This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 002363 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS, LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY, NSC FOR MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2013 
TAGS: PTER PGOV NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: MAOISTS CHANGE TACTICS AND TARGETS 
 
REF: A. (A) KATHMANDU 1979 
     ¶B. (B) KATHMANDU 2020 
     ¶C. (C) KATHMANDU 2266 
     ¶D. (D) KATHMANDU 2164 
     ¶E. (E) KATHMANDU 2340 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Malinowski for Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Since 2002, improvements in the 
effectiveness of the Royal Nepal Army (RNA), among other 
reasons, have caused Nepal's Maoist insurgents to shift the 
focus of many of their operations from the hills to the 
lowland Terai.  The Maoists' expansion into the Terai has 
enabled them to widen and deepen their extortion campaign and 
shorten supply lines from India.  The insurgents also have 
limited the size of their attacks, targeting primarily small 
patrols and police posts, ambushing selected vehicles with 
IEDs, and assassinating individuals.  The insurgents have 
restricted heavily the movement of local civilians and 
political party activists, putting a stranglehold on trade 
and commerce in the countryside.  There are some signs of a 
possible disconnect between Maoist leadership and those in 
the field.  Royal Nepal Army contacts believe the failure to 
launch major assaults reveals significant weaknesses within 
the Maoist military wing.  The RNA will continue to control 
urban centers and prevent the Maoists from achieving 
large-scale successes.  However, through guerrilla warfare 
tactics, the Maoists will continue to victimize all levels of 
Nepal society, from villagers to the elite in Kathmandu, 
while destroying infrastructure and restricting economic 
activity.  End Summary. 
 
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MAOISTS EXTEND THEIR REACH INTO TERAI LOWLANDS 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶2. (C) The tactics used by Nepal's Maoist insurgents have 
changed significantly since 2002.  At that time, the 
insurgents focused their attacks and strength in remote, 
impoverished mountainous areas, primarily in the mid- and 
far-west of the country.  Today, however, the Maoists have 
extended their theater of influence into eastern Nepal and 
the lowlands, or Terai.  There may be several reasons for the 
Maoists' expansion into the Terai.  First, the Terai produces 
much of the wealth of the country, in agricultural 
production, industry and trade, enabling the insurgents to 
extort more money to finance their military operations. 
Second, the increased scope of Maoist operations combined 
with the desire to avoid large-scale Maoist successes has 
forced the Royal Nepal Army and security personnel to spread 
themselves even thinner on the ground.  While the flat land 
of the Terai allows for relatively high mobility, the nearby 
hills provide the Maoists with look-out posts from which to 
stage attacks on small security patrols or vehicular convoys. 
 
¶3. (C) Third, proximity to the Indian border allows the 
Maoists to smuggle black-market explosives and ammunition and 
shorten their supply lines.  However, this proximity has also 
raised more concern on the part of the Government of India 
(GOI).  The Maoists might find themselves facing a second 
enemy if the GOI begins to crack down on Maoists in northern 
India.  Fourth, expansion of their operations into the Terai 
could be a focused effort by the Maoists to nationalize the 
conflict in preparation for renewed negotiations with the 
Government of Nepal (GON).  The Maoists must have a national 
power base if they are to be credible in their claim to be a 
national movement.  If the GON were to accede to the Maoist 
demand for constituent assembly elections -- which many 
analysts believe is merely a ploy aimed at abolishing the 
constitutional monarchy and bringing the Maoists to power -- 
the insurgents' stranglehold in many parts of the country 
might allow them to win votes through fear and intimidation 
at the ballot box.  Likewise, Prime Minister Surya Bahadur 
Thapa's government has committed itself to holding phased 
national elections, possibly beginning in the Terai; such 
elections would pose a serious threat to the Maoists, who 
have alienated many Nepalis by their violence and 
depredations.  With the stronger Maoist presence in the 
lowlands, the government's promise to hold elections may be 
difficult to keep. 
 
