This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T KATHMANDU 002364 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
STATE PLEASE ALSO PASS USAID - ANE/SA 
LONDON FOR POL - GURNEY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2013 
TAGS: PREL PTER EAID NP UK
SUBJECT: NEPAL:  HEAD OF BRITISH AID IN KATHMANDU TALKS 
WITH MAOIST LEADER 
 
REF: A. KATHMANDU 2340 
     ¶B. KATHMANDU 2254 
     ¶C. KATHMANDU 2048 
     ¶D. STATE 321142 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI.  REASON:  1.5 (B,D). 
 
¶1. (S/NF)  Summary:  On December 3 Pol/Mil Chief received 
from his British counterpart notes from a November 13 
telephone conversation between David Wood, the head of the 
UK's Department for International Development (DFID) in 
Nepal, and Baburam Bhattarai, top ideologue and erstwhile 
lead negotiator for the Maoists.  Bhattarai reportedly asked 
for advice on how to influence the U.S., which he described 
as "hostile" to the Maoists.  Wood recommended that the 
Maoists end their anti-U.S. rhetoric and return to the 
negotiating table.  The British Mission's willingness to 
share this information with us (albeit somewhat after the 
fact) is an encouraging sign of efforts to improve 
information sharing and transparency.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (S/NF)  On December 3 Pol/Mil Chief received from his 
British counterpart notes from a November 13 telephone 
conversation between David Wood, the head of the Department 
for International Development (DFID) in Nepal, and Baburam 
Bhattarai, top ideologue and erstwhile lead negotiator for 
the Maoists.  According to Wood's notes, Bhattarai's call was 
"completely unexpected."  When asked by Bhattarai for his 
assessment of the situation, Wood reportedly expressed dismay 
at the Maoists' decision to break the ceasefire, relayed his 
concern at the escalating casualties, and emphasized that 
since a military solution to the conflict is impracticable, 
negotiations must be resumed at some point. 
 
¶3.  (S/NF)  Asked by Bhattarai how to achieve a political 
solution to the conflict, Wood reportedly reminded him that 
political questions of that nature are more appropriately 
adderessed to others, rather than to the head of a 
development agency.  Bhattarai then contrasted DFID's 
position with that of the U.S., claiming that "DFID had a 
clear position on peace," while the U.S. is "hostile" to the 
Maoists.  He asked Wood's advice on how to influence the U.S. 
 According to Wood's notes, he replied, "by ending their 
anti-US rhetoric, and restoring the ceasefire and 
negotiations." 
 
¶4.  (S/NF) Bhattarai then attempted to reassure Wood that the 
Maoists are "not against development and would do nothing to 
disturb it."  That said, he acknowledged that the Politburo 
directive ordering Maoist cadres not to attack development 
projects (Ref C) "was taking time to implement."  Wood 
reportedly concluded the conversation by observing that 
undermining development hurts all Nepalis, which, he 
suggested, is not in the Maoists' "long-term political 
interest."  According to the SIS Chief at the British 
Embassy, Wood and Bhattarai have not spoken subsequently. 
 
¶5.  (S/NF)   Recently Major General Rookmangud Katawal, 
Nepal's National Security Advisor, told the Ambassador that 
the Maoist leadership twice had contacted DFID's Wood to ask 
for details of DFID's ongoing and future programs and plans 
in Nepal.  On both occasions Wood  refused to comply with the 
Maoist request.  Katawal did not provide the source of his 
information. 
 
¶6.  (S/NF)  Comment:  This is the first acknowledgement by 
our British colleagues that the head of the UK's development 
mission here in Kathmandu, as well as the British SIS chief, 
has been in contact with a Maoist leader.  (We suspect this 
is not the only time that Wood has conversed with Bhattarai.) 
 The implications of this conversation for U.S. security are 
attenuated by the fact that it predated the November 17 
Maoist threat to our Peace Corps trainees in Rupandehi 
District (Ref B), and the Department's subsequent 
instructions to demarche the UK Government to pass a message 
to its covert Maoist contacts to stop threatening our 
interests (Ref D).  The UK Embassy has since confirmed that 
its SIS Chief has passed such a message.  Nonetheless, the UK 
Mission's willingness to share this information with us--even 
if three weeks after the fact--is a hopeful sign of its 
efforts to improve communication and transparency with us. 
 
 
 
MALINOWSKI