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Viewing cable 03ROME5557, ITALIAN PARLIAMENT APPROVES CONTROVERSIAL MEDIA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03ROME5557 2003-12-12 12:45 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Rome
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ROME 005557 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT FOR EB/CIB 
COMMERCE FOR SPECK 
 
    SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECPS ECON PGOV IT ITALIAN POLITICS
SUBJECT: ITALIAN PARLIAMENT APPROVES CONTROVERSIAL MEDIA 
SECTOR REFORM BILL 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (U) ON DECEMBER 2, ITALYS PARLIAMENT, BY A VOTE OF 155 
TO 128, APPROVED A HIGHLY CONTROVERSIAL MEDIA- 
COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR REFORM LAW. KNOWN AS THE GASPARRI 
BILL (NAMED AFTER THE COMMUNICATIONS MINISTER), THE LAW NOW 
TREATS THE MEDIA MARKET AS A SINGLE BROAD, INTEGRATED 
MARKET, WITH NO DISTINCTIONS MADE AMONG TELEVISION, RADIO, 
PRESS, INTERNET SERVICES AND OTHER COMMUNICATION SERVICES. 
THE GOI ARGUES THAT THE LAW WILL CREATE MARKET/INVESTMENT 
OPPORTUNITIES, ENCOURAGE NEW MARKET PARTICIPANTS, 
AND PROMOTE GREATER COMPETITION. THE LAW SETS NEW OWNERSHIP 
CRITERIA  A 20 PERCENT CEILING OF THE ENTIRE MEDIA SECTOR 
REVENUES FOR EACH INDIVIDUAL OPERATOR  AND CALLS FOR THE 
PRIVATIZATION OF THE STATE-OWNED TELEVISION BROADCASTER RAI 
IN 2004. THE LAW ALSO IS DESIGNED TO HELP ACCELERATE THE 
SHIFT FROM ANALOG TO DIGITAL TRANSMISSION IN TELEVISION 
BROADCASTING. 
 
2.  (SBU) PARLIAMENT HAS HOTLY DEBATED THE LAW FOR NEARLY 
18 MONTHS.  OPPONENTS AND CRITICS OF THE LAW CONTEND THAT 
IT WAS DESIGNED EXCLUSIVELY TO ALLOW PM BERLUSCONI TO 
    LEGITIMIZE HIS MEDIA HOLDINGS (WHICH TECHNICALLY EXCEED 
THOSE PERMITTED UNDER CURRENT LAW) AND TO EXPAND FURTHER 
HIS MEDIA EMPIRE.  ON THE SPECIFICS, MANY CRITICS CLAIM 
THAT SUCH A BROAD DEFINITION OF THE MEDIA SECTOR WILL MAKE 
IT VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO MEASURE OWNERSHIP PERCENTAGES 
VALUE, AND THUS, MONITOR THE 20 PERCENT CAP.  OPPONENTS 
ALSO CONTEND THAT SUCH A BROAD DEFINITION COULD ALLOW A 
SINGLE OPERATOR OR OWNER TO DOMINATE ONE PARTICULAR FIELD. 
. 
SOME CLAIM THE BILL VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION, AND IN 
PARTICULAR, CONSTITUTIONAL COURT DECISIONS REGARDING THE 
PRIME MINISTERS TELEVISION OWNERSHIP.  PRESIDENT CIAMPI 
MUST SIGN THE BILL BEFORE IT BECOMES LAW; MANY ARE PRESSING 
HIM NOT TO DO SO.  EVEN IF HE WERE TO SIGN THE LAW, 
OPPONENTS HOPE THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT WOULD OVERRULE THE 
LAW. OUR BEST BET IS THAT CIAMPI WILL SIGN THE LAW.  ON THE 
OTHER HAND, OUR CONTACTS BELIEVE THAT THE SUPREME COURT 
COULD WELL FIND CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS.  REGARDLESS OF 
ITS PRACTICAL IMPACT, THE LEGISLATION IS STRENGTHENING 
PERCEPTIONS OF A GOVERNMENT INTERESTED IN FURTHERING ITS 
OWN NARROW INTERESTS. END SUMMARY. 
 
