This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 FRANKFURT 009824 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR PDAS RIES, EB, EUR/AGS, AND EUR/ERA 
STATE PASS FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD 
STATE PASS NSC 
TREASURY FOR DAS SOBEL 
TREASURY ALSO FOR ICN COX, STUART 
PARIS ALSO FOR OECD 
TREASURY FOR OCC RUTLEDGE, MCMAHON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EFIN EUN
SUBJECT: The EU Stability and Growth Pact:  Dead, On Ice, It 
Lives; Form Over Substance? 
 
 
T-IA-F-03-0062 
 
REF: (A) Frankfurt 08852; (B) Berlin 4399; (C) Paris 8585; 
(D) Paris 8620 
 
  (1)  (SBU) Summary: The failure of EU Finance Ministers to 
     find a compromise on November 25 acceptable to all on the 
     treatment of Germany and France under the Stability and 
     Growth Pact (SGP) sent another negative signal on the 
     viability of rules to coordinate fiscal policy in a monetary 
     union without political union.  The European Central Bank 
     (ECB)'s statement that Econfin's conclusions "carry serious 
     dangers" is a reflection of their concern that one of the 
     institutional underpinnings of the European Monetary Union 
     has been weakened. 
 
  (2)  (SBU) A close reading of Ecofin's conclusions suggests 
     that the disagreements were more over process than 
     substance.  Fundamentally, the issue was who is responsible 
     for fiscal policy coordination, member states or the 
     European Commission?  By rejecting the Commission's 
     recommendations, the Council sent a clear message: it's the 
     member states.  Failure to find common ground between all 
     member states and the Commission on such an important, high 
     profile issue could be a set back for the cooperative spirit 
     necessary for SGP rules to be effective. 
 
  (3)  (SBU) On substance, the qualified majority of Ministers 
     agreed that Germany and France should correct their 
     excessive deficits by 2005 rather than 2004, given the weak 
     economic recovery.  The Commission had come to the same 
     conclusion.  However, the Commission had recommended that 
     France and Germany (a) be found not to have complied with 
     Ecofin's earlier recommendations (reftels); and (b) be 
     notched up on the SGP's disciplinary rack, to just under the 
     sanctions rung.  In so doing, the next time these countries 
     were found not in compliance with the Ecofin's 
     recommendations, they could face sanctions.  In this way, 
     the Commission sought to bring along the hard-line, smaller 
     countries that were disgruntled with giving the next year 
     for Germany and France to get their budgets in shape.  This 
     procedure proved to be the undoing of any compromise. 
 
  (4)  (SBU) German Finance Minister Eichel took the lead in 
     opposing the Commission's proposal, not wanting to appear to 
     be "punished" (a German Finance Ministry characterization) 
     for doing the "right thing," particularly at a time when he 
     is facing tough domestic budget battles with the opposition 
     and his own party.   France was comfortable riding in 
     Germany's draft, calculatedly showing signs of "flexibility" 
     that, in the end, would be meaningless given Germany's tough 
     stance. 
 
  (5)  (SBU) While seemingly orthodox on substance but off the 
     consensus line on process, different portrayals of the SGP 
     have been rendered:  it is variously dead, on ice, or lives. 
     The consequences of failure to reach unanimous agreement, 
     however, could be serious -- not immediately for financial 
     markets, but for the future.  Other instances of this 
     inability of member states or the Commission to find common 
     ground in the economic world have cropped up under the 
     Italian Presidency (Investment Services Directive, Takeover 
     Directive) and could well spill over into other areas such 
     as the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty for Europe. 
     While one or two disputes might not send a signal to 
     financial markets, the inability to shape a more workable 
     Europe could.  End Summary 
 
  The Setting and Conclusions of November 25: Just the 
  Facts 
  --------------------------------------------- ------------ 
  - 
 
