) 
event with the ROYG in 2003.  From July 26 to August 6, the 
Department of State and the FBI jointly sponsored a terrorist 
crime scene investigation training course for ROYG officials. 
 Yemeni officials trained by the FBI participated in the 
take-down of the 'Amr Sharif al-Qaida cell (see above). 
 
-- Military/Counterterrorism Cooperation:  Based on mutual 
cooperation with Yemen, the U.S. is providing: 
 
- counter-terrorism training and modernization for Yemeni 
Special Forces; 
-  U.S. Military Training Teams (MTTs) in country to train 
ground and maritime forces; 
- equipment (including 8 patrol boats due to arrive in early 
2004), training, and guidance to establish Yemeni Coast Guard 
(YCG) capabilities; 
- equipment and training for Yemen's Terrorist Interdiction 
Program (TIPS), an on-line system for monitoring entry and 
exit from all of Yemen's air, land, and sea ports.  The 
program is currently in Phase II (of 3 phases) and has 
established monitoring portals at all 24 border crossing 
points in Yemen.  Phase III will be completed in early 2004. 
 
These collaborations are producing tangible successes.  In 
June 2003, the newly-formed Central Security Forces (CSF) CT 
unit was dispatched to the Hattat mountains in Abyan province 
to hunt down and bring to justice those responsible for an 
attack on a Red Crescent medical convoy the week before.  The 
area commander put this unit, trained by British and U.S. 
forces, at the lead of this effort when Ministry of Defense 
forces became bogged down by harassing gunfire from the 
surrounding hills.  Over a three day period, the CSF unit 
engaged those responsible and completed their mission with 
praise from Minister of Interior Alimi and President Saleh. 
The same unit was sent out the following week to complete 
mop-up operations, as they were trained to do by the 
U.S./British training teams. 
-- Actions to block terrorist assets:  Throughout the year, 
Yemeni authorities referred for action to appropriate banking 
institutions information about individuals and entities 
identified under U.S. executive orders as related to 
terrorists or terrorist activities, as well as the freezing 
of Iraqi assets.  The regulatory system of Yemeni banks 
remains relatively unsophisticated, however, and it is 
difficult to assess its effectiveness. 
-- Diplomatic Efforts:  President Saleh and senior government 
officials in 2003 held extensive bilateral discussions with 
visiting senior U.S. officials (CENTCOM General Abizaid, FBI 
Director Mueller, CJTF-HOA Commander General Robeson, 
Assistant Secretary Burns, Under Secretary for 
Non-Proliferation Ambassador Bolton), in which U.S.-Yemeni 
counter-terrorism cooperation was a key issue. 
 
-- Ratification of Existing CT Treaties:  As of November 
2003, the Yemeni government still needed to ratify two of the 
twelve (financing and bombing) counter-terrorism treaties, 
both of which have been referred to Parliament and are 
expected to be ratified by early 2004. 
 
B) DESCRIBE THE RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF EACH 
COUNTRY TO ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND/OR SIGNIFICANT 
ACTS OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM DURING 2003, INCLUDING ANY HOST 
GOVERNMENT PROSECUTIONS RELATING TO TERRORISM.  PARTICULAR 
ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO HOST GOVERNMENT ACTIONS 
REGARDING ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST OR AFFECTING U.S. 
CITIZENS OR FACILITIES. 
 
-- There have been no reported kidnappings of any Westerners 
since the November 2001 kidnapping of the German businessman. 
 The Yemeni government has worked closely with U.S. officials 
to prevent attacks against Western interests. 
 
-- The perpetrators of the December 30, 2002 shootings of 
three Americans in Jibla -- Abed Abdulrazak al-Kamel, the 
shooter, and Ali Ahmed Mohamed Jarallah, the planner -- were 
tried, convicted and sentenced to death in separate trials in 
¶2003.  On December 1, 2003, a three-judge panel affirmed the 
death sentence of al-Kamel, who will appeal the decision to 
the Yemen Supreme Court.  Court officials expect that the 
conviction will be upheld and passed to President Saleh, who 
is likely sign off on the order to carry out the sentence. 
Post representatives attended al-Kamel's trial and appeal 
proceedings, which were relatively transparent and openly 
reported in the local media. 
 