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INCREASED EXTORTION AND FORCED RECRUITMENT 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶4. (C) The Maoists' expansion into the Terai has enabled the 
movement to increase extortion activities in the wealthiest 
parts of the country.  Extortion is widespread and reaches 
nearly every strata of society.  Villagers are required to 
give food, shelter, and sometimes cash while business owners 
in urban centers are faced with letters demanding hefty 
"taxes."  Extortion demands are often accompanied by personal 
threats.  In October, for example, the Colgate-Palmolive 
plant in Hetauda was forced to close its doors after 
receiving a threatening letter demanding NRs 1.5 million 
(roughly USD 20,500) (ref B). 
 
¶5. (C) Before the spread of the conflict, Maoist recruitment 
occurred primarily in Maoist home areas in north-central 
Nepal, such as Dolpa and Jumla districts.  Now, however, the 
insurgency must recruit in areas outside its traditional 
areas of support. In September, for example, the media 
reported that Maoists had issued letters and verbal demands 
to households in rural areas in the eastern Terai requiring 
each household to provide either one son or daughter to serve 
in the Maoist armed forces.  Moreover, the Maoist leadership 
has moved its armed cadre into the East and Terai where the 
insurgents do not have cultural and social linkages with the 
local population.  Caste, language and cultural differences 
have increased tensions between the populace and the Maoists, 
contributing to the perception that the Maoists are invaders, 
not native sons.  Likewise, the Maoists must extort and steal 
food from locals in order to sustain themselves.  Forced 
recruitment and the criminalization of the insurgency have 
forced many young men and women to migrate to India and urban 
areas. 
 
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FOCUS ON SMALL, TARGETED ASSAULTS AND ASSASSINATIONS 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶6. (C) Since the collapse of the cease-fire in August, the 
Maoists have foregone their traditional, large-scale attacks 
on military and armed police encampments in favor of small, 
targeted assaults and assassinations.  The Maoists have 
attempted to reach the political elite in Kathmandu by 
destroying ancestral homes and assets of political and 
business leaders.  The insurgents have relied heavily on 
Improvised Explosion Devices (IEDs) planted along roads or 
footpaths to kill small mobile security patrols and have also 
focused heavily on the destruction of public infrastructure, 
such as radio towers, telephone exchanges, bridges and power 
plants.  The Maoists' ability to operate in smaller cells 
makes it harder for the RNA to detect and counteract them. 
 
¶7. (C) The only two major attacks the Maoists have launched 
since the cease-fire collapsed in August were on Armed Police 
Force (APF) camps in Dang and Banke districts on October 10 
and 12 (reported Ref A) and were largely unsuccessful.  The 
RNA and others believe the Maoists' change in tactics is a 
sign that the insurgents are incapable now of launching major 
attacks on security forces, with their improved defensive 
positions and better equipment and training.  To prevent the 
Maoists from succeeding at large-scale attacks, however, the 
RNA and Nepal Police have been forced to withdraw their 
presence from most Village Development Committee (VDC) areas 
and outlying areas in favor of consolidated, fortified bases. 
 In Makwanpur District south of Kathmandu, for example, only 
three police posts currently are staffed: one in the district 
headquarters and two in smaller urban centers.  Their absence 
in the country side will make it more difficult for the GON 
to win the hearts and minds of the people. 
 
¶8. (C) The Maoists themselves, in a statement by Pushpa Kumar 
Dahal (alias Prachanda) in late October, explained their 
operational strategy in three phases.  First, the insurgents 
would carry out decentralized action through small ambushes 
and raids in the rural areas as well as urban centers.  The 
goal of the first phase was to "shock and set into disarray 
the enemy" in the capital and rural areas.  The second and 
third phases would involve a gradual centralization of their 
attacks through operations involving larger numbers of 
combatants.  According to Prachanda, the first phase of the 
strategy has been "a complete success."  The RNA and many 
other analysts insist that phase has been a failure. 
 