  (6)  (SBU) Earlier this year Ecofin had declared that France 
     and Germany have deficits that exceed the 3% of GDP 
     reference value in the EU Treaty and would be handled under 
     the SGP's "excessive deficit procedures."  On October 8 the 
     EC had recommended, in accordance with Article 104(8) of the 
     Treaty, that France had taken no effective action to 
     implement Ecofin's June recommendations to correct its 
     excessive deficit.  On October 21 the Commission further 
     recommended that France take further measures to reduce its 
     deficit and that it submit implementation reports every six 
     months over the next two years so the Commission and Council 
     could assess progress.  The recommendation was under Article 
     104(9), the last step before moving to possible sanctions if 
     France were to fail to comply with the new recommendations. 
     Finally, the Commission gave France an extra year, to 2005, 
     to correct its deficit. 
 
  (7)  (SBU) The Commission's autumn forecast showed that 
     Germany also would fail to reduce its deficit below the 3% 
     of GDP reference value in 2004.  On November 18 the 
     Commission drafted similar recommendations for Germany under 
     Articles 104(8) and 104(9). 
 
  (8)  (SBU) At their November 25 session there was no 
     qualified majority of the Ecofin to accept the EC's 
     recommendations on France and Germany (reftels and USEU 
     septel).  Denmark, Spain, Belgium, Sweden, Austria, the 
     Netherlands, Finland and Greece voted for the Commission's 
     recommendation that both countries had taken no effective 
     action to correct their deficits.  The same countries voted 
     for the Commission's recommendations under 104(9), except 
     Denmark and Sweden who, because they have not adopted the 
     euro, cannot vote on decisions under Article 104(9). 
 
  (9)  (SBU) A qualified majority was mustered for an 
     alternative conclusion, described below.  Backing the 
     alternative approach on France was Germany, Italy, Greece, 
     Belgium, Portugal, Luxembourg and Ireland.  The same group, 
     but substituting France for Germany (since the country 
     subject to the procedures cannot vote on its own case), 
     voted for similar conclusions on Germany. 
 
  (10) (SBU) The Commission recorded its position in Ecofin's 
     report of its meeting by noting that Ecofin's rejection of 
     the Commission's recommendation was without any explanation, 
     as required in the SGP, and by stating that Ecofin's earlier 
     recommendation - which was a "decision" -- is still in force 
     (that calls for deficits to be under 3% in 2004).  The 
     Commission declared that it regretted that the "spirit and 
     rules" of the SGP were not followed and reserved "the right 
     to examine the implications of the Council conclusions and 
     decide on possible subsequent actions." 
 
  Ecofin's Alternative: Broad Agreement with the Commission 
  on Substance 
  --------------------------------------------- ------------ 
  ------------- 
 
  (11) (SBU) On substance, Ecofin's conclusions were broadly 
     similar to the Commission's recommendations.  These call for 
     (a) an end to excessive deficits "as rapidly as possible and 
     at the latest 2005;" (b) structural reforms recommended in 
     the EU's Broad Economic Policy Guidelines to be reflected in 
     implementing measures to reduce the deficits; and (c) an 
     acceleration of the reduction in the cyclically adjusted 
     deficits should the recovery be stronger than currently 
     expected.  The Commission wanted any higher-than-projected 
     revenues to be allocated to deficit reduction, while Ecofin 
     agreed to do so only if growth were higher than expected. 
 
  (12) (SBU) Slight differences in the speed of structural 
     deficit adjustment in 2004 appear between the two texts. 
     Ecofin called for 0.6 percentage point reduction in Germany 
     compared with the Commission's 0.8.  For France Ecofin asked 
     for 0.8 percentage point reduction, rather than 1.0 sought 
     by the Commission. 
 
  Econfin's Alternative: Major Difference on Procedures 
  --------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
  (13) (SBU) The fundamental difference between Ecofin's and 
     the Commission`s approach was on process. Ecofin did not act 
     on the basis of Treaty Article 104(9) as proposed by the 
     Commission.  Under this Article, if a member state "persists 
     in failing to put into practice the recommendations of the 
     Council may decide to give notice to the Member State to 
     take, within a specified time-limit, measures for the 
     deficit reduction.. And can request reports in accordance 
     with a specific timetable to "examine the adjustment 
     efforts."  Instead, Ecofin just issued more recommendations, 
     an iteration of their earlier action under Article 104(7). 
     The difference is that failing to comply with 
     recommendations under 104(9) would mean that the next stop 
     would be sanctions. 
 
