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Viewing cable 03KATHMANDU2385, BHUTANESE REFUGEES: UNHCR'S FAKHOURI FEARS CURRENT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03KATHMANDU2385 2003-12-05 07:42 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kathmandu
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 002385 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS, PRM/ANE; LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY; NSC FOR 
MILLARD; GENEVA FOR PLYNCH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2013 
TAGS: PREF PREL BH NP
SUBJECT: BHUTANESE REFUGEES: UNHCR'S FAKHOURI FEARS CURRENT 
BILATERAL PROCESS IS FAR OFF TRACK 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert K. Boggs for reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
1. (C) Summary.  After a two-day visit to Nepal, UNHCR 
Director for Asia, Jean-Marie Fakhouri met with Ambassador 
Malinowski privately to share his impressions and to discuss 
UNHCR's future role in the Bhutanese refugee camps.  Fakhouri 
fears that Nepal-Bhutan negotiations on refugee repatriation 
have led the process off track.  With little information 
available to them, the refugees of Khudunabari Camp are being 
forced to make an "emotional, not informed, decision" on 
whether to return to Bhutan.  Fakhouri also is concerned that 
discrimination continues to plague ethnic Nepalis inside 
Bhutan, increasing the need for third-party monitoring, 
particularly by UNHCR.  UNHCR's leadership has decided to 
phase out care and maintenance in the camps over a two-year 
period, but will maintain a strong protection program. 
Maoists are using the camps as rest stops and for health 
services.  Fakhouri will recommend upon his return to Geneva 
that UNHCR issue hard-hitting statements against the current 
situation.  In the absence of support from European donors to 
Bhutan, Fakhouri and UNHCR will look to the U.S. for 
leadership on this issue.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------ 
BILATERAL PROCESS IS OFF TRACK 
------------------------------ 
 
2. (SBU) On December 4, UNHCR Director for Asia, Jean-Marie 
Fakhouri, met privately with Ambassador Malinowski to offer 
his impressions of the current Bhutanese refugee situation 
from his meetings with refugee leaders in eastern Nepal and 
with the Government of Nepal (GON).  Fakhouri was accompanied 
by UNHCR Country Director Abraham Abraham.  DCM and PolOff 
also participated.  Fakhouri later gave a briefing to donor 
government representatives, which PolOff attended. 
 
3. (C) Fakhouri was very worried that the bilateral process 
was not moving in the right direction.  His meeting on 
December 3 with refugee leaders in eastern Nepal confirmed 
Fakhouri's concerns about the verification and repatriation 
process.  The refugees are extremely anxious and are being 
forced "to make an emotional decision, not an informed 
decision about whether to return to Bhutan," he said. 
Fakhouri noted that Category II refugees, which represent the 
majority of refugees with a right to return, do not know 
where they will be settled or what their status will be 
during the two-year probationary period.  They do not want to 
end up indefinitely in yet another camp, he said.  People in 
Category II have virtually been stripped of their refugee 
status and, Fakhouri expects, may remain stateless persons 
for the unforeseeable future. 
 
4. (C) Fakhouri confided that some U.N. agencies based in 
Thimpu have been asked by the RGOB to assist in moving ethnic 
Nepali citizens and residents into "temporary camps" for 
"internally-displaced" people in the north and east of Bhutan 
in an alleged effort to increase security in the south and 
deprive the Indian separatists of a support base.  To 
Fakhouri's chagrin, the U.N. agencies had considered 
providing support for such a program, but later realized what 
a mistake this would be.  (Comment. Fakhouri's example 
illustrates well the extent to which the RGOB has managed, 
through discriminatory policies, to trample on individual 
human rights in the name of preserving the national culture 
and religion.  End Comment.)  Fakhouri has also heard that 
the resettlement of northern Bhutanese in the south has not 
gone well and that more Nepali ethnics are leaving Bhutan and 
likely integrating themselves into India. 
 