¶9. (C) The concentration of GON security forces, plus their 
desire to expand the conflict and their sphere of influence, 
were likely important factors in the Maoist decision to 
modify their tactics.  Recognizing the difficulty of 
launching large-scale attacks, the Maoists may have decided 
small-scale, hit-and-run attacks are the most efficient and 
cost-effective means to achieve the same objective -- 
destabilizing and undermining central authority. 
 
------------------------- 
RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT 
------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) The insurgents' control in the countryside enables 
them to restrict the movement of locals and strangle commerce 
and trade.  (A report on the economic costs of the conflict 
provided septel.)  The Maoists are also able to limit the 
activities of political parties in nearly all of Nepal's 75 
districts.  By preventing party leaders from reaching their 
constituencies, the insurgents may seek to strengthen their 
own political presence while eroding popular support for the 
legitimate parties.  Likewise, the Maoist stranglehold has 
effectively prevented the government from delivering 
services, thereby undermining the GON's legitimacy.  However, 
the brutal, arbitrary nature of the vigilante justice meted 
out by "People's Courts" and local commanders likely outweigh 
whatever limited popular appeal they once had. 
 
--------------------------------- 
SCHISM BETWEEN THE RANK AND FILE? 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) There are signs of a possible disconnect between the 
Maoist leadership, most of whom we believe now reside in 
India or abroad, and the Maoist cadre.  NGO and INGO staff 
report that local cadres appear to have greater discretionary 
authority since the end of the cease-fire (Refs C and D). 
Moreover, the Maoist leadership has made policy 
pronouncements in some cases that appear to have been ignored 
by those in the field.  In late October, for example, Maoist 
commander Prachanda stated that it was not Maoist policy to 
kill security personnel on leave or at home.  Since then, 
however, many low-level policemen have been assassinated 
while drinking tea, leaving their homes, or engaging in some 
other innocuous activity.  Also, Maoist cadre in rural areas 
have brutally murdered even the family members of security 
forces.  Prachanda also indicated that the insurgents would 
not target public infrastructure in areas controlled by the 
Maoists.  However, the destruction of power plants and vital 
bridges linking local villages with district centers have 
continued unabated.  Whether the Maoist leadership is unable 
to control local-level commanders or has made a conscious 
decision not to follow through on public statements is 
unclear. 
 
-------- 
COMMENT 
-------- 
 
¶12. (C) From their two failed attacks on APF camps in 
October, the Maoists appear incapable of resuming a series of 
large-scale attacks to gain prestige and arms as they did in 
2001-2002, although we do not preclude that they will try one 
of these attacks again.  Realizing the impossibility of an 
outright military victory, the Maoist leadership may rely 
more and more on guerrilla warfare tactics, such as road 
mines, targeted assassinations and attacks on small security 
patrols.  The insurgents are highly mobile, able to disappear 
into dense forests and jungle and to blend in with local 
populations.  These tactics will allow the Maoists to 
maintain overwhelming influence over -- and deny control to 
the government of -- the majority of Nepal's rural areas, 
restricting the movement of locals and political party 
activists, and strangling trade and commerce.  Their 
influence in these areas will have a significant effect on 
elections unless the GON is able to fill the current 
administrative and security void. 
 
¶13. (C) As discussed Ref E, the Maoists, through their 
rhetoric, have attempted to isolate the U.S. diplomatically 
and discourage other donors from collaborating with us.  The 
Maoists have been successful in generating a climate of fear 
among both average Nepali workers in rural areas and the 
political elite in Kathmandu.  Ironically, many Nepalis feel 
less secure now than they did last year, when the intensity 
of the Maoists' "people's war" was more intense.  Maoist 
extortion, accompanied by personal threats, as well as 
targeted assassinations seems to have had a deeper 
psychological impact than the random bombings and forced 
closures, or bandhs, of last year.   Also, the withdrawal of 
security forces from most of the countryside has left Nepali 
villagers feeling more vulnerable.  The challenge facing GON 
security forces is how to modify their tactics to counter the 
Maoist terror campaign.  In the east, at least, aggressive 
counter-insurgency tactics have been achieving some success 
in blunting Maoist strength.  End Comment. 
MALINOWSKI