This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 002160 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, EUR/NB, EAP/J 
 
PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC 
 
E.O. 12958:       DECL:  12-22-13 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS CE NO JA EUN LTTE
SUBJECT:  Ambassador meets with other Tokyo co-chairs to 
discuss possible joint statement on cohabitation impasse 
 
Refs:  (A) FBIS Reston VA DTG 210609Z Dec 03 
 
-      (B) Colombo 2121, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. 
Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  The Ambassador met December 21 with 
representatives of the other co-chairs of the Tokyo 
process (Japan, Norway, Italy/EU) to discuss a possible 
joint statement regarding Sri Lanka's cohabitation 
impasse.  The co-chairs agreed on the outlines of a 
possible statement drafted by the Japanese (see Para 9 
and suggested tweaks in para 4).  Mission will be coming 
back to Department in the early January timeframe to 
review the possible issuance of the statement.  The co- 
chairs also discussed a possible visit by Special Envoy 
Akashi to Sri Lanka in January and urged Japan to review 
the purpose of any such visit further.  The Ambassador 
and the DCM also met December 20 with Minister Moragoda, 
who said both the President and the PM are still divided 
over what to do with the Defense Ministry.  Based on the 
December 21 meeting, the co-chairs appear to be on the 
same page regarding the seriousness of the situation and 
the need to press both sides to settle the ongoing 
crisis as soon as possible.  END SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Co-Chairs review Draft Statement 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Ambassador Lunstead met December 21 with other 
representatives of the co-chairs of the Tokyo process 
(Japan, Norway, Italy/EU) to discuss Sri Lanka's ongoing 
cohabitation impasse.  At the meeting, Japanese 
Ambassador Akio Suda handed out a possible joint 
statement concerning the cohabitation situation for the 
co-chairs to review.  Suda said his government was 
thinking that the draft statement should be issued this 
week in the name of the four co-chairs.  Norwegian 
Ambassador Hans Brattskar noted that he did not think 
that the GoN would want to be a co-signer of such a 
statement given its longtime role as peace process 
facilitator.  Suda (as if by magic) then took out 
another draft joint statement that did not include 
Norway's name.  (This draft is contained in Para 9.) 
There was some discussion as to whether the possible 
statement should be issued by the co-chair Chiefs of 
Mission in Colombo or, alternatively, at a meeting 
outside Colombo attended by high-level representatives 
of the co-chairs.  (This idea was floated by Milinda 
Moragoda in an earlier discussion.)  The Ambassador and 
the others present did not see the need for such a high- 
level meeting at this time, and agreed that the possible 
statement should be issued in the name of local 
representatives of the co-chairs.  Ambassador Brattskar, 
however, did note that if the cohabitation impasse 
continued into late January perhaps a high-level meeting 
should be considered by the co-chairs.  One reason such 
a meeting might be important down-the-line, he 
continued, was that donors had to decide on how to 
handle their assistance to Sri Lanka if the impasse 
seemed set to continue. 
 
¶3.  (C) Regarding timing, Suda indicated that the GoJ 
was thinking that now would be a good time to issue the 
statement.  The other representatives present disagreed, 
noting that the cohabitation crisis was quiet for the 
moment with Sri Lankans focusing on the holiday season. 
If a statement was issued now, it would not have the 
intended effect and would be lost in the run-up to 
Christmas.  After some discussion, the representatives 
agreed that early January (perhaps around January 5-6), 
would be the best time to issue the statement.  Suda 
said he would check with Tokyo on this. 
 
¶4.  (C) There was also the following discussion with 
respect to the substance of the draft statement: 
 
-- The Ambassador and the other representatives noted 
their full agreement with the fourth para of the draft 
where it states that "The co-chairs cannot overemphasize 
the importance of restoring the clarity of 
responsibility for the peace process within the 
government of Sri Lanka."  The Ambassador noted that 
this was an especially key para given the pressing need 
for the government and the Tigers to meet and discuss 
outstanding issues. 
 
-- There was also some discussion regarding the third 
para, with Ambassador Brattskar noting that the term 
"peace negotiations" should be substituted for "peace 
process," as the peace process was ongoing, but it was 
the talks that had been stalled since April 2003. 
Ambassador Suda agreed with this point and noted that he 
would review the matter with Tokyo. 
 
-- The Ambassador also expressed concern about the fifth 
para, noting that it directly implied that the Tamil 
Tigers were acting in "full compliance" with the 
ceasefire accord.  Through their actions, the Tigers had 
shown this was not fully the case.  After some 
discussion, it was agreed that the sentence in question 
would be rewritten and tempered to stress that both 
sides should act in full compliance with the ceasefire 
accord.  Ambassador Suda agreed with this and noted that 
he would review the matter with Tokyo. 
 
-- Ambassador Lunstead and Italian Ambassador Salvatore 
Zotta both made the point that the sixth para was not 
"sharp" enough.  They noted that the para did not 
underscore that full implementation of the assistance 
committments made at the June Tokyo conference would not 
be possible unless there was an end to the cohabitation 
impasse.  Ambassador Suda agreed that the para needed to 
be sharpened up and noted that he would review the 
matter with Tokyo. 
 