------------------------------- 
THIRD-PARTY OVERSIGHT ESSENTIAL 
------------------------------- 
5. (C)  Fakhouri continues to believe that only UNHCR can 
provide appropriate protection and oversight to the refugees 
during and after repatriation.  However, he admitted, UNHCR 
Lubbers has directed him not to continue to seek a role for 
UNHCR in the process.  Fakhouri expressed disappointment that 
the Royal Government of Bhutan (RGOB) and the Bhutanese King 
continue to blame UNHCR for allegedly creating the refugee 
problem by supporting them in camps rather than forcing them 
to assimilate into Nepal.  How can they believe anyone would 
willingly surrender their citizenship and livelihood in 
exchange for life in a refugee camp, he asked. 
 
6. (C) When questioned about whether he believed some other 
U.N. organization might be able to provide third-party 
oversight for the refugees, Fakhouri noted that the Bhutanese 
refugee situation is the only example in UNHCR's history 
where it has not been allowed to participate in a negotiated, 
trilateral agreement with the governments of the origin and 
destination countries.  In a recent conversation with the 
UNICEF Representative based in Thimpu, Fakhouri learned that 
the RGOB has never allowed UNICEF access to southern Bhutan. 
UNICEF, he said, feels it is not capable of providing -- nor 
does it want to provide -- oversight for the refugees.  He 
confided that the Danish government had suggested that 
third-country diplomats might be able to provide oversight -- 
a suggestion that Fakhouri strongly dismisses.  The DCM 
raised the suggestion of certain refugee leaders (reported 
septel) that an international organization, such as Lutheran 
World Federation or Oxfam, might be able to provide oversight 
for refugee repatriation.  Fakhouri rejected this proposal 
too, arguing that such non-government organizations, while 
effective when working hand-in-hand with UNHCR on refugee 
matters, do not have the authority or United Nations' mandate 
to act as liaisons between governments. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
UNHCR TO PHASE-OUT CARE AND MAINTENANCE, NOT PROTECTION 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
7. (C) Fakhouri recalled UNHCR Lubbers' statement before the 
UNGA supporting a phased withdrawal from the camps, adding 
that his trip has confirmed the need for such a withdrawal. 
He noted that having such well-run camps is a "double-edged 
knife" because now there exists a wide development gap 
between the refugee camps and the neighboring communities. 
UNHCR plans gradually to reduce assistance to the camps over 
the next two years while using some of the money this saved 
for development programs in surrounding communities. 
Fakhouri used the example of non-refugee Nepalis regularly 
using the camp's health care facilities to illustrate the 
necessity for reducing care and maintenance levels in the 
camps while raising the level of services available locally. 
 
8. (C) While in Kathmandu, Fakhouri met with the U.N. Country 
Team and they agreed that assistance to the Nepali 
communities could be undertaken through other U.N. agencies, 
such as UNDP.  In 2004, UNHCR expects to reduce direct 
funding to the camps by roughly USD 1 million while providing 
a similar amount for the development of neighboring 
communities.  Fakhouri highlighted that UNHCR will begin 
withdrawal of only care and maintenance in the camps, not 
refugee protection.  If anything, refugee protection will be 
further enhanced over the next two years, he said.  UNHCR has 
chosen a two-year timeline to correspond with the timetable 
informally agreed to by the GON and RGOB for verification and 
repatriation of all refugees. 
 
