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Viewing cable 03PARTO17, U) SECRETARY POWELL'S DECEMBER 2, 2003 MEETING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03PARTO17 2003-12-04 03:26 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL US Delegation, Secretary
O 040326Z DEC 03
FM USDEL SECRETARY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CASABLANCA IMMEDIATE
ARAB-ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
HQ COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTH BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARTO 00017 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2013 
TAGS: PREL PHUM TS
SUBJECT: (U) SECRETARY POWELL'S DECEMBER 2, 2003 MEETING 
WITH TUNISIAN PRESIDENT BEN ALI 
 
1.(U) CLASSIFIED BY: MARCIA K. WONG, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE 
SECRETARY, S/ES, DEPARTMENT OF STATE.  REASON 1.4. (D) 
 
2.(U) 12/02/03; 16:00 HOURS; TUNIS, TUNISIA. 
 
3.(U) PARTICIPANTS: 
 
U.S. 
THE SECRETARY 
TERENCE MCCULLEY, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES (NOTETAKER) 
A/S WILLIAM BURNS, NEA 
A/S RICHARD BOUCHER, PA 
ATUL KESHAP, NSC 
GEMAL HELAL, INTERPRETER 
 
TUNISIA 
PRESIDENT ZINE EL ABIDINE BEN ALI 
ABDELAZIZ BEN DHIA, MINISTER OF STATE/SPECIAL ADVISOR TO 
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC 
HABIB BEN YAHIA, FOREIGN MINISTER 
 
4. (C) SUMMARY: IN A LIVELY ONE HOUR AND 45 MINUTE MEETING 
ON DECEMBER 2, THE SECRETARY AND TUNISIAN PRESIDENT BEN ALI 
REVIEWED IRAQ, THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT, THE GLOBAL 
WAR ON TERROR, TUNISIA'S MIXED RECORD ON HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 
ITS SUBSTANTIAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS SINCE 
INDEPENDENCE.  BEN ALI TERMED THE U.S.-TUNISIA FRIENDSHIP A 
"STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP."  HE URGED THE UNITED STATES TO 
STAY THE COURSE IN IRAQ (WHILE CRITICIZING THE 
"UNREALISTIC" TIMETABLE FOR TURNING OVER POWER TO IRAQIS 
AND THE UNSETTLED SECURITY SITUATION), AND HE EXPRESSED 
PESSIMISM THAT ANY PALESTINIAN LEADER BUT ARAFAT COULD 
DELIVER THE PEACE AND SECURITY THAT ISRAEL REQUIRED.  BEN 
ALI ADDED THAT IF THE U.S. COULD WORK UNILATERALLY WITH 
ISRAEL TO CRAFT A SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO THE PALESTINIANS, 
"I WILL DELIVER ARAFAT."  ON TUNISIA'S INTERNAL POLITICAL 
SITUATION, THE SECRETARY URGED BEN ALI TO MOVE FORWARD WITH 
POLITICAL OPENING AND MEDIA FREEDOM, IN ORDER TO ENSURE 
THAT POLITICAL REFORM MATCHED TUNISIA'S REMARKABLE RECORD 
OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS.  BEN ALI REPLIED WITH A 
VIGOROUS DEFENSE OF TUNISIA'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD, AND 
CLAIMED THAT "NOT A SINGLE JOURNALIST" WAS IN PRISON FOR 
HIS POLITICAL VIEWS.  NOTING THAT BEN ALI WOULD MEET WITH 
PRESIDENT BUSH IN WASHINGTON IN FEBRUARY 2004, THE 
SECRETARY REITERATED THAT TUNISIA NEEDED TO DEMONSTRATE 
PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, IN ORDER TO COUNTER THE IMAGE 
THAT WAS WIDELY PORTRAYED IN THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
IRAQ - SECURITY AND STAYING THE COURSE 
-------------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) THE SECRETARY TOLD PRESIDENT BEN ALI THAT IRAQ 
REMAINED A CRUCIAL ISSUE FOR THE UNITED STATES, AND THAT 
PRESIDENT BUSH WAS DETERMINED TO STAY THE COURSE UNTIL THE 
IRAQI PEOPLE COULD DEVELOP SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRATIC 
INSTITUTIONS.  HE REVIEWED PROGRESS ON IRAQ, INCLUDING 
CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR RECONSTRUCTION, SUPPORT FROM THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AND PROGRESS ON INFRASTRUCTURE AND 
RE-ESTABLISHING THE IRAQI POLICE AND BORDER SECURITY 
FORCES.  SECURITY REMAINED A PROBLEM, BUT COALITION FORCES 
WOULD ULTIMATELY PREVAIL.  NOTING THE POSITIVE OUTCOME OF 
THE OCTOBER MADRID DONORS CONFERENCE, THE SECRETARY PRAISED 
THE PARTICIPATION OF TUNISIA. 
 