--------------------- 
Possible Akashi Visit 
--------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) The co-chairs also discussed a possible visit to 
Sri Lanka in the mid-January timeframe by Japanese 
Special Envoy Yasushi Akashi.  When asked about the 
purpose of the visit, Suda replied that Akashi had "some 
empty space" in his calendar and had a meeting around 
that time in India.  Akashi was also "frustrated" about 
the cohabitation situation and wanted to see what he 
could do to smooth matters out.  The other 
representatives present noted that this matter of "empty 
space" was not a very convincing reason for Akashi's 
visit.  Ambassador Zotta remarked that "If Akashi wants 
to send some sort of message, wouldn't it be better if 
he did not come?"  Suda, listening carefully to these 
points, said he would review the purpose of Akashi's 
possible visit with Tokyo and consult further with the 
co-chairs. 
 
--------------------- 
Meeting with Moragoda 
--------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) In a related development, the Ambassador and the 
DCM met December 20 with Minister Milinda Moragoda, a 
close confidant of Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. 
Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar was also present for part 
of the meeting.  Moragoda noted that there was still a 
wide gap in the positions of President Kumaratunga and 
the PM regarding what to do about the Defense Ministry 
(the President took over this ministry and two others on 
November 4).  He was not sure whether the two sides 
could come to an agreement on how to handle this matter. 
Moragoda said he hoped that India would become more 
involved in settling the dispute.  Nirupam Sen, the 
Indian High Commissioner, had just returned from 
consultations in New Delhi and had indicated that there 
was a new Indian approach.  Moragoda said it was 
important that the GoI "underpin" any cohabitation 
agreement reached by the two sides.  (Note:  We have no 
confirmation of the purported new Indian approach 
mentioned by Moragoda.  The DCM is having lunch on 
December 23 with Indian Deputy High Commissioner Mohan 
Kumar and will check then.) 
 
¶7.  (C) In the meantime, Moragoda said, the PM was 
concerned that the international community -- including 
the U.S. -- was treating him and the President in an 
equivalent manner, although she had been the one who had 
precipitated the crisis.  Ambassador Lunstead responded 
that this was not the case; the U.S. knew that she had 
provoked the situation.  Publicly, however, we had to 
urge both sides to try to reach an accommodation in the 
national interest.  This was the only logical position 
the international community could take.  For the U.S., 
and the international community, to take public 
positions urging the President (alone) to compromise 
would have two likely effects.  One, the President would 
become more obdurate.  Second, we (the international 
community) would become the issue.  Neither would 
contribute to a solution.  Moragoda said he understood 
and would inform the Prime Minister. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶8.  (C) As we have reported (see Ref B), there is no 
indication of any progress on the cohabitation front. 
Despite some press reports to the contrary (see Ref A), 
the talks have not in fact broken down -- they are 
postponed, however, due to the fact that the two sides' 
chief negotiators are leaving the country for the 
holidays.  (In the meantime, the Tigers -- doing their 
best to appear moderate -- have issued a statement 
asserting that they are willing to negotiate with just 
about anyone chosen by Colombo!)  In terms of the 
international response, the co-chairs seem to be on the 
same page regarding the seriousness of the situation and 
the need to press both sides to settle the ongoing 
crisis as soon as possible.  We think that the separate 
U.S. messages that we suggested be sent to the President 
and the Prime Minister in Ref B are also timely and will 
help set the stage for the co-chairs' efforts.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The possible joint statement drafted by the 
GoJ follows (also see suggested tweaks to the draft 
contained in para 4).  We will send a final version to 
Washington in early January: 
 
Begin text: 
 
Joint Statement by Three Co-chairs of the Tokyo 
Conference on Reconstruction and Development of Sri 
Lanka (DRAFT) 
 
(1)  Japan, the U.S. and the EU, as Co-chairs of 
the Tokyo Conference on Reconstruction and 
Development of Sri Lanka (hereinafter referred to 
as the "three co-chairs"), express their deep 
concern over the prolonged political crisis in Sri 
Lanka, by which the resumption of the peace talks 
has been made impossible. 
 
(2)  The three co-chairs are disappointed that no 
breakthrough has so far been achieved in the 
meetings between President Chandrika Kumaratunga 
and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe as well as 
through the discussions in the Committee of 
Officials. 
 
(3)  The three co-chairs strongly urge both parties 
to settle the current crisis swiftly so as to make 
it possible to resume the peace process 
expeditiously. 
 
(4)  The three co-chairs cannot overemphasize the 
importance of restoring the clarity of 
responsibility for the peace process within the 
Government of Sri Lanka.  This will provide an 
essential condition for achieving a negotiated 
peace. 
 
(5)  The three co-chairs welcome the continued firm 
commitments by the parties concerned, including the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), to the 
peace process and to the full compliance with the 
ceasefire agreement. 
 
(6)  The three co-chairs also welcome the 
willingness of the Government of Norway to resume 
its facilitation role when the peace process is re- 
started. 
 
(7)  The three co-chairs wish to reiterate their 
continued determination to implement the assistance 
pledged at the Tokyo Conference based on the Tokyo 
Declaration.  They also remind the parties 
concerned of the importance of taking advantage of 
the momentum of the donor community created at the 
Tokyo Conference. 
 
(8)  The three co-chairs reaffirm their unflinching 
support of the widespread aspiration of the people 
of Sri Lanka to achieve a durable peace in their 
country. 
 
End text. 
 
¶10.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
LUNSTEAD