-- Al-Kamel coordinated the attack with Ali al-Jarallah, who 
was convicted of both the Amcit murders and the assassination 
of Yemeni Socialist Party Deputy Secretary-General Jarallah 
Omar in a separate trial in Sana'a in October 2003. 
Al-Jarallah is also expected to appeal his conviction and 
sentence.  No specific date has been set for the executions. 
 
-- In April 2003, it was reported that a number of the U.S.S. 
Cole suspects had escaped prison; two have since been 
recaptured, but neither of the primary suspects, Jamal 
Mohammed al-Badawi and Fahd Mohammed Ahmed al-Quso, have been 
returned to custody. 
 
-- An Islamic scholarly commission formed in August 2002 
continues its dialogue efforts with detainees arrested in 
connection with extremism and/or terrorist attacks which 
reportedly include Yemeni returnees from Afghanistan and 
members of the Al Jihad organization.  Prior to being 
released, the detainees are screened by the Political 
Security Organization (PSO) and must sign statements assuring 
good conduct (i.e., commitment to Yemeni President Saleh, the 
constitution, laws, peace and security, the rights of 
non-Muslims, and the inviolability of foreign interests). 
Thirty-four detainees were released post-Ramadan 2002 and the 
commission recommended 92 for release after Ramadan 2003.  At 
this date it remains unclear how many have actually been 
released. 
 
-- In October 2003, despite repeated statements that "Islamic 
Aden-Abyan Army" leader Khalid Abd-al-Nabi was dead, Yemeni 
officials revealed that he was not killed in February 2003 
confrontations between the hard-line Islamic group and a 
Yemen army anti-terrorism unit in the Hattat Mountains 
region, Abyan Governorate (in the southern part of the 
country).  Instead, Abd-al-Nabi surrendered to the Yemeni 
authorities, was released from custody, and is not facing 
charges for any of his activities. 
 
C) DID THE HOST GOVERNMENT EXTRADITE OR REQUEST THE 
EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS FOR PROSECUTION DURING 
THE YEAR?  PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO HOST 
GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO U.S. REQUESTS FOR EXTRADITION OR 
ASSISTANCE IN TERRORIST CASES. 
 
D) DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT IMPEDIMENTS TO HOST GOVERNMENT 
PROSECUTION AND/OR EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS. 
(Answer to Question 2C and 2D combined) 
 
-- Article 45 of the Yemeni Constitution prohibits the 
extradition of any Yemeni citizen to any foreign authority. 
 
-- There is no extradition treaty between Yemen and the 
United States, and Yemen made no requests for extradition 
from the U.S. in 2003. 
 
-- The ROYG requested that the U.S. not extradite Shaykh 
Mohammed Hasan al-Moayad and Mohammed Mohsen Yahya Zayed, 
both Yemeni citizens, from Germany to the United States to 
face charges of conspiring to provide support to al-Qaida and 
HAMAS.  Al-Moayad and Zayed arrived at Kennedy International 
Airport in New York on November 16, 2003 and were 
subsequently arraigned in U. S. District Court in Brooklyn, 
New York. 
 
-- Yemen periodically exchanges prisoners with Saudi Arabia, 
including terrorist suspects.  One October 2003 press report 
claims that 40 "militants" have been exchanged in the past 
two years.  Names are generally not provided. 
 
E) DISCUSS HOST GOVERNMENT RESPONSES OTHER THAN PROSECUTION. 
THESE WOULD INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO, PUBLIC 
STATEMENTS BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OR OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCIES 
FOLLOWING A TERRORIST INCIDENT (IN OR OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY) 
AND EFFORTS BY HOST GOVERNMENT TO INVESTIGATE TERRORIST 
INCIDENTS OR TO ASSIST WITH INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 
INVESTIGATIONS. 
 