6. (C) BEN ALI TERMED THE CURRENT SITUATION IN IRAQ A "TRUE 
TRAGEDY."  WHILE IT WAS INDISPUTABLE THAT THE UNITED STATES 
HAD SAVED THE IRAQI PEOPLE FROM THE DEPREDATIONS OF A 
DICTATOR, HE SAID THAT TUNISIA WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER 
THE DETERIORATING SECURITY SITUATION.  HE TOOK NOTE OF THE 
POSITIVE STEPS SINCE THE END OF THE WAR, BUT STRESSED THAT 
UNLESS THE UNITED STATES COULD DEMONSTRATE THAT ITS 
PRESENCE HAD PRODUCED POSITIVE AND SUSTAINED CHANGES IN THE 
DAILY LIFE OF THE AVERAGE IRAQI, THE U.S. WOULD CONTINUE TO 
BE SEEN AS AN OCCUPIER AND NOT A LIBERATOR. 
 
7. (C) BEN ALI ALSO TOLD THE SECRETARY THAT HE HAD SERIOUS 
DOUBTS ABOUT THE TIMETABLE ESTABLISHED FOR THE RESTORATION 
OF IRAQI SOVEREIGNTY, NOTING THAT THE JUNE DEADLINE SEEMED 
TOO OPTIMISTIC. DESPITE THIS, BEN ALI UNDERLINED THAT U.S. 
FORCES MUST REMAIN IN IRAQ FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD, "OR 
THERE WILL BE CIVIL WAR."  THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT THE 
JUNE TIMETABLE WAS OPTIMISTIC, BUT HE STRESSED THE NEED TO 
GIVE THE IRAQI GOVERNING COUNCIL A REAL DEADLINE.  WHETHER 
THE IGC MET THIS DEADLINE OR NOT, HOWEVER, THE SECRETARY 
REITERATED THAT THE U.S. WAS DETERMINED TO STAY THE COURSE. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
ISRAEL-PALESTINE - ARAFAT ABOVE "ALL THOSE ABUS" 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
8. (C) THE SECRETARY TOLD BEN ALI THAT THE UNITED STATES 
REMAINED COMMITTED TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ROADMAP, BUT 
THE U.S. NEEDED PALESTINIAN PRIME MINISTER ABU ALA'A TO 
TAKE FIRM STEPS IN THE AREA OF SECURITY.  IF THE 
PALESTINIANS COULD TAKE THESE STEPS, HE ADDED, IT WOULD BE 
EASIER FOR THE U.S. TO CONVINCE THE ISRAELIS TO FULFILL 
THEIR PART OF THE ROADMAP.  HE ASKED BEN ALI TO CARRY THIS 
MESSAGE TO TUNISIA'S PARTNERS IN THE REGION, AND ESPECIALLY 
TO THE PALESTINIANS. 
 