3. (U) SINCE THE PARLIAMENTS PASSAGE OF THE LAW ON 
DECEMBER 2, WE HAVE SPOKEN WITH SENIOR AIDES TO MINISTER 
GASPARRI, A KEY DRAFTER OF THE LEGISLATION, AS WELL AS 
POLITICAL OBSERVERS AND SECTOR CONTACTS. 
 
------------------------ 
EXPANDING THE DEFINITION 
------------------------ 
 
    4.  (U) THE GASPARRI LAW INTRODUCES THE CONCEPT OF AN 
N 
INTEGRATED SYSTEM OF COMMUNICATIONS (THE SIC). THE SIC 
ENVISIONS THE MEDIA/COMMUNICATIONS MARKET AS ONE VERY BROAD 
SINGLE SECTOR ENCOMPASSING ALL MEDIA/COMMUNICATIONS, TO 
INCLUDE, BUT NOT BE LIMITED TO, TELEVISION AND RADIO 
BROADCASTING, THE PRESS, AND THE INTERNET. THE LAW 
ESTABLISHES A CEILING WHEREBY NO SINGLE OPERATOR CAN 
GENERATE MORE THAN 20 PERCENT OF OVERALL SIC REVENUES. ONE 
EXCEPTION PROVIDES FOR A 10 PERCENT CAP FOR THE FORMER 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS STATE MONOPOLY TELECOM ITALIA (WHICH 
ALSO OWNS A TV STATION  LA 7) AS IT WAS THOUGHT THAT THE 
COMPANY ALREADY ENJOYS A DOMINANT POSITION IN THE MARKET. 
IN LIGHT OF THE BROAD DEFINITION OF THE 
MEDIA/COMMUNICATIONS MARKET, THE LAW ALSO OPENS THE 
POSSIBILITY FOR CROSS-OWNERSHIP IN TELEVISION AND IN THE 
PRESS.  HOWEVER, ENTITIES OWNING MORE THAN ONE TELEVISION 
STATION ARE NOT ALLOWED TO PURCHASE NEWSPAPERS BEFORE THE 
END OF 2008. 
 
------------------------------ 
FROM ANALOG TO DIGITAL BY 2006 
------------------------------ 
 
ROME 00005557  002 OF 004 
 
OADCASTING BE SWITCHED 
FROM THE ANALOG SYSTEM TO DIGITAL BY 2006.  HOWEVER, THE 
LAW REQUIRES AN ACCELERATED PROCESS BY MANDATING THAT 70 
PERCENT OF THE POPULATION BE COVERED BY DIGITAL BY THE END 
OF 2004.  THE GOI MAINTAINS THAT THE GREATER TRANSMISSION 
CAPACITY OFFERED BY DIGITAL (5-6 TIMES THAT OF ANALOG 
TRANSMISSION) WOULD ALLOW CURRENT MARKET PLAYERS TO EXPAND 
AND ALSO ENCOURAGE NEW ENTRANTS.  IN ADDITION, DIGITAL 
BROADCASTING WILL ALLOW END-USERS TO OPERATE INTERACTIVE 
CHANNELS.  THUS, ACCESS TO PUBLIC SERVICES, INTERNET, AND 
OTHER DATA TRANSMISSION (SUCH AS TEXT MESSAGING) WILL BE 
POSSIBLE THROUGH A TELEVISION. THE GOI WILL PROVIDE 
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR CONSUMERS TO ENCOURAGE THE 
PURCHASE OF DIGITAL DECODERS TO ENCOURAGE THE SHIFT TO 
DIGITAL. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
PRIVATIZATION OF STATE-OWNED RAI CHANNELS 
----------------------------------------- 
 
6. (U) THE GASPARRI LAW INTRODUCES A TIMETABLE FOR THE 
PRIVATIZATION OF STATE-OWNED RAI (RADIO AND TELEVISION 
BROADCASTING CONGLOMERATE), WITH THE FIRST TRANCHE TO BEGIN 
    IN JANUARY 2004.  THE LAW SPECIFIES THAT NO SINGLE INVESTOR 
MAY HOLD MORE THAN ONE PERCENT IN RAI, BUT THE DEADLINE BY 
WHICH PRIVATIZATION MUST BE COMPLETED IS NOT DEFINED. 
HOWEVER, OUR MINISTRY CONTACTS BELIEVE THIS WILL BE A LONG 
PROCESS AND THAT RAI WILL REMAIN IN PUBLIC HANDS FOR THE 
FORESEEABLE FUTURE. 
 
