This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 002359 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR S. DELISI, M. RAYNOR 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER, TEITELBAUM 
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY 
PARIS FOR C. NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2013 
TAGS: PGOV PINR ZI ZANU PF
SUBJECT: RULING PARTY SUCCESSION RACE: IS ZVINAVASHE THE 
ONE? 
 
REF: A. HARARE 2286 
     ¶B. HARARE 1446 
     ¶C. HARARE ZI 2264 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Audu Besmer under Section 1.5(b)(d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: The retirement of Vitalis Zvinavashe as 
commander of the Zimbabwe Defense Forces (ZDF) and his 
emergence on the national political scene underscore 
uncertainties surrounding the ruling party's contortions over 
prospective leadership succession.  His possible appointment 
as Vice-President could mute disappointment among competing 
aspirants and facilitate the ruling party's management of 
political-military relations, but he reportedly is unpopular 
among military officers, and his entrance into politics could 
bolster Parliamentary Speaker Emmerson Mnangagwa's efforts to 
consolidate power and succeed President Mugabe.  For his 
part, Mugabe gives no indication of planning to hand over the 
reins of power any time soon.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) The announcement in early November that Zvinavashe 
was retiring effective December 31 had been rumored for some 
time.  President Mugabe's remarks at his retirement party, 
commentary in the government media, and Zvinavashe's own 
reported comments indicate that he will play a role in ruling 
party politics, although precisely what role remains to be 
seen. 
 
Old Soldier Not Ready To Fade Away 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Although the ZDF brass generally has eschewed public 
involvement in politics, Zvinavashe's name has been featured 
in well-publicized political circumstances on several 
occasions.  In late 2002, Zvinavashe and Parliamentary 
Speaker Emmerson Mnangagwa reportedly sent an emissary to 
opposition leaders to discuss a Mugabe exit strategy.  In the 
face of vocal criticism by party hard-liners, each denied 
involvement in such talks.  Last year Zvinavashe also was 
reported to have urged the formation of a national task force 
to address the nation's economic situation, which he 
attributed to bad economic policy.  Earlier, he created a 
stir in the run-up to national elections of March 2002 by 
stating publicly that the defense forces would not salute any 
political leader without liberation credentials, a clear slap 
at Tsvangirai.  Notwithstanding his somewhat checkered public 
past, Zvinavashe's retention of the top military slot 
suggests the depth of Mugabe's reliance on him. 
 
¶4.  (C) Upon announcement of his retirement, Zvinavashe 
publicly proclaimed his availability for national office and 
dismissed suggestions that he would take a "district" 
position.  Early speculation on his likely political role 
revolved around the Masvingo provincial party chair or 
governorship; however, both of those slots were recently 
filled.  That would appear to leave the Vice-Presidency or a 
slot in a rumored upcoming cabinet reshuffle.  According to a 
family friend of Minister of Justice, Legal, and 
Parliamentary Affairs Patrick Chinamasa, Chinamasa's wife 
(who is the older sister of Zvinavashe's wife) said the late 
Vice President Simon Muzenda on his deathbed told Mugabe that 
he wanted Zvinavashe to succeed him as MP for Gutu North and 
as Vice-President.  While Mugabe will not be bound by the 
dying wish of his trusted Vice-President, chief party 
strategist Muzenda's faith in Zvinavashe testifies to the 
defense chief's party loyalty and reliability and reflects 
positively on his standing for the Vice-Presidency in the 
President's eyes. 
 
¶5.  (C) Complicating Zvinavashe's path to national office is 
that he must hold an MP slot in order to fill a 
vice-presidential or cabinet slot for more than three months. 
 A constituency MP position might be of interest to 
Zvinavashe as a means to the vice-presidency.  One open 
non-constituency MP slot reportedly is slated for another 
individual, but presumably could be made available to 
accommodate Zvinavashe should party priorities dictate. 
Indeed, more non-constituency slots could open should a 
rumored cabinet reshuffle take place. 
 
Zvinavashe's Cache: Military Credentials... 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Sporting strong liberation credentials, the 60-year 
old Zvinavashe joined the Zimbabwe African National 
Liberation Army (ZANLA) in 1968 and has held his current 
position since 1994.  With the MDC distracted and lying low, 
and the ruling party having steeled itself to international 
pressure and economic collapse, an increasingly disaffected 
military may pose the biggest threat to the ruling party's 
firm control.  Mugabe and others in the party may calculate 
that Vice-President (or President) Zvinavashe would enhance 
ZANU-PF's management of a potentially restive and financially 
pinched military.  It is not clear that it would, however. 
The cold and impersonal Zvinavashe is reputed to be unpopular 
among military colleagues, many of whom chafed at the lack of 
opportunity in a military that ossified at the top under his 
leadership. 
 