-- In January 2003, the official government news agency 
(SABA) undertook a public diplomacy campaign aimed at 
stigmatizing terrorist activities.  The government printed 
booklets on "The Phenomenon of Terrorism in Yemen" to 
highlight the political, social and economic costs of 
terrorism, which were presented to Yemen's Parliament and 
widely distributed.  In 2003, the ROYG also began publishing 
the details, names and pictures of terror suspects, e.g., 
escaped U.S.S. Cole suspects. 
 
-- The public statements of President Saleh, Prime Minister 
BaJammal, Minister of Foreign Affairs Qirbi, Minister of 
Interior Alimi, and other senior Yemeni officials in 2003 
made clear the policy of the Yemeni government to oppose 
international terrorism, especially the activities of 
al-Qaida (see responses 2A through 2D above).  President 
Saleh repeatedly called upon al-Qaida elements in Yemen to 
repent and abandon their mistaken views, and to surrender to 
Yemeni authorities. 
 
F) DESCRIBE MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN IN 2003 
BY THE HOST GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING STEPS TAKEN IN 
INTERNATIONAL FORA. 
 
-- Increased cooperation with the U.S. on counter-terrorism 
(as described in the responses above) has included improving 
the Yemeni capabilities to develop and implement a Maritime 
Security Strategy and to increase border security. 
 
-- Land border security, particularly the long frontier with 
Saudi Arabia, is a major concern for Yemen.  In the aftermath 
of the Riyadh bomb attacks in May 2003, Yemen and Saudi 
Arabia launched a joint effort (reportedly with funding from 
the Saudi side) to improve border control, including a signed 
agreement in June 2003 to upgrade border surveillance.  An 
important change on the Yemeni side is that responsibility 
for border control is expected to be transferred from the 
military to civilian forces under authority of the Ministry 
of the Interior.  The head of the Border Guards has a bold, 
but as-yet unfunded, plan to establish 18 districts along the 
Yemeni-Saudi border to provide in depth defenses against 
smuggling activity. 
 
-- Yemen has also initiated a tripartite collaboration with 
Sudan and Ethiopia to increase counter-terrorism, security 
and cultural cooperation, as well as economic development. 
 
G) DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT HOST GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, TERRORISTS, OR TERRORIST GROUPS, 
INCLUDING (BUT NOT LIMITED TO) POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL 
SUPPORT OF TERRORISTS OR THEIR ACTIVITIES; DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT 
THROUGH DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION; MISUSE OF THE DIPLOMATIC 
POUCH AND OTHER DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES TO SUPPORT TERRORISM; 
PROVISION OF SANCTUARY AND/OR THE PRESENCE OF OFFICES OF 
TERRORIST GROUPS; PROVISION OF TRAINING OR TRAINING SITES; 
PROVISION OF WEAPONS; AND POSITIONS TAKEN ON TERRORISM ISSUES 
IN INTERNATIONAL FORA. 
 
-- Yemen is a supplier and transshipment point for weapons, 
including surface-to-air missiles, to both Middle Eastern and 
Horn of Africa countries.  A UN Committee of Experts recently 
reported on the need to reduce arms in the country and to 
increase international cooperation to reduce the flow of arms 
from Yemen to Somalia.  The government is aware of the 
illegal export of arms via various routes, and is taking 
steps to make borders less permeable (e.g. boat/vessel 
registration) and to track weapons within its borders (e.g., 
gun licensing). 
 
-- Like other Arab governments, Yemen distinguishes between 
terrorism, which it condemns and opposes, and what it sees as 
legitimate resistance activities against the Israeli 
occupation by Palestinian organizations such as HAMAS and 
Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ).  (Note: This position was 
given formal expression in the 1998 Arab Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism. End note) 
 
-- Yemen has consistently opposed the U.S. definition of 
"terrorism" and calls for a "demarcation line" to be drawn 
between 'terrorism' and 'resistance' in reference to the 
Palestinian intifadha.  Yemen's policies provide political 
support to Palestinian organizations, while seeking to 
dissociate it from approval for terrorist acts, such as HAMAS 
and PIJ-sponsored suicide attacks against non-combatant 
Israeli targets. 
 
-- Al-Qaida is attempting to re-constitute an operational 
presence in Yemen. 
 