  (14) (SBU) In addition, Ecofin called for "biannual 
     notifications" on progress in fulfilling their commitments 
     with the Commission and Council to give "due attention to 
     prevailing economic conditions and the structural reforms 
     being implemented."  The Commission had recommended four 
     "implementation reports" over the next two years to assess 
     progress. 
 
  Germany: Takes the Lead - France in its Draft 
  --------------------------------------------- 
 
  (15) (SBU) Germany would not accept being subjected to a 
     recommendation under Article 104(9), full stop.  According 
     to a Commission official, this was the fundamental stumbling 
     block.  The German delegation could agree to many 
     formulations, but none that included Article 104(9).  One 
     formulation sought to give Germany assurances that a 
     recommendation under 104(9) would not lead automatically to 
     sanctions if Germany were doing its best to reduce the 
     deficit.  No dice. 
 
  (16) (SBU) The German position, according to several German 
     Finance Ministry officials, was driven by their view that 
     they had lived up to Ecofin's recommendations issued to 
     Germany in February.  The Commission had confirmed that when 
     they assessed Germany's policies in May (ref a and b). 
     Deterioration in Germany's 2003 structural budget position, 
     as highlighted in the Commission's new autumn forecast, was 
     a reflection of other changed circumstances, not a change in 
     Germany's budget policies.  Specifically, German Finance 
     Ministry experts point that that revisions of the 
     statistical series, lower inflation (meaning lower revenues 
     than budgeted), and the Commission's assumption of lower 
     potential output all conspired to increase Germany's 
     structural deficit. 
 
  (17) (SBU) The Commission's recommendation to reduce the 
     structural deficit by an additional 0.2 percentage points to 
     0.8 was unappreciated.  The government is still uncertain of 
     getting its budget and reform package adopted that would 
     cause an estimated 0.6 percentage point reduction already 
     programmed into the Commission's calculations.  According to 
     a German Finance Ministry, the Commission said it was trying 
     to help Finance Minister Eichel in his tough budget debates. 
     With the final shape of the package in flux, the Commission 
     thought now was a good time to up the ante.  From the 
     Ministry's viewpoint, the Commission's meddling came at a 
     particularly bad time in the domestic political debate. 
     Despite having taken tough, unpopular measures in 2003, the 
     Commission's move to Article 104(8) and 104(9) was being 
     construed as "punishment," in the words of one German 
     official, for "doing the right thing."  It was asserting 
     that Germany had taken no measures and was being put on 
     formal legal notice of defaulting on its obligations.  "This 
     is ridiculous; the Minister will not accept it." 
 
  Buddy System:  Two Sink or Two Swim? 
  ------------------------------------ 
 
  (18) (SBU) German Finance Ministry officials were also 
     irritated that their case was being put together with that 
     of the French.  In their view, France had been disdainful of 
     SGP procedures.  German Finance Ministry officials explained 
     that they had privately been working with French finance 
     officials, coaxing them to take additional budget 
     consolidation measures.  That seemed to be working, in their 
     view.  France had announced a 0.1 percentage point 
     additional cut to their structural deficit for 2004.  The 
     SGP was exerting pressure and "working" in their assessment. 
 
  (19) (SBU) The Commission's case on Germany was issued on 
     November 18 and put on the November 25 Ecofin agenda 
     together with the French case, the discussion of which had 
     been postponed from the November 4 Ecofin meeting.  Why not 
     postpone discussion on the German case, pleading the need 
     for more time, thus de-linking the substantive debate on the 
     two? 
 