9. (C) BEN ALI EXPRESSED DEEP PESSIMISM ABOUT ABU ALA'A'S 
ABILITY TO DELIVER ON PEACE AND SECURITY.  HE SAID THAT 
NEITHER ABU MAZEN, ABU ALA'A, "OR ANY OTHER AMONG ALL THOSE 
ABUS" COULD DO ANY BETTER.  THE ONLY PALESTINIAN FIGURE 
CAPABLE OF BRINGING THE PALESTINIANS TO THE PEACE TABLE WAS 
ARAFAT.  "HE CANNOT BE GOTTEN AROUND," BEN ALI UNDERLINED, 
ADDING THAT HIS POSITION AS THE HISTORIC LEADER OF THE 
PALESTINIAN CAUSE AND THE SYMBOL OF THE NATION MADE HIM AN 
INDISPENSABLE PARTNER IN THE PEACE PROCESS.  CONTINUING, 
HOWEVER, BEN ALI CRITICIZED BOTH ARAFAT AND SHARON, NOTING 
THAT BOTH MUST PUT ASIDE THEIR PERSONAL QUARREL IN ORDER TO 
SIT DOWN AT THE TABLE AND WORK OUT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. 
TUNISIA WOULD CONTINUE ITS LONG TRADITION OF SUPPORT FOR 
THE PEACE PROCESS, BUT HE REPEATED THAT SIDELINING ARAFAT 
"WOULD BE A MISTAKE."  HE THEN SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S. WORK 
UNILATERALLY WITH ISRAEL TO COME UP WITH AN "ACCEPTABLE 
SOLUTION" TO THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT.  IF THE 
SOLUTION MET THE LEGITIMATE NEEDS OF THE PALESTINIAN 
PEOPLE, BEN ALI UNDERTOOK TO DELIVER ARAFAT.  "I KNOW HOW 
TO DEAL WITH ARAFAT AND I CAN PERSUADE HIM." 
 
10. (C) IN REPLY, THE SECRETARY NOTED ARAFAT'S HISTORIC 
ROLE IN THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE, BUT SAID THAT HE WAS A 
FAILED LEADER WHO HAD NOT BEEN WILLING TO USE HIS INFLUENCE 
AND POSITION TO MOVE THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD.  THE 
SECRETARY NOTED HIS EFFORTS IN THE FIRST YEAR OF THE 
ADMINISTRATION TO SPUR ARAFAT TO TAKE CONCRETE STEPS TO 
HALT PALESTINIAN TERRORIST ATTACKS, BUT THE PA PRESIDENT 
HAD FAILED IN ALL RESPECTS.  PRESIDENT BUSH, THE SECRETARY 
STRESSED, HAD COME TO THE DECISION THAT THE U.S. COULD NOT 
CONTINUE TO INVEST IN ARAFAT.  WHILE HE AGREED THAT ABU 
MAZEN'S TENURE AS PA PRIME MINISTER HAD NOT BEEN 
SUCCESSFUL, THE U.S. WOULD WATCH CAREFULLY TO SEE IF ABU 
ALA'A COULD TAKE THE STEPS NEEDED TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE 
ROADMAP. 
 
----------------------------------- 
TERRORISM - TUNISIA'S "LONG BATTLE" 
----------------------------------- 
 
11. (C) TURNING TO THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR, BEN ALI 
REMINDED THE SECRETARY OF TUNISIA'S LONG CAMPAIGN AGAINST 
RELIGIOUS EXTREMISTS.  HE SAID TUNISIA SUPPORTED AN 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TERRORISM, AND HAD ALSO CALLED 
FOR A FORUM TO EXAMINE THE ROOT CAUSES OF THE PHENOMENON. 
HE LAUDED TUNISIA'S COOPERATION WITH THE EU AND THE US ON 
TERRORISM ISSUES, BUT HE CRITICIZED THE EUROPEANS FOR 
FAILING TO HEED TUNISIAN WARNINGS ABOUT SPECIFIC 
INDIVIDUALS.  BEN ALI ASSERTED THAT TUNISIA HAD PROVIDED 
INFORMATION "YEARS AGO" TO BELGIUM ABOUT THE INDIVIDUALS 
INVOLVED IN THE ASSASSINATION OF AFGHAN LEADER AHMED SHAH 
MASSOUD, BUT THE BELGIANS HAD FAILED TO ACT.  ATTACKING THE 
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CAUSES OF TERRORISM, HE ADDED, WAS 
ESSENTIAL, AND WHILE HIS COUNTRY HAD MADE GREAT PROGRESS IN 
THIS AREA, BEN ALI NOTED HIS CONCERNS ABOUT A RESURGENCE OF 
CONSERVATIVE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS IN TUNISIA. 
 