7. (U) OTHER SIGNIFICANT ELEMENTS CONTAINED IN THE GASPARRI 
LAW INCLUDE PROVISIONS RELATING TO OWNERSHIP OF LOCAL 
TELEVISION STATIONS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND RIGHTS OF 
REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS, THE PROTECTION OF MINORS, AND 
ADVERTISEMENT CEILINGS. 
 
--------------- 
THE CONTROVERSY 
--------------- 
 
8. (SBU) PARLIAMENTARY REVIEW OF THE BILL LASTED OVER 18 
MONTHS. THOUSANDS OF AMENDMENTS WERE PROPOSED TO THE 
ORIGINAL TEXT. EVEN IN THE LAST MINUTES BEFORE THE VOTE, IT 
WAS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE SENATE WOULD APPROVE THE GASPARRI 
BILL. THE OPPOSITION TRIED TO OBSTRUCT PASSAGE OF THE LAW 
AND CALLED FOR SEC RET VOTES - HOPING THAT SOME IN THE 
MAJORITY WOULD DEFECT AS THEY HAD DURING THE CHAMBER OF 
DEPUTIES VOTE. HOWEVER, A FLOOR VOTE WENT AHEAD; THERE 
WERE NO DEFECTIONS. 
 
9. (SBU) CRITICS OF THE LEGISLATION, INCLUDING THE CENTER- 
LEFT OPPOSITION, CLAIM THE BILL WAS SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED 
TO ALLOW PRIME MINISTER BERLUSCONIS MEDIA EMPIRE TO 
EXPAND.  AT A MINIMUM, THE GASPARRI LAW LEGITIMIZES 
    BERLUSCONI'S CURRENT MEDIA HOLDINGS, WHICH EXCEED THE 
MONOPOLY CEILINGS UNDER THE CURRENT LAW. (NOTE: A 2002 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT DECISION ORDERED ANYONE OWNING MORE 
THAN TWO BROADCAST NETWORKS TO RELINQUISH THE EXCESS NUMBER 
BY NOVEMBER 2003.  UNDER THAT RULING, BERLUSCONI WOULD HAVE 
HAD TO GIVE UP ONE MEDIASET BROADCAST CHANNEL, EITHER 
SELLING IT OR CONVERTING IT TO A MUCH LESS PROFITABLE 
SATELLITE-ONLY NETWORK. END NOTE.) 
 
10. (SBU) BERLUSCONI OPPONENTS BELIEVE (OR CLAIM TO 
BELIEVE) THAT, AS THINGS STAND NOW, THE PMS DIRECT OR 
OR 
INDIRECT CONTROL OVER MOST OF ITALY'S BROADCAST NETWORKS 
REPRESENTS AN UNACCEPTABLE CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND A 
THREAT TO DEMOCRACY.  OPPONENTS TO THE BILL VOICED SPECIFIC 
CONCERNS THAT SUCH A BROAD DEFINITION OF THE 
MEDIA/COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR WILL MAKE IT VIRTUALLY 
IMPOSSIBLE TO MEASURE PERCENTAGE HOLDINGS IN ANY MEANINGFUL 
AND THUS MONITOR THE 20 PERCENT CAP.  IN THIS RESPECT, 
OPPONENTS ALSO CLAIM THAT BY NOT BEING ABLE TO MEASURE 
ANTITRUST CEILINGS, THE LARGE OPERATORS  ESSENTIALLY THE 
EXISTING TWO DOMINANT NETWORKS RAI AND BERLUSCONIS 
MEDIASET - WILL BECOME LARGER, WITH NO REAL MARKET 
OPPORTUNITY FOR NEW ENTRANTS. 
 
ROME 00005557  003 OF 004 
 
 CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
DECISIONS REGARDING BERLUSCONI'S TELEVISION INTERESTS. 
(NOTE: ONE 2001 RULING, FOR EXAMPLE, CALLED FOR ONE 
MEDIASET CHANNEL AND ONE RAI CHANNEL TO CEASE ANALOG 
TRANSMISSIONS BY YEARS END.  WHILE THE GASPARRI LAW 
ACCELERATES TRANSITION FROM ANALOGUE TO DIGITAL, IT ALSO 
SO 
PRESERVES THE STATUS QUO OF ANALOGUE TRANSMISSIONS IN THE 
INTERIM.  END NOTE). OPPONENTS OF THE LAW ALSO CONTEND THAT 
THE BILL IS NOT IN LINE WITH EU ANTITRUST RULES AND BELIEVE 
IT ALSO COULD BE APPEALED ON THESE GROUNDS. 
 