... and Ethnic Ties 
------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) To strengthen party unity and enhance party prospects 
in a national election, conventional wisdom dictates that the 
party's next leader should come from the Karanga ethnic 
subgroup, the largest within the dominant Shona tribe (Mugabe 
is from the Zezuru subgroup).  A Karanga, Zvinavashe may be 
expected to help subdue the historical split that has 
re-emerged within an important Masvingo-based Karanga 
subgroup with the death of Vice-President Muzenda.  Muzenda, 
the elder statesman in one of the Karanga subgroups, served 
to quell rivalry with the other subgroup.  Other key members 
of the Muzenda Karanga subgroup are Mnangagwa, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Stan Mudenge, and the presidentially 
appointed Governor of Masvingo province Josaya Hungwe.  Party 
strategists reportedly hope that a relatively apolitical 
figure of Zvinavashe's stature would help to keep a lid on 
simmering rivalries in the key ZANU-PF heartland of Masvingo. 
 But there are doubts that he alone could unify ZANU-PF in 
the province, much less stand up to the MDC in Masvingo were 
he to run.  Indeed, some senior party officials reportedly 
already are trying to undermine Zvinavashe's position, 
stressing his lack of position/background in the party. 
 
¶8.  (C) The other Karanga subgroup is headed by ZANU-PF MP 
for Masvingo South and intellectual elder statesman Eddison 
Zvobgo, and also includes former Air Marshal Josaya 
Tungamirayi.  In 1995 Tungamirayi challenged Muzenda for the 
ZANU-PF nomination for Gutu North, and he has publicly 
declared his intention to run for the seat now that it is 
vacant, placing himself as a potential rival to Zvinavashe 
were he to run.  Tungamirayi is a relatively popular and 
potentially formidable political force in his own right.  The 
power of this subgroup is unclear, though, as Zvobgo has been 
in a South African hospital since October 2003 when he was 
operated on for an undisclosed ailment. 
 
¶9.  (C) For now, the Muzenda Karanga subgroup appears to be 
in ascendancy, notwithstanding the death of its leader. 
Mnangagwa continues to be regarded by most as Mugabe's chosen 
successor.  He remains the point person for ZANU-PF's empire 
of companies with special government privileges.  The 
November 2003 ZANU-PF provincial elections resulted in 
Mnangagwa faithfuls Mutumwa Mawere and Daniel Shumba being 
elected as party provincial chairman and the newly created 
secretary for economic affairs respectively in Masvingo. 
 
SIPDIS 
Mawere and Shumba are both businesspeople with financial ties 
to Mnangagwa. 
 
¶10.  (C) As required in advance of the December 2003 ZANU-PF 
conference, the party has gone through a provincial 
restructuring exercise over the past few months.  This 
exercise has resulted in officials reportedly friendly with, 
aligned with, or at least acceptable to Mnangagwa to be 
re-confirmed or substituted into party structures throughout 
the country, particularly in Midlands, Masvingo, and 
Manicaland.  The restructuring exercise has not only been 
important on a backroom lobbying level, but per the ZANU-PF 
constitution provincial councils propose nominees for all of 
the national party positions, including President and 
Chairman of the party, at the party congress (to be held next 
in 2005).  Some observers have suggested that Mnangagwa might 
take over from Mugabe as President of ZANU-PF sometime 
between December 2003 and the party congress in 2005, and 
that this would be a clear message to the broader party 
membership that Mnangagwa is the best candidate for the next 
head of state.  With some Mnangagwa-friendly provincial 
structures in place already, Mnangagwa may already be 
engineering this scenario. 
¶11.  (C) As for Zvinavashe, he reportedly gets along well 
with Mnangagwa and shares business relationships with him 
through their companies.  He presumably would prosper under a 
Mnangagwa presidency.  Mnangagwa would not feel politically 
threatened by a Vice-President Zvinavashe, who could be 
counted on to yield to the Speaker at the appropriate time. 
Indeed, one scenario has Zvinavashe taking Muzenda's 
vice-presidential slot as a stalking horse for Mnangagwa. 
 
Succession Scorecard 
-------------------- 
 
-- Zvinavashe 
 
¶12. (C) As a relative party outsider and newcomer to the 
political arena, Zvinavashe has not been subjected to the 
kind of political scrutiny that has taken a toll on other 
ostensible candidates to succeed Mugabe.  Although 
unquestionably loyal to Mugabe (probably the most important 
eligibility criterion), Zvinavashe seems to lack charisma and 
broad support from within the party.  In spite of his 
military credentials, the military hierarchy would likely be 
ambivalent to him as a presidential candidate.  Rather than 
being a serious successor in his own right, more significant 
is the contribution he could make to Mnangagwa's position. 
 