12. (C) LOOKING AT THE SUB-REGION, BEN ALI SAID THAT 
TUNISIA REMAINED IN A BETTER POSITION THAN ITS NEIGHBORS IN 
THE BATTLE AGAINST TERRORISTS.  ALGERIA, HE NOTED, WAS "AT 
THE BEGINNING OF THE END" IN ITS WAR, WHILE MOROCCO WAS "AT 
THE BEGINNING OF THE BEGINNING."  THE ONLY WAY TO FIGHT 
TERROR WAS TO ATTACK THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CAUSES THAT SPAWNED 
THE TERRORIST. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL OPENING - "IT IS FICTION" 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
13. (C) THE SECRETARY AGREED ON THE NEED TO DEAL WITH THE 
ROOT CAUSES OF TERRORISM.  HE SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO 
ADDRESS SOCIAL INEQUALITY IN THE REGION, AND HE NOTED 
PRESIDENT BUSH'S SUPPORT FOR EXPANDING FREE TRADE IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST, AND FOR POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC OPENING 
THROUGH THE MIDDLE EAST PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE.  GREATER 
DEMOCRATIZATION AND AN EXPANSION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN 
WERE KEY COMPONENTS OF THIS, AND THE SECRETARY PRAISED 
TUNISIA FOR ITS PROGRESS ON WOMEN'S ISSUES AND SOCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC PROGRESS.  THE WORLD IS NOW LOOKING, HE ADDED, FOR 
BEN ALI TO DO MORE TO PROMOTE POLITICAL OPENNESS AND MEDIA 
FREEDOM, AND HE CITED RECENT MEDIA REPORTS CRITICIZING THE 
STATE OF POLITICAL FREEDOM IN TUNISIA.  TUNISIA NEEDED TO 
DO MORE TO COUNTER THE IMAGE PORTRAYED IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
MEDIA, PARTICULARLY AS PRESIDENT BEN ALI PREPARED FOR HIS 
MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BUSH. 
 
14. (C) IN REPLY, BEN ALI LAUNCHED INTO A VIGOROUS DEFENSE 
OF TUNISIA'S POLITICAL CLIMATE AND HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD.  IN 
"OPENING THE GATES OF FREEDOM," TUNISIA WAS A PIONEER. 
REVIEWING THE COUNTRY'S RECORD OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
PROGRESS, HE ASSERTED THAT A "COLLECTIVE" OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
EXISTED, INCLUDING THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN, AND THE RIGHT TO 
EDUCATION, HEALTH CARE AND HOUSING.  THE TUNISIAN 
GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIZED THE LEGAL OPPOSITION, AND HE HAD 
INSTRUCTED THAT 20 PERCENT OF THE SEATS IN THE COUNTRY'S 
PARLIAMENT WERE TO BE RESERVED FOR THE OPPOSITION. 
MOREOVER, "NOT ONE SINGLE JOURNALIST WHO HAS CRITICIZED THE 
GOVERNMENT IS IN PRISON."  HE CRITICIZED THE EMBASSY'S 
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING, AND HE CHALLENGED THE U.S. TO 
PROVIDE "TANGIBLE EVIDENCE" OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. 
DISMISSING AS "FICTION" THE PRESS REPORTS, HE SAID, "I AM A 
PRACTICAL MAN, I MUST DEAL WITH SPECIFICS."  CONCLUDING, HE 
ADMITTED THAT TUNISIA WAS NOT PERFECT, THAT THE COUNTRY 
WOULD CONTINUE TO REFORM ITS INSTITUTIONS, AND THAT IF THE 
U.S. HAD SPECIFICS TO DISCUSS HE WAS READY TO ENGAGE. 
 
15. (C) THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT TUNISIA'S PROGRESS, 
PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS WAS INDEED 
IMPRESSIVE, AND THAT THE COUNTRY'S ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN THE 
AREAS OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM WERE INDISPUTABLE, BUT 
THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD AN OBLIGATION AS A FRIEND TO 
TELL THE GOT WHAT WAS NEEDED IF TUNISIA WISHED TO BE 
ACCEPTED AS A FULLY MODERN STATE.  BEN ALI STEPPED BACK 
FROM HIS POLEMIC, AND THE MEETING CONCLUDED WITH AN OPEN 
INVITATION TO THE SECRETARY TO RETURN FOR A LONGER VISIT, 
AND A CONFIRMATION FROM THE TUNISIAN LEADER THAT HE WOULD 
COME TO WASHINGTON IN FEBRUARY FOR A MEETING WITH THE 
PRESIDENT. 
 
POWELL