------------------------ 
A COMPREHENSIVE LAW BUT 
------------------------ 
 
12. (SBU) EMBASSY MEDIA/COMMUNICATIONS CONTACTS OUTSIDE OF 
THE COMMUNICATIONS MINISTRY TELL US THAT THE POSITIVE 
ASPECT OF THE LAW IS ITS RECOGNITION THAT THERE IS A 
GROWING, INDISPUTABLE INTEGRATION AMONG COMMUNICATIONS 
COMPARTMENTS (I.E., TELEVISION, RADIO, PRESS, TELEPHONY, 
AND THE INTERNET).  HOWEVER, OUR CONTACTS ALSO EXPRESSED 
RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE LAW AND WERE PERPLEXED ABOUT THE 
    BROAD DEFINITION OF THE SECTOR.  THEY CONCURRED THAT IT 
WILL BE EXTREMELY COMPLICATED TO MEASURE THE SIZE OF SUCH A 
BROADLY DEFINED MARKET, AND THUS, TO MONITOR THE 20 PERCENT 
REVENUE LIMITATION.  MOREOVER, THEY UNDERSCORED THE DANGER 
THAT ONE ENTITY MAY DOMINATE A SPECIFIC FIELD (E.G., 
, 
TELEVISION) WITHOUT NECESSARILY VIOLATING THE 20 PERCENT 
CAP. 
 
13. (SBU) OUR CONTACTS FURTHER NOTED THAT SUCH MILESTONE 
LEGISLATION ENACTED BY A GOVERNMENT HEADED BY A MEDIA 
MAGNATE INEVITABLY RAISES SUSPICIONS AND CONCERNS - 
ESPECIALLY, AS THE BROAD DEFINITION OF THE MEDIA SECTOR 
WILL LIKELY PERMIT BERLUSCONIS MEDIASET TO GROW 
SUBSTANTIALLY. (SOME ESTIMATES INDICATE THAT MEDIASET COULD 
EVEN DOUBLE IN SIZE.)  COMMUNICATIONS MINISTRY OFFICIALS, 
WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THE ADVANTAGES FOR MEDIASET, MAINTAIN 
THAT ADVANCEMENT OF THE COUNTRY CANNOT BE HELD BACK BECAUSE 
OF THIS AND ALSO MAINTAIN THAT THIS IS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR 
ALL, NOT JUST MEDIASET. 
 
----------------------------------- 
CIAMPI AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
----------------------------------- 
 
14. (SBU) THE LAW NOW GOES TO PRESIDENT CIAMPI FOR HIS 
APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE.  THE PRESIDENT HAS THIRTY DAYS TO 
EXAMINE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LAW, DURING WHICH 
TIME, HE MUST SIGN IT OR RETURN IT TO PARLIAMENT WITH AN 
AN 
EXPLANATION FOR THE REJECTION.  OVER THESE PAST 18 MONTHS, 
    PRESIDENT CIAMPI HAS TRIED TO STAY ABOVE THE POLITICAL FRAY 
OF CHARGES AND COUNTER-CHARGES STEMMING FROM THE PROPOSED 
LEGISLATION.  ONLY WHEN THE LAW WAS FIRST INTRODUCED DID HE 
EXPRESS HIS OPINION THAT THERE IS NO DEMOCRACY WITHOUT 
PLURALISM AND IMPARTIALITY IN COMMUNICATIONS. 
 
15. (SBU) THE OPPOSITION IS PRESSING THE PRESIDENT NOT TO 
SIGN, CALLING THE LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL, NON-LIBERAL, 
TAILOR-MADE FOR BERLUSCONI, AND A LAW CONTRARY TO 
STATEMENTS BY CIAMPI HIMSELF IN THE CHAMBERS. ON THE OTHER 
HAND, THE MAJORITY HAS DEFENDED THE LAW, ARGUING THAT IT 
GUARANTEES AND DEFENDS PLURALISM.  PRESIDENT CIAMPI IS IN 
AN UNENVIABLE POSITION; WHATEVER DECISION HE TAKES WILL 
LIKELY STOKE THE POLITICAL FIRES. 
 