-- HAMAS maintains a political presence in Yemen. 
 
-- Yemen's indigenous Aden-Abyan Islamic Army remains active. 
 
-- While Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) has a legally declared 
presence in Yemen, it does not have any known actual or 
operational presence. 
 
-- Shaykh Abdallah Bin-Husayn al-Ahmar, Speaker of the Yemeni 
Parliament, has repeatedly called for boycotting Israeli 
goods as well as the goods that are made in states supporting 
Israel.  In an October rally for boycotting U.S. and Israeli 
goods at Sana'a University, Al-Ahmar said that "we must not 
buy Israeli products because it supports and strengthens the 
enemies of Islam, the oppressors, and the murderers who are 
spilling the blood of our Palestinian brothers."  Al-Ahmar 
subsequently backed away from any boycott of American goods. 
The al-Ahmar family runs the lucrative Kentucky Fried Chicken 
franchise in Sana'a. 
 
H) HAS THE HOST GOVERNMENT MADE ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN 
SUPPORT OF A TERRORIST-SUPPORTING COUNTRY ON A TERRORISM 
ISSUE?  (THE SEVEN GOVERNMENTS DESIGNATED BY THE SECRETARY AS 
STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM ARE CUBA, IRAN, IRAQ, LIBYA, 
NORTH KOREA, SYRIA, AND SUDAN. PLEASE NOTE THAT, ALTHOUGH 
IRAQ REMAINS A DESIGNATED STATE SPONSOR, ALL APPLICABLE 
SANCTIONS HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED.) 
 
-- The Yemeni government does not consider Arab countries 
such as Iraq, Syria and Sudan as "terrorist-supporting" 
countries.  As far as Iraq is concerned, the Yemeni 
government did not support U.S.-led Operation Iraqi Freedom 
and never accepted the U.S. position that the former Iraqi 
regime possessed weapons of mass destruction. 
 
-- In many local and international events, Yemen has 
reiterated its rejection of terrorism and violence, as well 
as any activities that aim to impair the interests of any 
country.  Yemen always called for lifting the sanctions 
imposed on Sudan, Libya and Iraq "as the reasons for imposing 
the sanctions do not conform with international laws." 
 
-- Yemen has never considered suicide attacks carried out by 
HAMAS or by other jihad movements in Palestine as terrorist 
acts, but it called on such organizations to give former 
Palestinian Prime Minister Abu Mazen the chance to accomplish 
peace. 
 
-- On November 12, 2003, Yemeni Vice President Abd Rabbu 
Mansour Hadi met with the Syrian Ambassador in Sana'a 
denouncing Israeli threats to strike at Syria and declaring 
full support to Syria, which is strongly opposed to U.S. and 
Israeli policies.  The official Saba News Agency quoted Vice 
President Hadi as vowing full support to Syria "against any 
provocations threatening Syria's security or stability." 
These remarks came after Israel had threatened to hit Syria 
if it continued to support extremist organizations 
threatening Israel from Syrian territories. 
 
-- In May 2003, Iranian President Khatami visited Yemen to 
sign seven bilateral agreements to cooperate on security, 
trade, development, culture and shipping; Khatami was on the 
first visit by an Iranian president to Sana'a since the 1979 
Islamic Revolution.  Relations between the two countries have 
improved noticeably in recent years and both nations have 
shown a firm political resolve to boost bilateral ties. 
 
-- Yemen has consistently expressed solidarity with Sudan and 
called for its territorial integrity to be maintained.  The 
Yemeni government welcomed and expressed strong support for 
the recent peace accord signed between the Sudanese 
government and the Sudanese Front for the Liberation of 
Sudan. 
 
I) DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE SINCE 2002, POSITIVE OR 
NEGATIVE, IN THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD TERRORISM, 
INTERNATIONAL OR DOMESTIC.  WHAT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS 
CHANGE? 
 
-- Over the past several years, Yemen's attitude regarding 
international and domestic terrorism has strengthened 
noticeably, and the trend continued throughout 2003.  (See 
responses to questions above.) 
 
HULL