9. (C) Fakhouri went on to explain that UNHCR soon would 
conduct a headcount and re-registration of all the refugees 
using UNHCR's new registration system.  UNHCR also will 
conduct a socio-economic survey, using ICMC, to identify 
vulnerable populations.  These vulnerable populations would 
be treated as candidates for possible third-party 
resettlement.  UNHCR expects the survey to begin in January 
2004 and be completed within three months. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
MAOISTS USING THE CAMPS FOR R&R AND HEALTH SERVICES 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
10. (C) The Ambassador asked about the current security 
situation in the camps.  Fakhouri replied that the UNHCR 
security officer based in Jhapa has evidence that Maoists are 
using the camps as rest stops and for health services. 
Although there is no hard evidence, Fakhouri also suspects 
that the Maoists are recruiting from the camps.  He noted 
that the young residents of the camps are relatively 
well-educated, politically frustrated and sensitized to human 
rights issues.  Fakhouri senses a certain level of militancy, 
particularly in Khudunabari camp, that might emerge if they 
begin to feel their rights are being trammeled by the current 
verification and repatriation process. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
UNHCR MAY BECOME MORE VOCAL AGAINST CURRENT PROCESS 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
11. (C) Fakhouri noted that UNHCR has remained "very quiet" 
about the verification and categorization process, but would 
do so no longer.  Over the past two years, UNHCR has financed 
the GON side of the Joint Verification Team (JVT).  However, 
UNHCR sent a letter o/a November 28 to Nepal's Home Ministry 
informing the GON that it can no longer provide financial 
assistance to the JVT.  UNHCR did agree to provide one last 
payment of USD 40,000 to allow the Nepali team a few months 
to find other external support.  (FYI: In the donor briefing, 
EU Commission Representative informed the group that the GON 
has requested such support from the EU.  End FYI.)  Fakhouri 
said that the UNHCR is not yet in a position to advise the 
refugees not to return to Bhutan, but didn't preclude that 
possibility in the future.  Fakhouri's recommendation to 
Lubbers upon returning to Geneva will be to issue 
"hard-hitting" statements against the current bilateral 
process, he said. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
UNHCR SEEKS SUPPORT FROM U.S. AND OTHER DONORS 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
12. (C) The UNHCR will be looking for support from the U.S. 
and other donors, although Fakhouri expressed uncertainty 
whether such support would be forthcoming.  He said frankly 
that Bhutan has managed to "ethnically cleanse" 
Bhutanese-Nepalis with almost no objection from the 
international community.  He anticipated that the situation 
might deteriorate if the refugees, upon return to Bhutan, are 
forced into labor camps, as was done in Myanmar.  Fakhouri 
urged the U.S. to provide leadership on this issue, including 
organizing another visit of the diplomatic corps to the 
refugee camps and the formation of a support group of donors 
and U.N. agencies to try to influence the Bhutanese 
government.  Fakhouri believes that the Bhutanese King 
himself is personally engaged on two primary issues: the 
insurgency in southern Bhutan and the refugees.  He felt that 
diplomatic engagement with the King is necessary to get this 
process back on track. 
 
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COMMENT 
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13. (C) The lack of information available to Khudunabari Camp 
refugees regarding their future status in Bhutan remains a 
major concern.  It is uncertain whether the January 2004 
Joint Ministerial will answer the refugees' questions, since 
the GON and RGOB have failed to fulfill earlier promises to 
provide these answers at previous ministerials.  Fakhouri 
appeared to be increasingly concerned that conditions inside 
Bhutan will not be favorable for the refugees -- a concern 
shared by Bhutanese human rights activist Tek Nath Rizal 
(reported septel) and by this embassy.  They both fear that 
the RGOB continues systematically to discriminate against 
ethnic Nepalis inside Bhutan.  Fakhouri and Rizal also appear 
convinced that, through its red carpet treatment of visitors 
and the exotic facade of life in Thimpu, the RGOB has lulled 
the "Friends of Bhutan" into complacency.  Accounts by the 
Swiss and Austrian Ambassadors, who returned from Thimpu on 
December 3, appear to support this assessment (reported 
septel).  Fakhouri and Rizal fear that there continues to be 
a serious disconnect between the RGOB's words and actions. 
If, in fact, the RGOB is confident that the refugees will be 
well-cared for, why does it continue to oppose an 
international presence in southern Bhutan -- a presence that 
would ease the concerns of the refugees and of the 
international community?  Fakhouri and Rizal also believe, 
and Post agrees, that a meeting between refugees leaders and 
the Bhutanese King could go far to eliminate mistrust between 
the two sides.  End Comment. 
MALINOWSKI