16. (SBU) AGAINST THIS BACKDROP, THE CENTER RIGHT SUDDENLY 
HAS DEVELOPED RENEWED INTEREST IN PASSAGE OF DRAFT CONFLICT 
OF INTEREST LEGISLATION, PENDING IN PARLIAMENT FOR AT LEAST 
A YEAR, WITH A FINAL VOTE SCHEDULED FOR DECEMBER 17. THE 
MAJORITY MAY HOPE THAT PASSAGE OF THIS LEGISLATION MIGHT 
MAKE IT EASIER FOR PRESIDENT CIAMPI TO SIGN THE GASPARRI 
LAW. (NOTE: UNDER THE DRAFT CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
LEGISLATION, SOME GOVERNMENT POSITIONS WOULD BE CONSIDERED 
INCOMPATIBLE WITH SOME PROFESSIONAL AND BUSINESS 
ACTIVITIES, ALTHOUGH OWNERSHIP OF A COMPANY OR SHARES ALONE 
 
ROME 00005557  004.1 OF 004 
 
UR ONLY WHEN A PUBLIC 
OFFICIAL TOOK ACTIO THAT NOT ONLY FAVORED HIS/HER COMPANY, 
BUT ALSOHARMED THE PUBLIC INTEREST, UNLESS THE ACT WOULD 
AFFECT THE GENERAL INTEREST OF MANY OTHER COMPANIES.  CASES 
OF PRESUMED CONFLICT OF INTEREST WOULD B REFERRED TO 
PARLIAMENT, WHICH WOULD DETERMINE TE SANCTIONS. END NOTE.) 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
17. (SBU) MOST OF OUR CONTACTS BELIEVE IT UNLIKELY THAT 
CIAMPI WILL SEND THE LAW BACK TO PARLIAMENT, AND WE SHARE 
THIS PERSPECTIVE.  TO DO SO WOULD BE ALMOST UNPRECEDENTED 
AND SET THE STAGE FOR AN INSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE 
PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT  SOMETHING BOTH WOULD 
LIKE TO AVOID.  OUR OBSERVATIONS SUGGEST THAT SUCH 
CONTROVERSIAL LEGISLATION WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PASSED ABSENT 
SOME TYPE OF TACIT UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE BERLUSCONI 
GOVERNMENT AND PRESIDENT CIAMPI.  ON THE OTHER HAND, SOME 
OF OUR CONTACTS DO BELIEVE THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
MAY FIND CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS. 
 
18. (SBU) IT IS CLEAR THAT THE CENTER RIGHT MAJORITY WANTS 
    TO CHALK UP SEVERAL LEGISLATIVE VICTORIES BEFORE THE 
CHRISTMAS RECESS AND BEFORE CAMPAIGNING BEGINS IN EARNEST 
FOR NEXT YEAR'S EUROPARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS.  PASSAGE OF 
THE TWO MOST CONTROVERSIAL PIECES OF LEGISLATION OF THE 
BERLUSCONI GOVERNMENT  THE GASPARRI BILL AND THE CONFLICTS 
OF INTEREST BILL  WOULD ALLOW THE GOVERNMENT TO CLAIM 
CREDIT FOR HAVING ACCOMPLISHED MORE OF ITS PROGRAM 
(INCLUDING ACTING ON TWO ISSUES THAT HAVE LANGUISHED 
THROUGH MULTIPLE PRIOR ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS).  PASSAGE OF 
THE TWO PIECES OF LEGISLATION WOULD ALSO SET ASIDE SOME 
ME 
HIGHLY CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES BEFORE THE CAMPAIGN SEASON 
HEATS UP. 
 