  (20) (SBU) One German Finance Ministry official said "there 
     is a certain dynamic" between Germany and France that made 
     the linkage inevitable.  Another was resigned that a fight 
     was inevitable, so postponement "won't help."  The 
     Commission logic, according to an official close to the 
     process, was the assumption that Germany would not vote on 
     the merits of the French case, rather would be driven by 
     politics.  Despite their private displeasure with the 
     French, the Germans would support them in a vote. 
 
  (21) (SBU) Also, the French had insisted on equal treatment 
     with Germany.  The Commission's recommendations on Germany 
     were virtually identical to those for France, a point the 
     Commission recorded in its press release.  An ECB official 
     pointed out that while the German rhetoric had been positive 
     toward the SGP, the numbers looked about the same.  Germany 
     had not reduced its structural deficit as it had pledged - 
     although not because of the central government's policies. 
 
  (22) (SBU) Twinning benefited France.  According to a 
     Commission official, Germany did most of the talking. 
     France demonstrated some flexibility, but maybe, mused this 
     official, because they knew it would not be taken up given 
     Germany's immoveable position on Article 104(9). 
 
  (23) (SBU) French Finance Minister Mer could never have 
     accepted a recommendation under Article 104(9) directed at 
     France alone.  While Germany might technically have asked 
     for a final delay to December 12 in Ecofin consideration of 
     its respect for the Commission's recommendations, France had 
     no more room for maneuver.  Mer went into the Euro Group 
     meeting having signaled to the press that the GOF would 
     bring flexibility to the table, but all indications are that 
     he had no mandate to accept the Commission's recommendation 
     of a 1%-of-GDP cut in the 2004 structural deficit.  Thus he 
     could stand shoulder to shoulder with Eichel (or perhaps, 
     back to back) in an absolute rejection of a recommendation 
     uner Article 104(9). 
 
  (24) (SBU) Despite Italian Finance Minister Tremonti's 
     claims just a few weeks that SGP targets should be upheld, 
     his reversal to support the Germans and French is not 
     surprising.  Tremonti has often expressed his concern that 
     the SGP does not encourage economic growth - and in country 
     with the lowest growth rates in the EU, this concern 
     resonates particularly well.  The Italian Government also 
     realizes that it could be well be standing in German shoes 
     next year; even under the most optimistic economic 
     predictions, Italy in 2004 will likely be hovering around 
     the three percent deficit ratio.  Self-interest rather than 
     esprit de corps with the French and Germans prompted 
     Tremonti's "change of heart." 
 
  The Commission: Rejected Again -- Principles and 
  Practicalities 
  --------------------------------------------- ------------ 
  ------ 
 
  (25) (SBU) The Commission wrapped its position in principle. 
     In explaining the decision to the European Parliament in 
     Strasbourg on November 18, Commissioner Solbes declared that 
     "The College stood firmly by the principle that we are a 
     Community of law and that the Treaty and the Stability and 
     Growth Pact have to be applied together."  While Germany had 
     taken budget consolidation measures in 2003, it is in "non- 
     compliance" with the Council recommendation to end its 
     excessive deficit situation in 2004.  Therefore the 
     Commission has an obligation to inform the Council of this 
     fact and "recommend further steps to be taken according to 
     Article 104(9)." 
  (26) (SBU) The Germans argued that the Commission took a 
     "mechanistic" approach.  First, the Commission could not 
     assert that Germany had taken "on effective action," since, 
     as noted above, the Commission had signed off Germany's 
     package as recently as May.  Second, even if the actions 
     were inadequate, there is nothing in the Pact or the Treaty 
     to suggest a country should be immediately treated under 
     104(9), in their view.  A German Finance Ministry official 
     reports that the Council's legal services shared this view - 
     at odds with the Commission's legal services.  Ecofin's 
     approach, in the view of theis official, was to "update" the 
     earlier recommendations in light of changed circumstances 
     since Germany has complied with the recommendations but the 
     deficit failed to respond. 
 