--  Mnangagwa 
 
¶13.  (C) Speaker of the Parliament Emmerson Mnangagwa remains 
the favorite and is reputed still to have the nod from Mugabe 
himself.  He has been on the hustings more than anybody, and 
Zvinavashe's elevation probably buttresses rather than rivals 
Mnangagwa's relatively weak support in the party.  But 
Mnangagwa is not without significant liabilities: most 
notably his lack of broad party support, his record of 
ruthlessness in the Matabeleland massacres, and a label as 
unelectable in a free and fair election.  Despite his 
ruthlessness and the fact that Mugabe elevated him through 
various Ministerial roles up to Speaker of Parliament, he is 
resented in quarters of the ZANU-PF hierarchy, most 
importantly Solomon Mujuru (Ref B).  Additionally, his 
bungled approach through Colonel Dyke and Zvinavashe to MDC 
leader Morgan Tsvangirai in late 2002 chafed Mugabe. 
 
-- Simba Makoni 
 
¶14. (C) A Mass Public Opinion Institute poll conducted in 
October demonstrated that "dissident" ex-Finance Minister 
Simba Makoni was the only party luminary who commanded broad 
national support without regard to provincial lines.  This 
should weigh heavily for those in the party who want to 
compete realistically in a democratic process.  Nonetheless, 
Makoni's lack of a strong political base in ZANU-PF and his 
liberal economic views, which are anathema to Mugabe, make 
him an unlikely choice.  The introduction of hard-liner old 
guard politburo member Didymus Mutasa as a vice-presidential 
candidate reportedly was apparently designed to undercut 
emerging support for Makoni's candidacy within their home 
province of Manicaland. 
 
-- Solomon Mujuru 
 
¶15.  (C) Notwithstanding the fact that retired 
Lieutenant-General Solomon Tapfumanei Mujuru, (nom de guerre 
Rex Nhongo) was named in a 2001 Zambian government report as 
having played a role in the 1975 assassination of then ZANU 
Chairman Herbert Chitepo, Mujuru reportedly enjoys 
significant support within the ZDF and the Central 
Intelligence Organization (CIO).  Considered too rough-edged, 
uneducated and more of a kingmaker than a candidate, in 2002 
he advanced Simba Makoni's name in succession discussions, 
and has consistently opposed Mnangagwa.  After the March 2002 
elections, and responding to assessments that the outcome was 
flawed he reportedly asked Mugabe when he intended to retire. 
 More recent reports suggest he himself might want the job, 
or that he would support Secretary of Defense Sydney 
Sekeramayi in the race. 
 
-- Sydney Sekeramayi 
¶16.  (C) If Sekeramayi's name is raised in succession 
discussions, it is usually in connection with Mujuru. 
Sekeramayi reportedly has played a low profile but respected 
role in the cabinet.  However, he reportedly advocated 
economic reforms within the cabinet, which may have dropped 
him a peg in Mugabe's eyes and prejudiced his prospects.  His 
credentials have not been extensively debated or discussed in 
public, and he may offer the appeal of not having as 
significantly negative a public image as others.  A Zezuru, 
Sekeramayi has broad experience, having held various 
ministerial roles within ZANU-PF since independence, and has 
been active in ZANU since 1963. 
 
-- Charles Utete 
 
¶17.  (C) Charles Utete, Cabinet Secretary since independence, 
is a dark horse candidate whose name emerges periodically.  A 
Zezuru, he is deeply loyal to Mugabe and does not appear to 
have strong enemies.  Utete generally has a reputation for 
integrity, although this has suffered outside the party with 
the release of his commission's report on land reform, which 
avoided most difficult issues and drew careful "political" 
conclusions. 
 
-- Others 
 
¶18.  (C) Several other names raised in succession debates 
months ago -- Party Chairman John Nkomo, Information Minister 
Jonathan Moyo, and Dumiso Dabengwa (Ref B) -- have received 
little serious public speculation as of late.  Their Ndebele 
ethnicity makes Nkomo and Moyo unlikely candidates.  The 
party's prominent hardline faction, including Moyo, Justice 
Minister Chinamasa, and Agriculture Minister Made, lack 
significant geographic constituencies, making them unlikely 
candidates.  Nonetheless, through their control of key party 
levers of power (information, judicial administration, and 
land reform, respectively), they could exert meaningful 
influence on candidate selection. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶19.  (C) That Zvinavashe is being touted in official circles 
as potential vice-presidential (and by implication 
presidential) material underscores how murky the succession 
picture remains.  None of the candidates stand above the 
rest, though Zvinavashe's entrance into politics tends to 
bolster Mnangagwa's ongoing -- and of late somewhat 
successful -- efforts to consolidate his position. 
Mnangagwa's evident liabilities, however, make his candidacy 
far from a foregone conclusion.  The key variable for 
succession is Mugabe's intent, which remains unknown.  While 
the international press has speculated that Mugabe might 
reveal his successor or a timeline for stepping down at the 
party conference this week in Masvingo, Party Spokesman 
Nathan Shamuyarira recently publicly declared what party 
members have been telling us in private: succession is not on 
the conference agenda.  We are inclined to think that because 
Mugabe has not yet decided, a clear announcement is unlikely 
for some time. 
SULLIVAN