19. (SBU) ASSUMING THE GASPARRI LAW COMES INTO FORCE (WITH 
OR WITHOUT ACCOMPANYING CONFLICT OF INTEREST LEGISLATION), 
IT WILL TAKE CONSIDERABLE TIME TO ASSESS IT REAL IMPACT 
UPON COMPETITION AND FAIR PLAY IN THE ITALIAN 
MEDIA/COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR.  IN OUR VIEW, THE ITALIAN 
MEDIA  NOW  DOES NOT SUFFER FROM A LACK OF DIVERSE 
OPINION.  HOWEVER, THE GASPARRI LAW CLEARLY SETS THE STAGE 
FOR FURTHER CONCENTRATION OF MEDIA OWNERSHIP. BERLUSCONI 
AND HIS SUPPORTERS SEEM UNSWAYED BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS 
(OUTSIDE THIS MISSION) THAT THIS LEGISLATION FURTHER 
CEMENTS A MEDIA SYSTEM LACKING DIVERSITY OF OWNERSHIP.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
SEMBLER 
R 
 
 

 
ROME 00005557  004.2 OF 004 
 
CUR ONLY WHEN A PUBLIC 
OFFICIAL TOOK ACTION THAT NOT ONLY FAVORED HIS/HER COMPANY, 
BUT ALSO HARMED THE PUBLIC INTEREST, UNLESS THE ACT WOULD 
AFFECT THE GENERAL INTEREST OF MANY OTHER COMPANIES.  CASES 
OF PRESUMED CONFLICT OF INTEREST WOULD BE REFERRED TO 
PARLIAMENT, WHICH WOULD DETERMINE THE SANCTIONS. END NOTE.) 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
17. (SBU) MOST OF OUR CONTACTS BELIEVE IT UNLIKELY THAT 
CIAMPI WILL SEND THE LAW BACK TO PARLIAMENT, AND WE SHARE 
THIS PERSPECTIVE.  TO DO SO WOULD BE ALMOST UNPRECEDENTED 
AND SET THE STAGE FOR AN INSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE 
PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT  SOMETHING BOTH WOULD 
LIKE TO AVOID.  OUR OBSERVATIONS SUGGEST THAT SUCH 
CONTROVERSIAL LEGISLATION WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PASSED ABSENT 
SOME TYPE OF TACIT UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE BERLUSCONI 
GOVERNMENT AND PRESIDENT CIAMPI.  ON THE OTHER HAND, SOME 
OF OUR CONTACTS DO BELIEVE THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
MAY FIND CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS. 
 
    18. (SBU) IT IS CLEAR THAT THE CENTER RIGHT MAJORITY WANTS 
TO CHALK UP SEVERAL LEGISLATIVE VICTORIES BEFORE THE 
CHRISTMAS RECESS AND BEFORE CAMPAIGNING BEGINS IN EARNEST 
FOR NEXT YEAR'S EUROPARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS.  PASSAGE OF 
THE TWO MOST CONTROVERSIAL PIECES OF LEGISLATION OF THE 
BERLUSCONI GOVERNMENT  THE GASPARRI BILL AND THE CONFLICTS 
OF INTEREST BILL  WOULD ALLOW THE GOVERNMENT TO CLAIM 
CREDIT FOR HAVING ACCOMPLISHED MORE OF ITS PROGRAM 
(INCLUDING ACTING ON TWO ISSUES THAT HAVE LANGUISHED 
THROUGH MULTIPLE PRIOR ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS).  PASSAGE OF 
THE TWO PIECES OF LEGISLATION WOULD ALSO SET ASIDE SOME 
ME 
HIGHLY CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES BEFORE THE CAMPAIGN SEASON 
HEATS UP. 
 
19. (SBU) ASSUMING THE GASPARRI LAW COMES INTO FORCE (WITH 
OR WITHOUT ACCOMPANYING CONFLICT OF INTEREST LEGISLATION), 
IT WILL TAKE CONSIDERABLE TIME TO ASSESS IT REAL IMPACT 
UPON COMPETITION AND FAIR PLAY IN THE ITALIAN 
MEDIA/COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR.  IN OUR VIEW, THE ITALIAN 
MEDIA  NOW  DOES NOT SUFFER FROM A LACK OF DIVERSE 
OPINION.  HOWEVER, THE GASPARRI LAW CLEARLY SETS THE STAGE 
FOR FURTHER CONCENTRATION OF MEDIA OWNERSHIP. BERLUSCONI 
AND HIS SUPPORTERS SEEM UNSWAYED BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS 
(OUTSIDE THIS MISSION) THAT THIS LEGISLATION FURTHER 
CEMENTS A MEDIA SYSTEM LACKING DIVERSITY OF OWNERSHIP.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
SEMBLER 
R 
 

 
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 2003ROME05557 - Classification: UNCLASSIFIED