  (27) (SBU) By using Article 104(9), the last stop before 
     landing on the possibility of sanctions, the Commission 
     sought to increase pressure on Germany and France, thereby 
     seeking to appease the hard-line countries who were 
     disgruntled that the Commission had given both countries the 
     extra year to correct their excessive deficits.  According 
     to a Commission official, the smaller countries would have 
     accepted the Commission's compromise.  Excluding action 
     under 104(9) meant no compromise.  And so it was. 
 
  (28) (SBU) A neater legal solution would have been for the 
     Commission to see which way the wind was blowing then, with 
     the appropriate concessions to save its face, proposed 
     revised recommendations based on the approach favored by the 
     qualified majority.  The Commission, according to this 
     German official, knew it did not have the votes on France as 
     early as the first week in November.  Not heeding the 
     warning signs, the Commission barreled along, putting the 
     German case on the table as well.  The Commission, in this 
     official's view, was heading for failure.  In the 
     negotiations the Commission demonstrated flexibility on 
     substance, but not on process.  In the end, the Commission's 
     decision to stick to their guns was not Commissioner Solbes 
     decision to make, according to this official, but left to 
     the President of the Commission. 
 
  ECB: "Serious Dangers" 
  ------------------------ 
 
  (29) (SBU) The ECB had been concerned about the debate and 
     had weighed in on the side of the Commission's compromise. 
     In its November Monthly Bulletin the ECB reported that the 
     "Governing Council takes the view that the proposals of the 
     Commission push the room for interpretation of the rules and 
     procedures to the limit."  A senior ECB official repeated 
     this statement when asked the ECB's view on the Commission 
     compromise. 
 
  (30) (SBU) In his first major policy speech on November 20, 
     ECB President Trichet made an impassioned plea:  " I very 
     profoundly wish an hope that all partners concerned will, in 
     the coming days, live up to their responsibilities: The 
     Commission, the Council, the governments concerned, so that 
     we can not only preserve but reinforce the overall 
     credibility of the euro area, and therefore growth." 
     Trichet and Vice President Papademous participated in 
     Ecofin's all night discussions on November 24 that ran until 
     4:30 am. 
 
  (31) (SBU) Following Ecofin's conclusions, the ECB's 
     extraordinary press release declared that the Governing 
     Council "deeply regrets these developments and shares the 
     views of the Commission on the Ecofin Council conclusions. 
     The Conclusions adopted by the Ecofin Council carry serious 
     dangers.  The failure to go along with the rules and 
     procedures foreseen in the Stability and Growth Pact risks 
     undermining the credibility of the institutional framework 
     and the confidence in sound public finances of Member States 
     across the euro area."  This is "serious," in the words of 
     an ECB official. 
 
  A Word From the Market 
  ---------------------- 
 
  (32) (SBU) As confirmed by an ECB official, the decision had 
     no effect on the market.  However, one currency strategist 
     said if this disagreement were to lead to a break-down of 
     the Inter Governmental Conference, such a break down would 
     send negative signals to investors about the euro.  Ecofin's 
     decisions could have implications for the IGC's negotiations 
     on a Constitutional Treaty for Europe, potentially making 
     agreement more difficult rather than less. 
 
  Two Observations: Deeper Meaning of the Pact 
  -------------------------------------------- 
 
  (33) (SBU) As a comment, we limit ourselves to two 
     observations, one on the operation of the SGP, the other on 
     the potential deeper implications. 
 
  (34) (SBU) With respect to the operation of the SGP, it has 
     been variously described as "dead," (Financial Times),"on 
     ice" (Dutch Prime Minister) and "living" (German Finance 
     Minister Eichel).  We discount the FT's view since they are 
     generally negative on the SGP in principle (although they 
     have softened of late - agreeing on the need for rules to 
     coordinate fiscal policy in the monetary union).  The FT's 
     ability to generate so many stories on a "dead" agreement 
     suggests the SGP has more lives than the proverbial cats' 
     nine. 
 
  (35) (SBU) The Dutch have a point, but one enshrined in the 
     SGP.  If countries fulfill Ecofin's recommendations, then 
     the excessive deficit procedures are considered to be in 
     abeyance.  Ecofin made that explicit in its conclusions. 
 
  (36) (SBU) Eichel too has a point.  The SGP continues to 
     exert peer pressure and is taken seriously, very seriously 
     in Germany.  Over the November 28-29 weekend German Finance 
     Ministry officials conveyed their views to the press that 
     the SGP included the necessary flexibility to accommodate 
     the current economic situation.  Perhaps this could explain 
     why Eichel reacted so strongly.  Entrenched in a political 
     battle not only with the opposition but also his own party 
     for his budget stewardship.  After using the SGP to help 
     justify his own predeliction for subsidy cuts and keeping 
     deficits as low as possible, to be seen as "punished" by the 
     SGP procedures would be a political cut of the deepest sort. 
     Groused one Finance Ministry official - "the SGP means 
     nothing to the French population - in Germany it does."  The 
     irony of Germany's position in the SGP continues to 
     compound: the principal author, one of the first test cases, 
     now running interference for the French.  Eichel is playing 
     a high stakes game domestically that has washed over to the 
     EU level - increasing the stakes considerably. 
 
  (37) (SBU) The second observation is on the deeper meaning 
     of Ecofin's decision.  One reason to be concerned with the 
     outcome is the failure to find a compromise that was 
     acceptable to all.  The SGP is more than rules.  It is 
     almost a state of mind, of the individual members reflected 
     the broad good of the whole - being communautaire. 
     Coordination of fiscal policy in a single monetary union is 
     a cooperative exercise, depending upon compliance with rules 
     - not enforcement. 
 
  (38) (SBU) A key to moving forward is to recapture that 
     cooperative spirit.  Pursuing the issue in courts is a 
     questionable tactic to foster cooperation.  Moreover, it 
     implies that the SGP is a precise legal covenant.  The 
     Commission's portrayal of its position as one of principle 
     and legal correctness is also questionable.  Arguing that 
     because its forecast estimates that Germany will have a 
     deficit over 3% in 2004 requires the Commission to use 
     104(9) because Germany "persists" in failing to adopt 
     Council recommendations might be tough in front of a judge. 
 
  (39) (SBU) The Commission itself chose to exercise the SGP's 
     flexibility that excessive deficits "should" be corrected in 
     the year after they are identified by pushing the date out 
     one more year.  In fact, the Treaty, the basis for the Pact, 
     gives no date certain for the deficits to be corrected. 
     Both Solbes and Tremonti are correct when saying the 
     Commission's and Ecofin's positions were, at once, 
     "political" - both seeking to find a view acceptable to all, 
     if not a qualified majority of member states, and "law 
     based" using the SGP rules and Ecofin voting procedures. 
     The SGP rules provide a framework, not a chemical formula. 
 
  (40) (SBU) Existentialist believe that "we are our choices." 
     Having made their choice, all Ecofin members and the 
     Commission should come together.  Visible, meaningful 
     results in Germany and France budget programs would be the 
     most important and necessary step toward this end.  Going to 
     court is a question of finding who has power.  Do member 
     states coordinate fiscal policy or the Commission?  That 
     should be settled in the IGC. 
 
  (41) (SBU) Italy's EU presidency has seen two other 
     decisions in which important interests were overridden by 
     votes: the Investment Services Directive (UK, Ireland, 
     Finland, Sweden opposition overridden)  and the Takeover 
     Directive (the Commission's position overridden).  As to 
     whether this is any indication of the current spirit of 
     cooperation on larger issues, like the ICG, only time will 
     tell. 
 
  (42) (U)  This cable coordinated with USEU and Embassies 
     Berlin, Paris and Rome. 
 
  (43) (U)  POC: James Wallar, Treasury Representative, e-mail 
     wallarjg2@state.gov; tel. 49-(69)-7535-2431, fax 49-(69)- 
     7535-2238 
 
  PASI